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ABSTRACT
Pascal’s wonderment at nature's immensity, and his insistence on 
its underlying continuity, attest its value for him. The description of 
nature as a coherent system knowable through geometry indicates that it is 
intelligible; but Pascal's failure to develop this conception, together with 
his opposition to cosmological speculation, shows that he sets little store 
by any mathematical view of nature. The idea of nature which predominates in 
his writings is of a continuously active process. Although geometry does not 
therefore provide the key to the understanding of nature, it remains for 
Pascal a valuable instrument in the demonstration and discovery of truth.
Assertions as to the superior value of ethics compared with natural 
science point to a watershed in Pascal's thinking. The 'utility' lacking in 
science is found in "honnêteté”; but the fluctuating estimate of nature as 
ethical norm makes it impossible'to determine what value it has in this 
respect. Pascal himself conceives of "morale" as rightly dominated by man's 
'end', for it is its relation to this 'end' which determines the moral worth 
of any act.
Dualism is the keynote of Pascal's estimate of both natural law 
and justice; and he considers that pursuit of the general good, vdiich should 
constitute the basis of society, has been superseded since the Fall by 
"amour-propre". Peace continues as the supreme political value only so long 
as it tends to security of property* ..The Church's superiority over secular 
institutions derives from the socializing agency of grace, which enables men
3.
to live together in the condition of "ordre" which "amour-propre" precludes 
in secular society.
The 'three orders' form the framework of Pascal's scale of values - 
the different orders represent at once categories of value and orders of being. 
And the relativism which characterizes Pascal's estimates of value results 
from treating value as a perspective of the orders.
Note.
The edition of the Oeuvres completes by Jacques Chevalier in the Bibliothèque 
de la Pléiade has been used throughout the thesis; and the alternative 
references given after quotations are to the fragment number in Brunschvicg's 
classification in the case of the Pensées, and the Grands Ecrivains edition of 
the Oeuvres complètes in the case of all other writings.
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S E C T I O N  O N E
Nature and scientific methodology.
Chapter one; • Nature as it is in itself.
(i) Expressions of wonderment at nature's "merveilles”.
The celebrated opening paragraph of the "Disproportion de l ’homme"
fragment in the Pensées contains, despite the obvious apologetic intent
with which it is written, an expression almost of awe, and certainly of
profound admiration, in the face of the immensity and grandeur of nature.
"Que l'homme contemple donc la nature entière dans sa haute 
et pleine majesté; qu'il éloigne sa vue des objets bas qui 
1 ’environnent. Qu’il regarde cette éclatante lumière, mise 
comme une lampe éternelle pour éclairer 1 ’univers ; .. >kis 
si notre vue s'arrête là, que 1'imagination passe outre; 
elle se lassera plutôt de concevoir, que la nature de fournir.
Tout ce monde visible n'est qu’un trait imperceptible dans 
l ’ample sein de la nature. Nulle idôe n ’en approche. Nous 
avons beau enfler nos conceptions au delà des espaces 
imaginables, nous n ’enfantons que des atomes, au prix de la 
réalité des choses." (p.1105; B72)
A little further on in the same fragment, having described the whole worlds,
the "merveilles aussi étonnantes dans leur petitesse que les autres par leur
étendue," which escape man’s perception at the other end of the scale,
Pascal alleges that anyone to whom these facts are brought home,
"tremblera dans la vue de ces merveilles; et je crois que, 
sa curiosité se changeant en admiration, il sera plus 
disposé a les contempler en silence qu'à les rechercher 
avec présomption.— l'auteur de ces merveilles les comprend.
Tout autre ne le peut faire." (p.1106-7; B72)
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the language of this
passage vibrates with a kind of natural piety. Such words and phrases as:
(1) Earlier version; "le vaste Q l ’immense [l’amplitude] "
(2) Earlier version continues with: "Cette vastitude immense"....
1Q.0
"sa haute et pleine majesté", "l’ample sein de la nature", "merveilles 
étonnantes"; together with the insistence on the vastness of the natural 
scheme, which swallows up man’s powers even of imagination, so that he is
reduced to merely contemplating its wonder, sharply distinguish this
passage from others in the Pensées (the "roseau pensant" and allied frag­
ments), where man's power of active thought is measured against the
unthinking mass of the material universe. In the latter the aspect of 
the physical world inspires no reverence in the beholder, and Pascal is 
concerned above all to emphasize the greater nobility of man. It would 
almost be true to say that these roles are reversed in the extracts at 
present under discussion, where it is implied that nature’s worth consists 
precisely in the immensity, and in the inexhaustible richness, which are 
beyond the power of the human intellect even to conceive.
The only other context in Pascal’s works in which this attitude 
of wonderment at nature’s marvels finds expression is in the treatise De 
l ’esprit géométrique, in connection with the development of the notion of 
the two-fold infinity everywhere discernible in nature. Near the end of 
the first part of that treatise, having pointed out that the relation 
holding between zero and any positive number - that they differ not 
simply in degree but in kind ("genre"), since no degree of multiplication 
can ever convert the former into a positive number - is identical with 
that between an indivisible and space, rest and motion, an instant and 
duration, Pascal claims that in this way — "on trouvera une correspondance 
parfaite entre ces choses; car toutes ces grandeurs sont divisibles à 
l ’infini, sans tomber dans leurs indivisibles, de sorte qu’elles tiennent
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toutes le milieu entre l ’infini et le néant.’’ (p.590) He then adds the
following significant remark:
"Voilà 1’admirable rapport que la nature a mis entre ces 
choses, et les deux merveilleuses infinités qu'elle a  ^
proposées aux hommes. non pas à concevoir, mais à admirer,— "
(ibid G.E.ix, p.268)
Here again the adjective "merveilleuse", used to describe this aspect of
nature, has as its corollary that man’s appropriate response, when confronted
with these infinities, should be one of admiration, and not an attempt to
grasp them by means of conceptual thought. The verb "admirer" is clearly
intended in this context, as earlier, to carry the full force of the Latin
verb from which it is derived.
In conclusion to the first part of the treatise Pascal maintains,
with respect to the infinite capacity for increase and diminution which
characterizes motion, number, space and time, that:
" ceux qui verront clairement ces vérités pourront admirer
la grandeur et la puissance de la nature dans cette double
infinité qui nous environne de toutes parts, et apprendre
par cette considération merveilleuse— " (p.591 G.E. ix, p.269-70)
Again in this passage a strong impression of an attitude of natural piety
is produced when Pascal speaks of looking in wonder at nature’s "grandeur"
and "puissance", and by the use of such an expression as "cette consideration
merveilleuse" in this context.
Although the preceding extracts, in which nature’s wonders call
forth an attitude of reverence, are all taken from two rather specialized
contexts, they nonetheless suffice as examples to show the positive value
Pascal accords to nature.
12,
(il) Indications that nature does form a system even if_incomprehensible 
for man.
The emphasis on the inmiensity and grandeur of nature in the 
"Disproportion de l ’homme" fragment is designed, as the title suggests, to 
serve Pascal’s apologetic purpose - to induce a mood of humility and self­
depreciation in his reader by showing how far the dimensions and wonders of 
nature exceed the bounds of human comprehension. Yet despite this fact, and 
however great may be the "disproportion", upon which Pascal insists, between 
nature and man’s powers of perception and conception, the very examples 
which he chooses to bring this out make it plain that even here he conceives 
of nature as constituting an ordered scheme of things.
Thus he alleges with respect to man "dans la nature" that:
"—  la fin des choses et leur principle sont pour lui 
invinciblement cachés dans un secret impénétrable,— "
(p. 1107 B.72)
and that his lot in this regard is;
"— un désespoir éternel de connaître ni le principe ni 
la fin des choses." (ibid. B.72)
There are principles and ends therefore, in terms of which the things that
go to make up the world of nature find explanation, even though these
"principles" and "ends" are such as to elude the human intellect.
And Pascal takes a step further when he goes on to describe the
"presumption" of those enquirers who:
"— ont voulu comprendre les principes des choses, et de 
là arriver jusqu’à connaître tout,— " (ibid. B.72)
(l) cf. an earlier variant: "Voilà une partie des choses qui rendent
1’homme si imbécile à connaître la nature. —  les choses en particulier— 
ont leur principle et leur fin: il ne conçoit ni l'un ni l'autre."
(p.1112. B.72)
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For such a statement obviously implies that there is a "tout", an ordered
whole, an all-embracing scheme of particular natural things. And the
conception of the world as an ordered whole is brought out in a more
arresting fashion in two further passages:
les parties du monde ont toutes un tel rapport et
un tel enchaînement^!’une avec ] ’autre, que je crois
g impossible de connaître l’une sans l’autre et sans
Il le tout." (p.1110; B.72)
"—  toutes choses étant causées et causantes, aidées 
et aidantes, médiates et immédiates, et toutes 
s ’entretenant par un lieu naturel et insensible qui
lie les plus éloignées et les plus différentes, je
tiens impossible de connaître les parties sans connaître 
le tout, non plus que de connaître le tout sans connaître 
particulièrement les parties." (ibid: B.72)
Thus the same nature, whose wonders and grandeur arouse in the beholder an
attitude of reverent awe, has a further title to respect because it forms a
system permeated throughout by continuity. Pascal does not merely envisage
nature as comprising an ordered whole, but actually goes so far as to affirm
the existence of a deep-lying connectedness and interdependence of all
phenomena, and to specify a mode of causal connection binding all things
together. The apologetic character of the fragment necessarily precludes
him from taking the final step, which follows logically from the conception
of the universe as a whole made up of interconnected parts. However, the
assumption which plays such an important role in the two treatises on the
equilibrium of f l u i d s , t h a t  there is a network of uniformities throughout
phenomena which enables laws and general modes of occurence to be discovered
and formulated, is at least clearly implied here.
(l) cf. below, p.S^ff,
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Chapter two: Nature as knowable by man
(i)(a) Nature as a coherent system knowable through geometry
In the treatise De l’esprit réométrique. after he has shown that
the concepts motion, number and space comprise the particular subject-matter
of geometry, Pascal continues:
"Ces trois choses, qui comprennent tout l ’univers, selon ces 
paroles: ’Deus fecit omnia in pondéré, in numéro, et mensui’a, ’ 
ont une liaison réciproque et nécessaire. Car on ne peut 
imaginer de mouvement sans quelque chose qui se meuve; et 
cette chose étant une, cette unité est l ’origine de tous 
les nombres; enfin le mouvemient ne pouvant être sans 
2^ espace, on voit ces trois choses enfermées dans la 
première. Le temps même y est aussi compris: car le 
mouvement et le temps sont relatifs l ’un à l ’autre; la 
promptitude et la lenteur, qui sont les différences 
des mouvements, ayant un rapport nécessaire avec le temps.
Ainsi il y a des propriétés comiLunes à toutes choses, 
dont la connaissance ouvre l ’esprit aujc plus grandes 
merveilles de la nature.
La principale comprend les deux infinités qui se 
rencontrent dans toutes; l ’une de grandeur, l ’autre de 
petitesse." (p.583-4 G.E. ix. p.255-6.
(l) This assertion, that one is the origin of all numbers, might be taken as 
implying that Pascal invests it with some peculiar mystical or meta­
physical significance, as the earlier metaphysicians like Bruno had done 
cf. the latter ’ s De Mini mo for example: "üufer undique monadem, n.usquam 
erit numerus, nihil erit numerabile, nullus numerator, Hinc optimus 
maximus, substantiarum substantia et entitas, qua entia sunt, monadis 
nomine celebratur." Quoted Gharbonnel, la pensee italienne— (Paris 1919) 
p.543. ’’Deus est monas omnium numerorum fons, simplicitas omnis 
magnitudinis et compositionis substantia, et excellentia super omne 
momentum innumerabile, immen.s'um". ibid.p. 554. Such a view is dis­
counted by later remarks made by Pascal in the same section of this 
treatise: "— puisque l’unité peut, étant multipliée plusieurs fois, 
surpasser quelque nombre que ce soit, elle est de irfême genrç. que les 
nombres pr"écisément par son essence et par sa nature immuable,— " and 
they are (ces choses)"— toutes proportionnées entre elles et ne 
diffèrent que du plus ou du moins,— ’’ (p.588-9 G.E.ix.p265-6,
15.
The term nature is used here, as in previous passages, in a 
collective sense to denote the sum of natural phenomena, and this extract 
purports to show how the underlying geometrical structure, hidden beneath 
these phenomena, can be discerned. It presents in other words the summary 
sketch of a unified mathematical cosmology, whose fundamental principle is 
abstract motion, so that although elsewhere in the same treatise Pascal 
prescribes admiration and contemplation as man’s appropriate response in 
the face of nature and her marvels, in this passage at least he appears to 
believe it intelligible to conceptual thought. He would seem to endorse
(2)Galileo’s conviction that the universe represents a book which really 
is understandable, if only to those who are acquainted with nature’s hand­
writing and hence able to interpret her text. For those unversed in 
mathematics however, this book must remain for ever closed, for Pascal has 
already pointed out that the branches into which ’geometry’ is divided - 
mechanics, arithmetic, geometry - follow directly from the particular 
concept - motion, number, space - with which each is peculiarly concerned. 
Thus it can only be by mastering these specific subjects that the mind will 
gain access to the "merveilles de la nature", held out almost as a sort of 
reward at the end of the extract.
Pascal represents this conception of the framework of the physical 
universe, as a coherent system of mutually implicated data (motion, number, 
space and time), as coming within the purview of the human intellect by 
virtue of the fact that thought, having fastened on one of these concepts, 
finds itself driven to illate from it to the others in turn, and finally to
(2) cf. the passage quoted from 11 Saggiatore qu.6, by A.C.Grombie in: 
Augustine to Galileo (London 1 9 5 2 ) vol.11, p.l42.
16.
(1)
see them as the elements of an integrated whole. Thus it is just such 
an underlying connectedness of the basic elements, as is elsewhere adduced 
as a principal cause of the inability of the human intellect to attain to 
any real knowledge of the scheme of nature, which here provides it with the 
key to the understanding of the universe in its inmost structure.
It follows from the sort of approach adopted in this passage 
that the truth of nature must consist in mathematical facts, and that in 
Pascal’s case what is real and intelligible in nature is that which admits 
of being considered under the aspects of motion, number and space. Hence 
there will be a tendency for these latter to become categories of absolute 
validity, and to represent at once the elemental constituents of all that 
exists, and the foundations of all possible knowledge of the physical world.
However, Pascal disappoints any hopes which may have been formed 
of seeing this synopsis of the whole of nature filled out, for the remainder 
of the first part of the treatise is taken up with demonstrating that the 
basic concepts are potentially infinite in respect of addition and division, 
while the second part is concerned solely with questions of methodology. 
Since this fact bears unquestionably on the significance which Pascal 
accords to the mathematical conception of nature, two questions raised by 
it call for some consideration: (a) What is the precise meaning intended by 
this definition of the structure of the physical universe; (b) Is it 
referred to in any other works.
(l) In the extract under discussion Pascal uses the verb "imaginer" without 
any of the technical overtones with which Descartes colours the 
substantival form of that word in the 12th of his Règles rour la 
direction de l’esprit. For Pascal it has no more than the normal 
connotation of "to envisage".
17.
The clue to the first question lies in the two short paragraphs
( 1 J
with which the extract concludes. The adverb "ainsi", coming as it
does at the beginning of the first of these, plainly indicates that the 
words which follow it - "des propriétés communes k toutes choses" - refer 
back to something in the preceding paragraph; and in fact, it would seem, 
to the motion, number and space there asserted to comprise the whole of the 
universe. It is logical therefore to interpret the opening words of the 
second paragraph - "la principale — " - as relating not to the "propriétés 
communes", but rather to the "merveilles de la nature", especially since 
these latter words are the more immediately antecedent. Indeed, if the 
words in the second paragraph are to be regarded as directly qualifying the 
"propriétés communes", the whole sentence commencing "ainsi" becomes both 
grammatically and contextually unintelligible. For in this case it is 
impossible for the "propriétés communes" to refer back to anything in the 
previous paragraph, as "ainsi" requires them to, since they have yet to be 
delineated.
However, if the full significance be grasped of Pascal’s statement, 
to the effect that motion, number and space represent the fundamental con­
stituents of everything that exists in the universe, then it is evident that 
his thought displays a gross confusion if he does in fact intend the words, 
"des propriétés communes k toutes choses", to pertain to those concepts.
(l) "ainsi il y a des propriétés communes à toutes choses, dont la
connaissance ouvre l’esprit aux plus grandes merveilles de la nature.
La principale comprend les deux infinités qui se rencontrent dans 
toutes;— ’’ cf. above, p.;(^ .
18.
Clearly it is impossible for one and the same thing to be at once a 
constituent and a property of some other composite thing, although it is 
possible that, since all things can be reduced in this way to the same basic 
elements, they will as a result have certain properties in common - i.e. the 
properties of those basic constituents. In this case the "propriétés 
communes" refer only indirectly as it were to the concepts motion, number 
and space, which still retain their status of components. The requireue nts 
of grammar and context are also satisfied, since the conseqience implied by 
the introductory "Ainsi -" is accounted for by the fact that, as these 
concepts are the fundamental constituents of all things, it follows that all 
things will exhibit the properties of these constituents.
The passage directly preceding the extract shows that this is the
meaning which Pascal intends it to convey. He there maintains that geometry
concerns itself with the simplest and purest of objects ; so simple and so
pure in fact that they do not admit of any definition or demonstration. It
therefore takes for granted that everyone knows what the words motion, number
and space signify,
"— et, sans s’arrêter à les définir inutilement, elle en 
pénètre la nature, et en découvre les merveilleuses 
propriéoés." (p.583 G.E. ix. p.255)
After this comes the assertion, supported from Scripture, that these three
concepts comprise the whole of the physical world, and the exposition of
the way in which thought is driven to follow out the thread of implication
connecting them, succeeded by the two short paragraphs under discussion.
Thus, having stated that the aim of geometry is to reveal the properties
19.
(1)
of the "simples" which go to make up its subject matter, and also that
these same "simples" are the basic components of ever-thing in the universe,
before going on to show how this aim is realized, Pascal points out in the
sentence commencing "Ainsi-" that this means that all things will have these
properties in common. And when he proceeds to demonstrate that motion,
number and space are potentially infinite in respect of increase and
diminution, he is not merely applying himself to the continued exposition
of the matter and method of geometry, but in his own terms at least is
describing certain properties inherent in all natural things.
The foregoing discussion makes it plain that it is the propensity
exhibited by all things for increase and diminution ad infinitum which
constitutes at once the most outstanding of all nature’s wonders, and the
most important property common to all things, so that the opening words of
the second short paragraph - "la principale" - may be regarded as qualifying
( 2 )
both the "propriétés communes" and the "merveilles de la nature". Pascal 
expressly links the two when he refers, in the extract quoted on the 
previous page, to the "merveilleuses propriétés" of motion, number and 
8pac e.
Although it might be argued that when Pascal goes to such lengths 
in the remainder of this section to demonstrate that motion, number and
(1) Obviously "to lay bare the nature" of these is merely an alternative 
form of expression, as "natui’e" in this sense designates no more than 
the ensemble of a thing’s properties.
(2) This means that the succession implied in Pascal’s phraseology - that 
nature’s foremost marvels will be revealed to the mind when it has 
grasped the properties common to all things - does not denote any fresh 
acquisition of empirical knowledge, but merely indicates that perceiving 
the wonder is the fruit of reflection upon knowledge of the property.
20 o
space are potentially infinite in respect of addition and division, he
does so in the belief that he is furthering his reader's knowledge of
the fundamental characteristics of the material universe, yet he nowhere
undertakes to show how the conclusion was reached, that these simple
concepts, the subject matter of geometry, represent the basic constituents 
(1)
of all that is. As it stands, does his plain unvarnished assertion that 
this is so indicate that Pascal takes for granted in his reader a thoroughly 
mechanistic outlook in regard to questions relating to the nature of the 
physical world? Germane to this possibility is the fact that coimaentators 
are generally agreed as to the soundness of M.Adam's conjecture,that 
the two pieces which comprise this treatise were written as the preface 
to an Essai d 'éléments de géométrie, now lost, but intended for use in the 
Petites Ecoles at Port-Royal, where the Cartesian philosophy was well 
established. However, in this case it becomes difficult to account for the 
quits significant divergences from Descartes's basic pattern of things, and 
in particular the omission of all reference to ':he great informing principle 
of the Cartesian universe - extension,
also, how much importance should be accorded to the quotation 
from the "Wisdom of Solomon"? Does it simply represent a convenient formula, 
seized upon because it superficially reconciles the religious and mechanistic 
world-views, and recommends itself, in virtue of its source, as suitable 
illustrative material for a treatise destined for use in a Jansenist school?
(1) In the original statement, quoted above , he does no more than
bring out the thread of implication that connects these concepts,
(2) cf. Brunschvicg, Pensées et opuscules. (Paris 1914) ed.min., p.163.
21.
And yet the only ground adduced by Pascal for attributing universality to 
his three basic conce ts is that contained in this Scriptural quotation, 
although the correspondence between the terms used in each case is by no 
means literal.
Moreover, the body of the treatise contains no subsequent
demonstration of this alleged universal inherence of the basic elements
motion, number and space, such as it would seem normal to expect from a
thinker who has propounded this as a principle by which he sets great
(1)
store. Indeed, with one rather doubtful exception, there is no further 
mention even of their relation to the overall scheme of things.
It therefore begins to look as if this all-inq ortant summary of 
Pascal's cosmological views amounts to little more than an interpolation, 
inserted with the object of lending significance to his exposition of the 
geometrical method - a bait almost, held out to entice the student to 
persevere in the attempt to master this discipline, since it alone provides 
the key to the understanding of the nature of things.
In the only other context outside the present work where Pascal 
treats of the relation holding between motion, number and space, he is 
primarily concerned with a quite different problem - that of the vacuum - 
and adds nothing relevant to his original assertion that they represent the 
basic constituents of everything that exists. The Jesuit Noël, in reply to 
Pascal's letter, which carried a carefully-worded refutation of the
(l)cf. "Mais ceux qui verront clairement ces vérités pourront admirer la 
grandeur et la puissance de la nature dans cette double infinité qui 
nous environne de toutes parts, — " (p.591; G.E. ix.p.ï6^. ) where "ces 
vérités" refer to the proofs advanced to show that it is impossible to 
set any limit to the potential exhibited by motion, number and space 
for increase or diminution.
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positions he had adopted in his attack on the conclusions adumbrated by the
latter in the preliminary Experiences nouvelles touchant le vide, had in
desperation resorted to a feeble reductio ad absurdum. This took the form
of a list of mutually exclusive characteristics attributed at various times
to void space, one cf which was that it is "immuable et se transporte avec
le tube". The parts of Pascal's resolution of this particular antithesis
which bear upon the present enquiry run as follows;
"1 'immobilité est aussi naturelle à l'espace que le mouvement 
l'est au corps. Pour rendre cette vérité évidente, il faut 
remarquer que l'espace, en général, comprend tous les corps 
de la nature, dont chacun en joarticulier en occupe une certaine 
partie; mais qu'encore qu'ils soient tous mobiles, l'espace 
qu'ils remplissent ne l'est pas; —  soit ou vide ou plein, 
toujours dans un pareil repos, ce vaste espace, dont 
1'amplitude embrasse tout, est aussi stable et immobile 
en chacune de ses parties, comme il l'est en son total."
(p.383; G.E.li, p.190)
Space therefore, though itself perfectly motionless, can be 
accounted universal in the sense claimed for it in the extract considered 
earlier since it encompasses the sum total of natural things. It shows too 
the necessary relationship with motion there ascribed to it, for, since 
motion is here asserted as natural to bodies, and since all bodies occupy 
space, whether they are in motion or at rest, it follows that motion will 
always take place in space. The numerical concept, insisted upon as the 
other basic constituent of the physical world, in the passage first treated, 
is accounted for by the fact that each particular thing in space is a single 
unit.
(l) This view of space as an entity in its own right, having a claim equal to 
that of substance itself to the quality of being per se (cf. also p.382), 
is of considerable ontological significance, since it cuts across the 
traditional philosophical division of all being into substance and 
accident. Furthermore, by affirming that motionless space, and the 
mobile bodies that occupy it, constitute two quite different things, 
though both are extended, Pascal openly disavows the orthodox Cartesian
cont.p.23.
23.
Thus in this further instance the conception of the basic structure 
of the universe as a complex of mutually implicated elements is at least 
clearly implied in Pascal's arguments, although no mention is made of 
geometry's role in enabling the mind to appreciate everything under this 
aspect. Despite the fact that his repeated assertions, that motion is 
"natural" to bodies, make it apparent that he was quite familier with, and 
accepted the consquences of, the concept of inertial motion as this had been 
set out b\r Galileo and Descartes, yet Pascal undertakes no further 
examination in this, or in any other of his writings, of the significance 
for his conception of nature of this principle. Nor does he give any hint 
that he is aware of the profoundly important allied laws of gravitation and 
of uniform acceleration from constant force.
A difficulty emerges in this passage with respect to one of the 
elemental constituents of the universe, which the very summary nature of 
the previous extract precluded from appearing. Does Pascal tacitly assume 
that visible and absolute or math^ematical space are one and the same thing? 
It is clear enough that when he maintains that s;ace is the immovable 
supporter of all material things he refers, whether consciously or not, to 
absolute space, a reality that must be inferred; yet he makes no overt 
distinction between this and the space occupied by particular physical 
units, which can therefore be directly and empirically known. In another 
fragment destined for an introduction to geometry, he lists among his
cont.from p.22 (l) - view that extension is peculiar to the corporeal. His 
definition, in an earlier letter (p.376)^ of a vacuum shows that he regards 
impenetrability, not extension, as the distinguishing mark of material 
substance, ^(p.376; G.E.ii, P.103-4).
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'first principles'
"(l) l'objet de la pure géométrie est l'espace, dont 
elle considère la triple etendue en trois sens divers 
qu'on appelle dimensions,—
(2) l'espace est infini selon toutes les dimensions.(3)> 
et immobile en tout et en chacune de ses parties"
(p.602-3; G.E. ix, p.291-2)
That this is the same "space" which was in question in the other 
extracts is conclusively attested by the fact that it is here held to be 
infinite, and by the almost word for word parallel between the third 
principle and the last two lines of the previous quotation: "— aussi 
immobile en chacune de ses parties, comme il l'est en son total". (^ )
(1) A similar confusion or lack of distinction between visible and absolute 
space is found in the writings of Gassendi, whose definition of space, 
in the section devoted to physics in his Syntagma, closely resembles 
that given by Pascal in the two preceding extracts. Space, according 
to Gassendi, is infinite in three dimensions, motionless in itself, 
and the place of all things, which move about freely in it: "Spatia 
sunt immensa —  et penitus immobilia; ubicunque licet concipere 
distantiam, ibi et dimensionem concipere licet." "Spatium neque 
agere, neque pati aliquid potest; sed habet solum repugnantiam, qua 
sinit caetera transire per se, aut se occupare." Syntagma, I, 183, 
quoted by P.P. Thomas ; La philosophie de Gassendi (Paris 1889; p.50)
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(i)(b) The attitude adopted toward cosmological speculation and toward
Descartes*3 approach - indicates that Pascal does not favour a i
"mathematical" view of nature. i
I
This failure on Pascal’s part to differentiate between sensuous 
and geometrical siace does not necessarily imply that the mechanistic view 
of the world of nature, which he appears to have taken for granted in his ;
I
reader on at least two occasions, is one to which he himself attached no '
great weight. It does however indicate that he was either not aware of, 
or not convinced of the significance for his view of nature of the 
direction which Copernicanism had taken in the hands of Galileo. In view 
of the fact that he attended the scientific conferences, which started 
under Mersenne's auspices and eventually some years after his death evolved 
into the Académie des Sciences, ^^^it is highly improbable that Pascal 
could have remained completely unfamiliar with Galileo’s work of application
of the principle of relativity to such primary constituents of the mechan­
istic cosmos as motion and space. And a thorough investigation of Pascal’s 
writings makes it apparent that the latter alternative explains with the I
greatest degree of likelihood the above inconsistency. For what scattered ,
references to the cosmological speculations of his contemporaries and i
!
immediate predecessors they contain, reveal an extremely tentative attitude,
(l)iJme.Parier recounts in her Vie,p.6, (G.E.I,p.56) that their father early 
introduced Blaise to the weekly gatherings of savants, where he ’’— tenait 
fort bien son rang, tant pour 1’examen que pour la production des 
ouvrages ’’—  Pascal himself designates the group in question "la très 
illustre académie parisienne de science," in the address which he delivered 
before them in 1654, outlining the scientific projects upon which he was 
then engaged. In the course of this he not only attributes his mathem­
atical training to these savants, but refers also to ’’— cette bienveillance, 
qui m ’a soutenu des mes plus jeunes années dans votre docte Assemblée,— ’’ 
(p.73, Transi.,p.1402; G.E. III, p.305.)
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which at times verges on scepticism, to any conclusions posited. A 
hesitancy moreover, which the contexts show can not be ascribed simply to 
motives of prudence.
Thus in the I8th Provinciale, following the enumeration of the 
three ’principles' of human knowledge, each of which has its own special 
subject matter, Pascal concludes that since "les choses de fait ne se 
p|)uvent que par les sens’i (p.899), mere authority, regardless of the 
sanctions with which it may arm itself, can have no influence in this domain.
He then adds by way of illustration that:
"Ce fut aussi en vain que vous obtîntes contre Galilée 
ce décret de Rome, qui condamnait son opinion touchant 
le mouvement de la terre. Ce ne sera pas cela qui 
prouvera qu'elle demeure en repos; et si l ’on avait des 
observations.constantes qui prouvassent que c'est elle 
qui tourne, tous les hommes ensemble ne 1'empêcheraient 
pas de tourner, et ne s'empêcheraient pas de tourner 
avec elle.(l) (p.900; G.E. VII, p.53-4)
The fact that this statement constitutes an attack upon the validity of
the whole procedure according to which Galileo was condemned, and actually
(l)With respect to the much-debated question, whether the description in 
the "Disproportion" fragment of the sun moving on a "vaste tour" round 
an apparently stationary earth, together with the implied contrast 
between the"objets bas" of the sublunary sphere and the nobler elements 
of the higher spheres, is evidence that he is here still clinging, in 
part at least, to the old geocentric cosmology, it is regrettable that 
too little notice has been paid to M. Allix's early and eminently 
plausible suggestion, "Peut-on dire qu'en parlant ainsi aux gens du 
monde, Pascal a opté pour le système de Ptolémée? Ikis tous les jours 
les expressions relatives au mouvement apparent sont couramment employées 
par les astronomes eux-mêmes aussi bien que par les profanes. Lorsque 
nous disons que le Soleil se lève, qu'il monte dans le ciel, puis qu'il 
se couche et s'abaisse au-dessous de l'horizon, est-ce que nous abjurons 
l ’opinion de Copernic?" - Pascal et le système de Copernic. Bulletin de 
l'Académie Delphinale, 4©» série, 18, 1904, p.279.
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calls in question the papal right to pronounce on matters of fact,
represents a far more significant act of defiance in the face of
ecclesiastical authority, than would any mere declaration of agreement 
with the condemned views. It is evident that the requirements of the 
inductive method, as Pascal envisages them, and not the dictates of prudence, 
determine his attitude towards Galileo's 'opinion'. He considers that 
as yet the necessary support from experimentation or observation carried 
out over a sufficiently long period of time, to justify accepting the 
conclusions of this theory, has not been furnished.
In a letter to Noël in October 1647, in answer to the latter's
recourse to the supposition of a "matière subtile", in order to account
for the results of his own experiments pointing to the apparent existence
of a vacuum, Pascal sets out a method for evaluating such hypotheses
advanced as explanations of observed phenomena. One of the reasons he
gives for the need of such a test is that, just as a single cause may
produce a number of different effects, so a single effect may be derivable
from a variety of causes.
"C'est ainsi que, quand on discourt humainement du;^  
mouvement, de la stabilité de la terre, tous les
phénomènes des mouvements et rétrogradations des
planètes s'ensuivent parfaitement des hypothèses de 
Ptolémée. de Tycho. de Copernic et de beaucoup 
d'autres qu'on peut faire, de toutes lesquelles 
une seule peut être véritable. Mais qui osera faire 
un si grand discernement, et qui pourra, sans danger 
d'erreur, soutenir l'une au préjudice des autres— "
(p.374-5; G.E. II, po100-101)
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None of the various cosmological schemes so far proposed has therefore, 
in Pascal's eyes, any special claim to the scientist's adherence, since 
all remain mere hypotheses, explaining with an equal degree of 
verisimilitude the phenomena in question. The standpoint adopted here 
is similar to that of Descartes in his Principes where, though Ptolemy's 
name is omitted from the list of 'possibles', the latter maintains that, 
provided one regards them simply as hypotheses, the explanations put 
forward by Copernicus and Tycho both tally equally well with the actual 
phenomena. However, it is clear from the proviso included here, as well 
as from Descartes's other w r i t i n g s , t h a t  in his case this position 
is a purely politic one, assumed in order to avoid compromising himself.
Both the context of Pascal's statement, and the other evidence hitherto 
adduced, would make it quite gratuitous to suppose his motives to be any 
other than genuine lack of intellectual conviction, consequent on the
(2)
presentation of insufficient positive data.
(1) cf. L. Brunschvieg, L'expérience humaine et la causalité physique 
(Paris 1922)p.l87.
(2) In the forward to his nr is tar chus. which appeared in the third volume of 
Mersenne's Novae Qbservationes (Paris 1647) Pascal's mentor and champion 
Roberval writes: "Sensum tandem nostrum quaeris? et an va1ere iussis 
Ptolemaio, atque Tychone, soli Aristarcho penitus adhaereamus? absit, Neque 
enim recte sentientern Mathematicum decet opiniones sequi; aut hinc adhaerere, 
illas vero reiicere; donee evidens prodierit vel huius demonstratio, vel 
illarum confutatio. Sed nec illud constat quidem, an ex tribus Authorum 
ipsorum celiberrimorum diversis Systematis, aliquod verum sit ac geminum 
Mundi Systema: forsan etiam omnia tria falsa sunt et verum ignoratur." op.cit.,! 
Tomus III, no pagination. Strictly speaking therefore, the mathematician | 
should refrain from passing judgement on such hypotheses until either a 
clear demonstration on the one side, or a convincing refutation on the 
other is forthcoming. Roberval adds however, that in this case the simplest 
explanation, and the one which best accords with established natural laws, 
is that formulated by Aristarchus. Hence, although not constrained
cont. p. 29.
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Again in the same letter, this time in connection with Noël's
tactics of taking for granted in his 'demonstrations’ the existence and
characteristics of the very element requiring to be proved, Pascal remarks
that if this method of demonstration, by mere question-begging, were to
become accepted scientific practice, there would be no difficulty in
solving even the most elusive of problems.
"Et le flux de la mer et l'attraction de l 'ainiant
deviendront aisés à comprendre, sl.il est permis de
faire d^^matières et des qualités exprès." (p.373;
G.E. II, p.96)
The implication of this comment made in passing is that among the problems, 
which in Pascal's judgement still await definitive solution, is to be 
numbered the whole question of gravitation. Despite the fact therefore 
that by this time (1647) the results of the investigations of Kepler, 
Gilbert and Galileo, to say nothing of those of Descartes, had become 
part of the general body of scientific opinion, which his membership of 
the 'Paris Academy* must have brought to Pascal's notice, yet he once again 
shows that he is by no means convinced of their adequacy as explanations 
of the phenomena involved.
(2) cont.from page 28. - to assent to the latter by absolutely convincing 
proof, he inclines with much greater weight ("graviori longe opinione") 
toward it than toward the two other hypotheses. Thus in the extract quoted 
he advocates the tentative approach toward cosmological explanations 
adopted by Pascal, but shows himself ready to advance from there to a sort 
of probabilism on this question which has no parallel in Pascal's writings.
(1) Moreover, throughout his writings on physics, Pascal displays a signal 
lack of interest in either the discovery or the application of general 
principles regarding the structure of nature as a whole. In fact, Descartes' 
criticism of Galileo's approach in physics is much more applicable to 
Pascal's than to Galileo's:"— sans avoir considéré les premières causes 
de la nature, il a seulement cherché les raisons de quelques effets u 
particuliers, et ainsi il a bâti sans fondement." (à Mersenne, ll.lO.l638,
cont. po30.
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The significance of the cautious.attitude displayed by Pascal in 
the preceding extracts emerges when it is realized that the theories 
there in question all in their various ways represent the application of 
the categories of geometry to the relations observable between the 
phenomena of the physical world - the very procedure which Pascal appeared
/ P \
to be advocating in the extract from the De 1'esprit géométrique . This
cont. from p.29. Pléiade ed. p.1025) For although Galileo set himself to 
solve particular problems as they arose, at least he did so with a |
cosmological objective in view. But it would be difficult to provide a more ' 
accurate and succinct description of the sort of approach which Pascal brings 
to physics, than is contained in these few lines. Further indication of 
Pascal's attitude toward general theories, and what he regards as their 
shortcomings, can be gleaned from a disparaging reference in the Avis. 
designed to accompany his arithmetical machine, to those who "— se persuadent 
possibles beaucoup de choses qui ne le sont pas, pour ne posséder qu'une 
théorie imparfaite des choses en général,— "(p.354;G.E.I p.305) - a theory 
which proves quite inadequate to cope with the necessary technical adjustments.
(1) Miss J. Leavenworth has also pointed out in her Methodological Analysis 
of the Physics of Pascal (New York 1930) that the conclusions, which 
Pascal draws from the experiments performed in connection with the vacuum 
controversy, do not depend for their cogency on the acceptance of any 
cosmological theory. Only at one point does he seem to make a cosmological 
presupposition - in regard to the proof of the existence of a vacuum drawn 
from the phenomena of rarefaction and condensation. This argument. Miss 
Leavenworth notes (op.cit.p.78), holds good only for a world composed of 
atoms. So Pascal "— les observations que nous faisons journellement de la 
raréfaction et condensation de l'air, qui,— se peut condenser jusqu'à la 
millième partie de la place qu'il semblait occuper auparavant, et qui se 
raréfie si fort, que je trouvais comme nécessaire, ou qu'il y eût un grand 
vide entre ses parties,— " (p.3^3; G.E. II, p.59)
(2) cf. above p.f4-f.
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rather curious inconsistency, coupled with the fact already remarked upon
that, despite his several opportunities to do so, he nowhere bothers to
explore the ramifications of the concept of inertial motion - a fact all
the more striking since it is the fundamental unifying principle upon which
his system of mutually implicated concepts hinges - points to the conclusion
that on the whole Pascal does not consider the mathematization of nature
as either a valid, or a worthwhile undertaking.
The attitude which he adopts towards Descartes's conception of
a mathematically interlocking universe, with an infallible "vera mathesis"
to match, further testifies to the truth of this conclusion. Marguérite
Périer in her account of her uncle's life records briefly that, with
respect to Descartes's philosophy, Pascal:
"—  ne pouvait souffrir sa manière d 'expliquer la formation 
de toutes choses— ". (l) (p.41)
The accuracy of this testimony is borne out in several fragments from the
Pensées, where Pascal makes his criticism quite explicit.
"— ces titres si ordinaires, 'Des principes des choses ',
'Des principes de la p h i l o s o p h i e ',I2) —  aussi fastueux %
en effet, quoique moins en apparence, que cet autre qui
crève les yeux, 'De omni scibili'(p^llOS; B72)
"Ecrire contre ceux qui approfondissent trop les sciences,
Descartes." (B 76)
"Descartes inutile et incertain." (B.78)
"Descartes - Il faut dire en gros: 'Cela se fait par 
figure et mouvement'; car cela est vrai. Mais de dire 
quels et composer la machine, cela est ridicule; car 
cela est inutile et incertain et pénible. Et quand 
cela serait vrai, nous n'estimons pas que toute la 
philosophie vaille une heure de peine" (p.1137; B.79)
(1) This obviously refers to more than the famous "chiquenaude" which follows.
(2) Descartes's "Les principes de la philosophie, at which this remark is 
chiefly directed, first appeared in French translation in 1647.
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Descartes then was right: broadly speaking things are composed 
in terms of shape and motion (Pascal has omitted the third term usually 
included by Descartes in this context^^'^- "grandeur"). But his plan to 
proceed further to a detailed analysis of the whole structure of the world 
of nature on the basis of these elemental concepts, and to attempt to 
explain its manifold processes by means of a cosmic 'machine*, functioning 
according to laws which admit of precise mathematical formulation, all this 
is in Pascal's eyes a complete waste of time. Fleeting though these 
references are, the fact that Pascal here concedes that Descartes is 
justified in postulating his initial general principle, while at the 
same time he denies any value to the subsequent project of formulating a 
universal science, which should at once embrace the whole of the physical 
world and be applicable to the relations of particular phenomena to each 
other, endorses the conclusion drawn above. Although it is necessary 
in the case of the fragments from the Pensées to take into account the 
apologetic factor - and although in the final sentence quoted the apologetic 
motive noticeably obtrudes - when looked at in the light of the extracts 
treated earlier they are seen to express a consistent view-point. For 
Pascal, general philosophies of nature, in which all phenomena find their 
full and primary explanation, are on a par with explanations of the facts 
of the natural world, like those advanced by Noël, not based upon what he 
regards as the requisite empirical knowledge.
(l) cf. Principes IV, 198-203, Pléiade éd., p.660-6
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The material considered so far in this section makes it even
more apparent that Pascal's statement in the De l'esprit éométrique, to
the effect that everything in the physical world falls within the grasp of
geometry - that one has only to draw out the implicatory threads connecting
the basic concepts motion, number and space, in order to be able to
comprehend the wonders of nature's structure - is an isolated one made
in passing, and contrary to the general direction of his thought. At
the very most this science might act as a guide to the most general
principles of the composition of natural things, but any attempt to relate
these to concrete nature is simply effort wasted. Pascal's writings
betray no tendency to reduce physics to geometry as was Descartes's
declared aim^^\ and in fact he draws a sharp distinction between the
fields in which the two operate.
Thus near the end of the letter to Noël, having defined what he
means by a vacuum, as a motionless space having length, breadth and depth,
capable of receiving and containing within itself a body of like length
and shape, he adds:
"— et c'est ce qu'on appelle solide en géométrie, ou 
l'on ne considère que les choses abstraites et 
immatérielles." (2j (p.376; G.E.II p.l03)
Geometry moves therefore in a non-existing world of abstractions; it has
(1) cf.int.al,a letter to Mersenne,17.7.1638, concerning Desargues: "S'il lui 
plait de considérer ce que j'ai écrit du sel, de la neige, de l'arc-en-ciel, 
etc., il connaîtra bien que toute ma Physique n'est autre chose que Géométrie*.'
(2) In a letter to Des Noyers, 15.5.1648, Roberval likewise draws a hard and 
fast division between the domains of mathematics and physics: "Mathematicus 
enim spatium^ primo ac per se considérât proutextensum est, mensurabile ac 
divisibile;— ". He is concerned solely with the extension in space of 
physical matter, and not with its corporeity or the form it assumes: "unde 
vulgare illud: " 'nathematicus abstrahit a materia '. Physicus, e contrario, 
corpus physicum primo ac per se considérât prout materiale est ac mobile; 
mutabile ant immutabile;— " G.E.,II, p.337-8.
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no access bo empirical reality. And Pascal nowhere even concedes that 
the conclusions arrived at in geometry hold good for the particular 
relations of existing things in the concrete world, which depend upon the 
aspect of them that has been thus isolated for consideration. The highly 
abstract character of his own mathematical researches, entirely devoid of 
references to the possible application of any conclusions reached to the 
behaviour of empirical phenomena, endorses this view.
This conception of the restricted scope of geometry is the
complete opposite of that of Descartes, who, convinced of the universality
of his "vera mathesis", is led to the position of excluding, at least in
theory, from the interpretation of nature whatever is not amenable to
mathematical treatment. At the end of the fifth Méditation, as a result
of having established to his own satisfaction that the truth and certainty
of any science are wholly dependent on the prior knowledge of a veracious
God, Descartes claims that he now possesses the means;
"—  d'acquérir une science parfaite touchant une infinité 
de choses, non seulement de celles qui sont en lui, mais 
aussi de celles qui appartiennent à la nature corporelle, 
en tant qu'elle peut servir d'objet aux démonstrations 
des géomètres,— "(l)
This extrusion from physics of all non-mathematical elements is enunciated
more explicitly in the heading to the last section of the second part of
the Principes;
"Que je ne reçois point de principes en physique, qui 
ne soient aussi reçus en mathématique, afin de pouvoir 
prouver par démonstration tout ce que j'en déduirai;
(1) Pléiade éd., p.317
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et que ces principes suffisent, d ’autant que tous 
les phénomènes de la nature peuvent être expliqués 
par leur moyen." (l)
But the most revealing passage in this connection, and certainly the one
which serves to bring out in the most striking fashion the difference of
standpoint between Pascal and Descartes, is the following one taken from
the "Entretien avec Burmn", where Descartes is recorded as saying that:
"— toutes les démonstrations des mathématiciens portent 
sur des êtres et sur des objets vrais et —  l ’objet tout 
entier des mathématiques, avec tout ce qu'elles y 
considèrent, est un être vrai et réel et a une vraie 
et réelle nature, non moins que l’objet de la physique 
elle-même."
The difference between the two disciplines resides solely in the fact that:
"—  la physique considère son objet non seulement comme
un être vrai et réel, mais comme un être en acte, et, en
tant que tel, existant; les mathématiques au contraire 
seulement en tant que possible, n'existant point en acte dans 
l'espace, pouvant toutefois exister."(2)
When considered in the light of previous ones, this last extract shows how
far that which actually exists in the physical world is a matter of complete
indifference to Descartes, so obsessed is he with his fetish of conformity
to mathematical type.
In sharp contrast to this a priorism, and far from seeing in the 
objects comprising the subject-matter of geometry the foundations of all 
genuine knowledge about the universe, Pascal expressly denies reality to 
those objects - to him they represent mere abstractions from the real and 
existent. In the Pensées he shows himself inclined to attribute their
(1) Pléiade ed. p.652
(2) " " " p. 1374.
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simplicity, and the immediacy with which they confront the mind, to
the circumstances of the mind's own physical embodiment;
"Notre âme est jetée dans le corps, ou elle trouve 
nombre, temps, dimensions. Elle raisonne là-dessus, 
et appelle cela nature, nécessité, et ne peut croire 
autre chose," (p.1212; B.233)
"La coutume est notre nature. Qui s'accoutume à la 
foi la croit. —  Qui doute donc que, notre âme 
étant accoutumé à voir nombre, espace, mouvement, 
croie cela et rien que cela." (ibid; B.49)
The mind therefore, in Pascal's view, is necessarily conditioned by the
fact that it is united in some way with, and functions in, the body; and
it is this fact which accounts for the constant presence to it of the
concepts space, time, number, motion, and explains why it comes to regard
them as the basic constituents of all that is. This impression is further
reinforced by the requirements of physical existence;
"L'homme a besoin de lieu pour le contenir, de temps 
pour durer, de mouvement pour vivre,— " (p.1110;B.72)
Thus the wheel of Pascal's thought has revolved in its full 
circle from the conception outlined in the De l'esprit géométrique, that 
the above concepts are the fundamental principles of the structure of 
everything in the physical universe, for he is here clearly sounding a 
warning not to impose a priori on reality the limitations of the modes of 
human perception. He maintains in effect that since the modes to which 
the mind becomes conditioned act as blinkers on our awareness, our mode of
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perception cannot be the measure of t h i n g s , a n d  that we must be careful 
to distinguish between what belongs to the subjective nature of knowledge 
and what belongs to the universe. To assert therefore, as Galileo and 
Descartes do, and as Pascal himself does by implication in the De l'esprit 
géométrique, that nature is mathematical, is to overlook precisely that 
fact - it is to advance from the mind's concepts to the independent reality 
that conforms to them, and to shape the external world of nature in 
conformity with the mind's subjective modes. And this predeminently 
subjective element in Descartes's approach, as Pascal sees it, prompts 
him to describe the former's philosophy as;
"—  le roman de la nature, semblable à peu près à
l'histoire de Don Quichot".(z)
(1) Similarly Bacon, when he ascribes the origin of the 'Idols of the 
Tribe'to human nature itself, writes; "—  it b a false assertion that the 
sense of man is the measure of things. On the contrary, all perceptions 
as well of the sense as of the mind are according to the measure of the 
individual and not according to the measure of the universe." Novuum 
Organon I, 41. In a rather different context in the De l'esprit géométrique 
Pascal writes: "—  ce n'est pas par notre capacité à concevoir ces choses 
que nous devons juger de leur réalité,— " (p.586; G.E. IX, p.26o)
(2) Related in a letter by Menjot to his colleague Puerari (p.1504 n.;
G.E. X, p.45)
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(ii) Nature regarded as acting in accordance with uniform lavs in the 
treatises.
The important role played by the assumption that nature acts 
according to regular laws in Pascal's two treatises on statics is brought 
out in a very clear light by the great use which he makes there.'of ' thought 
experiments '. For it appears that only one of the numerous experiments 
referred to was actually performed - Gassendi's testimony in the case of 
the experiment with the flaccid balloon is held by commentators to be 
sufficient evidence as to its having been carried out.^^ ^
As early as I666 Boyle in his Hvdrostatical Paradoxes affirms 
that, though in agreement in the main with the conclusions arrived at by 
Pascal in his treatises, he has no mind to make use of his experimental 
proofs. Three principal reasons are given for rejecting these: "First. 
Because though the Experiments he mentions he delivered in such a manner, 
as is usual in mentioning matters of fact; yet I remember not that he 
expressly says that he actually try'd them, and therefore he might possibly 
have set them down as things that must happen, upon a just confidence that
(2)he was not mistaken in his Ratiocinations."' ' Boyle's remaining two 
objections stem from what he considers are insuperable technical difficulties,! 
which would be encountered in attempting to perform the experiments as 
Pascal has described them, and it is significant that in regard to one of
(1) cf.G.E.Ill, p.200, n.i., for the letter in which Gassendi gives an 
account of this experiment.
(2) op.cit. p.4 - 5.
39.
these he notes that: "— they require Brass Cylinders, or Pluggs, oiade 
with an exactness, that, though easily supposed by a Mathematician, will 
scarce be found obtainable from a Tradesman." He concludes that these 
difficulties are such as to make Pascal's alleged experiments "more 
ingenious than practicable."
If, as Boyle considers possible, the experiments which Pascal 
sets out in the two treatises are only 'thought experiments*, this means 
that he is basing his conclusions here on principles of a very different 
nature from those which he repeatedly claims are the sole legitimate ones
(2)
in physics. The truth of Boyle's contention, that the experiments could
(3)not have been carried out, has been vindicated by subsequent writers; and 
since, as he points out, Pascal nowhere expressly affirms that he did 
perform them, his suggestion is confirmed that the latter did merely set 
down the purported experimental results I*,— as things that must happen 
upon a just confidence that he was not mistaken in his Ratiocinations,"
The most notable example of this occurs with respect to the 
principle of the hydraulic press - Pascal's most significant contribution 
to the science of statics - enunciated in the opening chapters of the 
first treatise. He envisages a number of experiments - the ones requiring 
the "Brass Cylinders, or Pluggs", alleged by Boyle to be unprocurable -
(1) ibid., and cf. also p.63-4
(2) cf. below p.H3^
(3) Ch.Thiirot, Recherches sur le nrincine d'Archimède notes that "Pascal —  
(ce qui est curieux de la part d'un homme qui professe que les expériences 
sont les seuls principes de la physique) invoque des expériences qu'il 
n'avait pas faites, et même qui ne peuvent pas être faites,— " Revue 
■archéologique, vol.20, p.19. cf. also A. Koyré: Pascal savant, in, Biaise 
Pascal; l'homme et l'oeuvre. (Paris 1956); p.276,
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to demonstrate that fluids have weight in proportion to their depth. The
results of these, he claims, make it plain that;
"— la force nécessaire pour empêcher l'eau de couler par 
une ouverture, est proportionnée à la hauteur de l'eau, 
et non pas à sa largeur;— " (p.413; G.E. III, p.l6l.
and that; "un petit filet d'eau tient un grand poids en équilibre;"—
(p.414; G.E. III, p.162)0 In the course of determining what causes this
multiplication of force, Pascal extends the latter conclusion to explain
the following phenomenon;
"Si un vaisseau plein d'eau, clos de toutes parts, a 
deux ouvertures, l'une centuple de l'autre; en mettant 
à chacune un piston qui lui soit juste, un homme poussant 
le petit piston égalera la force de cent hommes, qui 
pousseront celui qui est cent fois plus large,— "
(p.414; G.E,III, p.162),
It is evident from this, given the continuity and the fluidity of the
water, that:
"— un vaisseau plein d'eau est un nouveau principe de 
mécanique, et une machine nouvelle pour multiplier les 
forces— " (ibid; G.E.III, P.I63)
Further proof is then derived for the new principle by pointing out how
it links up with other previously established principles of statics; the
principle of virtual displacements, and Torricelli's principle of the
centre of gravity. It is also explained in hydrostatical terms by showing
how, in virtue of the "continuité" and "fluidité" of the liquid contained
in the vessel, pressure exerted on any portion of its surface will be
transmitted undiminished throughout. Having reached this point, Pascal
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considers himself justified in assuming the truth of his basic principle;
"Prenons donc pour très véritable, qu'un vaisseau plein 
d'eau, ayant des ouvertures, et des forces à ces ouvertures 
qui leur soient proportionnées, elles sont en équilibre; et 
c'est le fondement et la raison de 1'équilibre des liqueurs, 
dont nous allons donner plusieurs exemples." (p.4l6;G.E,III, p.168)
It is clear from Pascal's constant use of the conditional "si", and 
of the formula "il faut" and infinitive, in describing the experiments 
designed to prove and illustrate these principles, that he is here assuming 
as the basis of his argument, on which "the just confidence that he was not 
mistaken in his Ratiocinations" is grounded, the uniform behaviour of 
the natural forces whose effects he is engaged in tracing and corollating.
The procedure thich he follows is to affirm that, conditional on the perform­
ance of specified experiments, certain phenomena will be found to behave in 
a certain way. These predictions, which anticipate conclusions not directly 
observed, are no doubt based on and suggested by previously observed cases - 
the experiments concerning the v a c u u m ^ a n d  everyday experience of the 
behaviour of fluids, for example, - but they nonetheless take for granted, 
as an underlying principle, that natural processes are governed by a 
uniformity of law. And the confidence with which Pascal propounds the basic 
principle of statics arrived at in this way, together with the fact that the 
two ensuing treatises comprise little more than an elaboration of it, amply
attests the trust he places in this notion of nature's conformity to
(l) M.Kbyré argues that many of these even could not have been performed in
the manner, or with the results, that Pascal alleges, art.cit;p.275-8.
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invariable laws.
Presumably Pascal sees fit here to overlook the idea, which he
develops elsewhere, of there being an element of indeterminacy in nature,
whose subtlety is such as to render quite vain any attempt to reduce her
processes to a formula.Moreover, this procedure of drawing inferences
from the data of experiments never actually performed, and claiming far-
reaching scope and significance for their conclusions, runs directly counter
to his professed attitude towards induction. For elsewhere he disputes the
legitimacy of any inference beyond immediate experience, which is made in
trust that the uniformities discovered in the segment of nature that comes
(2)
within the purview of such experience hold good over all the rest. And
where the processes of nature are conceived of in terms of an iron
regularity of sequences outside the context of these treatises, it is
claimed rather paradoxically, not that it is justifiable in this case to
resort bo rational inference, but that empirical observation will on that
account prove fruitful. Thus in the address to the Paris 'Academy* in
connection with the problem of devising a method to equitably apportion
the stakes in a game of chance which has been interrupted, Pascal says:
II— c'est là certes ce qu'il faut d'autant plus chercher 
par le raisonnement, qu'il est moins possible d'être 
renseigné par 1'expérience. En effet les résultats du 
sort ambigu sont justement attribués à la contingence
(1) cf. below po55.
(2) cf. below p.Hq-ff.
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fortuite plutôt qu'à la nécessité naturelle. C'est 
pourquoi la question a erré incertaine jusqu'à ce 
jour; liais maintenant, demeurée rebelle à l'expérience, 
elle n'a pu échapper à l'empire de la raison." (p.74 
Trains.p.1403;G.£.III, p.307)
The significance of this alignment of what can be attributed to the
causality of "nécessité naturelle" with "expérience", can only be that the
appropriate method of investigation to adopt where one can count on regular
laws governing the behaviour of things is experimentation, but that its
effectiveness and reliability diminish when an element of randomness enterso
The method of reasoning b^ r analogy employed in the second
treatise, which is very largely an extension of the principles formulated
in the first to apply to the atmosphere as well as to liquids, provides
further evidence that Pascal directs his enquiries in accordance with the
belief in the existence of a network of uniformities underlying phenomena^
For he sets out to show how the phenomena ordinarily attributed to nature's
"horror vacui", obey the same laws as those studied previously in connection
with the equilibrium of fluids, by simply bringing out the clear analogies
between these two classes of phenomena in all important respects. The
explanation of the phenomena that relate to the supposed "horror vacui"
thus rests almost entirely on the way in which they are integrated into a
system of established laws.
(l) This expression also occurs in the Abrégé de la vie de Jésus-Christ 
(p.649) "— il mourut non pas par une nécessite naturelle, mais par sa propre 
volonté,— ". Also in the Pensées, p.1121 (cf.below p.^s.), where the 
element of "nécessité" is asserted to be not in things, but in the human 
mind, which spontaneously connects all phenomena, cf.also p*460.
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Already in the letter to Florin Périer, included in the Récit
de la grande expérienceo Pascal writes with respect to the phenomena
normally attributed to the "horror vacui";
"— j'incline bien plus à imputer tous ces effets à la 
pesanteur et pression de l'air, parce que je ne les 
considère que comme des cas particuliers d'une proposition 
universelle de l'équilibre des liqueurs,— " (p.393 G.E.II;p.l54)
And in the second treatise, having established as a result of the experiment
with the flaccid balloon that air has certain characteristics in common
(1)
with water and all other fluids, and having enumerated the effects
(2 )usually attributed to the "horror v a c u i " , h e  sets down in brief outline
the argument which is to be elaborated in the ensuing section;
"Si l'on a bien compris, dans le Traité de l'équilibre des
liqueurs. de quelle manière elles font impression par leur
poids contre tous les corps qui y sont, on n'aura point de
peine à comprendre comment le poids de la masse de l'air,
agissant sur tous les corps, y produit tous les effets qu'on
avait attribués \ l'horreur du vide; car ils sont tout à fait
semblables, comme nous 1 'allons montrer sur chacun."(p.434;G.F.III,p.206
Not only does this manifesto set the board, but it makes very plain the vjay
in which the method of argument to be followed, of bringing out the
analogies between the two different classes of phenomena, takes for granted
the central fact of nature's uniformity.
The first example to be treated is the difficulty experienced in
opening a bellows with all its apertures stopped:
"Pour faire entendre comment la pesanteur de la masse de 
l'air cause la difficulté qu'on sent à ouvrir un soufflet, 
lorsque l'air n'y peut entrer, je ferai voir une pareille 
résistance causée par le poids de l'eau." (ibid.G.E.IIIp.206-7)
(1) ch.I, p.429-431. G.E.III, p.194-199
(2) ch.II, sect.I p.432-4, G.E.III, p.201-6.
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Clearly in the case of a bellows immersed in water, with the tube emerging
into the air, it would be ridiculous to attribute the resistance to the
"horror vacui". And since what is said of water is to be understood of
any fluid, a "general law" can be propounded, that the resistance encountered
in opening a bellows with its apertures stopped in any fluid is caused by,
and is proportionate to, the weight of fluid which must be raised. If this
general law is applied to the particular case of air, it will be found to
be true that the weight of the mass of air causes the resistance felt in
opening the bellows :
"D'oû l'on voit que la difficulté d'ouvrir un soufflet 
bouché n'est qu'un cas particulier de la règle générale 
de la difficulté d'ouvrir un soufflet dans quelque 
liqueur que ce soit, 6b. elle n'a point d'accès. Ce que 
nous avons dit de cet effet, nous allons le dire de 
chacun des autres, mais plus succinctement."(p.435;G.E.p.208)
Having applied this method of reasoning by analogy to the
remaining eight examples of effects previously attributed to the "horror
vacui", formulating in each instance the general law of vbich this is the
particular case, Pascal concludes the chapter as follows:
"Voilà de quelle sorte le poids de l'air produit tous les 
effets qu'on avait jusqu'ici attribués à l'horreur du vide.
J'en viens d 'expliquer les principaux; s'il en reste quelqu'un, 
il est si aise de l'entendre ensuite de ceux-ci,— et on peut 
même dire qu'on les avait déjà tous vus, comme en leur source, 
dans le Traité précédent, puisque tous ces effets ne sont que 
des cas particuliers de la règle générale de l'équilibre des 
liqueurs". (p.443; G.E.III, p.225)
(l) In a further fragment Pascal extends this conclusion, again making the 
fundamental assumption that nature is regular, acting in accordance with 
uniform laws throughout different classes of phenomena. "La conformité de 
tous les effets attribués à l'horreur du vide, étant telle que ce qui se dit 
de l'un s'entend de tous les autres, nous doit faire conclure avec certitude 
que, puisque le mercure suspendu varie ses hauteurs suivant les variétés des 
temps, il arrivera aussi de semblables variétés dans tous les autres,— " 
(p.463;G.E.II, p.515) And one of the examples cited to show that the effects 
produced by varying degrees of atmospheric pressure are uniform throughout 
various cases, is especially interesting in this respect; "Que si le siphon
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Thus the method which Pascal adopts in this part of the treatise 
consists essentially in pointing out how closely analogous is the case in 
his previous treatment of the equilibrium of liquids to that of the 
particular effect in question attributed to the "horror vacui". In this 
way the "horror vacui" is made to appear superfluous as an explanation, 
since the relevant phenomena are shown to constitute a particular case of 
a general law already established. Such a method presupposes throughout a 
belief that nature's processes are governed by a far-reaching uniformity 
of l a w . F o r  Pascal is not merely assuming that the conditions of the 
occurence of phenomena are predictable; he is extending, on the grounds 
of analogy, the mode of cause and effect which holds good in one set of 
phenomena to another quite separate set.
contd. from p.45. à eau est dans une basse-cour, et que le tuyau du 
mercure soit dans une chambre; lorsqu'on observera que le mercure 
hausse dans la chambre ou l'on est, on peut assurer, sans le voir, que 
le siphon joue dans la cour oài l'on n'est pas. —  parce que tous ces 
effets sont conformes, et dépendant immédiatement de la pesanteur de l'air 
qui les règle tous, et les diversifie suivant ses propres diversités." 
Xp.466; G.E.II, p.519)
(1) Nature thus conceived is not necessarily incompatible with the nature of 
the Schools, with which Pascal aligns himself elsewhere. For there is 
nothing peculiar to 17th century mechanistic philosophy in the conception of 
nature acting in accordance with necessary laws. M. Gilson's account of the 
mediaeval idea of nature makes this evident. The mediaeval thinkers managed 
to reconcile both "fécondité" and"nécessité" , which they attributed to 
nature as the aggregate of active entities whose essence determines their 
behaviour according to necessary laws, so that for them "Chaque fois qu'il 
est possible de constater l'existence d'une constance, de quelque chose 
qui arrive 'ut in pluribus', on peut être sûr que cette constance a une 
cause et cette cause ne peut être que la présence d'une essence, ou nature, 
dont l'opération produit régulièrement le phénomène." L'esprit de la 
philosophie médiévale. (Paris, 1944) p.346,
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(iii)(a) Nature as continuous process
The context of Pascal's assertion in the Préface cour le traité
du vide, that experiments are the only legitimate principles in physics,
shows that he believes the necessity for such an empirical approach, in
order to acquire any knowledge about the physical world, is dictated by
the face which nature itself presents to the investigator,
"les secrets de la nature sont cachés; quoiqu'elle agisse 
toujours, on ne découvre pas toujours ses effets: le temps 
les révèle d'âge en âge, et quoique toujours égale en elle- 
même, elle n'est pas toujours également connue. Les expériences 
qui nous en donnent 1'intelligence multiplient continuelle­
ment;— » (p.532;G.E.II, p.136)
Although there are properly two ideas relating to nature implicit in this
passage - that of nature as a hidden continuous process, which often eludes
us since its effects are too subtle for our senses to detect, and that of
nature's constancy - it will be convenient, since the one frequently seems
to imply the other, to treat them together.
Some passages however, which describe nature's constancy alone,
may be isolated. In the'Disproportion" fragment in the Pensées, Pascal
contrasts nature and human nature in the following terms:
"L'immobilité fixe et constante de la nature, comparaison 
au changement continuel qui se passe en nous,— "(p.lllO;B.72)
An earlier variant, as well as the comparison drawn, shows that the
expression "immobilité fixe", which gives the impression that nature
constitutes a continuous, homogeneous mass, of which and within which there
can be no motion, is merely intended here to emphasize nature's constancy.
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"Voilà une partie des causes qui rendent 1'homme si 
imbécile à connaître la nature.—  Elle dure et se 
maintient perpétuellement en son être; il passe et 
est mortel." (p.1112; B.72)
Nature's constancy is again illustrated in the description of an experiment
designed to prove the effects of air-pressure. The air is prevented from
exerting pressure on the mercury lying in the elbow of a curved tube,
because the experimenter has placed his finger over the opening at the .
point where the curve joins the straight portion of the tube:
"Ikis comme rien ne se perd dans^ la nature, si le
vif-argent qui est dans la reôOi^ure ne sent pas le 
poids de l'air, parce que le doigt qui bouche son 
ouverture l'en garde, il arrive, en récompense, que 
le doigt souffre beaucoup de douleur car il porte 
tout le poids de l'air qui le presse par-dessus, et 
rien ne le soutient par-dessous."(p.450;G.E.III,p.240)
The notion of the constancy of nature is assumed here as a general principle
almost, adequate apparently to account for the occurence of phenomena, since
it is alleged that the sensation of pain result^ as "récompense".
However, the idea is by no means peculiar to Pascal in the first
half of the seventeenth century in France. Pierre Guiffart makes an
(2)interesting comparison, in his Discours du vuide. between Nature and Art;
"II y a une très notable différence entre l'Art et la 
Nature—  la Nature n'a pas besoin de l'Art, elle est 
toujours semblable à elle mesme, et depuis le moment 
de sa naissance jusques à sa fin;—  Aussi ses causes 
agissent sans cesse d'une mesme maniéré et produisent
(1) cf. diagram, p.450 Traité de la pesanteur de la masse de l'air.
G.E.III p.237.
(2) Published in August I647, and written to support the conclusions outlined 
by Pascal in his Expériences nouvelles — , against the criticisms which had 
been levelled at them by Jacob Pierius, a professor of philosophy at the 
College de Rouen.
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tous Jours de semblables effects. C'est pourquoy 
si quelques uns d'entre eux nous paroissent nouveaux, 
ils ne le sont neantmoins qu'à l'esgard de la 
connoissance que nous en avons, et non pas à 
l'esgard de la nature."(4)
Roberval also enunciates a very similar conception of nature in
a Fragment inédit:
"—  la nature n'est jamais contraire à elle mesme 
quoy qu'elle produise des effets contraires, ou qui 
nous semblent tels. —  On ne la peut détruire, non pas 
meme l'altérer en la moindre chose; quoy que les corps 
dans lesquels elle se rencontre puissent changer de 
mouvemens, de figures, et d'autres accidens. —  la 
nature demeure tousjours telle qu'elle est constante 
en son estre veritable:— " (2)
The textual similarities discernible in these extracts testify to a definite
interplay of influence here, but the fact that it is impossible to give a
definite date to the writings of either Pascal or Roberval, from which the
relevant passages are taken, means that it would be quite arbitrary to assign
priority in formulating this conception of the continuity and stability of
nature. Besides it appears to have been Bacon who first recognized the
significance of the idea for the investigation of the processes and
phenomena of physical nature. Already in the Novum Qrsrancn the essential
elements are present.
(1) Discourt-dn-.vnids sur les .expArl.eD.c.es._de.. monsieur. Pas chal et le traie te 
de Monsieur Pierius, (Rouen 1647) p.48-9.
(2) cf. Roberval's : Des principes du debvoir et des connoissances humaines;
(15) "Mesme cause naturelle ou semblable ou semblablement disposé, produit 
semblable effect en un sujet mesme ou semblable ou semblablement disposé; et 
la nature n'est point contraire à elle-mesme". Included by Cousin in Fragments 
de philosophie cartésienne (Paris,1845)p.247. The Fragment inédit is 
included in the G.E,edition of Pascal, vol.II. p.49-50.
(3) "For there is nothing more true in nature than the twin propositions that j 
'nothing is produced from nothing', and 'nothing is .reduced to nothing', but | 
that the absolute quantum or sum total of matter remains unchanged, without 
increase or diminution," op.cit.11,40 and of.also II 4-7. Newton, in the
cont. p.50. i
50,
However, the constancy and continuous process of nature does not 
mean for Pascal, as it clearly does for both Roberval and Bacon, that the 
individual phenomena sharing in the process are simply the transformations 
into new forms of what has already appeared in another form, without any 
loss of, or addition to, the quantity of the basic material. On this view 
nature's constancy consists primarily in the fact that the quantum remains 
undiminished despite processes and change. Clearly such a conception is 
not adequate to account for the principle of the unceasing activity of 
nature postulated in the passage from the Preface. Nature there represents 
in Pascal's eyes essentially a continuous activity, expressing itself in 
individual embodiments ("effets"), and not simply a given amount of matter 
which remains uniform throughout all time.
It is this sort of view that predominates, in the scattered
fragments of the Pens^es bearing upon the subject:
"La nature s'imite: une graine jet^e en bonne terre, produit; 
un principe jeté dans un bon esprit, produit; les nombres 
imitent l'espace, qui sont de nature si différente. Tout 
est fait et conduit par un même maître: la racine, les 
branches, les fruits; les principes, les conséquences."
(p.1096; B 119)
"La nature recommence toujours les mêmes choses, les ans, 
les jours, les heures; les espaces de même, et les nombres 
sont bout à bout à la suite l'un de l'autre. Ainsi se fait 
une espace d'infini et d'éternel— " (p.1123; B12X).
cont. from p.49. third of his Rules of Reasoning in Philosophv. incorporates 
a variation on the theme of nature as constant; "— nor are we to recede from 
the analogy of Nature, which is wont to be —  always consonant to itself." 
Nowton's Philosophv of Nature (New York, 1953);ed.H.S.Thayer, p.4.'
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Thus Pascal describes the fundamental continuity he sees running through the
world of nature, not in terms of any underlying material substance, but 
in terms of the processes of growth and change which take place according to 
the same sequence in such dissimilar aspects as plant-life and the mental 
life of man. This unity of pattern is extended to include numbers and space, 
which conform to identical laws of increase, despite the fact that the one 
is a mere mode imposed by the mind on objective reality while the other 
is an entity encompassing the whole of that reality. The use of the 
reflexive verb "s'imiter" in the first extract is especially significant, 
since it indicates that Pascal has broken away, at least in part, from the 
Aristotelean scholastic tradition of regarding nature as the material 
imitation of a transcendent immaterial model. Nature's model is now 
immanent not transcendent, for it is the ordered reproduction of its own 
inherent processes that "s 'limiter" suggests.
Although Pascal does endorse the sharp distinction, on which
( 1 )Descartes insists, between mind and body , the position he adopts in the 
first passage sets him outside the orthodox Cartesian view that mind and 
the thought processes generic to it form a class apart from every other sort 
of natural entity. Not that he has any conception of mind pervading the 
whole body of the physical world - minds simply constitute one class of 
phenomena which appear in nature, and exhibit the same characteristics of 
development as any other class.
(l) cf. Pensées, p.1110 "— nous sommes composés de deux natures opposées
et de divers genre, d'âme et de corps." (B.72)
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Closely akin to this principle of continuity, or more correctly
perhaps, resultant upon it, is the notion that everything in the natural
world is in reciprocal action;
"Le moindre mouvement importe à toute la nature; la mer 
entière change pour une pierre." (p.1296; B.505)
In this way the modification of one part of the world extends to all parts,
so that every point of the physical universe,reacts in however slight degree
to everything that happens anywhere in the whole universe. And Pascal's
sense of the proximity of different 'worlds' comes into play even in his
essays on pure mathematics. In conclusion to the treatise on the sum of
the numerical powers, after enunciating the general law that a continuous
magnitude of a given order is not increased by the addition to it of any
number of magnitudes of a lower order, so that points add nothing to lines,
lines nothing to surfaces, surfaces nothing to solids; or in arithmetical
terms, roots do not count in relation to squares, squares in relation to
cubes, etc., he makes the following observation:
"J'ai tenu à ajouter ces quelques remarques, familières 
k ceux qui pratiquent les indivisibles, afin de faire 
ressortir la liaison, toujours admirable, que la nature, 
éprise d'unité, établit entre les choses les plus éloignées 
en apparence. Elle apparaît dans cet example, oh nous 
voyons le calcul des dimensions des grandeurs continues 
se rattacher à la sommation des puissances numériques."
(p.171. Trans.1432; G-.E.III; p.366)
Now even if the notion of heterogeneous orders, as it is here set out, is
as banal as M. Koyre would have us b e l i e v e , t h i s  in no way affects the
(l) art.cit., p.265-6,
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significance for the present discussion of the fact that Pascal has noted, 
and considers it remarkable, that in geometry and arithmetic components 
are governed in certain of their relations by the self-same principle, 
and that he attributes this uniformity to nature's being "éprise d'unité". 
Indeed, the expression "toujours admirable", used in the translation to 
describe the correspondence between numbers and continuous magnitudes, 
hardly does justice to the matching expression in Pascal's original latin. 
This gives a much more precise indication of the light in which he regards 
this activity of nature: "nunquam satis mirata connexio".
The idea of the continuity of nature, of there being some
"liaison" connecting the diverse fields in which its activity is rcanifest,
appears to have enjoyed some popularity in the early part of the 17th
Century. Fournier reproduces a Discours de la vie, de la mort et des
os du géant Theutobocus. written by a certain Jacques Tissot, and first
published at Lyon in I613, where the appearance of giants in the natural
world is interpreted as an opportunity to:
"— mettre en pratique l'axiome: 'Operatur natura quantum, 
et quand in potest', sans néant moins- faire aucun sault 
'ab extremis ad extrema: natura enim in suis operationibus 
non facit saltum'."
The fact that Tissot's treatise is written in French, but that the relevant
phrase is quoted in Latin, indicates that it was in all likelihood a current
aphorism of the period. And Tissot's English contemporary Coke, the famous
jurist, applies it to the law in the form:
(1) Variétés historiques et littéraires, (Paris 1859) vol.ix,p.247-8..
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"Natura non facit saltus, ita nec lex."
The maxim proved fruitful when taken up by Leibniz at the end of the
century and developed in conjunction with his other great principle of
sufficient reason. It occurs in its apparently original form in the
New Essays on the Human Understanding:
"— it is one of my most important and best verified maxims
that nature makes no leaps."
Pascal himself gives no indication of the precise nature of the
connection he conceives as running through the various aspects of the world
of nature, but it is clear from the earlier passages cited that it is
formed in some way by nature's own creative process, which he describes in
the following terms:
"La nature agit par progrès, 'itus et reditus'. Elle passe 
et revient, puis va plus loin, puis deux fois moins, puis 
plus que jamais, etc., le flux de la mer se fait ainsi, le 
soleil semble marcher ainsi. (p.1168-9; B 355)
The human temperament behaves in this way, as do also the passage of a
fever, the inventive spirit of man, human motives of altruism and their
reverse, the rules of eloquence and the principle of "divertissement".
However, what is important for the present purpose, is that the process of
nature should be delineated as one of rhythmical change, and at the same
time of creative advance - an overall movement of progress which includes
and allows for a measure of periodic regression. Nature so conceived cannot
(1) Coke upon Littleton, 23&-9, in W.F.H.King: Classical and Foreign 
Quotations (London 1904)
(2) Leibniz: Philosophical Writings. Everyman ed.,p.l52. Pascal's emphasis 
in the "Disproportion" fragment on the "rapport" and "enchaînement" between 
the parts and the whole in the natural scheme, and on the "lier naturel et 
insensible" connecting the most diverse items in the physical world, has 
already been treated,above, p.jS.
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be thought of as a finished product or a closed system; and if it is 
progressive, as Pascal asserts it to be, then it cannot be pictured as 
a machine, nor can any of its parts be adequately described in mechanistic 
terms. For it is clearly impossible to describe the same thing in one 
and the same breath as a machine and as developing, for the one character­
istic which a mechanistic system specifically eliminates is that of any 
form of development - purposeless and unprogressive change is all that it 
can take cognizance of.
(iii)(b) Pascal's anti-mechanism.
Any doubts as to Pascal's final attitude toward a thorough-going
mechanistic view of nature are dispelled by his recognition of an element
of the unpredictable in nature's operations;
" 'Spongia soils.' - Quand nous voyons un effet arriver 
toujours de même, nous en concluons une nécessité naturelle, 
comme qu'il sera denain jour, etc. ï'^ is souvent la nature 
nous dément, et ne s'assujettit pas à ses propres règles."
(p.1121; B p.)
It is particularly significant here that, whereas the element of necessity 
is ascribed to the agency of the human mind, the indeterminacy does not 
depend on any human inability but is inherent in the nature of things, in 
a way completely incompatible with the conception of the physical world as
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a mere congeries of bits of matter, infinite in extent and permeated all 
through by movement, functioning in accordance with invariable laws. The 
secret of nature's uniform behaviour, which any mechanistic world view must 
take as its ultimate foundation, consists in the invariable sequences of 
cause and effect that Pascal expressly declares in this fragment to be 
frequently disregarded.
The idea of nature as process, growth and development, idiich seems
to have survived in Pascal's thinking as a relic of the conceptions of the
previous century, is strangely out of tune with the rationalist tendency
dominant in the thought of his period. To the Cartesian the world of
nature was a mechanistic system of interacting parts, capable of
mathematical interpretation in terms of the motion of matter in space and
time, ünd yet in one important respect Pascal does appear to have been
deeply influenced by this Cartesian m e c h a n i s m , f o r  several fragments
in the Pensees show him to have been in substantial agreement with
Descartes's doctrine of animal-automata.
"Je puis bien concevoir un homme sans mains, pieds, tête,...
I4ais je ne puis concevoir l'homme sans pensée: ce serait
une pierre ou une brute." (p.1156; B. 339).
(2)"L'histoire du brochet et de la grenouille de Liancourt; 
ils le font tou joui's, et jamais autrement, ni autre 
chose d'esprit." (ibid; B.341)
(1)This statement abstracts from the possible influence traceable to 
Descartes in regard to the assumption in the treatises, that nature acts in 
accordance with laws.
(2)E. Jovy, in vol.IV of his Etudes pascaliennes. (Paris 1928),p.58-66, 
traces a probable source of the anecdote to which Pascal alludes here.
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"Le bec du perroquet qu'il essuie, quoiqu'il soit 
net." (ibid; B.343)
"Si un animal faisait par esprit ce qu'il fait par 
instinct, et s'il parlait par esprit ce qu'il parle 
par instinct, pour la chasse, et pour avertir ses 
camarades que la proie est trouvée ou perdue, il 
parlerait aussi pour des choses oti il a plus d'affection, 
comri.e pour dire; 'Rongez cette corde qui me blesse, 
ou je ne puis atteindre'." (ibid; B.342.
In this last fragment in particular, Pascal seems to be echoing Descartes's
contention that it is the ability to communicate genuine thought, whether
by the use of articulate speech or some other means, that differentiates
man from beast, rational intellect from animal i n s t i n c t . T h e  testimonies
of Baillet, that it was this aspect of Descartes's philosophy which Pascal
most e s t e e m e d , a n d  of Marguérite Périer, who relates that; "II était
(3)
de son sentiment sur l'automate— ", apparently bear this out.
The foregoing evidence, together with the fact that such was the
(4)
view generally accepted at Port-Royal, has led Mrs. L.C.Rosenfield, in
(5)
her study of the subject, to lump Pascal in with the "solitaires", to
(1) e.g. the letter to Henry More, 5.2.1649:"— jamais jusqu'à ce jour on n'a 
pu observer qu'aucun animal en soit venu à ce point de perfection d'user d'iin 
véritable langage, c'est-à-dire d'exprimer soit par la voix, soit par les 
gestes quelque chose qui puisse se rapporter à la smle pensée et non à
1'impulsion naturelle. Le langage est en effet le seul signe certain d'une 
pensée latente dans le corps, —  c'est pourquoi il est permis de prendre le 
langage pour la vraie différence entre les hommes et les bêtes." Pléiade 
éd., p.1320.
(2) La vie de Monsieur Des cartes. I. p.52
(3) Mémoire sur la vie de M.Pascal, p.41.
(4) cf. Sainte-Beuve, Port-Roval (Pléiade éd.), voLI, p.757-8
(5) From Beast-Machine to î^n-Machine, (New York, 1941)
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swell the ranks of the protagonists of the Cartesian beast-machine theory
in the first half of the 17th century. The obviously crucial fragment in
this respect is completely omitted from her treatment however:
"La machine d'arithmétique fait des effets qui approchent 
plus de la pensée que tout ce que font les animaux; mais
elle ne fait rien qui puisse faire dire qu'elle a de la
volonté, comme les animaux." (p.ii56; B.340)
And since in writing her book Mrs. Rosenfield also seems to have been
unaware of the conclusion reached by M. Desgrippes, after a very careful
examination of all the relevant fragments in the light of the Cartesian
doctrine, that there is insufficient conclusive evidence to justify making
(1)a decision either way, her ascription is largely invalidated. It is 
also very difficult to see how a further passage, adduced in support of
her thesis, can possibly have given rise to the assertion by which it is
\
introduced; "Another fragment from Pascal's pen testifies to the same
a t t i t u d e ; " /
"— qu'y a-t-il de plus absurde que de dire que des corps 
inanimés ont des passions, des craintes, des horreurs? 
que des corps insensibles, sans vie, et même incapables 
de vie, aient des passions, qui présupposent une âme au 
moins sensitive pour les recevoir?" (p.1136-7)
For Pascal expressly states that it is to inorganic substance that he is
concerned to deny 'passions, fears and horrors'. And if Mrs. Rosenfield
interprets the passage as implying that he accords a mere 'sensitive' soul
to animals, as opposed to the conscious intelligence which characterizes
the human species - though the fragment only warrants the conclusion that
(1) Etudes sur Pascal; De l'automatisme à la foi. (Paris 1935)p.103-121, 
Desgrippes himself inclines toward the negative view.
(2) op.cit., p.216, n.37.
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he regards such a soul as the sine qua non of sentience - even this cannot
be taken as indicating his espousal of the Cartesian view. For Descartes
claims, in the final sentence of his Traité de l'homme, that it is
unnecessary in order to account for the presence of passions in any animal,
not excepting man, to envisage any;
"— ame vége^ive, ni sensitive, ni aucun autre principe de
mouvement et de vie, que son sang et ses esprits, agités
par la chaleur du feu qui brûle continuellement dans son 
coeur, et qui n'est point d'autre nature que tous les 
feux qui sont dans les corps inanimés."
And Pascal's colleagues at Port-Royal justified their indifference to the 
pain inflicted on animals in the course of anatomical experiments, on the 
grounds that the latter are totally without feeling of any kind.
M. Brunschvicg's attempt to explain away the fragment contrasting 
the arithmetical machine with animals is both implausible and self­
contradictory. He maintains that it would be rash to conclude from this 
fragment that Pascal attributes the power of volition to animals, in 
opposition to the Cartesian view established at Port-Roj^l which he himself 
seems to accept elsewiiVTe, and continues.; "Peut-être ne convient-il de 
voir là qu'un exemple destiné à mettre en lumière la différence des 
opérations de 1'entendement pur et des tendances de la volonté."(^) But 
surely any such "tendances de la volonté" must presuppose the existence of 
a "volonté" in whatever is alleged to exhibit them, and in the case in 
point in animals I In whatever light this extract may be considered the
(1) Pléiade éd., p.873
(2) cf. Sainte-Beuve, op.cit., loc. cit., and the passage quoted form 
Fontaine's Mémoires by E. Jovy, op.cit., p.58.
(3) Pensées et Opuscules, ed.min., p.486, n.2»
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fact remains, as M. Desgrippes has pointed o u t , t h a t  it would be 
impossible to imagine a more apt contemporary example of an automaton, to 
which to assimilate animal behaviour, than the arithmetical machine and that
in the one context where Pascal does compare the two it is to bring out the
differences between them.
Furthermore, this acknowledgement of a will in animals tallies
with the singularly un-mechanistic language used by Pascal in describing
animal instinct in the Préface, where he contrasts its essentially static
character with the ever-increasing body of knowledge which the human mind
is capable of embracing. In illustration, he quotes the stock example
of the bee-hive, which has not varied in shape or size over a period of a
thousand years, and adds:
"II en est de même de tout ce que les animaux produisent 
par ce mouvement occulte." (p.533; G.E.II, p.138)
According to Descartes there is no need to have recourse to any such
"occult movement", in order to explain the behaviour of animals, since
the motive force in them is in no way different from that of inanimate
bodies»
Even this isolated aspect of the mechanistic conception of 
nature fails therefore to secure Pascal's adherence, and one might speculate 




(iii)(c) Nature as active principle
Pascal's statements regarding nature considered in section (a) 
showed that it constitutes for him a self-contained process, in the sense
that it stands in no necessary relation with any agency outside or prior
to itself, upon which it is dependent for its existence.
This implies that the word "nature" denotes not simply the
physical world, or the things which go to make up that world together
with the processes that characterize them, but in addition the principle
in virtue of which everything in the world behaves as it does. And
several further extracts testify to the fact that Pascal does conceive of
nature as not merely active, but as generative and regulative as well.
Thus in the Préface, having shown how animals always act in accordance
with the dictates of instinct, he continues:
"La nature les instruit à mesure que la nécessité les presse;
— la nature n'ayant pour objet que de maintenir les animaux 
dans un ordre de perfection bornée, elle leur inspire cette 
science nécessaire, toujours égale, de peur qu'ils ne tombent 
dans le dépérissement, et ne permet pas qu'ils y ajoutent,
de peur qu'ils ne fassent les limites qu'elle leur a
prescrites." (p.533; G.E.II, p.138)
However, it is not only in the life of animals that nature fulfils this
role of ordaining principle, but, as numerous fragments from the Pensées
attest, in the life of men as well. In the "Disproportion" passage
Pascal maintains that, once their position between the two infinites,
with all that it entails, has been brought home to men, they will be
content to make the most of what it presents.
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"chacun dans l'état oh la nature l'a placé." (p.ll09;B72).
In another fragment an interlocutor is imagined as putting the following 
questions;
"Pourquoi ma connaissance est-elle bornée? ma taille? ma 
durée à cent ans plutôt qu'à mille? Quelle raison a eue 
la nature de me la donner telle,— ?" (p.lll3;B 208).
Again, in the course of illustrating the effects produced on anyone's
attitude by the imagination, Pascal shows how even a venerable magistrate,
who appears to judge things on their intrinsic merits without allowing
himself to be influenced by other factors, is distracted by the grotesque
appearance of the preacher at a sermon:
"Que le prédicateur vienne à paraître, que la nature 
lui ait donné une voix ehrouée et un tour de visage 
bizarre,— "(p. 1117;B 82).
It is nature too that ensures the concurrence of the appropriate emotions
with the various states of health through which men pass:
"La nature donne alors des passions et des désirs conformes 
à l'état présent." (p.1131; B 109).
Even in the case of the two distinct types of cognition, after expressing
the wish that all knowledge derived from the "coeur" as opposed to the
"raison", Pascal adds in regretful tones;
"Mais la nature nous a refusé ce bien; elle ne nous a
au contraire donné que très peu de connaissances de
cette sorte,— " (p.1222; B 282).
Clearly nature's significance is considerably enhanced when it is
thought of in this regulative capacity. Yet any notion that Pascal's
conception of nature as thus active and directive implies a revival of
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something akin to the l6th century theory of an ^anima mundi*, is rendered
untenable by his emphatic rejection of any form of animism. In the letter
to périer, included in the Récit de la grande expérience— , he alleges
that one of his reasons for doubting the truth of the belief that nature
abhors a vacuum is that;
"— j'ai peine à croire que la nature, qui n'est point animée, 
ni sensible, soit susceptible d'horreur, puisque les passions 
présupposent une âme capable de les ressentir,— "(p.393;G.E.II,p.l54)
In the final section of the Récit— , having shown that the "horror vacui"
is a pure fiction, invented simply in order to conceal man's ignorance,
Pascal goes on to say that this is by no means the first time that men,
when unable to discover the true causes of phenomena, have substituted
imaginary ones, couched in specious terms which satisfy the ear rather
than the mind;
"— c'est ainsi que l'on dit que la sympathie et l'antipathie 
des corps naturels sont les causes efficientes et univoques 
de plusieurs effets, comme si des corps inanimés étaient 
capables de sympathie et antipathie,— " (p.400;G.E.II,p.370-1)
And in the conclusion to the two treatises he contends that, sine e it has
been demonstrated that atmospheric pressure alone is the true cause, of
the effects normally attributed to the "horror vacui", it is now established
that nature produces nothing with a view to avoiding a vacuum. He claims
that it would be easy to pass on from here to show that it has no horror
of one either :
"— car cette fagon de parler n'est pas propre, puisque 
la nature créée, qui est celle dont il s'agit, n'étant 
pas animée, n'est pas capable de passion,— " (p.457;G.E.III,p.254)
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The proviso contained in this extract is highly significant, since it may 
be taken as showing that Pascal is in the habit of distinguishing between 
an active and passive sides of nature. This would imply the retention of 
the scholastic distinction between a 'natura naturans' and a ’natura 
naturata'.
Opposition to any form of animism..also appears in two fragments
from the Pensées. The untenable position of those who defend the "horror
vacui" thesis is demonstrated by a reductio ad absurdum:
"— pour l'examiner en elle-même, qu'y a-t-il de plus absurde 
que de dire que des corps^inanimés ont des passions, des 
craintes, des h o r r e u r s ? —  de plus, que l'objet de cette 
horreur fût le vide? —  Ce n'est pas tout; qu'ils aient en 
eux-mêmes un principe de mouvement pour éviter le vide.
(p.1136-7; B 75)
Elsewhere Pascal alleges that the readiness men display to account for
phenomena by such spurious reasons stems from their own composite nature
of body and mind, which precludes them from perfect knowledge of any
'simple' object, whether corporeal or spiritual;
"De là vient que presque tous les philosophes confondent 
les idées des choses, et parlent des choses corporelles 
spirituellement —  Car ils disent hardiment que les corps 
tendent en bas, qu'ils aspirent à leur centre, qu'ils 
fuient leur destruction, qu'ils craignent le vide, — qui 
sont toutes choses qui n'appartiennent qu'aux esprits."
(p.1111; B.72)
The foregoing assertions that the objects comprising the world 
of nature are completely devoid of psychical properties and innate energies, 
so that it is no longer possible to resort to the age-old device of
(^) cited above, p.58.
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explaining the effects produced by such phenomena as air-pressure in 
terms of various passions, are final enough. But how do they tally, since 
they also imply that the movements of natural things are imposed upon them 
from without, with the conception of nature as not merely active but self­
ordering and progressive, with the capacity for change and development?
The difficulty here is very largely resolved if the proviso noted above:
"— la nature créée, qui est celle dont il s'agit;"—  is interpreted as 
pointing to some distinction between nature as process and nature as the 
effects which result from the process.
Germane to this question is the notion which Pascal develops 
of a relation between nature and God. As one would expect he conceives of 
God as the creator of the material univers, and refers in the Pensées to:
"La conduite de Dieu, qui dispose toutes choses avec 
douceur;— "(p.1090; B.185)
There is also the line from the "Wisdom of Solomon", quoted in such a
significant context in the "De l'esprit géométrique":
"Ces trois choses qui comprennent tout l'univers, selon 
ces paroles: 'Deus fecit omnia in pondéré, in numéro, 
et mensura',— " (p.583; G.E.IX, p.255)
i^nd Pascal's illuminating gloss on a passage from Saint Augustine in the
12th Provinciale:
"— 'l'ouvrage de Dieu', c'est-à-dire la nature;— " (p.79'8;G.E.V p.373) 
But when he becomes explicit as to the relation of the deity to the 
physical world, nature is seen to play a kind of intermediate role linking 
the two. Thus in the Entretien avec M. de Saci Pascal is recorded as
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having drawn a comparison between the way in which Epictetus and Montaigne
have succeeded in achieving some degree of resemblance in their writings
to: "— la sagesse veritable qu'ils ont essayé de connaître— ", and the
manner in which nature strives to reproduce God in all her works:
"— il est agréable d'observer dans la nature le désir 
qu'elle a de peindre Dieu dans tous ses ouvrages, oh. 
l'on en voit quelque caractère parce qu'ils en sont les 
images— " (p.571; G.E.IV.p.51-2)
Natural objects therefore bear a divine imprint in so far as they are
images of God, and in addition nature herself attempts to shadow forth
God in all her works. The notion of a dual causality is quite unmistakable
here, for Pascal makes a clear distinction between nature and God, affirming
(a) that nature desires to depict God in all her works, and (b) that the
divine stamp is discernible in these works because they are in fact the
images of God. And the choice of the conjunctive particle "oh", instead of
for example "ainsi", indicating that no necessary consequence relates the
two statements, suggests that he wishes to emphasize the two causal forces
here at work.
Although it should be borne in mind that the above do not
represent Pascal's 'ipsissima verba', they are confirmed by the following
extract from the Pensées:
"Quand on est instruit, on comprend que, la nature ayant
gravé son image et celle de son auteur dans toutes choses,— "
(p.1107; B.72)
Thus all phenomena in the physical world exhibit the image of nature, and 
more remotely (one presumes) that of nature's own author. And this relation
66
holds good not only in the physical world, but even in the human sphere,
for in the letter to his sister lime, périer and her husband, after the
death of their father, Pascal writes:
"Ne quittons donc pas cet amour que la nature nous a donné
pour la vie, puisque nous l'avons reçu de Dieu;— "
(p.497; G.E.II, p.553)
The notion of God standing as it were at one remove from the world, and
working through nature, appears also in a letter to Mile, de Roannez:
"Les impies, voyant les effets naturels, les attribuent à 
la nature, sans penser qu'il y en ait un autre auteur."
(p.510; G.E.VI, p.89)
It is clear from this conception of dual authorship that it is
through the agency of nature, construed as an active and generative
power in its own right, that God penetrates the world with his organizing
activity and accomplishes his ends. Nature, in the sense of the physical
world, is therefore to be distinguished from nature the active principle,
whose activity is the immediate cause of all the productions of that world.
The similarity is very irarked between nature as thus conceived and the
Aristotelean concept of "phusis", as it was taken over and developed by
(2)the Schoolmen, Pascal falls with them between Renaissance hylozoism, 
which regarded nature as something divine and s e l f - c r ea t i v e, a n d  the 
Cartesian idea of the world as a sort of giant clockwork, which needs an 
initial push but can then be left to its own devices. Marguérite Perier
(1) Reproduced with slight verbal alterations by PIMe.Périer in her Vie,p.21.
(2) cf. A.C.Crombie, op.cit., voll, p.69-72.
(3) cf. R .G .Coilingwoord: The Idea of Nature (London,1945) p.94?
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has recorded Pascal's comiaent on this conception of Descartes, according
to which the first mover, in the shape of an immaterial spiritual being,
is dispensed with after his original act of setting the universe in motion,
since its movements can then be explained as going on after its own
mechanical laws :
"Je ne puis pardonner à Descartes; il voudrait bien, dans 
toute sa philosophie, se pouvoir passer de Dieu, mais il 
n ’a pu s'empêcher de lui faire donner une chiquenaude 
pour mettre le monde en mouvement; après cela il n'a plus 
que faire de Dieu." (l) (B.77)
VJhether or not this criticism does full justice to Descartes's doctrine is
unimportant for the present discussion, since it suffices to indicate
Pascal's attitude toward the mechanistic solution of the problem of divine
interaction with the world of nature.
although Pascal, by means of this conception of nature as a sort
of active go-between linking the physical world with God, eliminates any
need to ascribe every detail in the behaviour of every natural object to
a special ad hoc act of will on the part of God, it is nonetheless clear
that he believes God continues to direct his world, which everywhere
exhibits his image. Here again there is a marked divergence from the
(1) Mémoire sur la vie de M. Pascal, loc.cit.
(2) The contemporary, outside the 8^chools, with whose views Pascal's idea of 
nature as a formative principle would seem to have most in common is Cudworth. 
In the True Intellectual System Cudworth specifies the function of his 
'plastic nature' as follows :"— there is a plastic nature under God which as 
an inferior and subordinate instrument doth drudgingly execute that part of 
his providence which consists in the regular and orderly motion of matter— " 
And just as Pascal, in the passage from the Préface quoted above p. 4 ^  
envisages nature as constant and continuously active, so Cudworth alleges in 
regard to his plastic nature that:"— it goes on in one constant unrepenting 
tenor from generation to generation— ", and that in this it constitutes
"— a living stamp or signature of the divine wisdom." Extracts quoted by 
C.E.Raven, Natural Religion and Christian Theology (London 1953)vol.I.pll5-6.
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Cartesian view, for, as M. Koyré has pointed out with respect to the ideas
elaborated in the Principes, "Descartes’ God, in contradistinction to most
previous Gods, is not symbolized by the things He created; He does not
express Himself in them. There is no analogy between God and the world,
no ’imagines’ and ’vestigia Dei in mundo’;— Pascal on the contrary,
in an early letter to Mme. Périer, refers to the;
"— ressemblance que la nature créée ait avec son. Créateur,— "
and contends that;
"— les moindres choses et les plus petites et les plus 
viles parties du monde représentent au moins par leur 
unité la parfaite unité qui ne se trouve qu’en Dieu,— "
(p.485; G.E.II, p.250-1)
No mention is made here of nature as the tertium quid, which bridges the
gap between God and the things that comprise the physical world. Yet the
use of the significant expression "nature créée", to designate things
analogous to "nature's works", which are elsewhere sharply differentiated
from nature as a creative force, clearly points in this direction.
The references to the way in which God is shadowed forth in all 
nature's works show plainly enough that Pascal is not concerned to withdraw 
from nature the support of the concept of God. Indeed he can even on 
occasion go so far as to affirm that "— je vois bien qu'il y a dans la 
nature un être nécessaire, éternel et infini" (p.1211; B.469), where the 
locative preposition "dans" makes it clear that this is so, not in the 
sense that natural objects by their very existence demand some such being 
as. an ultimate ground, but that this being is in some way discernible
(1) From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. (Baltimore,1957) p.lOO
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actually within the framework of nature. Despite this however, and despite 
the very obvious similarity between his conception of nature as an active 
principle linking God and the physical world and that taught in the Schools, 
it is not true that in his case the study of the physical world points to the 
idea of God as it did for the scholastic tradition. For it is undoubtedly 
this tradition, insisting as it did, in keeping with its aristotelean 
origins, that theology grows out of physical science in which its roots 
remain always firmly embedded, so that all knowledge appears in the last 
resort homogeneous, which is uppermost in Pascal's mind in the Préface, 
when he attacks the classification of disciplines current in his own day.
This fact in no way detracts however from the dignity and worth 
with which nature is invested in thus becoming co-partner almost with the 
deity in the work of creating and sustaining the physical world.
(l) He there emphasizes the absolute harrier separating the "sciences", 
where reason and empirical observation must be allowed free rein if 
knowledge is to progress, from those fields where what may be designated 
'literary authority' is alone competent to add to our knowledge, and 
where as a result great stress is laid upon the memory. Pre-eminent 
among the latter is theology, because authority "— y est inséparable de 
la vérité, et que nous ne la connaissons que par elle:— " (p.530:G.E.II,p.I31) 
Pascal's uncompromising rejection of the traditional proofs for the 
existence of God, drawn from the consideration of the physical universe 
or from metaphysical conclusions, also reflects this attitude.
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(iii) (d) Naturel diversity
The idea of nature, which has emerged from the preceding sections, 
as an active process manifesting itself in the continuity and unity 
running all through the physical world which comprises its effects, does 
not mean that the world is therefore devoid of multiformity and characterized 
only by change-and development. Indeed in a fragment from the Pensees. 
where he extends the conception of nature's diversity to the individual 
members of the human species, Pascal expressly asserts that uniformity is 
alien to nature as creative principle. With respect to the influence 
exerted on anyone's choice of profession by being continually subjected 
in childhood to hearing certain "métiers" recommended and the rest derided, 
he notes:
"Tant est grande la force de la coutume, que, de ceux que 
la nature n'a faits qu'hommes, on fait toutes les conditions 
des hommes, car des pays sont tout de magons, d'autres tout 
de soldats, etc. Sans doute que la nature n'est pas si 
uniforme. C'est la coutume qui fait donc cela, car elle 
contraint la nature;— " (p.1122-3; B.97)
On the contrary, it is evident from several further fragments in
the Pensées. that the inexhaustible diversity of nature's effects adds to
its worth in Pascal's view.
"La diversité est si ample, que tous les tons de voix, 
tous les marchers, toussers, mouchers, éternuements—
On distingue des fruits les raisins, et entre ceux-là 
les muscats, et puis Condrieu, et puis Desargues, et 
puis cette ente. Est-ce tout? en a-t-elle jamais 
produit deux grappes pareilles? et une grappe a-t-elle 
deux grains pareils? etc." (p.l095;B.114)
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"Diversité. - Un homme est un suppôt; mais si on 1 'anatomise, 
sera-ce la tête, le coeur, 1'estomac, les veines, chaque veine, 
chaque portion de veine, le sang, chaque humeur de sang? Une 
ville, une campagne, de loin est une ville et une campagne; 
mais, à mesure qu'on s'approche, ce sont des maisons, des 
arbres, des tuiles, des feuilles, des herbes, des fourmis, 
des jambes de fourmis, à 1'infini. Tout cela s'enveloppe 
sous le nom de campagne." (p.1095-6; B 115)
"Combien les lunettes nous ont-elles découvert d'astres 
qui n'étaient point pour nos philosophes d'auparavant!—
Il y a des herbes sur la terre; nous les voyons. - De la 
lune on ne les verrait pas. - Ét sur ces herbes des poils; 
et dans ces poils de petits animaux: mais après cela, plus 
rien. - 0 présomptueux! - les mixtes sont composés d 'éléments ; 
et les éléments, non. - 0 présomptueux! voici un trait 
délicat." (p.1218; B 266)
The last fragment here clearly impinges on the subject matter of 
the "Disproportion de l'homme" passage, where the theme of the two infinites 
discernible on all sides is more fully developed. There too Pascal 
emphasizes not only the boundless extent of the firmament hidden in the 
"ample sein de la nature", but also the fact that, however far we proceed 
in the analysis of the parts of even the most minute organism, we shall 
still find that they are syntheses made up of complex component parts, 
and this as far as the powers of seeing will carry us, and on into the 
infinitely little.
Thus despite his belief that nature is "éprise d'unité", Pascal 
has a deep sense of the irreducible character of the individual species, and 
of the immense complexity of the phenomena which go to make up the physical
(l) "Qu'un ciron lui offre, dans la petitesse de son corps, des parties 
incomparablement plus petites, —  que, divisant encore ces dernières choses, 
il épaise ses forces en ces conceptions, — Je lui veux peindre non seulement 
l'univers visible, mais 1 'immensité qu'on peut concevoir de la nature, dans 
1'enceinte de raccourci d'atome." (p.1106; B 72.)
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world. He contrasts, in a cryptic statement, the way in which nature
achieves unity in and through such manifold diversity, with the opposite
mode of design followed by human art, which models all its productions on
a single archetype:
"Nature diversifie et imite, artifice imite et diversifie."
(p.1095; B.120)
The significance of this distinction is made apparent in a further short 
fragment;
"La nature a mis toutes ses vérités chacune en soi-même;
notre art les renferme les unes dans les autres, mais
cela n ’est pas naturel: chacune tient sa place."(p.1102;B.21.)
Nature therefore in Pascal's view does not respond to this sort of 
manhandling, and thought, instead of trying to explain one property in 
terms of another, must just accept the world as it is empirically given, 
with the various phenomena all enjoying separate existence. To seek to 
interpret otherwise is to falsify nature, and Pascal's censure would 
obviously fall with equal severity on an a priori scheme into which every­
thing is fitted willy nilly, and on one which simply extrudes recalcitrant 
elements.
The continuity which runs all through its productions does not 
therefore prevent Pascal from seeing nature as always saying something new, 
as always enlarging before man's vision. And this infinite richness and 
diversity, as the language which he uses to describe it clearly indicates, 
enhances nature's value for him.
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Chapter three; Scientific Methodology
(i) The superiority of the geometrical method
Although Pascal's claim on behalf of geometry, that once mastered 
it provides the key to the path of the secrets of n a t u r e , i s  not 
substantiated in his own writings, this does not necessarily mean that its 
value is on that account reduced to negligible proportions, for its 
methodological superiority is not thereby impugned. On the contrary,
Pascal seems to have always retained a high respect for this aspect of 
geometry.
In a letter to Le Pailleur, written at end of 1647, he shows how
Noël's statement, that all substance is corporeal, is emptied of significance
since the latter confuses his personal definition of corporeality with what
normally goes by that name. He then points out that this confusion becomes
immediately apparent if the definition is substituted in place of the thing
defined in the statement in question, and adds;
"Je ne m'arrêterai pas davantage sur une conséquence dont
la faiblesse est si évidente, puisque Je parle à un 
excellent géométre, et que vous avez autant d'adresse 
pour découvrir les fautes de raisonnement, que de force 
pour les éviter." (p.385; G.E.II, p.195-6.)
No doubt allowance must be made here for the note of flattery which Pascal
permits to creep into his language, although he can have had little motive
for trying to ingratiate himself with Le Pailleur, who was already a close
(1) cf. above, p.
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(1)
family friend» Besides, what is important is that it should be 
le Bailleur’s qualifications as a geometer, which are alleged to constitute 
sufficient reason for not insisting further upon NoSl’s bad logic. In 
addition Pascal implies that the ability to detect and to avoid falling 
into errors in the conduct of reasoning is also contingent upon those 
qualifications »
Similarly in a letter to Fermat (I654), concerning the question
of probabilities, and the celebrated mathematical problem of the "règle des
partis", he writes :
"Je n'ai pas le temps de vous envoyer 1^ démonstration
d'une difficulté qui étonnait fort M. —  ^ ^^car il a très
bon esprit, mais il n'est pas géomètre (c'est, comme
vous savez, un grand défaut) et même il ne comprend pas
qu'une ligne mathématique soit divisible à 1'infini et
croit fort bien entendre qu'elle est composée de points
en nombre fini, et jamais je n'ai pu l'en tirer. Si
vous pouviez le faire, on le rendrait parfait."(p.80;G.£.111,p.388)
This judgement, that a lack of proficiency in geometry should constitute,
even in the case of one who evidently displayed little interest in acquiring
it, a serious lacuna in his intellectual equipment, is a significant
testimony to the esteem in which Pascal holds the mental training involved
in mastering this subject. For in his own terms, this inability to
perceive that a mathematical line admits of division ad infinitum simply
denotes that M.-'s mind is not logically accurate.
Again, in the dedicatory letter accompanying the arithmetical
(1) Mme.périer in her Vie describes him as Etienne Pascal's "ami intime".(p.6 
G.E.I, p,55.)
(2) Commentators are generally agreed that the person in question here is 
Méré. cf. Brunschvicg, ed.min., p.176, n.i.
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machine, he refers to mathematics as;
-Ucetbe veritable science, qui, par une préférence toute 
particulière, a l'avantage de ne rien enseigner qu'elle 
ne démontre,— " (p,352;G.£. I, p.301)
The emphasis here is on the method of demonstration used in the "true
science", for it is in this that Pascal implies its superiority lies.
Even in the letter to Fermat, dated august I66O, containing the
derogatory comments on geometry as an occupation, he still recognizes its
superiority as a form of intellectual discipline;
"— pour vous parler franchement de la géométrie, je la 
trouve le plus haut exercice de l'esprit; mais en même 
temps je la connais pour si inutile,—  elle est bonne 
pour faire l'essai, mais non pas l'emploi de notre 
force:— " (p.522; G.E.X, p.4-5.)
Finally in a fragment from the Pensées, taken up with discussing
the question of a suitable order in which to develop his apologetic
argument, Pascal notes;
"Ordre. - — Je sais un peu ce que c'est, et combien 
peu de gens 1'entendent. Nulle science humaine ne 
le peut garder. Saint Thomas ne l'a pas gardé. La
mathématique le garde, mais elle est inutile en sa
profondeur." (p.1102).
Here, as in the previous extract, the fact that geometry is 
useless in itself does not detract from the worth of its method for Pascal.
(i) (a) Superiority in demonstration of truth.
In the De l'esprit géométrique. Pascal outlines an ideal method
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of demonstration,to comply with which it would be necessary to 
rigorously • define all terms used, in addition to only advancing propositions 
proved by means of previously established truths. It is evident however 
that such a method would involve a process of indefinite regression in 
definition and proof, and is on that account impossible and completely 
impracticable. Besides, a point is always reached in this process where 
one comes up against 'primitive' words which cannot be defined, and primary 
propositions which it is impossible to get behind in order to prove - a 
state of affairs which Pascal regards as arising, not simply in the nature 
of the case, but because of the limitations of the human intellect. Whence 
he concludes;
"D'ou il parait "que les hommes sont dans une impuissance 
naturelle et immuable de traiter quelque science que ce 
soit dans un ordre absolument accompli." (p.579;G.E.IX,p.246)
The method within the scope of the human mind which approximates 
most closely to this unattainable ideal is the geometrical, which Pascal 
designates;
"Get ordre, le plus parfait entre les hommes,— "(ibid.G.E.IX,p.247)
It consists in keeping to a via media ("à se tenir dans ce milieu") of 
defining only those things not clear and understood by all men, and of 
proving only those things not known by men. And in order to expound the 
'art' of demonstrating truths, and of making them so clear that their 
proofs cannot be refuted, Pascal claims that;
(l)"— qui formerait les démonstrations dans la plus haute excellence, 
s'il était possible d'y arriver, — " (p.577; G.E. IX, p.242)
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"— je n ’ai pour cela qu’à expliquer la méthode que 
la géométrie y observe; car elle 1'enseigne parfaitement 
par ses exemples quoique’elle n'en produise aucun 
discours." (p.576; G.E.IX, p.241.)
In the second part of the treatise, having enumerated the rules which
comprise "La conduite des preuves méthodiques parfaites",(p.596-7;G.E.IX,
p.277-80) Pascal refers back to them^^^ in the following terms:
"La méthode de ne point errer est recherchée de tout 
le monde. Les logiciens font profession d'y conduire, 
les géomètres seuls y arrivent, et, hors de leur science 
et de ce qui l'imite il n'y a point de véritables 
démonstrations. Tout l’art en est renfermé dans les 
seuls préceptes que nous avons dits: ils suffisent seuls, 
ils prouvent seuls; toutes les autres règles sont inutiles 
ou nuisibles. Voilà ce que je sais par une longue 
expérience de toutes sortes de livres et de personnes."
(p.601; G.E.IX, p.287)
Thus in regard to the traditional scholastic logic he claims to 
wipe the slate clean - the rules which he outlines, derived as they are from 
the practice of geometry, alone represent the true instrument of demonstratiai. 
Traditional logic may have 'borrowed’ some of these rules from geometry,
"sans en comprendre la force" (p.600;G.E.IX, p.286), or made passing 
reference to them, but this, far from reflecting to the credit of 
scholasticism, only testifies with even greater force to the confusion that
(2)
clouds its methods of reasoning. In this way Pascal flatly denies all
(1) In a preliminary conspectus the eight rules are reduced to 'three essent­
ial parts';"— à définir les termes dont on doit se servir par des (finitions 
claires; à proposer des principes ou axiomes évidents pour prouver la chose 
dont il s'agit; et à substituer toujours mentalement dans la démonstration 
les définitions à la place des définis." (p.596;G.E.IX, p.277). Pascal goes 
on to claim with respect to the foregoing: "— jamais une démonstration dans 
laquelle ces circonstances sont gardées n'a pu recevoir le moindre doute;
et jamais celles ou elles manquent ne peuvent avoir de force."(ibid;G.E.IX 
p.278).
(2) "Car de l'avoir dit en passant, sans avoir pris garde que tout est 
renfermé là-dedans, et au lieu de suivre ces lumières, s'égarer à perte de 
vue après des recherches Inutiles,— c'est véritablement montrer qu'on 
n'est guère clairvoyant,— " (p.601; G.E.IX, p.287)
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substance to the claim that the geometrical canon implies nothing new, 
since it is already included within the corpus of the traditional logic*
The fact that he has put his finger on "La source de tous les défauts des 
raisonnements, qui sont véritablement communs" (p.598; G.E.IX, p.283) - the 
failure to comply with these very rules - abundantly illustrates Just how 
ill-founded this criticism is. For, if exception be made of those practised 
in geometry, "qui sont en si petit nombre qu’ils sont uniques en tout 
un peuple et dans un long temps" (p.598-9; G.E. ibid), the ’art’ which 
he expounds represents something quite new, different from anything 
contemplated by the schoolmen - it is the high road to certainty in 
demonstration.
and in answer to a further charge, that the geometrical method
of demonstration which he has set out is useless in practice, since it is
restricted in application solely to geometrical problems. Pascal affirms
that in actual fact there is;
"— rien de plus utile et de plus universel"(p.598;G.E.IX,p.282)
The usefulness of this method is amply demonstrated by the fact that;
"Le défaut d'un raisonnement faux est une maladie qui ^
se guérit par ces deux remèdes." (p.601;G.E.IX, p.288)
For the 'two remedies' here refer to the two fundamental principles which
he has previously asserted to contain in epitome the whole of the new 'art':
to define all words used and prove all propositions, taking care always to
mentally substitute the definition in place of whatever is defined in the
d e m o n s t r a t i o n . B y  contrast, the method used by the old logicians to
'> Ï-
(l) cf. above, p.HI n. i.
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expose the sophisms of captious arguments has been simply to invent a
'barbarous' nomenclature, and to apply indiscriminately a plethora of
rules for the conduct of reasoning, with the result that the handful which
really do point the way to the desired goal are hopelessly obscured in the
(1)
tangle.
With respect to the universality of the rules which he la s elaborated,
Pascal nain ta ins : ,
"Rien n'est plus commun que les bonnes choses; il ' |
n'est question que de les discerner, et il est certain < 
qu'elles sont toutes naturelles et à notre portée, et 
même connues de tout le monde. Mais on ne sait pas les 
distinguer. Ceci est universel. Ce n'est pas dans les 
choses extraordinaires et bizarres que se trouve 
1'excellence de quelque genre que ce soit. On s'élève 
pour y arriver, et on s'en éloigne;— la nature qui seule 
est bonne, est toute familière et conmiune.
Je ne fais donc pas de doute que ces règles, étant 
les véritables, ne doivent être simples, naïves, 
naturelles, comme elles le sont. Ce n'est pas 'barbara' 
et 'baralipton' qui forment le raisonnement. Il ne 
faut pas guinder l'esprit;— " (p,602;G.E.IX,p.288-9.)
( 2 )As H. Brunschvicg has noted, '  ^ Pascal here does little more than • .
echo and enlarge upon Montaigne's indictment of the "philosophy" taught in
the educational establishments of his day - there is the same scorn poured
on the barren form of syllogistic reasoning practised by the Schoolmen,
the same distrust of an imposing and high-sounding terminology, the same
conviction that the 'natural' criterion to be aimed at is synonymous with
( 3 )the simple and familiar. However, what is of especial significance for
(1) And Pascal avers that: "— on ne peut débrouiller tous les replis de ce 
noeud si embarrassé qu'en tirant l'un des bouts que les géomètres assignent— " 
(p.601;G.E.IX, p.288)
(2) Pensées et Opuscules. ed.min* p.195, n.i.
(3) cf. Essais (Garnier) I, p.173 (De 1'institution des enfants).III p.371 
(De 1'expérience)
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the present enquiry, is that Pascal makes these criticisms and claims against 
the background of the geometrical method. It is to the methodological 
tenets derived from the pr ocedure followed in geometrical demonstrations 
that he expressly ascribes the prized qualities, natural, simple, familiar, 
which guarantee universal application to the new 'art', and set it as an 
intellectual instrument within the reach and grasp of all men.
The reason why geometry is considered to be thus uniquely
qualified to provide the rules for the logic of demonstration in every
field of enquiry, is made apparent in the following extracts. In the
prologue to the treatise, the rules relating to the geometrical 'art*
of proving each proposition individually and setting out all the propositions
in the best order, are alleged to contain;
"— tout ce qui sera nécessaire pour la conduite du 
raisonnement à prouver et discerner les vérités,— "
(p.576;G.E.IX,p.241, u.2)
And a further claim advanced on geometry's behalf makes it plain that the
"truths" here in question do not relate exclusively to geometrical matters:
"— elle (la géométrie) seule sait les véritables règles 
de raisonnement, et — s'arrête et se fonde sur la véritable 
méthode de conduire le raisonnement en toutes choses, que 
presque tout le monde ignore,— "(p.576;G.E.IX,p.242,n.1.)
Once again, having thus affirmed that geometry alone conforms to the true
procedural rules applicable to reasoning in whatever context, Pascal goes
on to say that it has been empirically established that, among minds of
similar calibre, other things being equal,
"— celui qui a la géométrie 1'emporte et acquiert une 
vigueur toute nouvelle." (ibid; G.E.ibid)
"  -i
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These confident assertions, that an account of the modus operandi
of geometry will bring to light all the principles necessary for the
guidance of reason in whatever field, imply that Pascal believes the method
followed by geometrical reasoning to be that which reason must use for
demonstrative certainty in every field of the knowable. A further extract
directly testifies to this belief:
"— la géométrie —  est presque la seule des sciences
humaines qui produise d'infaillibles démonstrations,
parce qu'elle seule observe la véritable méthode, au
lieu que toutes les autres sont par une nécessité
naturelle dans quelque sorte de confusion que les
seuls géomètres savent extrêmement connaître."(p.576-7;G.E.ibid).
Despite the obscurity of the final clause here, the basic judgement is clear
enough: geometry alone among the sciences has evolved a method adjusted to
the inherent nature of the intellect, and one which furnishes a framework
within which human reasoning can attain to certain demonstration. Thus in
the sentence immediately following, where mention is made of the ideal
method, which must remain for ever out of reach of the human mind, Pascal
maintains that this is so because,
"— ce qui passe la géométrie nous surpasse;— "
(p.577; G.E.IX, p.242)
The geometrical method therefore exploits^to the full the positive faculties
of the human intellect as well as recognizing its limitations, and so
represents the ultimate, at least in practical terms, in this sphere.
However, despite all this, and despite his contentions as to its 
usefulness and universality, Pascal himself is not entirely without some 
misgivings as to whether the geometrical method represents anything more
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than an unrealizable ideal outside geometry itself. Thus in the second
section of the treatise, before enumerating the rules for the "conduite
des preuves méthodiques parfaites," which involves showing how the
particular truths requiring to be demonstrated flow as a necessary
consequence from generally accorded principles, he expresses doubt as to
whether such rules will hold good outside geometry;
"— comme il y a peu de principes de cette sorte, et que
hors de la géométrie, qui ne considère que des figures
très simples, il n'y a presque point de vérités(^/dont
nous demeurions toujours d'accord,— je ne sais s 'il y a
moyen de donner des règles fermes pour accorder les
discours à 1'inconstance de nos caprices^"(p.$95-6;G.E.IX,p»277)
The simplicity characterizing the objects which form the subject-matter of
geometry is therefore peculiar to geometry alone. This means that the
general agreement as to the meaning and truth of the principles, which have
to be accorded as a prerequisite for certain demonstration, will be
unattainable in any other sphere. Consequently a set of fixed rules, which
lay down the procedure followed in geometry for demonstrating truth, cannot
hope to achieve the same success when applied to any other subject-matter*
;
(1) cf. above, V*ll n.i,
(2) The term "vérité" is synonymous in this context with "principe", as 
when Pascal a little earlier groups them together "— des principes 
communs et des vérités avouées." (p.593; G.E.IX, p.274).
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(i) (b) Superiority in discovery of truth.
In the brief prologue to the treatise De 1'esprit.géométrique,
Pascal affirms that geometry excels not merely in the art of demonstrating
truths already found, but also in the original discovery of truths:
"La géométrie —  a expliqué l'art de découvrir les vérités
inconnues; et c’est ce qu'elle appelle .analyse,— " (p.576;
G.E.IX, p.240-1)
However, he considers it unnecessary to expound this aspect of the 
geometrical method in view of the e^chaustive treatment it has received at
the hands of other writers. Consequently it is necessary to turn to his
own mathematical writings to obtain some idea of the light in which he 
regards this geometrical art of discovering truths.
Now whatever else Pascal may understand by this 'art' the one
thing which he emphatically does not envisage it as implying, at least in
so far as his own discoveries in this field are concerned, is a set of a
priori principles in conformity with which all solutions of geometrical
problems must be framed. On the contrary he himself seems to be content to
allow the particular problem to be the occasion for the formulating of a
law that springs almost spontaneously to his mind when applied - a stochastic
approach, which finds typical expression in the 'apology' at the end of a
short essay, outlining the means of determining if a given number is divisible
by some other given number. He alleges that;
"— si j'ai touché ce sujet c'est parce que je cédais 
volontiers à l'attrait de la nouveauté— "(p.l65.
Trans.p.l427;(l) G.E.III, p.338)
(l) Of a piece with this attitude is the way in which he refuses to be drawn 
into discussion upon mathematical problems in which he has no special 
interest. His lame excuse in a letter to Fermat illustrates this;for, after 
expressing admiration of the latter's method for solving the puzzle of the
cont. P084.
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This does not mean to say however that Pascal evinces no interest
in the discovery of laws or principles which admit of general application
in the special subject matter to which they relate - indeed, if a single
unifying theme had to be assigned to his mathematical researches this
would have a strong claim to priority. Even the youthful treatise on
conics, no longer extant but of which a sumiiary from Pascal's own hand
still survives, affords ample evidence of such an interest. For he there
claims that, having once established his famous theorem - that the
intersections of the three pairs of the opposite sides of a hexagon
inscribed in a conic are collinear - he will proceed to set out:
"— des Eléments coniques complets, — quoi faisant, nous 
énonçons les propriétés que nous en touchons d'une 
maniéré plus universelle qu'à 1'ordinaire,— " (p.6l;
G.E. I, p.255)
Mersenne maintains that he did in fact deduce from it more than four
(2)
hundred corollaries. And when about to enumerate some of the various 
usages to which his theory of the arithmetical triangle can be put, Pascal 
writes :
"— j'en laisse bien plus que je n'en donne; c'est une 
chose étrange combien il est fertile en propriétés."
(p.108; G.E.III, p.465)
Two illuminating statements in regard to the art of discovery that 
leads to the formulation of such fertile principles, occur in the course of
(1) cont. from p.83. "partis", he goes on; "Mais, Monsieur, si j'ai concour^u 
avec vous - en cela, cherchez ailleurs qui vous suive dans vos inventions 
numériques, —  Pour moi, je vous confesse que cela me passe de bien loin;— " 
(p.90; G.E.III, p.43.1.)
(2) In the preface to his Cogitata Phvsico - Mathematica,(Paris, I644)
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the treatises relating to the arithmetical triangle. In the conclusion
to a cognate treatise on numerical orders Pascal affirms;
"La méthode que j'ai donnée pour la résolution des ordres 
numériques est tout à fait générale. Cependant je ne 
l'ai trouvée qu'après bien des recherches.— je cherchais 
ainsi les racines non pas suivant une règle générale 
mais suivant une règle appropriée a chaque ordre 
particulier.—  Puis donc qu'on ne connaît pas encore 
de règle générale pour la résolution des puissances, 
je n'osais guère espérer en trouver une pour la 
résolution des ordres : mais le résultat de mes efforts 
a dépassé mon attente, et j'ai trouvé la méthode que  ^ . 
j'ai exposée plus haut, méthode tout è fait générale,— "
(p.138-9. Trans.p.l408;G.E.III, p.524-5)
The important point here is the account of the genesis of the 
general method, which, as the context clearly shows, is the equivalent of 
a principle or law. It does not antedate the initial formulation of the 
problem, but only comes to light in the course of calculations undertaken 
with a view to solving this. So that Pascal does not confront the question 
ready-armed with an all-purpose formula which can be adapted to any field of 
enquiry, but is led to propound his general rule only when, after treating 
numerous individual instances, the thread linking them together becomes 
apparent. The hallmark of the geometrical art of discovery would thus seem 
to be a flexibility of the reason, which enables a set of categories to be 
devised appropriate to the subject matter being studied, but realizes all 
the while that, although these categories are useful in this particular
(l) Pascal continues : "— et qui fut fort goûtée de mes savants amis, amateurs 
de solutions universelles. Ce sont eipc qui m'ont conseillé de tenter une 
résolution générale des puissances numériques à l'instar de la résolution 
générale des ordres." This reference to the "Paris Academy", as the source 
of inspiration behind the search for "solutions universelles", is highly 
significant, since it emphasizes the stochastic character of Pascal's own 
approach.
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context, they will be of no relevance in another.
The second statement 'occui's at the end of a short general treatise,
where Pascal has extended some other of the consequences of the arithmetical
triangle to the subject of numerical orders. The last enunciated proposition
is to be left for application to whoever itay be interested in exercising
his talents in this branch of research, which should claim the attention
of all geometers ;
"— car si on ne sait pas tourner les propositions à tous
sens, et qu'on ne se serve que du premier biais qu'on a
envisagé, on n'ira jamais bien loin; ce sont ces diverses
routes qui ouvrent les conséquences nouvelles, et qui,
par des énonciations assorties au sujet, lient des
propositions qui semblaient n'avoir aucun rapport dans
les termes ou elles étaient commues d'abord."(p.134;G.E.III,p.511)
Pascal's conception of the function of "analyse" in a geometrical context
is presented in a nutshell in this extract. It presupposes an ability
to view all sides of a problem almost simultaneously, thus grasping
unforeseen consequences, and enabling fresh relationships between
propositions to be elucidated. He comments further on this geometrical
"analyse" in the fragment from the Pensées. distinguishing between the
two different types of "sens droit".
"Les uns tirent bien les conséquences de peu de principes, 
et c'est une droiture de sens. Les autres tirent bien
les conséquences où il y a beaucoup de principes. Par »
exemple, les uns comprennent bien les effets de l'eau, 
en quoi il y a peu de principes;—
Et ceux-là ne seraient peut-être pas pour cela grands 
géomètres, parce que la géométrie comprend unrgrand 
nombre de principes,—
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Il y a donc deux sortes d'esprits : l 'une de pénétrer 
vivement et profondément les conséquences des principes, 
et c'est là l'esprit de justesse; l'autre de comprendre 
un grand nombre de principes sans les confondre, et c'est 
là l'esprit de géométrie. L'un est force et droiture 
d'esprit, l'autre est 1'amplitude d'esprit."(p.IO93-4)
The "esprit de justesse", the type of analytic mind ideally suited to
grapple with the problems of physics, and which adopts what may be termed
for purposes of classification a method of linear inference, is set in
sharp contrast to the "esprit de géométrie", which follows what may best
be described as an order of manifold implication. For if the last two
extracts are considered together, it is evident that Pascal believes the
work of discovery in geometry requires the capacity to grasp clearly in a
single mental act a complex nexus of correlative factors, and to perceive
the nanifold lines of implxatory sequences contained therein*
And yet, although the quality of mij^ prescribed as the sine qua
non for geometrical "analyse" is "amplitude", whereas "pénétration" is
j
regarded as belonging rather to the method of enquiry used in physical j
science, in at least one mathematical context it is this latter ,
characteristic which Pascal claims to prize most highly. Indeed his challenge! 
to the "géomètres les plus illustres de l'univers" (p.lSO), to furnish a 
solution to the problem of the cycloid, is specially designed to exercise 
and appropriately recognize it. In the course of formulating the problem,
and having made quite clear what particular cycloid he has in mind, Pascal
remarks that one thing remains to be done, in order to make his invitation 
more acceptable to the geometers to whom it is addressed;
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M— c'est d'écarter de notre programme toutes les choses,
— qui ne réclament aucune pénétration d'esprit, cette 
dernière qualité étant la seule dont nous fassions cas, 
que nous recherchions et que nous désirions couronner."
(p.182. Trans. p.1435; G.E.VIII, p.18)
Obviously therefore the mind must be perspicacious (the phrase "pénétration
d ’esprit" is a translation of Pascal's "perspicacitas ingenii'), as well as
flexible, if it is to accomplish fruitful researches in geometry.
There is a marked contrast between this conception of "analyse", 
the instrument of discovery in geometry, and that of the art of geometrical 
demonstration. The latter constitutes a method, a set of universally 
valid rules which only need to be applied in order to achieve their 
object, and which level minds and capacities,leaving little or nothing 
to the differences of intellectual power; whereas the former could more 
aptly be called an approach, demanding special mental aptitude, and which 
is improvised to fit the peculiarities of particular subject-matter 
within the general field of geometry.
(ii) The primacy of "lumière naturelle".
Pascal's profound admiration for the geometrical ideal in 
demonstration stems in large part from the simplicity which marks the
( 1  ''i
class of objects comprising the subject matter of geometry. It is
(l) cf. above, p.31.
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true of course that he considers the "order" followed by geometry, in 
defining all the things it treats of which are not clear, and proving 
all those which are not known,to approximate most nearly to the ideal 
method, and the degree of precision it attains where definition is necessary 
to be such that there is no need of a dictionary to understand any of the 
terms used. But quite apart from this, it is plain that he wishes to
stress the advantage of the peculiarly transparent nature of the terms 
and propositions with which geometry is primarily concerned.
Thus in the De l'esprit géométrique, having pointed out that
1U
geometry is unable to provide definitions of any ofj^ t^hings which make up 
its basic objects - motion, nuiûber, space - Pascal remarks that this should 
cause no surprise, since this "excellent science" deals only with the 
simplest things.
-•"•cette même qualité qui les rend dignes d'être ses objets, 
les rend incapables d'être définies; de sorte que le manque 
de définition est plutôt une perfection qu'un défaut, parce 
qu'il ne vient pas de leur obscurité, mais au contraire de 
leur extrême évidence,— " (p.583;G.E.IX, 25$0•
Lilvewise in the case of the separate principles; that each of the above
concepts is potentially infinite in respect of addition or division:
"Toutes ces vérités ne se peuvent démontrer, et cependant
ce sont les fondements et les principes de la géométrie.
Mais comme la cause qui les rend incapables de démonstration ^
n'est pas leur obscurité mais au contraire leur extrême
évidence, ce manque de preuve n'est pas un défaut, mais
plutôt une perfection." (p.584;G.E.IX, p.257)
1
The significance of these assertions, that the inability to extend the
(1) cf. p.582; G.E.IX, p.254.
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machinery of definition and demonstration to such terms and propositions
is caused by the very simplicity of the recalcitrant items and their
"extreme évidence", lies in the fact that this "extrême évidence" in turn
results from "lumière naturelle". For it is elsewhere alleged of the "order"
followed by geometry, that:
"— il ne suppose que des choses claires et constantes par 
la lumière naturelle, et c'est pourquoi il est parfaitement 
véritable, la nature le soutenant au défaut du discours".
(p.579:G.E.IX, p.246-7)
The simplicity and clarity of those primitive terms like space,
time, motion, number, which do not admit of any definition, is thus
accounted for in terms of "lumière naturelle". Such terms designate "so
naturally" the things they signify that any attempt at clarification would
(l)in their case contribute more obscurity than instruction. The human
mind when challenged to produce adequate definitions of these simple words 
finds itself unable to do so, but Pascal argues that the testimony of 
normal everyday conversation bears out his contention that "lumière 
naturelle" makes good this deficiency by ensuring that any such term is 
recognized, and seen as denoting the same idea, everyone wherever it 
is in question.
(1)ln illustration of this point Pascal holds up to ridicule the definition 
said to have been proposed by Plato, of man as a two-legged animal without 
feathers, and objects : "Comme si l'idée que j'en ai naturellement et que je 
ne puis exprinier n'était pas plus nette et plus sûre que celle qu'il me donne 
par son explication inutile et même ridicule;— " (p.579;G.E.IX,p.248).
(2)"— si la nature n'avait supplié è ce défaut par une idée pareille qu'elle 
a donnée à tous les hommes, toutes nos expressions seraient confuses; au 
lieu qu'on en use avec la même assurance et la mêiae certitude que s'ils 
étaient expliqués d'une manière parfaitement exempte d 'équivoques ; parce que 
la nature nous en a elle-même donné, sans paroles, une intelligence plus nette 
que celle que l'art nous acquiert par nos explications." (p.580;G.E.IX,p.249)
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The description of geometry's "order", as the assuming of only
what is clear by "lumière naturelle", indicates that it is by this means
also that primary propositions are known to be true without being proved.
And in a context where he has just affirmed that geometry undertakes the
demonstration of all propositions not self-evident, Pascal adds;
"quand elle (la géométrie) est arrivée aux premières 
vérités connues elle s'arrête là et demande qu'on les
accorde, n'ayant rien de plus clair pour les prouver:
de sorte que tout ce que la géométrie propose est 
parfaitement démontré, ou par la lumière naturelle, 
ou par les preuves." (p.$82; G.m.IX, p*2$4).
The only instance cited in the presenttr-eatise of such a proposition
"demonstrated" by "lumière naturelle", is that motion, number, space and
time are all potentially infinite in respect of addition and division.
Positive proof in this case is both impossible and unnecessary, for the
intellectual certainty with which the truth of this kind of proposition
is recognized is immediate. Indeed Pascal claims of this sort of knowledge
that:
"II n'y a point de connaissance naturelle dans l'homme 
qui précède celles-là, et qui les surpasse en clarté."
(p.585; G.E.IX, p.2$8)
M. Droz has undertaken an exhaustive examination of the implications
of the fragments from the Pensées where Pascal seems to advocate what he
describes as the "pyrrhonist" a t t i t u d e . I f  seriously intended, this
would undermine the certainty of immediate awareness of the meaning of
the indefinable terms, as well as of the truth of the undemonstrable
(2)
propositions, which comprise the very groundwork of geometry. However 
U) p.1188-9;B.386,387,388,392 and p.1204-7;B.434-
(2) The argument of these fragments is adumbrated in the Entretien avec M. 
de Saci. where Pascal attributes to Montaigne the following sceptical approach: 
"II demande —  puisque nous ne savons ce que c'est q u e —  temps, espace,
cont. p.92.
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M. Droz makes plain the extent to which this seeming endorsement of the 
"pyrrhonist" position on Pascal's part is a deliberately chosen move within 
the general strategy of the apology, and concludes that it does not impugn 
in his terms the validity of this sort of k n o w l e d g e . T h e  statement 
from the De l'esprit géométrique, that such knowledge is unsurpassed in 
clarity and priority by any other natural knowledge, therefore stands.
The preceding extracts amply attest the high esteem in which 
Pascal holds this immediate knowledge. Yet despite this, and despite the 
fact that "lumière naturelle" plays such a crucial role in his conception 
of the geometrical method, in assigning the limits to which definition and 
demonstration are to be pushed, he nowhere in the coeurse of the treatise 
explains precisely what the terms "la nature" or"la lumière-naturelle" 
signify in this particular context. Furthermore, such information as can 
be inferred from the passages where these expressions occur is discrepant 
in regard to an obviously central issue - the degree of conviction which 
self-evident terms and propositions carry with them, in comparison with 
those defined and demonstrated with full logical rigour. The fact that, 
because of an inherent weakness of the human intellect, certain primitive
(2) cont. from page 91. mouvement, vérité, —  ni expliquer l'idée que noua 
nous en formons, comment assurons - nous qu'elle est la même dans tous les 
hommes, vu que nous n'en avons d'autre marque que l'uniformité des 
conséquences, qui n'est pas toujours un signe de celle des principes?—  il 
examine aussi profondément —  la géométrie dont il montre 1'incertitude dans 
les axiomes et dans les termes qu'elle ne définit point, comme d 'étendue, de 
mouvement, etc.,— " (p.$66-7; G.E.IV, po43-4)
(l) E.Droz: Etude sur le scepticisme de Pascal (Paris 1886) p.183-213.
However, M. Droz seems to me to pass into the realm of pure conjecture on 
this question\hen he attributes to Pascal the belief that: "Toutes nos 
connaissances spontanées et intuitives, sont l'oeuvre de ce que nous avons 
conservé de notre sainteté originelle;— " op.cit.,p.108-9,cf.p.198-9? and 




words have to be left undefined and certain primary propositions accorded 
without demonstration, points undeniably to the conclusion that they will 
have as a result inferior convincing power. And Pascal affirms that the 
geometrical "order", when set beside the ideal method of demonstration, 
is :
"— à la vérité inférieur en ce qu'il est moins convaincant, 
mais non pas en ce qu'il est moins certain. Il ne définit 
pas tout et ne prouve pas tout, et c'est en cela qu'il lui 
cède; mais il ne suppose que des choses claires et constantes 
par la lumière naturelle, —  la nature le soutenant au 
défaut du discours." (p.$79; G.E.IX, p.246-7).
The capacity of the geometrical method is therefore held to be 
in some measure defective in producing conviction simply because it is 
compelled to stop short of complete definition and demonstration - a 
judgement which reflects back on to the "lumière naturelle". The same 
point is made in regard to the lack of definition in the case of the 
concepts forming the subject matter of geometry, \h ich is said to derive 
from:
"— leur extrême évidence, qui est telle qu'encore qu'elle 
n'ait pas la conviction des démonstrations, elle en a 
toute la certitude." (p.$83; G.E.IX, p.2$$)
However, later in the first section, the following "sole and favourable
reason" is alleged to account for the inability of geometry to define its
its prime terms, and to demonstrate its basic principles;
"— que les uns et les autres sont dans une extrême clarté 
naturelle qui convainc la raison plus puissamment que le 
discours." G.E.IX, pl 2$7)
(l) cont. from p.92. coeur et la raison selon Pascal (Paris 19$0) p.121-2. 
Neither writer seems to me to produce convincing evidence in support of 
this view.
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This statement is the direct converse of the preceding ones. In them it 
was precisely in respect of convincing power that such "clarté naturelle" 
was asserted to fall short of "discours", which in Pascal's terminology 
denotes the process of definition and reasoned proof. Clearly these 
conflicting assertions make it impossible to determine with any degree of 
certainty whether he actually does believe that "lumière naturelle" falls 
short of "discours" in convincing power. But at all events the primacy 
of the knowledge that derives from this source, and the certainty which 
Pascal repeatedly ascribes to it, remain unaffected by such inconsistencies.
More directly consequent upon his failure to specify his exact 
meaning in using the words "la nature" and "la lumière naturelle", is the 
confusion w^hich arises between the function of mind involved and the kind 
of object upon which the mind is directed. For although it is obvious 
where "lumière naturelle" is in question that the object apprehended, 
whether term or pronosition, is self-evidencing, bathed in natural light,
|;  ^ ^
there is no unequivocal statement in the treatise ;to the effect that any ■
distinctive act of apprehension or power of mind corresponds to this special j,
type of object. That the nature of the object contributes to, and indeed | .
is the factor that determines, the immediacy and certainty with which it is f :
registered cannot be doubted; but it is extremely difficult to ascertain f
whether Pascal's references to "lumière naturelle" point only to this and 
no more. If such were in fact the case, the mind's part in the operation ; g
would be purely passive and receptive. It would be impossible to speak yq.
- 1
even of its native capacity for immediate awareness being called into ’
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action, as it were, by the simplicity of the object in question, nnd 
this is undoubtedly the import of the last extract quoted, which occurs 
later in the treatise than any considered previously. The sole distinction 
drawn there is between the "clarté naturelle" and the "discours", which 
differ in the degree of conviction they succeed in producing upon the 
self-same passive "raison" - the latter does not have any special or 
separate functions or aspects matching the former.
Although "lumière naturelle" in this treatise signifies almost 
a medium of cognition - that which helps to bring the mind into relation 
or contact with the o b j e c t - Pascal does use the term in four other 
contexts to denote a power of intellectual perception. In the Entretien 
avec M. de Saci. the phrase "abandonnés a leurs lumières naturelles" occurs 
(po565;G.E»IV,p.41), and in the Pensées the expression is used as follows; 
"Parlons maintenant selon les lumières naturelles"(p.1213; B.233). "Ils 
ont vu par lumière naturelle" (p.1279;B.556), "nos lumières naturelles"
(n.ll^9; E.392)^^^ However, this is not sufficient to justify M. Laporte, 
when he succumbs to the temptation of identifying "la nature", "lumière 
naturelle", as employed in the treatise, with the "coeur", as described
(3)
in the Pensées. He is no doubt setting the correct interpretation
(1) It is at least feasible that it is in fact the peculiar nature of the 
object itself which is responsible for thus aiding cognition and ensuring 
immediate awareness.
(2) In the fragment on "pyrrhonism", from which this last extract is taken, 
the expression "clarté^naturelle" appears to be employed as in the treatise. 
Similarly with "la nature", in the phrase; "La nature soutient la raison 
impuissante,— " in a related fragment (p.1206; B.434)
(8) Lp nnionT» pt. raison selon Pascal, p.83
4- r‘ •
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on the term "lumière naturelle" as it appears in the above extracts, but 
the internal evidence of the treatise points to a quite different conclusion 
for the usage there. The relevant parts of the "coeur" fragment from the 
Pensées run;
"Nous connaissons la vérité, non seulement par la raison, mais 
encore par le coeur; c'est de cette dernière sorte que nous 
connaissons les premiers principes, —  la connaissance des 
premiers principes, comme qu'il a espace, temps, mouvement, 
nombres, est aussi ferme qu'aucune de celles que nos 
raisonnements nous donnent. Et c'est sur ces connaissances 
du coeur et de 1 'instinct qu'il faut que la raison s'appuie, 
et qu'elle j fonde tout son discours. Le coeur sent qu'il 
y a trois dimensions dans l'espace, et que les nombres 
sont infinis ; et la raison démontre ensuite,— les principes 
se sentent, les propositions se concluent, et le tout avec 
certitude, quoique par différentes voies," (p.1221-2)
Now whereas in the De l'esprit géométrique space, time, motion 
and number are treated as primitive terms, which do not admit of any 
definition, Pascal is concerned with them in this passage as propositions, 
so that the "coeur" grasps intuitively not what these concepts signify, but 
that they have objective existence. One of the first principles here 
alleged to be apprehended by the "coeur" - that numbers are infinite - is 
classified in the treatise as a primary proposition not amenable to 
to demonstration, but nonetheless known to be true through "lumière 
n a t u r e l l e " And the primacy and certainty of this immediate knowledge 
is insisted upon no less in the fragment from the Pensées than in the
(l) It is noteworthy in regard to the remaining example of a first principle 
-that space is three dimensional- that in a further fragment Pascal refers to 
the object of pure geometry as space "— dont elle considère la triple 
étendue en trois sens divers qu'on appelle dimensions, lesquelles on 
distingue par les noms de longueur, largeur et profondeur— " However, he 
makes no claim that the fact that space actually three dimensional is 
known intuitively, but merely that these underlined terms "sont connus 
d'eujc-mêmes". Nor do any of the theorems, which he there designates as 
"connus naturellement", contain any reference to that fact. (p.602-3?G.E.IX, 
p. 291-2).
9 7 ,
extract from the treatise»
However, despite this and despite the obvious similarity between
the epistemological views expounded in the two contexts, if they are set
alongside each other it becomes evident that Pascal had two distinct,
even if related, aims in view when writing them. In the passage from the
Pensées he is concerned to distinguish between two quite separate faculties
or activities of mind - the "coeur" and "raison". The former assures us
of certain primary data which it apprehends by an immediate, intuitive act,
while the latter guarantees as it were our advance from these data by
means of "discours" or stringently prosecuted reasoning. In the De l'esprit
géométrique on the other hand, it is not two distinct functions of mind
that are in question, but two different kinds of objects - terms and
propositions requiring definition and demonstration, and terms and
propositions which do not admit of any definition and demonstration - and
the means whereby in the case of terms they are rendered intelligible,
and in the case of propositions they are proved to be true. Thus Pascal
asserts in regard to the terms employed in geometry that they are all:
"— parfaitement intelligibles, où par la lumière naturelle, 
ou par les définitions qu'elle (la géométrie) en donne,— "
(p.582; G.E.IX, p.254)
and that:
"— tout ce que la géométrie propose est parfaitement 
démontré, ou par la lumière naturelle, au par les
preuves." (ibid) G.E. ibid). ■.
^ . 4 " -  I
It is clear from the symmetrical structure of these phrases that "lumière j p i
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naturelle" denotes a characteristic of the terms and propositions in 
question, and not a form of intellectual vision. Besides it would be 
nonsensical to speak of a word being intelligible, or a proposition being 
proved, ^  a faculty of mind; where definition and demonstration can or 
must be dispensed with this is so because the meaning of the term and the 
truth of the proposition are luminous to the mind as the result of their 
peculiar nature.
Moreover, it would be utterly paradoxical for Pascal to maintain 
in one and the same section of a treatise that our inability to produce 
definitions of primitive terms and demonstrations of primary propositions 
stems from a weakness inherent in the human intellect, and that definition 
and demonstration are unnecessary and impossible in such cases because 
some native power of the mind registers them intuitively. When he refers 
therefore to "nature" making good the deficiency with respect to definition, 
by ensuring that wherever a primitive word is pronounced the same idea is 
summoned up to the mind of everyone who hears it,, and again when he affirms, 
after marking the limitations of geometry in definition and proof, that 
"— la nature fournit tout ce que cette science ne donne pas." (p.583; G.E.IX, 
p.254, n.i.), it would be quite gratuitous to assume that the term "nature" |#
in this context is synonymous with the "coeur" of the Pensées, meaning the ij
K
intuitive side of the mind. "Nature" here is much closer in connotation P
to the usage in the Pensees where it represents the ordaining principle 
responsible for assigning the different objects of knowledge to their 
appropriate s o u r c e s * A n d  the means whereby "nature" guarantees the
(l) cf. above p.fel.
99.
mind access to terms and propositions not susceptible of definition or 
proof is, not by awakening in it any innate power of immediate awareness,
n
but by so ordering these objects that they confront the mind in such a
(1)
direct fashion that it cannot help but recognize them.
Despite his discrepant statements as to the precise source of 
this immediate knowledge, Pascal’s insistence on its fundamental character, 
regardless of whether it derives from the mind’s intuition or rather from 
the self-evidence of the objects in question, gives at least one element 
of consistency to his treatment of it. Even if, in the De 1 ’esprit 
g^ométrique. the primacy of "lumière naturelle" is essentially the result 
of the limitations of the human intellect, and so to that extent only a 
second best to complete definition and complete proof, the fact remains that 
Pascal himself claims that the whole of geometry is built on the knowledge 
which it furnishes.
(l) M. Laporte brings out very clearly the fundamental divergence between 
Pascal’s and Descartes’s conception of intuitive and discursive knowledge. He 
notes that whereas the former regards "coeur" and "raison", in his terminology 
the intuitive and discursive faculties, as radically heterogeneous, function­
ing in his own words "par différentes voies", the latter’s aim is to show 
conclusively that the mind intuits its first principles and conducts its 
deductive reasoning by means of the self-same infallible insight, thus 
reducing deduction to a series of intuitions, (cf.Laporte,op.cit.,p.106; also 
V, Delbos La philosophie française. Paris 1919, p6$) Nor does the expression 
"lumière naturelle", as it is used by Descartes in his Regies pour la 
direction de 1’esprit and other writings, to describe the natural power of 
discriminating the true from the false, native to the minds of all men, 
correspond with Pascal’s usage in the De 1’esprit géométrique, where it 
denotes a characteristic peculiar to certain objects of mind. (cf.particularly 
a letter to Mersenne 16.10.1639 concerning Herbert of Cherbury’s account of 
the human intellect. Pléiade ed.,p.1059-60) Moreover, in view of the sharp 
cleavage which Pascal envisages between "coeur" and "raison", it is evident 
that his conception of "true method", as one that should ideally be able to 
do without any appeal to intuitive knowledge, is alien to Descartes’s basic 
epistemological tenets. For as Professor Joachim has noted with respect to
cont, p.100,
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(ill) "Démonstration" and certain knowledge in -physics.
At the conclusion of his letter to Le Pailleur, Pascal describes
the confusion of opinion among those persons who maintain that nature
constitutes a plenum, and goes on to point out that it is unnecessary to
take the trouble of refuting them since they all contradict one another.
Truth is not to be looked for amid such disagreement:
"— l ’on ne peut la trouver hors de cette maxinie, qui 
ne permet que de décider des choses évidentes, et qui 
défend d ’assurer ou de nier celles qui ne le sont pas."
(p.390; G.E.II, p.210).
In view of the context in which it is put forth, two highly
significant implications can be drawn from this "maxim" in regard to
Pascal’s conception of physics: (a) true knowledge is attainable in this
science, which (b), when properly conducted, deals with "choses évidentes".
And this "maxim" is in fact the epitome of a "universal rule", enunciated
in the opening paragraphs of the earlier letter to Noël, and designed to
avoid any needless misunderstanding over points of method. Pascal claims
that this rule applies in all subjects which have as their aim the discovery
of truth, and, since the occasion of the letter is a disagreement over a
question of physics, it is obviously directed more especially to that field.
"— on ne doit -jamais porter un jugement décisif de la 
négative ou de l’affirmative d ’une proposition, que 
ce que l’on affirme on nie n ’ait une de ces deux 
conditions; savoir, ou qu’il paraisse si clairement 
et si distinctement de soi-même aux sens ou à la 
raison, suivant qu’il est sujet à l ’un ou à l ’autre, 
quJJ^ l’esprit n ’ait aucun moyen de douter de sa certitude
(l) cont.from p.99.’ the Règles ; "What he says implies the recognition • 
that so far as intuitus is absent our knowledge is neither genuine nor 




et c ’est ce que nous appelons orincioes ou axiomes ; 
comme par example; ’si à choses égales on ajoute choses 
égales, les touts seront égaux’; ou qu'il se déduise 
par des conséquences infallibles et nécessaires de tels 
principes ou axiomes, de la certitude desquels dépend 
toute celle des conséquences qui en sont bien tirées ; 
comme cette proposition, ’les trois angles d'un triangle 
sont égaux à deux angles droits,’ —  Tout ce qui a une 
de ces deux conditions est certain et véritable, et tout 
ce qui n'en a aucune passe pour douteux et incertain.’’
(p.371; G.E.II, p.90-1.)
The Cartesian tone in which this passage is written is misleading,for
although Pascal asserts that one should accept as true only self-evident
propositions, and what results from following the correct logical expansion
of such propositions, he is in reality far removed from the epistemological
position of Descartes. For he expressly affirms'that self-evident principles
or axioms can derive from either the senses or the reason, and implies that
it is possible for certain things to confront the senses with the same
clarity and distinctness as others confront the reason. Descartes on the '
contrary, makes it quite plain in the second of his Regies pour la direction
de l ’esprit, that the reason why the power of knowing attains its perfect
realization in geometry, is because the supreme simplicity of the objects
there presupposes nothing dependent on sense-observation. By his insertion
of the word ’’sens’’ in the above context, Pascal thus completely disregards
the basic Cartesian distinction between rational intuition and sensible
experience.
Since Pascal describes the precepts laid down in this "universal
(l) Pascal himself says of the rule that: "— elle fait la principale de 
la façon dont on traite les sciences dans les écoles,— ’’ (p.370-1; 6.E. II, 
p.90).
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rule" as the "conditions nécessaires pour rendre une démonstration parfaite"
(p.372; G.E.II, po94)j hinting that Noel has failed to comply with them, it
is evident that he considers it possible to comform to them, and so to
achieve "perfect demonstration" in physics. He goes on to examine Noël's
supposed refutation of the vacuum thesis in the light of these precepts,
and points out that in his attempt to prove the space in question corporeal:
"— vous prenez pour principes deux choses: la première
est qu’il transmet la lumière avec réfractions et réflexions ;
la seconde qu’il retarde le mouvement d ’un corps." (p.371;
G.E.II, p.92)
These two principles, although Pascal disallows them, are by definition
propositions wholly dependent upon evidence furnished by sense-perception.
And his rejection of them is correspondingly based on the fact that the
former at least "— n ’a paru véritable à aucun de ceux qui l ’ont voulu
éprouver,— " but that precisely the opposite has always been observed to
occur: i.e. the only refraction discernible in the light rays which penetrate
the space is caused by the glass surrounding it. Noël has simply concluded
from the fact that the ray reflected by the glass does pass through this
space, and that bodies do take time to fall there, that it must be composed
of some material substance in order to transmit such light and cause such
retardment. However Pascal claims that:
"— si nous rapportons cela à la méthode de raisonner dont 
nous avons parlé, nous trouverons qu’il faudrait auparavant 
être demeuré d ’accord de la définition de l’espace vide, de 
la lumière et du mouvement, et montrer par la nature de ces 
choses une contradiction imnifeste dans ces propositions;
’Que la lumière pénètre un espace vide, et qu’un corps s ’y 
meut avec temps.’ ’’ (p.372;G.E.II, p.93).
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Until such time as these conditions have been fulfilled, Noël’s "proof" 
remains inadmissible. The "rule" therefore not only sets out the procedure 
for perfect demonstration, but also acts as the criterion by which to judge 
the validity of demonstrations already performed, -and the implication of 
what is alleged to result, when Noel’s conclusion is referred to the terms 
of the rule, is that to assert the converse of what appears clearly and 
distinctly to the senses or the reason amounts to the same thing as to involve 
oneself in a manifest contradiction.
The opening chapter of Pascal’s second treatise illustrates his
application to a concrete instance of the tenetpropounded in the "rule",
that consequences shown to follow with perfect logical rigour ("des
conséquences infaillibles et nécessaires") from principles are logically
dependent on them, although there is no reciprocal dependence of the
principles on consequences. Having postulated the principle that air has
weight, he goes on to deduce a number of consequences from it, in respect of
which he maintains :
"II y a une liaison si nécessaire de ces conséquences avec 
leur principe, qrf l’un ne peut être vrai, sans que les 
autres le soient également: et comme il est assuré que 
l ’air qui s ’étend depuis la terre jusqülau haut de sa 
sphère a de la pesanteur, tout ce que nous en avons conclu 
est également véritable." (p.450; G.E.III, p.198). 1
(l) In his Des principes du debvoir et des connoissances humaineè. Roberval 
enunciates an identical tenet: "Il y a des propositions qui d ’abord ne 
paroissent ny fausses ny vrayes, comme —  un triangle a trois anglæesgaux -fe
I deux angles droits; mais, lorsqu’on fait voir qu’elles sont comprises soîiis •
des vérités premières, et tellement conjointes et annexes avec elles qu’elles 
ne peuvent estre vrayes les unes sans les autres, elles sont tenues pour 
certaines; que si on ne monstre aucune de ces connexités, elles demeurent 
ou doibvent demeurer toujours douteuses." (Cousin, op.cit., p.243). And in 
his letter to Des Noyers he applies this principle, alleging that in physics 
the only safe course to follow is: "— dubia pro dulDiis, incerta pro incertis 
habere; nec cuivis placito aut dogmati assentiri, nisi aut lumine naturali 
ac sensu coimnuni, aut certe evidenti demonstratione ab evidentibus principiis 
deducta, illud verum esse constat;— " (G.E.II, p.331-2)
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Thus it is obvious that Pascal's attitude towards the principle in question 
is in no way affected by the discovery that it leads to such particular 
results; and this despite the fact that he takes it more or less for 
granted as a generally known phenomenon, referring those desirous of 
additional proof, apart from the significant difference in weight 
discernible- between an inflated and deflated balloon, to writers who 
have dealt specifically with the question. In such circumstances it would 
not have been surprising to find him looking to the productiveness of his 
principle to provide confirmation of its truth, but even here it is only 
because he accepts the principle first, as clear in itself, that he accepts 
the consequences to which it leads.
A further indirect illustration of this irreversible pattern of
demonstration in physics occurs in the conclusion to the two treatises,
where Pascal relates that before experiments had established that water
will not rise in pumps beyond a certain level:
"— il n ’y avait pas lieu de démontrer que la pesanteur 
de l'air fût ce qui élevait l'eau dans les pompes; puisque 
cette pesanteur étant limitée, elle ne pouvait pas 
produire un effet infini." (p.46l;G.E.III,p.263).
The principle that air has weight is certain; but since this weight is
limited because the atmosphere is not infinite in extent, it follows that
inferences drawn from the principle will be certain only in so far as they
take cognizance of this fact and do not attempt to relate an indefinite
effect to it - i.e. their certainty does not extend beyond that of the
i-
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. . T (1)principle.
Additional instruction on the form which a demonstration should
take in physics is given in the letter to Le Bailleur. Prompted by Noël's
continual confusion of a definition with a proposition, Pascal sets out
what he regards as the "véritable ordre" in which things should be treated;
"— l'on doit toujours définir les choses, avant que de 
chercher si elles sont possibles ou non, et —  les degrés 
qui nous mènent à la connaissance des vérités, sont la 
définition, l'axiome et la preuve; car d'abord nous 
concevons l'idée d'une chose; ensuite nous donnons un 
nom à cette idée, c'est-à-dire que nous la définissons; 
et enfin nous cherchons si cette chose est véritable ou 
fausse. Si nous trouvons qu'elle est impossible, elle 
passe pour une fausseté; si nous démontrons qu'elle est 
vraie, elle passe pour vérité;— " (p.380;G.E.II,p.184-5)
Precisely the same "order" is prescribed for a correct geometrical
/ / (2)
demonstration in the De l'esprit r^eometrique And since it is a question 
of physics which is being debated, Pascal here carries over into physics, 
along with the traditional geometrical "order", the geometrical ideal of 
certain demonstration.
The way in which experimentation is combined with deductive 
reasoning in order to demonstrate conclusions in physics, is clearly shown 
in the opening chapter of the second treatise, which commences as follows:
(1) cf. 2nd treatise, ch.Ill, p.444, where Pascal argues as follows :"Puisque 
la pesanteur de l'air produit tous les effets —  il doit arriver que, comme 
cette pesanteur n'est pas infinie, et qu'elle a des bornes, aussi ses effets 
doivent être limités;— " G.E.III, 225.
(2) "La conduite des preuves méthodiques parfaites" is there alleged to 
consist in the following three steps: "— à définir les termes— ; à proposer 
des principes ou axiomes évidents, pour prouver la chose dont il s'agit;— " 
(p.596) cf. above,p.77 n.i.
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"On ne conteste plus aujourd'hui que l’air est pesant; 
on sait qu'un ballon pèse plus enflé que désenflé: cela 
suffit pour le conclure;— " (p.42S;G.E.III, p.193)
Pascal's reason for thinking it safe to postulate his fundamental principle
in this way, unsupported except by common experience, probably lies in the
acquaintance he can presume in his reader with Torricelli's discoveries.
That he considers it sufficiently established is evident from the promptness
with which he passes on to the business of educing its consequences:
"Ce principe posé, je ne m'arrêterai qu'à en tirer quelques 
conséquences." (p.429; G.E.III, p.194)
These include: the limited weight of the mass of air, which follows from
the fact that the sphere of air is not infinite in extent; the extension,
by analogy, of the effects of the weight of water on the ocean-bed to that
of air pressing down on all parts of the earth-surface; and most important,
the fact that the pressure of air is greater at lower levels, and hence
that a balloon half-full of air at sea-level may be expected to expand
considerably if carried to a mountain top where less pressure will be
exerted upon it. Pascal claims that there is a "liaison si nécessaire" '
binding these consequences to the principle from which they have been
deduced, that it is impossible for the latter to be true without them
(2)being true also. Yet, however certain these conclusions are found to 
be, it is desirable to confirm the last consequence by experiment, for if 
a balloon is actually seen to expand as it is carried higher :
(1)e.g. the passage from the famous letter to Ricci; "Nous vivons submergés 
au fond d'un océan d'air, et nous savons par des expériences indubitables que 
l'air est pesant— " Letter dated II.6.I644. Transi. Gh.Thurot; Note histori­
que sur 1'expérience de Torricelli; Journal de Physique, 1872, p.173.
(2) cf. above, p.iof, One of the conditions stipulated in the "rule" for 
certain demonstration.
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"— il n'y aurait aucun lieu de douter que cette enflure 
ne vînt de ce que l ’air du ballon était plus pressé en 
bas qu'en haut, puisqu'il n'y a aucune autre chose qui 
put causer qu'il s 'enflât, —  et cet.e compression de 
l'air du ballon ne pourrait avoir d'autre cause que le
poids de la masse de l'air; —  et partant cela prouverait
absoluirient que l'air est pesant; que la masse de l'air est 
pesante; —  Et comme dans la physique les expériences ont 
bien plus de force pour persuader que les raisonnements.
Je ne doute pas qu'on ne désirât de voir les uns confirmés 
par les autres." (p.430-1; G.E.III, p.198-9)
Thus, although it is true in one sense to say that the
consequences deduced from the basic principle established by experiinentation
hang with their whole weight from it, since they remain dependent upon it
for their original certainty, they are also supported by cross-reference
to further experiments. And the certainty, which Pascal believes it possible
to attain by this method, is attested by the sort of language he uses in
recording these results. Such phrases as; "il n'y aurait aucun lieu de
douter", "cette compression— ne pourrait avoir d'autre cause", "il n'y a
aucune autre chose qui pût causer", " cela prouverait absolument," together
with the fact that he intends to base the whole of: the ensuing treatise
on the above conclusion, point to his having regarded the degree of
certainty procurable by this method in its demonstrations as. equal to 7*'
any claimed for those of mathematics »
The first letter to M. de Ribeyre contains an admirable summary
of this method of dove-tailing induction from experimental data with
(l) A little further on Pascal states with respect to this experiment: "Cette 
expérience prouve tout ce que J'ai dit de la masse de l'air, avec une force 
toute convaincante; aussi était-il nécessaire de le bien établir, parce que 
c'est le fondement de tout ce discours." (p.431; G.E.III, p.200-201.)
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(l)reasoned de^'Ucticn:
"Ces nouvelles nous ayant été en l'année I646 portées à 
Rouen, —  nous y fîmes cette expérience d'Italie sur 
les mémoires du P. Mersenne, laquelle ayant très bien 
réussi je la répétai plusieurs fois ; et par cette
fréquente répétition, m'étant assuré de sa vérité,
j'en tirai des conséquences, pour la preuve desquelles
je fis de nouvelles expériences très différentes de
celle-là,— " (p.404; G.E.II, p.482-3)
The procedure which Pascal describes here, as in the previous extract, -
establishing the experiiriental fact as a principle^ deducing the consequences
it implies ; and proving that what is thus found to follow from the fact is
in agreement with experimental findings - does not strictly conform to
the pattern laid down in the "universal rule". According to it the third
step would be superfluous, since the consequences, if deduced with full
logical rigour from the principle, are equally with it "certaines et
véritables".(pa37l) These inconsistencies notwithstanding, Pascal
undoubtedly considers the method a fertile instrument for the discovery
of certain knowledge in physics.
However, it is not merely with respect to the conclusions arrived 
at by means of (Eduction from experimental facts, and verified by further 
experiments, that the language used by Pascal is highly significant. The 
sort of conviction which he claims is produced by 'crucial experiments' 
themselves, also shows that he believes it possible to achieve a degree of
(l)Pascal's father seems to have been his precursor in this combined use of 
induction and deduction. Mersenne, in the course of dedicating the sixth 
book of his Harmonie universelle to "Président Pascal", remarks; "— cette 
partie de la Philosophie,— vous est plus obligée qu'à nul autre, à raison du 
mariage très excellent que vous avez fait de la Pratique avec la Théorie." 
Quoted G.E. vol.I, p.174.
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certainty in demonstrations in physics equal to that attainable in geometry.
Thus in the introductory section of the Expériences nouvel1es, having listed
the various objections which continue to carry some weight with the
opponents of the vacuum thesis, despite the success of Torricelli's
experiment, he recounts that;
"Je me résolus donc de faire des expériences si convaincantes, 
qu'elles fussent à 1 'épreuve de toutes les objections qu'on y 
pourrait faire;—  (p.363: G.E.II, p.59-60).
In the forward to the Récit de la grande expérience—  he states that his
reason for calling it the "grande expérience" is:
"— parce qu'elle est la plus démonstrative de toutes celles 
qui peuvent être faites sur ce sujet,— " (p.392; G.E.II,p.366)
He daims further of this experiment that in regard to the "horror vacui"
notion it provides:
"— une parfaite connaissance de ce que j'en devais 
croire." (ibid., G.E. ibid.
Again in the first letter to M. de Ribeyre, in the course of outlining the
contents of his projected treatise on the vacuum, where the precise extent
of his debt to Galileo and Torricelli will be made clear, Pascal affirms
with respect to this experiment;
"— il paraîtra par quels degrés on est arrivé aux 
connaissances que nous avons maintenant sur ce sujet, 
et que cette dernière expérience du Puyjie Dême fait 
le dernier de ces degrés." (p.409; G.E.II, p.495)
The "grande expérience" therefore forges the final conclusive link in a
chain of discoveries; and when he refers to it in the conclusion to his
two treatises, it is in the following almost extravagant terms;
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"—  l'expérience qui a été faite sur les montagnes 
a renversé cette créance universelle du monde, que la 
nature abhorre le vide, et ouvert cette connaissance 
qui ne saurait plus jamais périr, que la nature n ’a 
aucune horreur pour le vide, qu'elle ne fait aucune chose 
pour 1 ' éviter, et que la pesanteur de 1.'air est la 
véritable cause de tous les effets— " (p.462,G.E.III,p.266)
And in the concluding paragraph of the Récit— , where he has been again
discussing the importance for the problem of the vacuum of this
’I experiment urn crucis ’, Pascal writes;
"— le traité entier —  dans lequel je déduirai les 
conséquences que j'en ai tirées, et que j'avais 
différé d'achever jusqu'à cette dernière expérience, 
parce qu'elle y doit faire l'accomplissement de mes 
démonstrations." (p.401;G.E.II, p.372-3.)
In this case therefore, Perier's experiment carried out on the Puy de Dôme
provides the clinching data for the demonstrations of the whole of the
projected treatise. Elsewhere in the Recit— . when discussing whether
sufficient evidence of a conclusive kind has been produced to justify
abandoning the old explanation of the phenomena relating to the vacuum,
he affirms;
"En effet, je n'estime pas qu'il nous soit permis de 
nous départir légèrement des maximes que nous tenons 
de l'antiquité, si nous n'y sommes obligés par des 
preuves indubitables et invincibles. Mais en ce cas 
je tiens que ce serait une extrême faiblesse d'en 
faire le moindre scrupule, et qu'enfin nous devons 
avoir plus de vénération pour des vérités évidentes, 
que d'obstination pour ces opinions reçues." (p.393;
G.E.II, p.155)
(1) This merely repeats, with added emphasis, what Pascal has already affirmed 
at the end of the Récit— . that as a result of the experiments described in 
the earlier Abrégé— ; "— je ne fais plus de difficulté de prendre le
principe que la pesanteur et pression de l'air en est la seule et véritable 
cause,— " (p.400; G.E.II, p.371)
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Pascal believes therefore that the sort of evidence which he is in a
position to bring forward, as a result of the experiments he has been
carrying out, furnishes "indubitable and invincible proof" of the falsity of
the "horror vacui" theory, and successful experiments are by implication
classified as "obvious truths". A little further on, while describing the
difficulty of finally disproving this theory, he speaks of himself as:
"— résolu —  de chercher 1'éclaircissement entier de cette 
difficulté par une expérience décisive. J'en ai imaginé 
une qui pourra seule suffire pour nous donner la lumière 
que nous cherchons,—  Vous voyez déjà sans doute, que 
cette expérience est décisive de la question — " (p.394;
G.E.II, 159-60.)
And recounting the gradual stages by which he jettisoned the traditional
beliefs, "— cédant à la force de la vérité qui m'y contraint," he alleges
that in the end:
"— 1'évidence des expériences me force de quitter les 
opinions ou le respect de 1 'antiquité m'avait retenu."
(p.401; G.E.II, p.371.)
Also the letter to Le Pailleur provides two examples of the power 
of confirmatory experimental data to transform mere opinion into certain 
knowledge. In regard to Noël's speculations on the capacity of void space 
to transmit light-rays, Pascal relates that the "opinion" contrary to Noël's 
was accounted the more likely by other savants:
"— avant même qu'elle re^ut les forces que ces expériences 
lui ont apportés." (p.379; G.E.II, p.l82)
Again he writes of Torricelli's conjecture ("pensée"), that the weight of 
the surrounding air was the trie cause of a liquid remaining suspended in 
an inverted tube, that;
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"Nous en attendons —  l'assurance de 1'expérience 
qui s'en doit faire sur une de nos hautes montagnes,— "
(p.386; G.E.II, p.198)
The belief in the certainty of knowledge attainable in physics 
by the combined use of induction and deduction, which is amply attested in 
the foregoing extracts, together with the transference to that domain of 
the geometrical ideal of demonstration, mark a striking divergence from 
the views of the anti-Cartesian "school" of s a v a n t s , w i t h  whom Pascal 
is generally in such close agreement upon questions of scientific 
methodology. Mersenne, Roberval and even G a s s e n d i , a l l  sharply 
distinguish between mathematics and physics, reserving to the former alone 
the capacity to achieve certain knowledge and true demonstration.
(l)cf. P. Boutroux; L'histoire des principes de la dynamique avant Newton.
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale. 1921, p.679-80.
(&) For Mersenne the essential difference between physics and mathematics 
lies in the fact that it is impossible to achieve certain demonstration 
in physics. A demonstration, as Aristotle had laid down, must start from 
assur.ed principles, and since in physics such principles, so far as the 
human mind is concerned, are non-existent, demonstration is impossible there 
(cfoR. Lenoble;Mersenne. ou la naissance du mécanisme. Paris 1943,p.313) In 
his Harmonie universelle, after recording one of his experiments, Mersenne 
gives the following warning; "— je suis bien esloigné de vouloir demonstrer 
tout ce que je prouve par expérience,—  parce qu'il faut convaincre !j
1 ' entendBiûent par la raison évidente pour la contraindre d ' embrasser une 
démonstration; ce que je desire que l'on remarque une fois pour toutes afin 
que l'on ne croie pas que j'use tousjours de la diction demonstrer ou 
demonstration dans un sens I4athématique; ce que ceux-là concluront aysement 
qui souvent la difficulté qui se rencontre à demonstrer aucune chose dans la 
Physique, dans laquelle il est très difficile de poser d'autres maximes plus 
avantageuses que les experiences bien réglées et bien faites— " (quoted 
Lenoble, op.cit., p.384). Similarly Gassendi, despite his belief that science 
must be firmly grounded on "données sensibles", concedes the superiority of 
mathematics in the matter of demonstration. In his inaugui-al lecture at the 





(iv) The contrast with Pascal's view of the non-final character of 
knowledge acquired in physics.
The light in which Pascal regards the conclusions arrived at in
physics, at least as this appears in the extracts considered in the
previous section,hardly tallies with the attitude which he himself adopts
with respect to the discoveries made by that science in other contexts.
In the Préface pour le traité du vide, he states quite
unequivocally that;
"Les expériences —  sont les seuls principes de la 
physique." (p.532; G.E.II, p.136)
And in the conclusion to his two treatises he endorses this view as follows;
"— les expériences sont les véritables maîtres qu'il 
faut suivre dans la physique— "(l)(p.462;G.E.III,p.266)
These two statements are noteworthy here chiefly for the particular
significance which they lend to the following assertion, also from the
Préface— :
(2) cont.from page 112. que la Mathématique, car dans le reste de ce qu'on 
appelle les sciences, il n'y a point de démonstrations, mais seulement des 
conjectures, à moins qu'elles ne profitent de quelque lumière venue des 
Mathématiques". (quoted.H.Berr:Du scepticisme de Gassendi (Paris,I960) p.96. 
Roberval too clearly differentiates between the knowledge attainable in 
mathematics and physics respectively, in a Fragment inédit.(G.E.vo1.II.p.50-1) 
And Mersenne, in his Optique et catoptrigue. attributes to someone,
"également versé en la Philosophie et en la Mathématique", whom the Abbé 
Lenoble has identified as beyond question Roberval, the view that, although 
principles may be all very well in mathematics, none such are available in 
physics, and that: "au deffaut de tels principes, nous devons avoir recours 
a une experience constante faite avec les conditions requises, pour en tirer 
des conclusions vraisemblables. Et il appelait Science, la cognoissance qui 
vient des conclusions de la premiere sorte: quant aux conclusions tirées des 
experiences; il appelait Opinion la cognoissance qui nous en vient." (quoted, 
Lenoble,op.cit., p.416)
(1) cf.from the first chapter of the second treatise: "— dans la physique les 
expériences ont bien plus de force pour persuader que les raisonnements,— " 
(^ -.430-1; G.E.III, p.199)
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"— dans toutes les matières dont la preuve consiste 
en expériences et non en démonstrations, on ne peut 
faire aucune assertion universelle que par la générale 
énumération de toutes les parties ou de tous les cas 
différents(p.535;G.E.Il)p.144)
By drawing such a sharp distinction between questions where proof takes the
form of "expériences", and those where it takes the form of "démonstrations",
Pascal directly implies that the methods of indue tion and demonstration are
mutually exclusive, and therefore, in view of the two preceding‘extracts,
that demonstration can have no place in physics. It is nature itself which
is responsible for giving this strongly empirical colouring to Pascal's
approach, thus in his own terms ruling out the possibility of reaching
demonstrative certainty in physics. Although in the Préface—  he is
concerned above all to emphasize the ever-expanding character of huimn
knowledge, consequent upon the continuously active object of its
interpretation, it is clear that he believes it is also because of this
that the investigator must close hand to hand with phenomena if nature is
(l)to be induced to reveal her secrete.
Moreover, the conception of scientific knowledge that underlies 
most of his relevant methodological pronouncements, as something essentially 
tentative, would seem to exclude, except in the case of a refutation, the 
possibility of achieving anything in the nature of a demonstration in 
physics. Illustrative of this are the rules proposed for testing the
(l) "Les secrets de la nature sont cachés; quoiqu'elle agisse toujours, on 
ne découvre pas toujours ses effets; le temps les révèle d 'age en âge, et 
quoique toujours égale en elle-même, elle n'est pas toujours également 
connue. Les expériences qui nous en donnent 1'intelligence multiplient 
continuellement; et comme elles sont les seuls principes de la physique,— " 
(p.532; G.E.II, p.l36)
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validity of hypotheses in the letter to Noël. The latter's practice of 
accounting for the results arrived at in Pascal's experiments by conjuring 
up a sufficiently elusive substance, whose properties admit of whatever 
modification imy be needful to bring it into line, calls forth the following 
retort:
"— toutes les fois que, pour trouver la cause de plusieurs 
phénomènes connus, on pose une hypothèse, cette hypothèse 
peut être de trois sortes. Car quelquefois on conclut un 
absurde manifeste de sa négation, et alors l'hypothèse est 
véritable et constante; ou bien on conclut un absurde 
manifeste de son affirmation, et alors 1 'hypothèse est 
tenue pour fausse; et lorsqu'on n'a pu encore tirer 
d'absurde, ni de sa négation, ni de son affirmation,
1 'hypothèse demeure douteuse; de sorte que, pour faire
qu'une hypothèse soit évidente, il ne suffit pas que 
tous les phénomènes s 'ensuivent, au lieu que s'il 
s'ensuit quelque chose de contraire à un seul des 
phénomènes, cela suffit pour assurer de sa fausseté."
(p.374; G.E.II, p.98-9)
This assertion, that an hypothesis is not necessarily proved veracious
/
just because it accounts for all the phenomena, really means that no amount
of positive evidence can ever conclusively confirm an hypothesis, although
(1)only one negative instance is needed to conclusively falsify it. In 
support of his contention, Pascal refers to the various cosmological
(l) Pascal differs radically from Descartes in this rejection of the method 
of formulating explanatory hypotheses deemed to be verifiable by the products 
of mere observation. M. Gilson's admirable summary of the way in which 
Descartes sets about tackling a problem in physics serves to bring this 
divergence out. Having pointed out that it is their "fécondité explicative", 
which eventually establishes for Descartes the truth of principles in a 
deductive chain, he concludes in regard to hypotheses that;"La démonstration 
djune hypothèse de physique consiste donc à montrer que ses conséquences 
régulièrement déduites s'accordent avec les faits; et la seule réfutation 
que l'on puisse en apporter consiste soit a montrer par 1'expérience que les 
suppositions initiales sont fausses, soit a relever des paralogismes dans la 
déduction des conséquences que l'on en tire." Etudes sur le rôle de la 
pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésian. (Paris 1951)p.131-2» 
That the former of these alternatives does not provide for the
continued on p. Il6
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explanations which have been advanced. Each of these answers the facts,
but only one can be correct; and he continues, addressing Noël;
"Vous voyez par là qu'encore que de votre hypothèse 
s ’ensuivissent tous les phénomènes de mes expériences, 
elle serait de la nature des autres; et que, demeurant 
toujours dans les termes de la vraisemblance, elle 
n'arriverait jamais à ceux de la démonstration,"
(p.375; G.E.II,p.101)
The full rigour of the conditions, which an hypothesis must
satisfy in order to be accepted as true, or to attain the "terms of
demonstration", becomes apparent by contrast with the relative ease with
which it can be proved false, after showing that the most favourable
judgement it is possible to pass on Noël's"opinion"relating to the vacuum
"serait de la mettre au rang des vraisemblables", Pascal adds;
"Mais comme on en conclut nécessairement des choses
contraires aux expériences, jugez quelle place elle
doit tenir entre les trois sortes d'hypothèses dont 
nous avons parlé tantôt."(p.376; G.E.II, p.103)
The inference which he plainly intends to be drawn from this 
statement is that an hypothesis, from which conclusions are deduced 
contrary to experimental fact, is equivalent to one from the affirmation 
of which a manifest absurdity follows - i.e. an untenable one. Yet, in
view of his express assertion, that no amount of positive evidence of this
cont. from page 115. discounting, in Pascalian fashion, of the hypothesis 
once accepted, by the emergence of a single piece of contradictory evidence, 
is shown by Descartes's remark in a letter to Mersenne: "Je me moque du 3r. 
Petit et de ses paroles, et on n'a, ce me semble, pas plus de sujet de 
1'écouter, lorsqu'il promet de réfuter mes réfractions par 1'expérience, que 
s'il voulait faire voir, avec quelque mauvaise équerre, que les trois angles 
d'un triangle ne seraient pas égaux à deux droits," (à Mersenne,9.2.1639)
Thus Descartes believes that once an hypothesis has become established as asc- 
iehtific law, and has been integrated in his rational framework, it is, so to 
speak, out of the range of experiments, unless these can be shown to have 
undermined, by bringing forth fresh data, the initial supposition on which 
it is based.
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kind suffices to certify the truth of an hypothesis, it is not legitimate 
to continue the inference and equate an hypothesis, from which conclusions 
are drawn that tally with experimental fact, with one from the negation of 
which a manifest absurdity follows - i.e. a true one. and since he never 
undertakes to demonstrate that a manifest absurdity results from the 
negation of any of the explanatory hypotheses which he himself formulates 
or takes o v e r , i t  is clear that Pascal considers physics unable to 
advance beyond the realm of the "douteuse" and the "vraisemblable".
Pascal's conception of the limits of induction ties in with his
insistence that whatever successes an hypothesis may achieve in accounting
for phenomena do not serve to establish its validity, whereas only one
negative instance is required to prove that it is false. In the Preface—
he sets out a canon of complete induction, maintaining that in order to
justify a general postulate regarding any natural fact;
"— ce ne serait assez de l'avoir vu constamment en cent 
rencontres, ni en mille, ni en tout autre nombre, quelque
grand qu'il soit; puisque s'il restait un seul cas à - ^
examiner, ce seul suffirait pour empêcher la définition ^ ^
générale, et si un seul était contraire, ce seul— Car %
dans toutes les matiêi'es dont la preuve consiste en expériences :.
et non en démonstrations, on ne peut faire aucune assertion
universelle que par la générale énumération de toutes les ; -
parties ou de tous les cas différents."(p.535;G.E.II, p.144) mb:
(1)For example, Torricelli's "belle pensée", "simple conjecture", which in ■ ■
effect constitutes the groundwork for all Pascal's hydrostatical conclusions, i
is not established by demonstrating that its negation involves a manifest 
absurdity. On the contrary it is the positive evidence furnished by the Puy ;
de Dome experiment, and the fact that numerous "conséquences —  très belles et
très utiles" are deduced from it, which incline Pascal to accept it as true. 
(p.408-9; G.E.II, p.494-5).
(2) The dots here indicate a lacuna in the text.
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This assertion, that no finite number of observations can ever justify a 
generalization, comes perilously close to depriving induction of any 
useful function at all in physical s c i e n c e . T h e  context in which it
(2)appears,' ' makes it quite plain that such a canon is enunciated in order 
to allow for the possibility of phenomena falling outside the normal pattern 
of observed occurrence. Moreover, a disparaging reference to "experience", 
and by implication to the process of induction, which occurs in the Pensées, 
indicates that Pascal remined convinced of these limitations to inductive 
certainty;
"Je puis bien concevoir un homme sans mains, pieds, tête
(car ce n'est que 1'expérience qui nous apprend que la
tête est plus nécessaire que les pieds)." (p.ll$6; B.339)
Induction therefore can never be the measure of the possible, but is
restricted in its coverage to the particular instances from which the
generalization is drawn. There is an obvious and close, affinity between
the reason adduced in the Préface—  for adopting this cautious approach,
and Pascal's insistence in the letter to Noël that a single piece of negative
evidence is sufficient to invalidate any hypothesis, however much it may
have been verified otherwise positively.
(1) I can make nothing of W.G.Moore's attempt to explain away this passage by
interpreting Pascal's use of the adjective "universelle" to mean that; "Any
and every statement about the physical universe is bounded by the known cases;
it cannot include cases which may well exist but of which we have as yet no
knowledge." (Pascal and the scientific spirit; Cambridge Journal.1954.u.553). 
This surely implies the rejection of inductive reasoning, which either means 
the attempt to establish universal propositions through the'examination of 
selected individual facts or nothing, every bit as much as Pascal's statement 
in its original form,
(2) cf. below, p.iî-l.
(3) "— puisque, s’il restait un seul cas è examiner, ce seul suffirait pour 
empêcher la définition générale, et si ce seul était contraire, ce seul— " 
(p.535).
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The final step, of actually affirming that induction is impossible,
was taken by the authors of the Port-Royal Logique, who declared that:
"— les seules inductions ne sauraient nous donner une 
certitude entièï'e d 'auciane vérité, à moins que nous ne 
fussions assurés qu'elles fussent générales, ce qui est 
impossible;— "(l)
Pascal's exposure, in the conclusion to his two treatises, of the completely 
groundless nature of the age-old belief that pumps will draw water to any 
height desired above sea-level, serves to illustrate what these v/riters 
describe as an "induction défectueuse". It also sheds further light on 
his own attitude toward induction. What engendered this belief, which
(3)
numbered among its adherents Hero/i himself, was clearly not that those
who accepted it had established the fact experimentally, since the attempt
to do so could only have disabused them. On the contrary, they had merely
observed suction pumps and siphons up to twelve feet long which always
worked, and they had never seen water fail to rise in any of their experiments
"De sorte qu'ils ne se sont pas imaginé qu'il y eût 
un certain degré après lequel il en arrivât autrement.
Ils ont pensé que c'était une nécessité naturelle, 
dont l'ordre ne pouvait Être changé;—  et ainsi tirant 
une conséquence de ce qu'ils voyaient à ce qu'ils ne 
voyaient pas, ils ont donné l'un et l'autre pour 
également véritable." (p.46O;G.E.III,p.262)
The last half-sentence here is particularly interesting in the
context in view of the contrast it sets up between Pascal and Descartes.
(1) La logique de Port-Roval, (Paris,I869),p.41ô. For Gassendi's similar 
views of the limits of induction,cf.G.Sortais ; La philosophie moderne.(Paris 
1920) vol.I, p.475.
(2) ibid. p.345.
(3) Pascal describes Eeronji as; "— I'un des plus anciens et des plus 
excellents auteurs qui ont écrit de 1'élévation des eaux." (p.460;G.E.III
p.261)
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For it shows that the former doubts the legitimacy of proceeding beyond
immediate experience in physics, and hence of drawing inferences concerning
any objects which lie outside its purview. Descartes, on the other hand,
affirms in his Principes that:
n— c'est ce me semble, faire grand tort au raisonnement 
humain, de ne vouloir pas qu'il aille plus loin que les 
yeux;— "(l)
And he outlines the programme which he has undertaken in this treatise in 
the following terms;
"--de juger de ce qui arrive en ces petits corps, que 
leur ^seule petitesse nous empêche de pouvoir sentir, 
ps.r 1 ' exemple de ce que nous voyons arriver en ceux 
que nous sentons, et de rendre raison, par ce moyen, 
de tout ce qui est en la nature,— "(2)
Descartes's method therefore provides an even better example of the
Port-Royalists' definition of an "induction défectueuse", than the
groundless inferences of Heron and his followers. Moreover, it brings out
by contrast the extent of Pascal's scepticism as to the validity of any
line of inference which, starting from observations, assumes by induction
that what has been observed is a fair sample of nature in its entirety#.
The consequences of Pascal's attitude toward induction and 
hypotheses for his estimate of the sort of knowledge that physical science 
can give, becomes clear from the light in which he regards the views held by 
the "ancients" on questions whose whole aspect has been transformed by recent 
discoveries. In the Preface—  he points out that most of their false 
inferences were the result of a lack of experimental knowledge, rather than




of any defect in their powers of reasoning, and continues;
"Car n'étaient-ils pas excusables dans la pensée qu'ils 
ont eue pour la Voie de lait, quand, la faiblesse de 
leurs yeux n'ayant pas encore re(ju le secours de 
l'artifice, ils ont attribué cette couleur" à une plus 
grande solidité en cette partie du ciel?— N'avaient-ils
pas aussi sujet de dire que tous les corps corruptibles
étaient renfermés dans la sphère du ciel de la lune, 
lorsque durant le cours de tant de siècles, ils 
n'avaient point encore remarque de corruptions ni de 
générations hors de cet espace?—  C'est ainsi que, 
sur le sujet du vide, ils avaient droit de dire que la 
nature n'en souffrait point, parce que toutes leurs 
expériences leur avaient toujours fait remarquer 
qu'elle l'abhorrait:— " (p.534-5; G.E.II,p.142-3)
In each of these cases the fruits of the improved opportunities for
observation and experimentation have now removed all ground for clinging
to the theories in question. But the significant fact is Pascal's
readiness, despite this, to grant that at the time of being formulated
they were adequate and justifiable, provided it is recognized that the
"ancients" meant to speak of nature only as they knew it. For it follows
from this attitude that the only certain knowledge attainable in physics
is of a negative kind - the future of existent theories must always remain
uncertain, dependent as it is on the non-appearance of any recalcitrant 
phenomena. Thus it can only be in regard to theories advanced in the past,
b
and since disproved by the results of observation, that one is warranted in | 
considering knowledge indubitable. Finality is not to be looked for in 
physics. It constantly advances through new discoveries, which take the 
form of refutations of provisionally accepted theories, to new points of 
view, themselves always open to rebuttal.
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Earlier in the Préface—  Pascal notes with respect to subjects
accessible to sense or reasoning, of which physics is one, that the mind's
"— fécondité inépuisable produit continuellement, et ses 
inventions peuvent être bout ensemble sans fin et sans 
interruption— " (p.530;G.E.II,p.132)
However, the inability to arrive at any final knowledge in physics by no
means stems entirely, nor even chiefly, from this "fécondité inépuisable"
of the human mind. Like the tentative character of scientific knowledge
generally, it is essentially the result of the ever-active and inexhaustibly
subtle nature which the mind seeks to interpret. The fundamental theme of
both the Préface— . and the "Disproportion" fragment in the Pensées.
emphasizes this fact. Since man's knowledge of the natural world is based
very closely on his acquaintance with those phenomena which he is able to
observe experimentally, it follows that this knowledge will be conditioned
by the limits of his observational capacity, and the completely non-final
character of the sciences of nature mirrors the "disproportion" between
man's limited powers of observation and the infinitely varied and vast
object upon which they are directed. Thus in the Pensées— , Pascal points
out that, nature having set her mark and that of her author on all things.
(l) Pascal goes on to affirm that; "— la géométrie, —  la physique, la 
médecine,—  et toutes les sciences qui sont soumises à 1'expérience et au 
raisonnement, doivent être augmentées pour devenir parfaites. Les anciens 
les ont trouvées seulement ébauchées par ceux qui les ont précédés ; et nous 
les laisserons à ceux qui viendront après nous en un état plus accompli que 
nous ne les avons regues." (p.531;G.E.II,p.132) If the adjective "parfaites" 
is intended in this context to signify that at some predictable point in time 
these various sciences will achieve perfection, and with that finality of 
knowledge, Pascal's thought exhibits an inconsistency. For according to his 
remarks later in the Préface— , physics anyway will have accomplished the 
most that can be expected of it in any period, if it revises the theories 
and conclusions inherited from the previous age, in the light of whatever 
fresh facts may have been unearthed.
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"— elles tiennent presque toutes de sa double infinité," He continues, 
describing the implications of this for the sciences;
"O'est ainsi que nous voyons que toutes les sciences 
sont infinies et 1'étendue de leurs recherches :— "
(p.ll07;B.72)
as far as physics is concerned, this applies with respect to
principles as well as to the propositions educed from them. So-called
"first" principles do not reflect anything ultimate in the nature of things,
but are imposed on the mind by its own perceptual l i m i t s . A s  if in
illustration of the fact, Pascal alleges in the Préface—  that experiments,
which alone point the way to knowledge of nature's secrets;
"— multiplient continuellement; et comme elles sont les 
seuls principes de la physique, les conséquences 
multiplient a proportion." (p.$32; G.E.II, p.136)
It is this inexhaustible potentiality for fresh discovery which nature
offers, that justifies the method of scientific advance through the
refutation of accepted theories to new points of view. In this way, the
knowledge handed on to later generations by the "ancients" has been used as
the "steps" by which to advance a stage further, by revising their
conclusions in the light of fresh evidence.
"Notre i/ue a plus d ’étendue, et, quoiqu'ils connussent 
aussi bien que nous tout ce qu'ils pouvaient remarquer 
de la nature, ils n'en connaissaient pas tant néanmoins, 
et nous voyons plus qu'eux." (ibid.;G.E.II,p.137)
Here again the implication is that the theories formulated by the "ancients"
were as adequate as it was possible for them to be, given the state of their
(l) "Comme nous appelons dans la physique— " (earlier variant)"— nous faisons
des derniers qui paraissent à la raison comrae on fait dans les choses 
matérielles, oh nous appelons un point indivisible celui au delà duquel nos 
sens n'aperçoivent rien, quoique divisible infin huent et par sa nature."
(ibid.) S'
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empirical knowledge, but that they are superseded once this has been 
added to hy later discoveries.
In view of this attitude, and since he holds that experiments,
the sole principles in p h y s i c s , a r e  constantly multiplying, with the
result that there'is an ever-present possibility of the emergence of the
single contradictory phenomenon, which is all that is needed to upset
any explanatory hypothesis, it seems fair to expect from Pascal a readiness
to revise such theories as he himself puts forward to account for phenomena,
or at least to concede that others will probably find occasion to do so.
The following passage from the first letter to M. de Ribeyre, shows that
Pascal does recognize that his own findings in physics have no special
claim to finality:
"Et comme je suis certain que Galilée et Torricelli eussent 
été ravi d ’apprendre de leur temps qu’on eéit pass^ outre la 
connaissance qu'ils ont eue, je vous proteste, Monsieur, 
que jè n ’aurai plus jamais de joie que de voir que quelqu'un 
passe outre celle que j ’ai donnée.’’(p.409;G.E,II,p.495)
(1) This tentative attitude, with the insistence which more than anything 
else characterizes Pascal’s ivritings on physics, that experiments constitute 
the only principles available in this field, where, quite apart from the 
necessity of comparing deduced consequences with ’’expériences", general 
truths themselves require to be both suggested and supported by empirical 
observation, serves as another illuminating point of contrast between his 
own and Descartes’s methodological ideas. It is true that the latter found 
himself forced, when he came to deal with the particular facts of the world 
of nature, to compromise somewhat in regard to his original aim of evolving 
an all-inclusive natural science based on self-evident first principles, and 
to concede a not unimportant role to experimentation. However, what he 
describes in the sixth Discours as "— l'ordre que j’ai tenu en ceci— " 
(Pléiade éd., p.l69), reveals just how far his approach diverges from 
Pascal’s'. Thus he relates that he started out with the attempt to discover 
’’— les principes ou premieres causes de tout ce qui est ou qui peut être 
dans le monde, sans rien considérer pour cet effet que Dieu seul qui l ’a 
créé, ni les tirer d'ailleurs que de certaines semences de vérité qui sont
continued on p.125
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(l) continued from page 124. naturellement dans nos âmes." (ibid.pol69). 
Having then deduced from these causes "Les premiers et les plus ordinaires 
effets", which include the basic elements of the physical universe, he 
desired to descend to more particular effects, and it was at this point 
that "— il s'en est tant présenté à moi de diverses, que je n'ai pas cru 
qu'il fût possible à l'esprit humain de distinguer les formes ou espaces 
de corps qui sont sur la terre d'une infinité d'autres qui pourraient y 
être si c'eût été le vouloir de Dieu de les y mettre,—  si ce n'est qu'on 
vienne au-devant des causes par les effets, et qu'on se serve de plusieurs 
expériences particulières," (ibid.p.170). The abstract method of 
proceeding is therefore inadequate by itself since, unless one resorts 
to an empirical test, it is impossible to know what God did actually 
decide to put into the world. Descartes emphasizes this when he goes on 
to say that, although his principles account satisfactorily for sensible 
phenomena, nature's productive power is so inexhaustible, and his principles 
so general, that it is impossible to determine a priori which particular 
line of deduction out of all the possible lines actually applies to any 
individual effect, üppeal must again be made to experiment. It is therefore 
no exaggeration to say that it is only at the point of practical application 
of an a priori method of discovery that Descartes acknowledges the need to 
experiment. And that he regards the scope of empirical investigation as 
limited to a quite subsidiary role, in comparison with the a priori 
deductions which are alone capable of furnishing scientific knowledge, 
is clear from the well-known passage in the Principes (111.4). where 
he insists that his object is to deduce the reasons of effects from 
causes and not vice versa. far cry this both from Pascal's conception 
of the wholly tentative character of scientific knowledge and the way in 
which it is acquired, and from his claim that experiments represent the 
sole principles in physics.
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S E C T I O N  T W O
Moral values.
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Introduction: Morals regarded as more important than mathematics and 
natural science.
Mme. Périer, in her account of Pascal’s life, records that before 
reaching his twentyfourth year the latter had abandoned his scientific 
researches and devoted himself entirely to religious pursuits. The 
chronological inaccuracy of this claim scarcely needs to be pointed out. 
However, there is evidence in Pascal’s own writings of a shift of emphasis 
from the study of the sciences to that of questions relating to man’s 
condition and destiny, which undoubtedly represents a major watershed in 
his intellectual development. This evidence, in the form of express 
statements of a change of interest and of judgements as to the relative 
value of these two pursuits, shows conclusively tMt he regards morals as 
more important than mathematics and natural science.
Even the first section of the treatise De 1’esprit géométrique.
where he displays such profound admiration for both the subject-matter and
method of geometry, concludes on this note. One of the advantages held out
to those capable of perceiving that motion, space and number all admit of
increase and diminution ad infinitum is that this will enable them to
appreciate nature’s power and greatness in the twofold infinity observable
on all sides, and to learn
”— par cette considération merveilleuse à se conraitre 
eux-memes, en se regardant placés entre une infinité et un 
néant d’étendue, entre une infinité et un néant de nombre,—
Sur quoi on peut apprendre à s’estimer à son juste prix, et 
former des réflexions qui valent mieux que tout le reste 
de la géométrie meme.” (p.$91; G.E.IX, p.270, )
(1) La vie de Monsieur Pascal, p.? G.E.I p.$8-9. In point of fact all 
Pascal’s physics and by far the greater part of his mathematics are 
posterior to June 1647.
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In a passage from the Pensées, which purports to be autobiograph­
ical, Pascal writes:
”J’avais passé longtemps dans l’étude des sciences abstraites; 
et le peu de communication qu’on en peut avoir m’en avait 
dégoûté. Quand j’ai commencé l’étude de l’homme, j’ai vu que 
ces sciences abstraites ne sont pas propres k l’homme,— et 
que (l’étude de l’homme) est la vraie étude qui lui est 
propre.” (p.ll04; B.144)
Further evidence of this transition is contained in the letter to Fermat,
dated August I66O. Pascal there excuses himself, on the grounds of ill-
health, from accepting the former’s invitation to meet him at a point
between Clermont and Toulouse, and makes the following significant remarks:
"Vous êtes le plus galant homme du monde, et je suis 
assurément un de ceux qui sais le mieux reconnaître ces 
qualités-lk et les admirer infiniment. — Je vous dirai 
aussi que, quoique vous soyez celui de toute l’Europe 
que je tiens pour le plus grand géomètre, ce ne serait 
pas cette qualité-là qui m’aurait attiré; mais que je me 
figure tant d’esprit et d’honnêteté en votre conversation, 
que c’est pour cela que je vous rechercherais." (p.522;G.E.X,p.4)
The almost complete change in outlook which this letter reveals when
compared with Pascal’s previous correspondence with Fermat is very striking.
Not merely is he exclusively preoccupied in earlier letters with geometrical
questions, but on one occasion he actually affirms with respect to someone,
whose "esprit" and "honnêteté" were unrivalled, that his ignorance of
(1)
geometry is a desideratum.
Mathematics undergoes a more drastic debasement in the long 
passage from the Pensées dealing with "divertissement", where it is 
classified among the pastimes which fall into that category. Dwelling on,
(1) cf. above p.^tf.
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man’s need for "divertissement" to prevent him from being overcome by
boredom, Pascal notes that something as slight as billiards suffices for
his distraction, since the only object he has in playing is to be able to
boast of his prowess to his friends. The fragment continues:
"Ainsi, les autres suent dans leur cabinet pour montrer aux 
savants qu’ils ont résolu une question d’algèbre qu’on 
n’aurait pu trouver jusqu’ici;— "(p. 1104; B 139)
A further short fragment from the Pensées, headed Vanité des
sciences, makes a definite comparison between morals and the sciences:
"La science des choses extérieures ne me consolera de 
1’ignorance de la morale, au temps d’affliction; mais 
la science des moeurs me consolera toujours de l’ignorance 
des sciences extérieures." (p.1137; B.67)
In a slightly different vein, but reflecting the same basic attitude, is
the following:
"Je trouve bon qu’on n’approfondisse pas 1’opinion de
Copernic: mais ceci— l II importe à toute la vie de
savoir si l’âme est mortelle ou immortelle." (]-) (p.ll81;B.218)
These two fragments are especially significant since they point to the
(2)
notion of utility as the criterion behind Pascal’s judgements as to the 
relative importance of morals and physical science. It is obviously this 
same criterion which is operative in two further valia tions. Having cited 
an example of the perfunctory sort of argument often deemed sufficient to
(1) Pascal’s rejection of the metaphysical proofs for the existence of God is 
similarly based on their alleged non-utility:"Quand un homme serait persuadé 
que les proportions des nombres sont des vérités immatérielles, éternelles, 
et dépendantes d’une première vérité en qui elles subsistent, et qu’on 
appelle Dieu, je ne le trouverais pas beaucoup avancé pour son salut." 
(p.1281; B.556)
(2) The element of self-interest also implied in such assertions is 
discussed at length below, p. 7^6 ff.
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discount the claims advanced on behalf of the Christian religion, Pascal 
objects;
"C’en serait assez pour une question de philosophie; mais 
ici, oh il va de tout!" (p.1182; B.226)
And his estimate of Descartes’s achievement concludes, with the following
disparaging remark:
"Et quand cela serait vrai, nous n’estimons pas que toute 
la philosophie vaille une heure de peine."(l) (p.ll37;B.79)
Now it is noteworthy that even Pascal’s writings relating to
mathematical and scientific subjects are singularly lacking in references
to the possible practical application of his discoveries. No doubt the
highly abstract character of his mathematics largely explains the
(2)
deficiency in that sphere. Despite the purpose which geometry is shown 
to serve in prompting man to moral reflexion, making him aware of his 
own physical position in the natural scheme, Pascal adjudges it useless in 
itself. The letter to Fermat continues where the extract quoted earlier 
left off:
"Car pour vous parler franchement de la géométrie, je 
la trouve le plus haut exercice de l’esprit; mais en 
même temps je la connais pour; si inutile, que je fais 
peu de différence entre un homme qui n’est que géomètre 
et un habile artisan."(3) (p.$22; G.E.X, p.q. )
(1) cf. above, p.3/. where the fragment is quoted in full, together with 
others that bear on Pascal’s attitude toward Descartes’s "philosophy".
M.Brunschvicg points out that Pascal uses the term "philosophie" here in the 
sense of natural philosophy-i.e.physical science.ed.min.p.361, n.3.
(2) The only reference I have found occurs at tb end of a brief treatment 
of the numerical powers appended to the arithmetical triangle. Pascal there 
writes:"Je supprime la démonstration de cette règle, que j’ai toute prête, 
mais qui est long;ue, quoique aisée, et plus ennuyeuse qu’utile: laissons-la 
donc, et tournons nous vers un sujet qui promet de r^orter plus de fruits 
qu’il n’exigera d’efforts."(p.147.Trans.p.1415; G.E.III, p.$$4-5)
(3) cf. also above, p.l5.
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However, even in physics the emphasis on practical utility of
discoveries is surprisingly slight considering the tendencies of the age
(1) (2) 
in which Pascal lived. Unlike Bacon and Descartes, he does not seem
to have been motivated by a pre-eminently practical aim in undertaking the
study of nature. His writings betray none of the hope which animates theirs’,
that the growth of scientific knowledge will result in the relief of man’s
estate by harnessing nature to his purposes. Nor is this the end which he
looks to in striving after a fuller and surer way of interpreting nature.
In the Préface pour le traité du vide he refers to human reason in terms
of a stored consciousness capable of indefinite development and increase of
content, and insists on the analogous continual overall increase and progress
of the body of mankind’s scientific knowledge. But even here there is
nothing to indicate that he believes aiqr amelioration of man’s lot will
follow on such progress.
(l) In the Récit de la grande expérience he alleges that in the projected 
Traité du vide he will deduce ’conséquences— aussi utiles que curieuses" 
from the results of the experiment performed on the Puy de D&me. (p. 400;
G.E. II, p.368-9) Again in the first letter to M. de Ribeyre he claims of 
this experiment that:"Les conséquences en sont très belles et très utiles."
(p.409;G.E.II, p.494) In an additional Fragment Pascal propounds a rule for 
certain of the variations which occur in the effects produced by atmospheric 
pressure as a result of varying weather conditions, and notes "Cette 
connaissance peut être très utile aux laboureurs, voyageurs, etc., pour 
connaître l’état présent du temps, et le temps qui doit suivre immédiatement, 
mais non pas pour connaître celui qu’il fera en trois semaines: mais je laisse 
les utilités qu’on peut tirer de ces nouveautés, pour continuer notre projet." 
(p.467;G.E.II, p.523). Although the fragment concludes here, so that it is 
not possible to determine the precise nature of the "project" to which Pascal 
alludes, it is highly significant that he should deliberately neglect in this 
way to pursue a line of enquiry which promises to be fruitful in practical 
advantages. Finally, the opening lines of the dedicatory letter for the 
arithmetical machine show that considerations of utility played some part in 
its conception: "Si le public re<joit quelque utilité de 1 ’ invention que 
j’ai trouvée pour faire toutes sortes de règles d’arithmétique par une 
manière aussi nouvelle que commode,— " (p.349;G.E.I, p.298).
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(2) cont.from p. 131. In the final aphorism of the Novum Organon (11,52) 
Bacon claims that, consequent on the "emancipation" and "coming of age" 
of the human understanding effected by his new method of discovery, "there 
cannot but follow an improvement in man’s estate and an enlargement of his 
power over nature." The Fall resulted in man being deprived of his 
dominion over creation, but this can be in some part repaired "by arts and 
sciences. For creation—  is now by various labours —  at length and in 
some measure subdued to the supplying of man with bread, that is, to the 
uses of human life." Descartes’s dominant concern to promote the welfare 
of mankind through the study of the sciences is attested notably in the 
sixth part of the Discours. He there alleges that on recognizing the 
scope and novelty of some "notions générales touchant la physique", reached 
through the application of his method, j’ai cru que je ne pouvais les 
tenir cachées sans pécher grandement contre la loi qui nous oblige à 
procurer autant qu’il est en nous le bien général de tous les hommes. Car 
elles m ’ont fait voir qu’il est possible de parvenir à des connaissances 
qui soient fort utiles à la vie, et qu’au lieu de cette philosophie 
spéculative qu’on enseigne dans les écoles, on en peut trouver une pratique, 
par laquelle, connaissant la force et les actions du feu, de l’eau, de l’air, 
des astres, des deux et de tous les autres corps qui nous environnent,—  
nous les pourrions employer en même faqpn à tous les usages auxquels 
ils sont propres, et ainsi nous rendre comme maîtres et possesseurs de 
la nature." This is desirable not only in order that man may be able to 
take advantage of the opportunities which the physical world offers,
’’— mais principalement aussi pour la conservation de la santé, laquelle 
est sans doute le premier bien et le fondement de tous les autres biens de 
cette vie;— " Whence Descartes’s intention to devote "his whole life" to 
the study of medecine - "une science si nécessaire". (Pléiade éd., p.168-9)
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Chapter one: "Honnêteté"
(i) The useful as criterion.
Pascal professes to find in "honnêteté" some aspects at least
of the utility which he claims is lacking in mathematics and the physical
sciences. The criterion of utility, by which the mathematician is adjudged
deficient, is precisely that which exhibits most plainly the superior worth
of the "honnête homme". A series of fragments included in the Pensées
illustrate this preference:
"II faut qu’on n’en puisse dire, ni: ’Il est mathématicien’, 
ni ’prédicateur’, ni ’éloquent’, mais: ’Il est honnête 
homme’. Cette qualité universelle me plaît seule. Quand 
en voyant un homme on se souvient de son livre, c’est 
mauvais signe; je voudrais qu’on ne s’aperçût d ’aucune 
qualité que par la rencontre et l’occasion d’en user— : 
de peur qu’une qualité ne l’emporte, et ne fasse 
baptiser." (p.1098; B.35)
"L’homme est plein de besoins: il n’aime que ceux qui 
peuvent les remplir tous. ’C ’est un bon mathématicien’, 
dira-t-on. - Mais je n ’ai que faire de mathématiques:
il me prendrait pour une proposition. ---- Il faut donc
un honnête homme qui puisse s’acconpder à tous mes 
besoins généralement." (ibid.; B.36;
"Peu de tout. Puisqu’on ne peut être universel en 
sachant tout ce qui se peut savoir sur tout, il faut 
savoir peu de tout. Car il est bien plus beau de 
savoir quelque chose de tout que de savoir tout d’une 
chose; cette universalité est la plus belle."
(p.1098-9: B.37)
"On ne passe point dans le monde pour se connaître en 
vers si l’on n’a mis l’enseigne de poète, de mathématicien, 
etc. Mais les gens universels ne veulent point d’enseigne 
et ne mettent guère de différence entre le métier de poète 
et celui de brodeur.
Les gens universels ne sont appelés ni poètes, ni 
géomètres, etc.; mais ils sont tout cela, et juges de tous 
ceux-là. On ne les devine point.—  On ne s’aperçoit point 
en eux d’une qualité plutôt que d’une autre, hors de la 
nécessité de la mettre en usage;— " (p.1098; B.34)
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The close parallels discernible here with the definition of the
"honnête homme" formulated by the most notable seventeenth century exponent
of the idea, the Chevalier de Méré, have been pointed out by M. Bruns chvicg
and other commentators on the Pensées: the same strictures on any
inclination to shine, to display exceptional talent in a particular field,
the same disparagement of the notion of a special "métier", the same
(1)
preference for the dilettante as against the specialist. The most
important ingredient missing from Pascal’s conception as set out in the
foregoing extracts, and one upon which Méré insists, is that the prime
object of the "honnête homme", and that which secures his own happiness,
consists in giving pleasure to others. In place of this Pascal substitutes
(2)the notion of utility - the "honnête homme" is to be preferred 
because he alone will be able to adapt himself to, and so to satisfy, the 
manifold needs of his fellows. It is this requirement that prompts Pascal’s 
warm recommendation of what he terms "universalité".
In the letter to Fermat also, Pascal’s preference for "honnêteté" 
is linked with the disparagement of the specialist tendencies of mathematics. 
Not only does he declare mathematics useless, but he further qualifies this 
judgement:
(1) For Méré’s views on these points, cf.M. Magendie, La politesse mondaine 
et les théories de l’honnêteté, en France, au XVIIe siècle, de_l600 à 1660. 
(Paris 1925),II,p.747-782.M.Ch-H. Boudhors in an article: Pascal et Méré:
A oronos d ’un manuscrit inédit. Rev.d’hist.litt..1913. discusses very fully 
the question of the possible influence of Méré on Pascal’s conception of 
Honnêteté. He even suggests the possibility (p.394 ) that it was Pascal who 
provided Méré with some of his basic notions.
(2) Méré also uses utility as a criterion of judgement; for example in 
regard to the value of mathematics, and even of moral qualities.(Magendie,
p.776)
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"Aussi je l’appelle le plus beau métier du monde; 
mais enfin ce n’est qu’un métier; et j’ai souvent dit 
qu’elle est bonne pour faire l’essai, mais non 1’emploi 
de notre force: de sorte que je ne ferais pas deux pas 
pour la géométrie,— " (p.522; G.E.X, p.5)
In thus stigmatizing mathematics as "inutile", and relegating it to the
status of a mere "métier", Pascal is clearly using as his yardstick the
same conception of practical utility as that alleged in the previous
passages to be the peculiar characteristic of the "honnête homme".
The same idea recurs elsewhere in the Pensées, in connection with
his emphasis on the importance for ethics of the question of the possibility
of a future life. Pascal affirms with respect to those who think to win the
esteem of their fellows by ’shaking off the yoke*, and showing themselves
completely indifferent to the whole issue:
"Cé n’est pas le moyen d’en acquérir, je dis même parmi 
les personnes du monde qui jugent sainement des choses et 
qui savent que la seule voie d’y réussir est de se faire 
paraître honnête, fidèle, judicieux et capable de servir 
utilement son ami, parce que les hommes n’aiment 
naturellement que ce qui peut leur être utile." (p.1177;B.194)
The final clause here is strongly reminiscent of the statement which occurs
in a fragment cited earlier: "— l’homme n’aime que ceux qui peuvent remplir
(1)
tous ses besoins." Hence, although the capacity to be of use to one’s 
fellows is not directly predicated of "honnêteté" in the extract in 
question, as was the case previously, the fact that the two attributes are 
grouped together in this way may be taken as further evidence that the one 
implies the other.
Judgements signifying a high value ascribed to the quality of
(l) cf. above, p. 133.
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"honnêteté” are not however restricted to the Pensées. In the Trois 
discours sur la condition des grands, in illustration of the distinction 
which he has drawn between the different sorts of respect which ought to 
be accorded to "grandeurs naturelles" and "grandeurs d’établissement",
Pascal writes;
"II n’est pas nécessaire parce que vous êtes duc, que je 
vous estime; mais il est nécessaire qu^je vous salue. Si 
vous êtes duc et honnête homme, je rendrai ce que je dois 
à l'une et à l’autre de ces qualités." (p.6l9;G.E.IX, p.370)
He then asserts that, in contrast to the mere formal recognition due to
rank, "La qualité d ’honnête homme mérite l’estime", and that if the person
in question has rank without being an "honnête homme" it would be right to
have for him "le mépris intérieur que mériterait la bassesse de votre esprit."
Quite apart from the express demand for the "respect naturel" of esteem for
the quality of "honnête homme", the particular significance of this extract
is that Pascal should choose just that quality to typify a"grandeur
naturelle". In the terms of his own definition this consists in;
"— des qualités réelles et effectives de l’âme ou du 
corps, qui rendent l’une ou l’autre plus estimable, 
comme les sciences, la lumière de l’esprit, la vertu, 
la santé, la force." (p.6l8; G.E.IX, p.369)
The fact that ability in the sciences and intellectual capacity are thus
classified among the "grandeurs naturelles" but are passed over in favour
of "honnêteté" when Pascal wishes to give a concrete illustration, shows
that pride of place is accorded to the latter. Moreover, the implication
behind the judgement, that a titled person who is not an "honnête homme"
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deserves "mé{)ris intérieur", is that anyone lacking the quality of "honnêteté" 
is automatically convicted of "bassesse d’esprit".
Since Pascal regards "honnêteté" as a "grandeur naturelle", as a
"qualité réelle et effective de l’âme", it would seem to follow that it
represents a natural endowment, as distinct from an accomplishment to be
acquired through any degree of study or application. A rather ambiguous
fragment from the Pensées confirms this view;
"On n’apprend pas aux hommes à être honnêtes hommes, et 
on leur apprend tout le reste; et ils ne se piquent jamais
tant de savoir rien du reste, comme d’être honnêtes hommes.
Ils ne se piquent de savoir que la seule chose qu’ils 
n’apprennent point." (p.1104; B.68)
Now this passage can be interpreted to mean either simply that no
instruction in the art of "honnêteté" is provided (though it is difficult
to see why, if the demand is as pressing as Pascal makes it out to be, no
attempt is made to meet it), or that in the nature of the case the task of
teaching anyone to be an "honnête homme" is an impossible one. Obviously
the latter interpretation, which implies that one.is by nature either an
"honnête homme" or not, and if not that there is nothing one can do about
it, is of a piece with the statements which point to the conception of
"honnetêté" as a naturel endowment.
Two further extracts from the Pensées refer indirectly to this
sort of view. Once again, in regard to those who adopt a nonchalant
attitude toward the problem of human destiny, Pascal writes;
"Qu’ils laissent donc ces impiétés à ceux qui sont assez 
mal nés pour en être véritablement capables; qu’ils soient 
au moins honnêtes gens s’ils ne peuvent être chrétiens,— "
(p.ll79; B.194)
138
"Honnêteté" here seems to have become a matter of good breeding almost,
but the underlying assumption that it is a natural quality which inheres
in the individual from the outset is still present. The relevant portion
of the second fragment reads as follows:
" (Miton) voit bien que la nature est corrompue, et que 
les hommes sont contraires à l’honnêteté;— ’’
(p.l200; B.448)
This passage clearly reflects a quite different sort of attitude toward 
natural man from that which lies behind the judgements expressed in the 
majority of extracts so far considered. However, its significance at 
this stage of the enquiry consists in the fact that it underlines the 
notion of "honnêteté" as a quality which has its roots in nature. For, 
although men’s opposition to "honnêteté" is not directly affirmed to 
be the corollary of human nature’s corruption, the syntax leaves no doubt 
that such is the meaning Pascal intends to convey.
(ii) "Honnêteté" in the perspective of the "orders!.
The positive value ascribed to "honnêteté" has so far been 
measured solely by comparisons drawn with the qualities which it supersedes 
in Pascal’s esteem; its relation to possible higher terms in his scale of 
values has not been considered at all. However, since some commentators.
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and notably M. Demorest in an ingenious but unconvincing article,have
tried to make out a case for regarding "honnêteté" as the stepping-stone to
"foi", it seems desirable at this point to examine the precise relation
holding between these two terms.
It is sufficient, in order to refute the view that Pascal envisages
"honnêteté" as the threshold of "foi", to point out its divergence from
the basic notion of the three orders. This specifically eliminates the
possibility of any such bridges from the natural order, where "honnêteté"
rightly belongs, to the supernatural. But there is ample direct evidence
to render M. Demorest’s thesis untenable. The counter to one of his main
(2)
contentions - "l'honnête homme est un chrétien en puissance" - is quite
simply that this is correct, but that so is any other sort of person.
Such an outlook follows from Pascal's conception of the inscrutable
character of divine election:
"— cette religion nous oblige de regarder les hommes 
toujours, tant qu'ils seront en cette vie, comme capables 
de la grace qui peut les éclairer, et de croire qu'ils 
peuvent être dans peu.de temps plus remplis de foi que 
nous ne sommes,— " (p.1179; B.194)
I have found nothing in Pascal's writings to indicate that he regards the
"honnête homme" as a more lôJkely candidate to receive the gift of grace than
any other man. Besides his idea of the infinite gulf separating the various
orders is such as to engender the belief that differences on the purely
human and natural level are of no account when looked at from the standpoint
of the supernatural order.
(1) J.J. Demorest: L'honnête homme et le croyant selon Pascal. Modem 
Philology. Vol.53, 1956.
(2) art.cit., p.218
(3) cf. also the fifth letter to Mlle, de Roannez, 5.II.I656, p.512;
G.E. VI, p.162.
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M. Demorest is guilty of a further confusion when he adds:
"Remarquons a cet égard que Pascal, après Montaigne, Du Vair et Guez de
Balzac, présente les anciens sous l'apparence d'honnêtes hommes; c'est-
à-dire, suivant notre interprétation, comme des p r é c h r é t i e n s . " In
support of this assertion he cites the following lines from the Pensées;
"On ne s'imagine Platon et Aristote qu'avec de grandes 
robes de pédants. C'étaient des gens honnêtes— "
(p.ll63; B.331)
However, the number of passages to be found in Pascal's works reflecting
(2)
a harsh attitude toward the virtuous pagans, together with the
comparisons unfavourable to the ancient philosophers between the moral
philosophy taught by them and the sort of conduct inspired by the Holy
(3)
Spirit in the early Christians, set precisely the opposite interpretation 
on the extract in question. Seen in this light it serves to illustrate 
the gulf dividing the mere "honnête homme" from the Christian.
Furthermore, in addition to the two "pis aller" references to the 
concept of the "honnête homme" citbd previously,there is a decisive 
passage occurring at the end of the Trois discours which is particularly 
damaging to M. Demorest*s case, and which he has entirely failed to take 
account of. Having completed his advice to the future duke as to how best 
to use the privileges and discharge the duties attaching to his office,
(1) art.cit.p.218
(2) cf.p.ll89;B.432yi5.1302;B.466,^.1306-7;B.48l/p.l337jB.90$/ and below,p.
(3) cf.p.492;G.E.II,p.540-l/p.l256;B.724/p.l295;B.772.
(4) "— qu'ils soient au moins honnêtes gens s'ils ne peuvent être chrétiens." 
"— je dis même parmi les personnes du monde—  qui savent que la seule voie 
d'y réussir est de se faire paraître honnête,— " cf. above, p.
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Pascal goes on to say that following out this line of conduct will not
however suffice to save him from perdition:
"— mais au moins vous vous perdrez en honnête homme. Il 
y a des gens qui se damnent si sottement, par l'avarice, 
par la brutalité, par des débauches, — I Le moyen que 
je vous ouvre est sans doute plus honnête; mais en vérité 
c'est toujours une grande folie que de se damner;— "
(p.620; G.E.IX, p.372)
In order to escape this uninviting end Pascal asserts that:
"II faut mépriser la concupiscence et son royaume, et 
aspirer à ce royaume de charité oû tous les sujets ne 
respirent que la charité, et ne désirent que les biens 
de la charité." (p.620-1; G.E.IX, p.373)
The full import of this last statement emerges when it is recalled that
Pascal's advice to his young pupil, which if put into practice will result
in the latter living as an "honnête homme", is directed toward his future
status of "roi de concupiscence". (p.620;G.E.IX, p.372)
Thus the high value which Pascal has been shown to accord to the
concept of the "honnête homme", turns out to be an entirely relative one.
Although on the purely natural plane this represents his confessed ideal,
any attempt to carry it further, and make it appear as if he regards the
"honnête homme" as a Christian in embryo, runs counter both to the most
fundamental conceptions of his thought and to express statements bearing
upon the subject.
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(ill) "Honnêteté" and aesthetics.
The extent to which Pascal's conception of "honnêteté" is bound
up with his views on aesthetics was evident in the extracts quoted earlier,
where the superiority of the "honnête homme's" judgement in the matter of
verse-making as against that of the 'professional* poet was continually
emphasized. Two further fragments from the Pensées bring out this
relation even more clearly*
"Je hais également le bouffon et l'enflé: on ne ferait 
son ami de l'un ni de l'autre. - On ne consulte que 
l'oreille, parce qu'on manque de coeur: sa règle est
l'honnêteté. Poète et non honnête homme." (p.l096;B.30 and 38)
"Quand on voit le style naturel, on est tout étonné 
et ravi, car on s'attendait de voir un auteur, et on 
trouve un homme. Au lieu que ceux qui ont le goût bon, 
et qui en voyant un livre croient trouver un homme, 
sont tout surpris de trouver un auteur: 'Plus poetice
quam humane locutus es'." (ibid; B.29)
These two fragments contain in germ the two major themes running all
through Pascal's pronouncements on aesthetics - the primacy of "finesse"
and "sentiment" in aesthetic judgement, and his predilection for the
"style naturel". But what is especially relevant for the present
consideration of the relation between "honnêteté" and aesthetics is that
both "finesse" and the "style naturel" are here declared by implication to
be the prerogative of the "honnête homme". The rightful function of the
"coeur" in creative literature has been usurped by the ear, with the result
that verse has become the preserve of the expert, the "poète" initiated to
the approved rhymes instead of the "honnête homme". Obviously therefore when
(l) cf. above p.|33.
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Pascal asserts that "honnêteté" is the 'role* followed by the "coeur",
it is not the emotive or affective side of that organ which he has in
mind, but rather the intuitive or instinctive side, which subsumes the
attribute of "finesse" and the activities of "sentir" and "juger". A
passage quoted previously makes it quite plain that the "homme" referred
to in the second fragment, who emerges unexpectedly in place of the
"auteur" as responsible for the work composed in the "style naturel",
can only be an "honnête homme":
"Les gens universels ne sont appelés ni poètes, ni 
géomètres, etc.; mais ils sont tout cela, et juges 
de tous ceux-là." (p.1098; B.34)
Clearly this adds a fresh dimension to the "honnête homme", and 
enhances the already relatively high value to which Pascal considers him 
entitled.
(a) "Finesse" the preserve of the "honnête homme".
The importance assumed by the category of "finesse" in Pascal's
views on aesthetics is brought out very plainly in a rather obscure
fragment from the Pensées:
"Géométrie, finesse. - La vraie éloquence se moque de 
l'éloquence, la vraie morale se moque de la morale; c'est- 
à-dire que la morale du jugement se moque de la morale de 
l'esprit, qui est sans règles.
Car le jugement est celui à qui appartient le sentiment, 
comme les sciences appartiennent à l'esprit. La finesse 
est la part du jugement, la géométrie est celle de l'esprit." 
(p.1094; B.4.)
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There appears to be no justification here for Bruns chvicg's opinion that 
the qualifying relative clause in the first paragraph, "qui est sans 
règles", applies to the "morale du jugement" and not to the "morale 
de l ' e s p r i t " . Quite apart from the grammatical and stylistic 
arguments against such a clumsy usage, the fragment makes much better 
sense if the true eloquence and true ethics, based on "jugement", which 
poke fun at the eloquence and ethics based on rational principles, are
regarded as superior in that the latter have in fact no "règles" on which
(o)
to ground themselves.^ ' The gist of the passage is clear enough - according 
to Pascal there can be no true ethics or eloquence which depends on the 
"esprit" (used here exclusively in the sense of the faculty whose function 
it is to carry on discursive reasoning). Since ethics and eloquence 
belong to the domain of "sentiment" and "jugement", the "esprit" will be 
unable to discover there any palpable principles from which to draw its 
logical inferences.
The apparent paradox involved in these assertions disappears 
when the sharp distinction drawn by Pascal between what he designates the 
"esprit de finesse", and the "esprit de géométrie", is borne in mind. This 
distinction is readily discernible, he claims, in the principles peculiar 
to the two types of mind in question - those appropriate to geometry are
(1) ed.min.,p321, n.2.
(2) One of the previously unedited "pensées" 'discovered* by M.Jean Mesnard 
in 1962 corroborates this interpretation: "Les philosophes de l'Ecole 
parlent de la vertu et les rhéteurs de l'éloquence sans les connaître. 
Présentez aux uns un homme véritablement vertueux mais sans éclat, et aux 
autres un discours plein de beautés naturelles mais sans pointes: ils n'y 
entendront rien". Biaise Pascal; Textes inédits. (Paris, I962), p.32-3.
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'palpable* but recondite, while thoæwith which the "esprit de finesse"
is concerned are commonplace and easily accessible; the former demand a
somewhat unusual application of mind but no special aptitude, whereas the
latter require merely very clear mental vision, (p.1092-3; B.l) In
contrast to geometry, where principles are clear and "gross', and where
deduction commences only after they have been carefully examined and arranged,
in matters of "finesse":
"On les voit à peine, on les sent plutôt qu'on ne les voit; 
on a des peines infinies à les faire sentir à ceux qui ne
les sentent pas d'eux-mêmes; ce sont choses tellement
délicates et si nombreuses, qu'il faut un sens bien 
délicat et bien net pour les sentir, et juger droit et 
juste selon ce sentiment, sans pouvoir le plus souvent 
les démontrer par ordre comme en géométrie, —  il faut 
tout d'un couç voir la chose d'un seul regard, et non 
pas par progrès de raisonnement, au moins jusqu'à un 
certain degré." (p.1092; B.l)
Thus Pascal uses the verb "sentir" to denote the apprehensive act appropriate 
to principles in questions of "finesse", and qualifies this further by- 
prescribing a "sens bien délicat et bien net" as essential to the operation.
When the principles have been apprehended - i.e. when the "sentiment" is
completed - a true and accurate judgement must be made in the light of it.
Two distinct operations are therefore specified here: first, the appre­
hension of the principles, and then the judgement exercised in the light 
of this prior "sentiment" as it is described. Since these principles have 
been grasped "d'un seul regard", and not in a linear sequence, it is 
impossible to demonstrate them in geometrical fashion, setting out all 
the intermediate stages.
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An even more radical distinction between the two types of mind
is set out in the following fragment:
"Ceux qui sont accoutumés k juger par le sentiment ne 
comprennent rien aux choses de raisonnement, car ils veulent 
d'abord pénétrer d'une vue et ne sont point accoutumés à 
chercher les principes. Et les autres, au contraire, qui 
sont accoutumés à raisonner par principes, ne comprennent 
rien aux choses de sentiment, y cherchant des principes, 
et ne pouvant voir d'une vue." (p.1094; B.3)
The minds classified under "finesse" find themselves at a loss in questions
requiring familiarity with the processes of "raisonnement", for the
immediacy which characterizes their judgements disqualifies them for the
task of reasoned analysis of principles. In this way Pascal confines the
entire activity of the "esprit de finesse" to the "sentiment", the act of
immediate apprehension, separating it off completely from all discursive
reasoning. And the phrase, "juger par sentiment", here carries a quite
different meaning from the similar one in the other extract - "juger droit
et juste selon ce sentiment" - where the context requires that some
exercise of reasoning be involved in this act. The different prepositions
used in the two phrases provide the clue to the divergence. "Selon"
indicates that two successive operations occur, since if a judgement is
to be made in the light of, or in accordance with, a "sentiment", this
necessarily implies that the "sentiment" is already completed before the
judging commences. "Par" on the other hand, is employed to designate the
means whereby the judgement is made. In the first passage therefore, as
already noted, Pascal uses the verb "juger" of the operation which succeeds
the original registering of the "sentiment"; whereas in the second "juger"
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is actually identified with the "sentiment" - the "sentiment" constitutes 
the mental operation, if it can be so described, which issues in a
judgement. The primacy ascribed to "jugement" in the extract "Géométrie.
(1)
finesse". appears to be merely an emphasizing of the fact that in 
matters of "finesse" "jugement" and "sentiment" are indistinguishable - 
one's judgement in a given instance actually is a sentiment.
Thus, in refusing to allow any place to the "esprit", denoting 
the ratiocinative faculty, in ethics and aesthetics ('eloquence' is defined 
in the Pensées as "une peinture de la pensée" p.1099; B.26) Pascal is no 
more than consistent, since he regards these as two fields where decisions 
must be made spontaneously, "d'une vue", without resorting to the apparatus 
of definition and deductive processes.
Now the significance of all this for Pascal's estimate of the 
"honnête homme" becomes apparent when it is recalled that the "règle", 
to which the "esprit de finesse" conforms in aesthetic judgements, is 
"honnêteté". The advantage which he considers the "honnête homme" 
enjoys as the result of this fact can be inferred from the following 
statement:
"Ceux qui jugent d'un ouvrage sans règle sont, à l'égard 
des autres, comme ceux qui ont une montre à l'égard des 
autres. L'un dit: 'Il y a deux heures' l'autre dit:
'Il n'y a que trois quarts d'heure'. Je regarde ma 
montre, et je dis k l'un: 'Vous vous ennuyez', et à 
l'autre: 'Le temps ne vous dure guère'; car il y aune 
heure et demie; et je me moque de ceux qui me disent 
que le temps me dure à moi, et que j'en juge, par ma 
fantaisie: ils ne savent pas que j'en juge par ma 
montre". (p.1095; B5)
(l) Quoted above, p.
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Most of Pascal's editors have corrected the first sentence here, making 
the final verb in it negative. Indeed the fragment is quite meaningless 
if it is not his intention to point out the advantage of having some standard
of judgement in literature and art, by analogy with that which a person
in possession of a watch has over those without one when a debate arises 
as to the amount of time that has passed. It follows from what has gone 
before that any non-"honnête homme" faced with a work of art must find 
himself in a position parallel to that of a person who is forced to simply 
guess at the time which has elapsed.
A further fragment brings out by implication yet another 
advantage attaching to the attribute of "honnêteté" where aesthetics 
are concerned.
"Comme on se gâte l'esprit, on se gâte aussi le sentiment.
On se forme l'esprit et le sentiment par les conversations.
Ainsi les bonnes ou les mauvaises le forment ou le gâtent.
Il importe donc de tout de les savoir choisir, pour se le
former et ne le point gâter; et on ne peut faire ce choix,
si on ne l'a déjà forme et point gâté. Ainsi cela fait un 
cercle, d'oh sont bien heureux ceux qui sortent."(p.1095;B 6)
The "honnête homme" however, breaks out of this circle, or rather is
never implicated in it since "honnêteté", in Pascal's own terms a natural
endowment, is the model, the "règle", on which the "sentiment", here
obviously equivalent to taste, should be formed.
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(b) "Style naturel” the preserve of the "honnête homme».
The quality which secures the admiration of the "honnête homme" 
in whatever he finds aesthetically pleasing, is detailed hy Pascal as 
follows s
"II y a un certain modèle d'agrément et de beauté qui 
consiste en un certain rapport entre notre nature, faible 
ou forte, telle qu'elle est, et la chose qui nous plaît.
Tout ce qui est formé sur ce modèle nous agrée: soit 
maison, chanson, discours, vers, prose, femme, oiseaux, 
rivières, arbres, chambres, habits, etc. Tout ce qui 
n'est point fait sur ce modèle déplaît à ceux qui ont 
le goût bon." (p.1097; B.32)
It is a legitimate, and indeed necessary, inference from the foregoing
discussion that those who are described here as having good taste are
synonymous with the "honnêtes gens". Conformity to the "modèle" outlined
in this fragment can therefore be said to represent the "honnête hommefe"
criterion in aesthetics. However, the description of this "modèle" raises
difficulties. There would not appear to be any devastating objection to
I
positing a spontaneously felt relation between a perceiving subject and 
object as a model cf what is agreeable or beautiful. Nor is it merely 
tautologous and equivalent to affirming that what affords pleasure is in 
fact pleasing to the aesthetic sense, but means simply that in a given 
instance a particular object is found to be beautiful or pleasing because 
it establishes a particular form of relation. But if this "modèle" is to 
be used as a norm by idiich to evaluate the beauty of individual objects, 
then clearly the real test will be whether or not they evoke this special 
sort of relation. Thus when Pascal goes on to say that: "Tout ce qui est
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formé sur ce modèle nous agrée", he involves himself in a contradiction 
in terms. To speak of an object being modelled on a relation amounts to 
just this, since, in the sense in which he has been using that term, it 
signifies no more than the way in which a particular object and its judging 
subject stand to each other. If Pascal wished to retain this notion of 
a relation constituting the "modèle" of what is beautiful, he should have 
substituted in place of the above phrase something akin to the following:
'All things which are so formed that they set up this special sort of relation 
are pleasing to us'. However, in this case a further "modèle", independent 
of the relation, would be required upon which to design things so that 
they will induce the relation, for obviously, as it is described ty Pascal, 
it is evoked by, and must be attached to, some special quality in the object 
concerned.
The confusion which marks this fragment would seem to indicate 
that Pascal never really thought out the implications of his basic ideas 
in aesthetics. But what does come out in striking : fashion even here is 
the importance assumed by the sort of person who fills the role of judging 
subject in the relation. As he defines it, the character of this relation 
never depends upon just one of the terms involved, but Js conditioned by 
the way in which the two terms ("notre nature" and "la chose qui nous plaît") 
mutually affect each other. Indeed the logical outcome of his "modèle"
f
notion would be that, apart from establishing as a universally valid 
phenomenon the fact of the relation between subject and object as the basis 
of aesthetic appreciation, there can be no absolute standard of beauty.
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Since human nature as he depicts it is the very opposite of invariable,
the criterion or "modèle" will vary with the individual in question*
Pascal however is not content to leave the matter there. Further
on in the same fragment he condemns as being in bad taste sonnets composed
on a model he deems false, and a woman dressed in what appears to him an
outrageous garb, even though if he were strictly consistent he must
recognize that, provided the sonnets are found aesthetically pleasing by
someone, his own criterion of the "rapport entre notre nature —  et la
chose qui nous plaît" is satisfied. Clearly in the case of the sonnets
and the female attire Pascal considers there is something defective in the
judgement of the persons concerned; and behind his criticisms of contemporary
literary style lies the conviction that the wrong sort of persons have
undue influence in moulding literary taste: "Poète et non honnête homme".
(p.1096; B.3Ô) Thus in a long passage he calls attention to the way in
which, as it seems to him, current fashion has so blinded the general
taste that the tru^model of poetic diction is in danger of disappearing:
"Beauté poétique. - Gomme on dit beauté poétique, on devrait 
aussi dire beauté géométrique, et beauté médicinale; mais 
on ne le dit pas: et la raison en est qu'on sait bien quel 
est l'objet de la médecine, et qu'il consiste en la 
guérison, —  mais on ne sait pas en quoi consiste 
l'agrément, qui est l'objet de la poésie. On ne sait ce 
que c'est que ce modèle naturel qu'il faut imiter; et, 
à faute de cette connaissance, on a inventé de certains 
termes bizarres: 'siècle d'or, merveille de nos jours, 
fatal*, etc.; et on appelle ce jargon beauté poétique."
(p.l097; B.32)
The fact that this "jargon", the cachet of the specialist poet 
ignorant of the "modèle naturel", in contrast to the "honnête homme" who
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"ne veut point d ’enseigne", has come to be accepted as standard poetic 
diction testifies to the inordinate influence, at least as Pascal would 
have it, exerted by the former group in the shaping of the- canons of 
literary expression. His quarrel with the protagonists of such "beautés 
poétiques" - these overworked and stilted figures and expressions - is 
that they parade an affected style of writing of little real literary 
worth under this name. If the quality of their verse genuinely merited
the title there would be no occasion for them to label it such, since it 
would achieve instant and general recognition. Furthermore, such artificial 
conventions can only have a stagnating effect on verse, by depriving it 
of what Pascal regards as its roots in nature.
Some indication as to what Pascal believes a natural style of
writing consists in, and of the esteem in which he holds it, can be
gleaned from the concluding paragraphs of his De l'art de persuader;
"Rien n’est plus commun que les bonnes choses; il n’est 
question que de les discerner; et il est certain qu'elles 
sont toutes naturelles et à notre portée, et même connues 
de tout le monde. Mais on ne sait pas les distinguer.
Ceci"est universel. Ce n'est pas dans les choses extra­
ordinaires et bizarres que se trouve l’excellence de jj
quelque genre que ce soit. On s'élève pour y arriver, 
et on s’en éloigne: il faut le plus souvent s’abaisser.
Les meilleurs livres sont ceux que ceux qui les lisent 
croient qu'ils auraient pu faire. La nature qui seule 
est bonne, est toute familière et commune."
cf. extract quoted above, p.*33.
(2) M.Z. Tourneur, in his commentary on this fragment, after citing 
contemporary poems in which the usages condemned by Pascal occur, concludes:
"Ge n'était pas ïk des exceptions, des fantaisies individuelles, échappées 
a quelques versificateurs en mal de rimes; ces "termes bizarres" étaient 
alors généralement regardés comme la marque même de la poésie". Beauté 
poétique, histoire critique d'une pensée de Pascal et de ses annexes, 
toun, 1933) p.91.
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Then, referring to the methodological rules which he has outlined, he 
continuesi
"Je ne fais donc pas de doute que ces règles, étant les 
véritables, ne doivent être simples, naïves, naturelles, 
comme elles le sont. —  Et une des raisons principales 
qui éloignent autant ceux qui entrent dans ces 
connaissances du véritable chemin qu'ils doivent suivre, 
est l'imagination qu'on prend d'abord que les bonnes 
choses sont inaccessibles, en leur donnant le nom de 
grandes, hautes, élevées, sublimes. Cela perd tout.
Je voudrais les nomirier basses, communes, familières; 
ces noDïs-là conviennent mieux; je hais ces mots 
d'enflure (p.602; G.E.IX, p.288-290)
Thus Pascal considers that the universal inability to 'distinguish' - to
perceive for example what is the natural mode of expression appropriate
to a particular literary form - stems from the general acceptance of a
sophisticated code, which ordains that one must always as it were set
one's sights high, and aim for the extraordinary, the striking, the
sublime; from a conviction firmly planted that excellence is synonymous
with that and cannot be allied with the everyday, the natural, On the
contrary, he most emphatically asserts that, regardless of the genre with
which one may be concerned, precisely the opposite holds good, for: "La
nature qui seule est bonne, est toute familière et commune".
Nature therefore, and it is significantly a nature accessible 
to all, constitutes a sort of touchstone for Pascal in all questions of 
aesthetic appreciation, as well as of linguistics and methodology. It is on 
this account that he deplores the contemporary practice of regarding mere
(l) cf. the following two extracts from the Pensées which also attest his 
dislike of a flamboyant style of writing: " 'Eteindre le flambeau de la 
sédition': trop luxuriant. 'L'inquiétude de son génie': trop de deux mots 
hardis." (p.llOO;B.59). "Je hais également le bouffon et l'enflé:— "
(p.l096; B.30)
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current fashion as the "arbiter elegantiae". In a cryptic fragment he
notes that "— la mode fait l'agrément"— (p.U52;B.309) and alleges elsewhere
that the tendency to acquiesce in this state of things results from some
weakness inherent in men:
"Raison des effets. - La faiblesse de l'homme est la 
cause de tant de beautés qu'on établit: comme de ne 
point savoir bien jouer du luth n'est un mal qu'à 
cause de notre faiblesse." (p.ll64; B.329)
This defect of allowing one's aesthetic judgements to be shaped 
by the demands of current fashion, like the inability to 'distinguish' in 
the previously quoted extract ("Ceci est universel".), appears to admit of 
no exceptions. However, Pascal's conception of "honnêteté", as set out in 
passages e^^mined earlier, requires that the "honnête homme" should not 
be included among those thus enslaved ty fashion and unable to discern the 
"modèle naturel".
At least one reason for Pascal's marked predilection for a
"style naturel" appears to be because he believes it enables the artist
to make his audience experience the truth of his message in themselves.
This much emerges from the following extract:
"Quand un discours naturel peint une passion on un effet, 
on trouve dans soi-même la vérité de ce qu'on entend, 
laquelle on ne savait pas qu'elle y fût, en sorte qu'on 
est porté à aimer celui qui nous le fait sentir;— "
(p.l099; B.14)
>ke. Périer's description of the "règles d'éloquence toutes particulières" 
which Pascal faàhioned for himself, shows that this was the object which 
he set himself to pursue in his own writings:
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"Ce n'était point ce qu'on appelle de belles pensées qui 
n'ont qu'un faux brillant, et qui ne signifient rien; —
Mais il concevait 1'éloquence comme un moyen de dire les 
choses d'une manière que tous ceux à qui l'on parle les 
puissent entendre sans peine et avec plaisir, et il 
concevait que cet art consistait dans de certaines dispositions 
qui doivent se trouver entre l'esprit et le coeur de ceux 
k qui l'on parle, et les pensées et les expressions dont 
on se sert; mais que les proportions ne s'ajustent proprement 
ensemble que par le tour qu'on y donne."
He was not satisfied that this last requirement had been fulfilled until
he was sure that:
"— il fut impossible à l'esprit de l'homme de ne s'y pas 
rendre avec plaisir. — Ce n'était pas assez pour lui qu'une 
chose parût belle; il fallait qu'elle fût propre au sujet,
— cette manière d'écrire naïve, juste, agréable, forte et , x
naturelle en même temps lui était si propre et si particulière;—
Bes oigne, in reproducing this passage in the form of a series of die turns
enunciated by Pascal, reframed the last sentence quoted here as follows:
"II faut se renfermer, le plus qu'il est possible, dans
le simple naturel;— " (2)
The passage emphasizes then that the use of a natural mode of
expression is in Pascal's eyes the most effective means of achieving the
primary object of art, which consists in establishing a relation between
artist and audience, in order that others may be infected with the feelings
of the artist.
(1) Vie, p.14-15; G.E.I, p.72-3.
(2) p.1094, note a.}B.15, appendix. Nicole, although more appreciative
of the sublime than Pascal, holds similar views in regard to the natural style: 
"II y a deux sortes de beautés dans l'éloquence, — L'une consiste dans les 
pensées belles et solides, mais extraordinaires et surprenantes.— L'autre au 
contraire ne consiste nullement dans les pensées rares, mais dans un certain 
air naturel, dans une simplicité facile, élégante et délicate, qui ne bande 
point l'esprit, qui ne lui présente que des images communes, —  et qui sait 
si bien le suivre dans ses mouvements, qu'elle ne manque jamais de lui 
proposer, sur chaque sujet, les objets dont il peut être touché, et 
d'exprimer toutes les passions et les mouvements que les choses qu'elle 
présente y doivent produire." Essais de morale (Liège, 1767), vol.2, p.293*
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Such a warm recommendation of the natural, as the best model for
literary style, would appear to set Pascal very much in his age. As René
Bray has pointed out: "L'art doit imiter la nature. Voilà la première des
règles dictées par la raison, le premier commandement de la poétique
classique —  toute la génération 'préclassique' a voulu suivre la nature
et a prétendu la suivre aussi bien que Boileau et ses amis— It is to
the generation of Chapelain and the 'pre-classics', rather than to Soileau's,
that Pascal truly belongs, and indeed, as Bray would have it, he put his
finger on the reason for his contemporaries' lack of success in achieving
this aim when he wrote: "On ne sait ce que c'est que ce modèle naturel
qu'il faut imiter."  ^ And the close resemblance in idea between the
following brief fragment from the Pensées :
"Eloquence. - II faut de l'agréable et du réel; mais il
faut que cet agréable soit lui-même pris du vrai." (p.l099;B.25)
and Boileau's famous dictum from the 9th Enitre:
seul
"Rien n'est beau que le vrai, le vrai^est aimable." 
seems to indicate that for Pascal as for Boileau truth, beauty and nature 
are but different names for one and the same thing. However, the elevation 
of reason into a sort of sovereign principle, which represents the cornerstone 
of classical aesthetics, even if it did not imply all that M.Bray claims
(3 )vhen he equates "raison" with "une entité metaphysique", rather than with
mere "bon sens", has no counterpart in Pascal's writings. For whereas, as
(1) La formation de la doctrine classique en France. (Paris 1931) p.140-1.
(2) op.cit., p.145, cf.above, p.
(3) op.cit., p.126.
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Ernst Cassirer notes, "the theory of French classicism has nothing to do
with any philosophy of common sense; it does not concern itself with the
everyday and trivial use of the understanding but with the highest powers
of scientific r e as o n" ; Pa s c al  deliberately asserts that:
"Rien n'est plus commun que les bonnes choses: —  La nature 
qui seule est bonne, est toute familière et commune. —  Je 
voudrais nommer les bonnes choses basses, communes, familières:— " 
(p.602; G.E.IX, p.288-290)
The context shows that this declaration of confidence in the natural and
the everyday is a conscious revulsion against just such an attitude of
intellectual ism as that described by Cassirer.
(1) The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. (Boston 1955), p.282.
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Chapter two: Natural ethics.
(i) Positive attitude in the Pensées and minor works
The emphatic language used by Pascal in the passage at the end
of the Art de persuader, where he insists that excellence is to be sought
in all spheres in the natural, in the commonplace and in what is readily
accessible to all men, taken together with the fact that his description
of the "honnêtes gens" makes it quite plain that he sees in them the
exponents of this sort of approach, leads one to expect from him some
comments at least on the possibility of a natural ethics. There appears
to be no prima facie reason for excepting ethics from the expressly general
statement that:
"La nature qui seule est bonne, est toute familière et 
commune." (p.602; G.E.IX, p.289)
Moreover, in the Trois discours sur la condition des grands, "vertu" is
cited as an example of the "grandeurs naturelles", and is therefore to be
regarded as a "qualité réelle et effective de l'âme." (p.618; G.E.IX, p.369).
And in a fragment from the Pensées, discussed earlier in connection with
aesthetics, some such natural ethics seems to be definitely envisaged.
"Géométrie, finesse. - La vraie éloquence se moque de 
l'éloquence, la vraie morale se moque de la morale; 
c'est-a-dire que la morale du jugement se moque de la 
morale de l'esprit, qui est sans règles, (p.1094: B.4)
The textual problem involved in this fragment has already been
treated, ^  ^and it remains to point out that its significance for the present
(l) cf. above p.
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discussion consists chiefly in the two assumptions which it makes: (a) 
that there is such a thing as a "vraie morale", and (b) that a knowledge 
of what comprises this "vraie morale" can be had by man, for how otherwise 
would it be possible to ascertain that it makes light of the false ethics? 
Furthermore, since this "vraie morale", like the "vraie éloquence", belongs 
to the sphere of "finesse" and "jugement", it must be accessible to 
the natural man unaided by any supernatural grace, and will require no 
supernatural sanctions to ensure that its precepts are observed. The 
store which Pascal sets ty this natural ethics is sufficiently attested 
by the fact that he declares it to be the true ethics.
Also very significant in this regard is the following fragment
from the Pensées:
"Ceux qui sont dans le dérèglement disent à ceux qui sont 
dans l'ordre que ce sont eux qui s'éloignent de la nature, 
et ils la croient suivre: comme ceux qui sont dans un 
vaisseau croient que ceux qui sont au bord fuient. Le 
langage est pareil de tous côtés. Il faut avoir un point 
fixe pour en juger. Le port juge ceux qui sont dans un 
vaisseau; mais ou prendrons -nous un port dans la morale."
(p.1112; B.383)
This passage implies that nature is the yardstick by which conduct must be 
judged; but that difficulties arise over the question as to what, in a 
given instance, the natural act will be. However, the important point for 
the present enquiry is that thoæwho are "dans l'ordre" are alleged to be 
so because they are following nature. Thus, even if in the latter part of 
the fragment Pascal does take up the stock objection that what may be 'natural'
(1) It will be recalled that the fragment continues: "Car le jugement est 
celui à qui appartient le sentiment, comme les sciences appartiennent à 
l'esprit. La finesse est la part du jugement, la géométrie est celle de 
l'esprit."
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for one person will not necessarily be so for another, so that some external 
criter^n, "un point fixe", is required, the fact remains that he sets up 
nature here as the standard of action and the source of "order", and points 
to it ly implication as the foundation of ethics.
Some indication of the sort of questions such an ethics is concerned
with can be obtained from another fragment*
"Vanité des sciences. - La science des choses extérieures 
ne me consolera pas de l'ignorance de la morale, au temps 
d'affliction; mais la science des moeurs me consolera 
toujours de l'ignorance des sciences extérieures."
(p.1137; B.67)
The phrase "la science des moeurs", used here as a simonym for "la morale", 
may well have been chosen in part with an eye to the symmetry of the sentence. 
But the very fact that Pascal does use it in the second clause, in place of 
the noun "morale", is sufficient evidence that he conceives of ethics as 
dealing with practical questions relating to conduct and life, and not 
with the search for a rational basis for such conduct, nor with abstract 
notions of 'duty' or 'justice'. Equally clear is the fact, according to 
this definition, that "morale" is not simply a code of divine legislation, 
but is drawn from the sort of experience common to all mankind.
This preoccupation with the nractical aspect of morals comes out
very plainly in a short fragment from the Pensées:
"II faut se connaître soi-même: quand cela ne servirait pas 
à trouver le vrai, cela au moins sert à régler sa vie, et il 
n'y a rien de plus juste." (p.1104; B.66)
As it stands this extract implies that the business of ordering one's life,
in Pascal's view the primary concern of "morale", presupposes no external aid
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of aiy kind, even in the shape of a set of rules prescribing right conduct. 
That such practical measures are possible for man in his natural capacity is 
also the force cf the passage from the conclusion to the De 1'esprit 
géométrique, where Pascal maintains that those who realize that motion, 
space and number are potentially infinite in respect of addition and 
division:
"— pourront admirer la grandeur et la puissance de la 
nature dans cette double infinité qui nous environne 
de toutes parts et apprendre par cette connaissance 
merveilleuse à se connaître eux-mêmes— "(591;G.E.IX,p.269-270)
The notion that nature, if attended to, represents an adequate
guide to moral conduct appears to lie behind the following fragment from
the Pensées :
"L'Ecriture a pourvu de passages pour consoler toutes 
les conditions, et pour intimider toutes les conditions.
La nature semble avoir fait la même chose par ses deux
infinis, naturels et moraux; car nous aurons toujours du
dessus et du dessous, de plus habiles et de moins habiles, 
de plus élevés et de plus misérables, pour abaisser notre 
orgueil, et relever notre abjection." (p.1300; B.532)
Nature therefore, according to the relevant portion of this extract, by
means of the infinite diversity of types and corresponding range of
abilities that characterize the individuals who make up the human race,
sets forth what amounts to an admirable system of checks and counterbalances
which restore man to a state of equilibrium when he indulges in excesses,
and make plain the sort of conduct befitting his condition.
Finally, even idien, in despite of his claim that "naturellement 
on aime la vertu, et on hait la folie" (p.ll22;B.97), Pascal asserts that
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for man to continue in a virtuous state recourse must be had to the method
of counterpoise,there is no suggestion that the "vertu" in question is
not a purely natural quality.
"Nous ne nous soutenons pas dans la vertu par notre propre 
force, mais par le contrepoids de deux vices opposés, comme 
nous demeurons debout entre deux vents contraires: ôtez un 
de ces vices, nous tombons dans l'autre." (p.ll69;B.359)
In fact, since the method of counterpoise is declared to be necessary only
in order to keep in the right path so to speak, it follows that "vertu" is
originally attained "par notre propre force".
(ii) Negative attitude in the Pensées and minor works
In order to obtain a complete picture of Pascal's views on this 
subject, alongside such passages as the foregoing where he shows himself 
ready to accord a definite place and value to a natural ethics, must be 
set the more numerous ones in which it is denied ary positive value.
Particularly interesting in this respect is the Entretien avec 
M. de Saci. reported by Fontaine, and dating from the very early days of 
Pascal's close association with Port-Royal in 1655. In this dialogue, 
which took place before the full force of the Jansenist influence can have 
had time to make its impact on his outlook, the more tolerant attitude 
toward naturalism which one is led on that account to expect fails to appear.
(l) The expression is used by Professor A.O. Love joy in his Reflections on 
Eman Nature. (Baltimore, 1961),ch.II, where he shows that the device is a 
common one in the writings of 17th and early 18th century moralists.
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This is all the more remarkable in that, although Pascal condemns Montaigne's
whole approach to "morale" as pagan (p.569;G.E.IV, p.49), when he goes on
to depict the former's conception of "vertu" the chief component noted is
one which he himself takes over in a later treatise:
"II rejette donc bien loin cette vertu stoique qu'on peint
avec une mine sévère, —  La sienne est naive, familière,
plaisante, enjouée, et pour ainsi dire folâtre; elle suit 
ce qui la charme,— " (p.570; G.E.IV, p.50-1)
The similarities between this description and the extract
previously cited from the conclusion to the first part of the De l'esnrit
géométrique, where Pascal asserts that: "La nature qui seule est bonne, est
toute familière et commune", are manifest. Indeed, the passage from the
(1)
essay De l'institution des enfans. on which Pascal draws for his descrip­
tion of Montaigne's conception of "philosophie" and "vertu", is the self­
same one which provides the inspiration for this conclusion to the De 
1'esprit géométrique, with its denunciation of those who claim that in 
order to achieve excellence in any sphere one must "guinder 1'esprit", and 
fervent declaration of faith in the everyday and the natural. Although 
Pascal does not specifically treat of "vertu" there, nonetheless, as was 
argued earlier in the case of "morale", there is no prima facie reason for 
excepting it from such general statements as that:
"Rien n'est plus commun que les bonnes choses:—  il est 
certain qu'elles sont toutes naturelles et à notre portée, 
et même connues de tout le monde."
Despite all this however, the condemnation of Montaigne's "morale" stands, 
and again in the Pensées Pascal notes concerning him that:
(l) Essais, vol.I, p.172-3 (Gamier ed.)
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"— on ne peut excuser ses sentiments tout païens sur la 
mort;— " (p. 1104; B.63)
Pascal's indictment of Epictetus's version of the stoic philosophy
in the Entretien, as "principes d'une superbe diabolique" (p.563; G.E.IV,p.36),
involves him in a wholesale rejection of the possibility of a natural ethics.
The offending principles are outlined as follows :
"II dit que Dieu a donné à 1'homme les moyens de s'acquitter 
de toutes ses obligations; que ces moyens sont en notre 
puissance; —  que l'esprit ne peut être forcé de croire ce 
qu'il sait être faux, ni la volonté d'aimer ce qu'elle sait 
qui la rend malheureuse; que ces deux puissances sont donc 
libres, et que c'est par elles que nous pouvons nous rendre 
parfaits; que l'homme peut par ces connaissances parfaitement 
connaître Dieu, l'aimer, lui obéir, lui plaire, se guérir de 
tous ses vices, acquérir toutes les vertus, se rendre saint 
ainsi et compagnon de Dieu." (ibid; G.E.IV, p.35-6)
There is nothing particularly remarkable in the explanation advanced by
Pascal to account for these errors of Epictetus - the latter simply failed
to realize that man is essentially a fallen being, and, unaware of his
corruption, on discerning traces of his former "grandeur" treated human
nature as intrinsically s o u n d . I t  follows from this that Pascal's own
refusal to endorse Epictetus's tenets st^as from his conviction that the
consequences of the fall have been so dire, and so far-reaching for human
nature, as to make it inconceivable that man should attain to any good through
his own efforts, and hence to rule out the possibility of any such natural
(2)
ethics as Epictetus envisaged.
(1) p.571; G.E.IV, p.52
(2) The most Bascal will concede in the way of benefits to be derived from
& combined study of both Epictetus and ÿontaigne is summed up in the judgement 
that this cannot lead to "la vertu, mais seulement troubler dans les vices:— " 
(p.574j G.E.IV, p.56)
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This line of reasoning is made more explicit in a passage from the
Pensées, where Pascal again comments on Epictetus's ethical teaching:
"Quand Epictète aurait vu parfaitement bien le chemin, il 
dit aux hommes: 'Vous en suivez un faux'; il montre que 
c'en est un autre, mais il n'y mène pas. C'est celui de 
vouloir ce que Dieu veut;(l) Jesus-Ghrist seul y mène:
'Via, veritas'.
Les vices de Zenon même." (p.1302; B.466)
The conjectural preterite used in the first clause here allows that
Epictetus was justified in one of his claims mentioned in the Entretien -
that man's "esprit" is quite 'free', and able to guide him aright on moral
questions, since it would be self-contradictory otherwise to assert that
he (Epictetus) may perfectly well perceive what is the right path to follow.
This admission on Pascal's part is not perhaps as startling as may at first
sight appear, for he has already acknowledged in the Entretien that
Epictetus "a si bien connu les devoirs de l'homme."(p.563; G.E.IV, p.35)
Moreover, the proof of original sin in the Pensées, drawn from the paradoxes
discernible in human nature, depends for its cogency on recognition of the
fact that man combines a real awareness of what constitutes his true nature
and 'end' with an impotence to realize them. Several passages directly
testify to this hiatus between the knowledge of the good accessible to man
and the power to do it which he lacks:
"Toutes les bonnes maximes sont dans le monde; on ne manque
qu'à les appliquer." (p.1149; B.38O)
"— il y a bien des gens qui voient le vrai, et qui n'y 
peuvent atteindre."12) (p.l06l; B.915)
(1) cf.Entretien: "Epictète ne se lasse point de répéter que toute l'étude et 
le désir del'homme doit être de reconnaître la volonté de Dieu et de la 
suivre." (p.563; G.E.IV, p.34)
(2)cf. from the same group of fragments dealing with casuistry: "Encore qu'on 
ne puisse assigner le juste, on voit bien ce qui ne l'est pas," (p.l06l;B.93l)
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Thus it is in his other claim - that nan's "volonté" is equally 
'free', and that his natural capacity suffices to ensure him access to and 
perseverance,in the state of highest "vertu" - that Epictetus reveals the 
extent of his ignorance of the actual condition of human nature. Even 
though he may act as a signpost to the true path, neither Epictetus nor any 
other human being can lead man along it. In Pascal's opinion a supernatural 
guide is required for that purpose. But an ethics which, even if it does 
by itself point man in the right direction, yet depends upon external aid 
to enable him to travel in that direction, cannot consistently be termed a 
natural ethics.
The following short fragment from the Pensées completely
undermines any doctrine that holds up obedience to, or conformity with,
nature as an ethical maxim:
"Quand la malignité a la raison de son côté, elle devient 
fière. —  Quand l'austérité on le choix sévère n'a pas 
réussi au vrai bien, et qu'il faut revenir à suivre la 
nature, elle devient fière par ce retour." (p.ll27;B.407)
This passage implies both that evil is natural to man, and that the moral
worth of any act derives from the stern effort it involves to overcome the
impulse to follow nature. If "nature" is to be construed here as meaning
specifically human nature - the obvious sense of the extract - then no
really fresh developnent is implied. For, granting Pascal's postulate that
human nature has become corrupt consequent on the fall, it is clear that
f
such good actions as man may perform will be carried out in despite of the 
promptings of his nature.
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Nor are passages lacking in which Pascal explicitly asserts 
that vice in some form or other is natural to nan in his present condition.
H—  le vice, qui nous est naturel,— "(p.1308;B.498)
"L'homme n'est donc que déguisement, que mensonge et 
hypocrisie, —  et toutes ces dispositions, si éloignées 
de la justice et de la raison, ont une racine naturelle 
dans son coeur." (p.ll25-6;B.100)
"Du désir d'être estimé de ceux avec qui on est. - L'orgueil 
nous tient d'une possession si naturelle au milieu de nos 
misères,— " (p.ll28;B.153)
"— les vertus nous sont étrangères,— "(p.l294;B.668)
"Si l'on ne se connaît plein de superbe, d'ambition, 
de concupiscence, de faiblesse, de misère et d'injustice, 
on est bien aveugle."(p.1201; B.450)
For man to attain to "vertu" in this state of nature Pascal
believes that external aid is necessary. In contradiction to his remarks
concerning Epictetus in the Entretien, he notes in the Pensées that:
"La vraie nature de l'homme, son vrai bien, et la vraie
vertu, et la vraie religion, sont choses dont la connaissance
est inséparable." (p.1203;B.442)
Elsewhere he goes even further and alleges that:
"Sans Jésus-Christ, il faut que l'homme soit dans le vice 
et dans la misère; avec Jésus-Christ, l'homme est exempt 
de vice et de misère. En lui est toute notre vertu et 
toute notre félicité; hors de lui il n'y a que vice, misère 
erreurs,— (p.1301; B.546).
It would be difficult to conceive of a more direct repudiation of an ethics
based on the principle that "vertu" consists in obeying the dictates of
(l) cf. also: "La corruption de la raison paraît par tant de différentes et 
extravagantes moeurs. Il a fallu que la vérité soit venue, afin que l'homme 
ne véquit plus en soi-même." (p.1202;B.440) Pascal is obviously alluding here
to the passage in St. John's Gospel where it is alleged that "grace and truth
came by Jesus Christ." (1.17) Again in the 7th letter to Nile, de Roannez he 
maintains that "vertu" is a product of "piété" (p.$l6;G.E.VI, p.222) and in 
the Pensées one of the reasons adduced why God has instituted the practice of 
prayer is: "Pour nous apprendre de qui nous tenons la vertu." (p.l296;B.513)
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nature than that contained in these two fragments. Not merely does the 
second stand in sharp contrast to the extracts quoted earlier where "vertu" 
was declared to be a natural attribute, but taken together they cut away 
the ground from under much that is claimed for Epictetus in the Entretien, 
and in particular the approval of the aim, there alleged to inform all his 
teaching, to bring man to consider God "comme son principal objet", (p.562; 
G.E.IV, p.32)
The dualism which has been shown to characterize Pascal's thought 
on this subject is so radical as to make the task of determining the precise 
value which he assigns to a natural ethics, and the sort of "vertu" achieved 
by following out its precepts, an almost impossible one. Any attempt to 
set up a graduated scale is defeated by his practice of affirming quite 
definitely in one place that in this respect nature has a positive value, 
and in another categorically denying that very fact. Nor, as is apparent 
from the differing viewpoints adopted in the Entretien and the De 1'esprit 
géométrique, to say nothing of the Pensées themselves, is it possible to 
explain this dualism in terms of a chronological development.
(iii) Positive attitude in the Provinciales
This dualism appears to be resolved in the Provinciales, for on 
the rare occasions when Pascal does accord some positive value to nature 
there as a standard of action, the judgement takes the form of a comparison
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with some higher term in his scale.
Thus, denouncing the Jesuit casuists at the beginning of the
fourteenth letter for their decisions relating to the legitimacy of homicide,
he alleges that:
n— vous êtes éloignés des sentiments de l'Eglise, et même de
la nature.  vous avez tellement oublié la loi de Dieu, et
tellement éteint les lumières naturelles, que vous avez besoin 
qu'on vous remette dans les principes les plus simples de la 
religion et du sens commun; car qu'y a-t-il de plus naturel 
que ce sentiment: 'Qu'un particulier n'a pas droit sur la vie 
d'un autre'?"
And he goes on to quote approvingly a very significant passage from Saint 
Chrysostom:
" 'Nous en sommes tellement instruits de nous-mêmes, que,
quand Dieu a établi le précepte de ne point tuer, il n'a 
pas ajouté que c'est à cause que l'homicide est un mal; 
parce, dit ce Père, que la loi suppose qu'on a déjà appris 
cette vérité de la nature'."
Pascal here reproduces the traditional scale, according to which 
nature is assigned a positive, even if low, value. More noteworthy however, 
is that his citing this particular assertion of Saint Chrysostom implies 
that he considers a morals based on "lumières naturelles", on natural 
sentiment, forms the groundwork upon which the more specifically Christian 
ethic has been built. Certainly such natural truths, as that homicide is 
evil - "les principes les plus simples du sens commun" as they are also 
denominated -, a knowledge of which is presupposed by the Christian precepts, 
are regarded as being somehow more basic to man than the latter. This fact, 
although it does not entitle them to a higher rank in the scale, nonetheless 
assures such natural moral principles of a positive value.
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It is the same conception which lies behind a further very
similar condemnation of the Jesuit casuistry occurring later in the letters
"II est aisé de juger par tout ce que j'ai dit jusqu'ici 
combien le relâchement de vos opinions est contraire à la 
sévérité des lois civiles, et même païennes. Que sera-ce 
donc si on les compare avec les lois ecclésiastiques, qui 
doivent être incomparablement plus saintes,— ?" (p.826;G.E.VI,p.l45)
In an earlier letter it had been affirmed with respect to the Jesuits that;
"Gomme leur morale est toute païenne, la nature suffit 
pour l'observer." (p.707; G.E.IV, p.304)
Now despite the fact that the Jesuit position has worsened in the interval
between these two extracts (the second is taken from the fifth letter), it
remains true that in the former the pagan legal code is assigned a definite
value, while the latter makes it plain that such a code is grounded on a
natural ethics. Thus the normal traditional scale - natural, civil,
ecclesiastical in an ascending order - is implied here too, and Christian
morality is made to appear as merely the perfected version of the natural.
Also in the fourteenth letter, referring to Lcssius's opinion that
the right of self-defence covers any action necessary to preserve oneself from
hurt, Pascal objects;
"Que d'étranges suites sont enfermées dans ce principe 
inhumain et combien tout le monde est-il obligé de s'y 
opposer,— " (p.826; G.E.VI, p.144)
Here again Pascal seems to be appealing to some moral sentiment natural to
man, which should prompt him to resist such an innovation^ The eighth
letter contains a somewhat similar reference. Pascal is reporting one of
his interviews with the Jesuit father:
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"Il me fit voir ensuite, dans ses Auteurs, des choses 
de cette nature si infâmes, que je n'oaeraîs les rapporter, 
et dont il aurait eu horreur lui-même (car il est bon 
homme), sans le respect qu'il a pour ses Pères,— "
(p.74S;G.E.V, p.152)
But in order to legitimately infer that the effect of scandal, which Pascal
implies would be produced in any "bon homme" by the sort of proposition
here in question, is the response of a natural moral sense, it would be
necessary to have a definition of "bon homme" from him. In the Provinciales
at least, no such definition is forthcoming.
However, two eminent critics, M. M. Lanson and Pellisson have 
put forward the view that it is the conscience, the natural moral sense in 
man, to which Pascal continually appeals in the Provinciales in his 
denunciation of Jesuit practices, and that moreover his whole case against 
the Jesuits depends upon establishing the fact that their principles run 
counter to the dictates of this conscience.Clearly if these contentions 
are justified the extracts so far examined from the Provinciales have been 
misleading as to the relative value which Pascal really accords to natural 
ethics in that work.
(l) M. Pellisson, in an article entitled: La secularisation de la morale 
^  XVIIIe siècle, maintains, "Quand Pascal intenta aux jésuites le grand procès, 
ou il dénonce les restrictions mentales, —  ce n'est pas au tribunal de 
l'Eglise qu'il cite ses adversaires; c'est à la conscience qu'il en appelle.
Il sent qu'en pareille cause il n'appartient à aucune religion de rendre la 
sentence; et, à cette heure, pélagien inconscient, il met son suprême recours 
dans cette morale qui, comme eût dit Montaigne, a été plantée au coeur même 
de l'homme." La révolution française. 1903,p.397. In a similar vein, in his 
article La transformation des idées morales et la naissance des morales 
rationnelles de 1680 à 1715. G.Lanson writes, "Bayle fut le premier qui 
démontra le principe de la souveraineté de la conscience. Mais ce principe 
existait déjà —  C'est en y faisant appel que Pascal pouvait rendre ridicule 
le jésuite qui parlait d'après la conscience du P. Bauny, et non d'après la 
sienne." Revue du mois. IX, 1910, p.18-19.
172
(iv) Negative attitude in the Provinciales
Although Pascal nowhere in the Provinciales uses the actual term
"conscience" in the sort of context which would give substance to the views
of M.M.Lanson and Pellisson, this by no means proves conclusively that it
is not at the bar of conscience that he sets out to indict the Jesuits. It
is significant nonetheless that the word does appear frequently in the
letters in its usual acceptations
"Vous êtes obligés en conscience, —  de dire— "(2nd,p.679;
G.E.IV, p.165)
"— dites-moi, en conscience,—  Vous parlez donc, contre 
votre conscience? Point du tout, dit-il: je ne parlais 
pas en cela selon ma conscience, mais selon celle de Ponce 
et du Père Bauny." (5th,p.709;G.E.IV, p.309)
"La plaisante comparaison, —  des choses du monde à celles 
de la conscience!" (p.710; G.E.IV, p.3H)
"Et ainsi, —  un seul docteur peut tourner les consciences 
et les bouleverser k son gré,— " (ibid.;G.E.IV, p.310)
"— vous avez bien mis ceux qui suivent vos opinions probables 
en assurance à l'égard de Dieu et de la conscience;— "
(6th, p.726; G.E.V, p.50)
"—  les cas de conscience— " (ibid.;G.E.V, p.5l)
"C'est par cette subtilité de conscience qu'il a prouvé— "
(I2th, p.802-3; G^E.V, p.382)
"Je vous demande donc si cette maxime d'Escobar peut être 
suivie en conscience— " (p.804; G.E.V, p.386)
"Quand vous avez entrepris de décider les cas de conscience 
d'une manière favorable et accommodante,— " (l3th, p.810;
G.E.VI, p.28)
"— les questions de contrition, — qui ne touchent que 
1'intérieur des consciences." (ibid)
"— en leur déclarant qu'ils le peuvent faire en sûreté de 
conscience,— " (p.8l6;G.E.VI, p.39)
"— je ne puis sortir de l'hérésie, ou qu'en trahissant ma 
conscience, ou qu'en réformant la vôtre." (I5th,p.839;G.E.VI,p.198)
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In none of these cases can Pascal be said to make an appeal to
the conscience as man's natural guide in moral questions* The role which
he does assign it in such questions becomes more evident in the following
two extracts. In connection with Lessius's opinion, that the right of self-
defence covers all that is necessary to preserve oneself from any hurt,
Pascal points out that it is in the interests .especially of those holding
public office to oppose such views, which would expose them to the attacks
of would-be disturbers of the order of the realm who,
M— -n'auront plus à vaincre les remords de la conscience, 
qui arrêtent la plupart des crimes dans leur naissance, 
et ne penseront plus qu'à surmonter les obstacles du 
dehors." (p.826; G.E.VI, p.144)
In the fifteenth letter, commenting on the Jesuit maxim that it is "probable
et sûr en conscience qu'on peut calomnier sans crime pour conserver son
honneur," Pascal remarks that:
"L'inclination corrompue des hommes s'y perte d 'elle-même 
avec tant d'impétuosité qu'il est incroyable qu'en levant 
l'obstacle de la conscience, elle ne se répande avec toute 
sa véhémence naturelle." (p.835;G.E.VI, p.191)
Now if M.M.Lanson and Pellisson are right in their contention 
that Pascal regards the conscience as the natural moral sense whose primacy 
he is concerned to uphold, then ipso facto one would expect to find him 
exhibiting it as emphatically rejecting those Jesuit principles Uiich it 
recognizes as violating its own most certain principles. But manifestly 
this is not the case. The chief ostensible reason for Pascal's exposure of 
the morally pernicious consequences of the Jesuit principles is precisely 
that, on this most crucial issue, the individual conscience stands in need 
of instruction. Its voice is silenced by the weight of the Jesuit assurances.
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and it requires to have the right and the wrong of the w  tter clearly pointed 
out before it can exercise its sanctioning function.
A further passage from a later fragment, criticizing the Jesuit 
approach to the problems of moral theology, shows just how far Pascal is 
from considering the conscience as such as the source of some natural 
code of morals:
"Les Jesuites ont voulu joindre Dieu au monde et n'ont gagné 
que le mépris de Dieu et du monde. Car du côté de la conscience 
cela est évident, et du côté du monde — " (p.l063jB.935)
The implication here is quite definitely that the "conscience" is simply
the faculty which registers the precepts of the divine will, and reflects
on their consequences for human conduct.
And what might appear to be a tacit appeal to some natural moral
sense in an extract from the eleventh letter, turns out on close examination
to be little more than an empirical statement of fact.
"Quoil faut-il employer la force de l'Ecriture et de la 
tradition pour montrer que c'est tuer son ennemi en trahison 
que de lui donner des coups d'épée par derrièijJ et dans une
embûche; et que c'est acheter un bénéfice que de donner de
l'argent comme un motif pour se le faire resigner?" (p*783;
G.E.V, p.316)
Since Pascal clearly considers that the second example cited here fais within
the same category as the first, it is plain that he does not intend the
latter to carry any appeal to the conscience.
In addition to such negative evidence as the foregoing, the view 
that Pascal, in his criticisms of Jesuit moral theology, invokes as criteron
(l) cf. from the Pensées: "En montrant la vérité, on la fait croire;—  On 
assure la conscience en montrant la fausseté;— " (p.l331;B.893) "Jamais on ne 
fait le mal si pleinement et si gaiement que quand on le fait par conscience." 
(ibid. ;B.895)
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a natural code of ethics completely fails to take account of the fact 
that one of his favourite devices for heaping approbrium on the Jesuits 
is to show that their innovations have had the effect of aligning Christian 
and natural morality, and that theirjs is a purely pagan ethic.
Thus in the fifth letter his Jansenist colleague alleges that 
the errors of the Jesuit doctrine of grace spring from the laxity of their 
morals %
"Comme leur morale est toute païenne, la nature suffit pour 
l'observer. Quand nous soutenons la nécessité de la grâce 
efficace, nous lui donnons d'autres vertus pour objet.— c'est 
pour une vertu plus haute que celle des pharisiens et des plus 
sages du paganisme. La loi et la raison sont des grâces 
suffisantes pour ces effets. Mais pour dégager l'ame de 
l'amour du monde, pour la retirer de ce qu'elle a de plus 
cher, —  ce n'est 1'ouvrage que d'une main toute-puissante.
Et il est aussi peu raisonnable de prétendre que l'on a 
toujours un plein pouvoir, qu'il le serait de nier que ces 
vertus, destituées d'amour de Dieu, lesquelles ces bons Pères 
confondent avec les vertus chrétieimes, ne sont pas en notre 
puissance." (p.707;G.E.IV, p.304)
Pascal therefore is not concerned to deny the possibility of a pagan ethics
orientated toward "vertus" wholly within man's natural capacity; his object
is to mark the sharp distinction between such an ethics and what he considers
to be the true Christian conception of morality, and to show just how far
the Jesuit system diverges from this by equating it with the former. Hence,
although such a statement, as that the Christian ethic has as its goal "une
vertu plus haute que celle des —  plus sages du paganisme," does assign a
(l) This radical disparity between the range of man's natural power and that 
of divine grace with respect to "vertu", is insisted on in the Pensées also. 
In a fragment devoted to showing how the Old Testament predictions were 
fulfilled, Pascal claims: "— il est arrivé qu'en la quatrième monarchie,—  
les païens en foule adorent Dieu et mènent une vie angélique;— les hommes 
renoncent à tous plaisirs. Ce que Platon n'a pu persuader à quelque peu 
d'hommes choisis et si instruits, une force secrète le persuade à cent 
Billions d 'hommes ignorants,— Qu'est-ce que tout cela? C'est l'esprit de 
Dieu qui est répandu sur la terre." (p.l256;B.724) In another fragment
cont.p.l76
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positive though low 'value to the pagan "vertu", and by implication to the 
natural morals which produces it, this in no way reflects to the credit of 
the Jesuits, Nor can Pascal be said to refer to the latter as criterion - 
the criterion here is quite plainly "1'amour de Dieu".
In the thirteenth letter, pointing out that the explanation for 
the variety of opinions offered by the Jesuit casuists on any one point is 
to be sought in the fact that they set out to satisfy all comers, Pascal 
relates that*
"A ceux qui voudront tuer on présentera Lessius; à ceux qui 
ne voudront pas tuer on produira Vasquez, afin que personne 
ne sorte mal content, —  Lessius parlera en païen de l'homicide, 
et peut-être en chrétien de 1'aumône; Vasquez parlera en 
païen de l'aumône,— "(p.817;G.E.VI, p.41)
Since it is Lessius's views as to the circumstances in which homicide is
excusable which Pascal is particularly concerned to denounce earlier in
this letter, it is clear that the label "païen" in this context is a
derogatory one. And since, as has already appeared, "païen" and "nature" are
correlative terms in Pascal's vocabulary in the Provinciales, it would be
ridiculous to maintain that the invective which he directs at the Jesuit
principles bearing on this problem stems from some natural sense of right.
A further example of the use of the epithet "naturel" as a means 
of inducing disapproval of the Jesuit position occurs in the tenth letter, 
where Pascal recounts his reaction to the exposition of their doctrine of 
attrition:
"Vous me surprenez, mon Père; car je ne vois rien en toute 
cette attrition-là que de naturel; et ainsi le pécheur se 
pourrait rendre digne de l'absolution sans aucune grâce 
surnaturelle." (p.774;G.Ë.V, p.267)
cent, from p.175. he notes: "Lja conversion des païens n'était réservée 
qu'à la grâce du Messie. Les Juifs ont été si longtemps à les combattre sans 
succès:—  Les sages comme Platon et Socrate, n'ont pu le persuader." (p.1295:
B.769)
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Here again it is their failure to discriminate between the Christian and
the purely natural way of approaching such a question that brings down
Pascal's censure on the Jesuits*
Perhaps the most significant passage in this regard however, is
found near the beginning of the Factum pour les curés de Paris, where he
alleges that the whole aim of the Jesuit moral theology has been to accommodate
Christ's teaching to the demands of human nature, instead of to raise the
standard of human life to conform to that teaching. He continues;
"C'est par cet horrible renversement qu'on a vu ceux qui 
se donnent la qualité de docteurs et de théologiens, 
substituer à la véritable morale, qui ne doit avoir pour 
principe que l'autorité divine et pour fin que la charité, 
une morale toute humaine qui n'a pour principe que la raison 
et pour fin que la concupiscence et les passions de la 
nature." (p.907-8; G.E.VII, p.280)
A little further on in the same Factum, after listing some of the 'most
abominable propositions' advanced by the casuists, Pascal concludes;
"Enfin tout sera permis, la loi de Dieu sera anéantie, et 
la seule raison naturelle deviendra notre lumière en toutes 
nos actions,— " (p.913;G.E. VII, p.290-1)
That Pascal should consider it an "horrible renversement" that the
effect of the Jesuit innovations has been to substitute a purely human ethics
in place of the true ethics grounded on the divine will, not only provides an
example of his practice of stigmatizing the Jesuit doctrines by treating
them as identical with a natural morals, but also indicates very plainly
the relative value he is prepared to accord the two types of ethic in
question. The same point is made in rather more extreme terms when he
goes on to affirm that the final degradation in morals will have been reached
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if the Jesuits have their way, and the natural light of reason is recognized
as man's sole guide to the principles of action.
This substitution of human for divine authority in ethics, which
results from the Jesuits' corrupting influence, is referred to again in
the Second écrit des curés de Paris, when Pascal maintains that their "detestable
morale" consists in setting up,
"— leurs traditions humaines sur la ruine des traditions 
divines." (p.923;G.E.VII, p.318)
The gulf which separates these two types of morality, despite what may
appear to be superficial resemblances, is effectively brought out in a highly
figurative passage from some notes obviously intended for the Provinciales*
"Un bâtiment également beau par dehors, mais sur un mauvais 
fondement. Les païens sages le bâtissaient; et le diable 
trompe les hommes par cette ressemblance apparente fondée sur 
le fondement le plus différent." (p.l051; B.921)
Once again the contrast is worked in to expose the Jesuit moral theology to
odium ty showing that it is based upon natural principles; and the implication
of the extract is that such "vertus" as the pagan ethical teaching may yield
when judged by the Christian criterion will not be seen as real "vertus" at all*
Finally, in the Cinquième écrit, in the course of comparing the
culpability of schismatics like the Calvinists with that attaching to the
Jesuits for propagating moral laxity, Pascal notes that, although the evil
of which the latter are guilty is not nearly as serious in itself as schism,
"— il est néanmoins plus dangereux, en ce qu'il est plus 
conforme aux sentiments de la nature,— "(l) (p*938;G.E.VII,p.373)
(l) cf. from the Factum:— "comme il y a des hérésies dans la foi, il y a aussi 
des hérésies dans les moeurs—  d'autant plus dangereuses qu'elles sont confornes 
aux passions de la nature, et à ce malheureux fonds de concupiscence— "
(p.917; G.E.VII, p.298)
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Thus, far from using some conception of a natural morals as his touchstone 
in decrying the Jesuit system of casuistry, it is precisely their attempt 
to bring Christian ethics into line with such a purely natural morals that 
has excited Pascal's antipathy. As the second half of the sentence quoted 
here abundantly testifies,his view of human nature is altogether too 
sombre for him to be able to subscribe to the belief in a close relation 
between what is and what ought to be, which the use of the term 'nature* as 
an ethical criterion implies.
Two further passages, although not illustrative, at least directly,
of Pascal's practice of equating the Jesuit with the pagan approach to morals,
may be cited here as evidence that the resultant low value ascribed to
any ethical scheme which sets up conformity to nature as the primary rule
of action is not simply part of a polemical device. In the fourth letter
his Jansenist colleague is represented as objecting in the following terms
to the Jesuit tenet that no one sins without prior knowledge of his
'infirmity' and 'doctor', nor without having previously experienced the
desire to be cured and to implore God to that end:
"Pensera-t-on que ces philosophes, qui vantaient si hautement 
la puissance de la nature, en connussent 1'infirmité et le 
médecin? Direz-vous que ceux qui soutenaient, comme une maxime 
assurée, 'que ce n'est pas Dieu qui donne la vertu, et qu'il ne 
s'est jamais trouvé personne qui la lui ait demandée', pensassent 
à la lui demander eux-mémes?" (p.697;G.E.IV, p.258-9)
Since Pascal Introduces this objection by the phrase, "Mais mon second,
soutenant mon discours, lui dit— ," it is plain that he endorses the views
(l) "— il est néanmoins plus dangereux, en ce que—  les hommes y ont d'eux- 
Bemes une telle inclination qu'il est besoin d'une vigilance continuelle pour 
les en garder." (ibid.; G.E.VII, p.373)
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put forward, which therefore do not merely amount to an exposé of the 
'official* Jansenist position. In the light of its context this extract 
amply attests Pascal's estimate of the sort of ethical theory which treats 
nature as of itself capable of motivating and effecting virtuous acts, and 
has as its object a "vertu" whose source is elsewhere than in some God-given 
movement of the heart.
The other fragment, criticizing the Jesuit doctrine of 
probabilism, contains an indirect disparaging reference to any natural 
morals ;
"II y a du plaisir de pouvoir bien faire et de savoir bien 
faire: 'scii^et posse'. La grâce et la probabilité le 
donnent, car on peut rendre compte à Dieu en assurance 
sur leurs auteurs." (p.1064; B.942)
When Pascal's opinion of probabilism has been taken into account, this
passage implies that not only the power of performing good acts, but
even the knowledge as to what constitutes such acts, depends upon divine
grace. An ethics, therefore which relies solely on natural capacity will
not only fail to realize any good in practice, but will be incapable of
attaining even to the idea of the good.
An admirable summary of the various points considered in this
section is set out in a passage from a single fragment usually included
in the Pensée s. but obviously written with the Jesuits very much in mind.
"Toutes les religions et les sectes du monde ont eu la raison 
naturelle pour guide. Les seuls chrétiens ont été astreints 
à prendre leurs règles hors d'eux-mêmes, et à s'informer de 
celles que Jésus-Christ a laissées aux anciens pour être 
retransmises aux fidèles. Cette contrainte lasse ces bons 
Pères. Ils veulent avoir, comme les autres peuples, la 
liberté de suivre leurs imaginations." (p.1336;B.903)
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It is interesting to note that in an earlier variant of this fragment,
afterwards deleted, Pascal wrote:
"Ils ont dit aux peuples: 'Venez à nous; nous suivrons les 
opinions des nouveaux auteurs; la raison sera notre guide;
nous serons comme les autres peuples qui suivent chacun sa
lumière naturelle.' " (ibid. n.;B.ibid.n.)
The fact that the principles of Jesuit moral theology, which Pascal wishes
to decry, are treated as indistinguishable from those of any secular or
pagan morality, whereas the Christian ethic derives superiority from its
very uniqueness in not being natural, provides an index to the value
he assigns to these different conceptions. Moreover, the readiness which
he alleges the Christian shows to allow the religious tradition to mould
(2)
his ethical judgements, together with the denial it implies of the
competency of "raison" and "lumière naturelle" in this regard, hardly
seem to justify/the claims of M.M. Lanson and Pellisson with respect to 
his supposed vindication of a natural moral sense.
(1) cf. also from the Pensées: "La seule religion' contre la nature, contre le 
sens commun, contre nos plaisirs, est la seule qui ait toujours été."(p.1309;
B. 605)
(2) This claim, that there is a religious tradition which is the guide to the 
true Christian morality, is a constantly recurring one in the Provinciales :
"— je me moque de ces auteurs-là, s'ils sont contraires à la tradition."
(4th, p.693;G.E.IV, p.252) "Je croyais ne devoir prendre pour règle que 
l'Ecriture et la tradition de l'Eglise, mais non pas vos casuistes." (5th, 
p.709;G.E.IV, p.309) "C'est-à-dire, mon Père, qu'à votre arrivée on a vu 
disparaître saint Augustin, saint Chrysostome, —  et les autres, pour ce qui 
est de la morale." (p.713;G.E.IV,p.317) "— je prévois—  de puissantes barrières
qui s'opposeront à votre course.—  l'Ecriture sainte, les papes et les Conciles 
— qui sont dans la voie unique de l'Evangile." (p.714;G.E.IV,p.319) "0 mon 
Père! d'oh Molina a-t-il pu être éclairé pour déterminer une chose de cette 
importance, sans aucun secours de l'Ecriture, des Conciles, ni des Pères?"
(7th, p.737;G.E.V, p.104) "Saint Augustin en a le plus,— Outre une chose 
qu'on peut considérer, qui est une tradition sans interruption de 12,000  ^
papes, conciles, etc." (notes,p.l049;B.925) "Aguavivae. Ep.XVI. Lire les 
Pères pour les conformer à son imagination, au lieu de former sa pensée sur 
celle des Pères." (notes,p.1058; B.958) "Il y a contradiction, car d'un côté 
ils disent qu'il faut suivre la tradition et n'oseraient désavouer cela, et de
. cont. p.182
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It is clear from the foregoing discussion not merely that Pascal 
limits the role of the conscience to applying the appropriate sanctions when 
presented with two possible lines of choice, one of which has been marked 
out as right and the other wrong, but that his own moral sense, if it is 
this which is responsible for the purported indignant outbursts, is not 
shocked by the Jesuit propositions in isolation. It is their divergence 
from what he conceives to be the Christian norm which causes such expressions,
and there is nothing in the Provinciales to indicate that, had the Christian
1
standards of behaviour never been set up, his moral sense would still be 
scandalized by the Jesuit casuistical practices. The Jesuit position is 
not denounced in the abstract, but in relation to what Pascal regards as 
the established Christian position, and the office of the conscience is 
in effect reduced to registering disapproval at the degree to which the 
former falls away from the latter. Such evidence points to the conclusion 
that Pascal's dominant concern throughout the Provinciales is, not to uphold 
the autonomy of any natural moral sense, but to reassert the primacy of the 
Christian ethic as he sees it.
cont.from p.]81 l'autre ils diront ce qu'il leur plaira. On croira 
toujours ce premier,— "(notes,p.1062;B.944) "Je ne crains pas même vos 
censures, paroles si elles ne sont fondées sur celles de la tradition." (notes 
p. 1074; B.920. cf. also below, p.
(l)The essentially polemical nature of the Provinciales makes it very 
difficult to ascertain precisely what it is that characterizes this ethic as 
against what Pascal claims is the Jesuits ' modified version of it. There 
are references to; " les règles les plus saintes de la conduite chrétienne— " 
(p.778;G.E.V., p.273), "les saintes règles de l'Evangile,— " (p.798jG.E.V, 
p.373), "les règles de la morale de l'Eglise— " j[p.907;G.E.VII, p.279-80)
"les règles évangéliques— " (p.915;G.E.VII, p.295); but Pascal never under­
takes to define these. (The 14th letter constitutes an exception to this 
general pattern. However, the aspect of Christian morality treated there - 
the precepts relating to homicide - is an isolated one.) There is
cont. p.183.
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cont. from p.182 considerable truth in Vinet's assessment of the 
Provinciales as an ^ouvrage de morale*: "A parler proprement, ce n'en est 
pas un. Non seulement l'auteur n'apporte sur ce sujet aucun nouveau 
système, mais rarement il s'engage dans l'exposition des idées reçu^."
Etudes sur Biaise Pascal. (Lausanne, 1936), p.255. Thus in his attack 
on the Jesuit casuistical practices, as debasing moral standards and 
destroying all principles of right action, Pascal takes for granted in 
his reader an acquaintance with the basic moral tenets of Christianity. 
Confident that it will suffice his purpose to expose such practices in a 
clear light, he is content, having done so, simply to affirm that they 
entail a "renversement" of, or an "égarement" from, the Christian ethic 
without specifying in detail what this is. Even such a resounding manifesto 
as that with which the Factum opens is not followed by any exposition;
"Notre cause est la cause de la morale chrétienne. Nos parties sont les 
casuistes qui la corrompent." (p.906jG.E. VII, p.278) One of the most 
recent commentators on the Provinciales claims that in this respect,
"the positions (Pascal) chose to attack indicate clearly enough what he 
himself stood for." A.J.Krailsheimer, Studies in Self-Interest. (Oxford, 
1962) p.99. But the most that can be inferred by this indirect means, 
apart from some such banal conclusion as that he stands for the Gospel 
precepts in their pristine purity, is, in M. Adam's words, that; "Toute 
la critique de Pascal sous-entend que l'amour de Dieu est l'unique maxime 
de la morale." Histoire de la littérature française au XVIIe siècle. (Paris 
195/ ), t. II, p.253. This is backed by explicit assertions on Pascal's 
part; "On viole 'le grand commandement, qui comprend la loi et les 
prophètes'; on attaque la piété dans le coeur; on en ôte l'esprit qui 
donne la vie; on dit que l'amour de Dieu n'est pas nécessaire au salut;— " 
(p.778;G.E. V, p.274) "— vous anéantissez la morale chrétienne en la 
séparant de l'amour de Dieu,— " (p.868;G.E. VI, p.345)
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(v) Pascal'3 antl-ratlomllam In .thlos in th. Provinciales.
It is Pascal's 'traditionalist* approach to ethics in the 
Provinciales which leads him to this uncompromising rejection of the 
rationalizing tendencies of the Jesuit moral theologians, and to the 
virtual abandonment of the critical office of the conscience. He plainly 
regards the moral injunctions implicit in the Christian faith as forming 
part of what he believes is a revealed system of truth. And the two factors 
which chiefly determine this authoritarian approach are his conception of 
theology, the discipline that properly concerns itself with revealed truth, 
and his view of human nature.
A passage from a fragment, where Pascal undertakes to justify
the position he adopts in the Provinciales, illustrates the gulf which such
an approach to moral questions sets between him and the Jesuits;
"S'ils ne renoncent à la probabilité, leurs bonnes maximes 
sont aussi peu saintes que les méchantes, car elles sont 
fondées sur l'autorité humaine. Et ainsi si elles sont 
plus justes, elles seront plus raisonnables, mais non pas 
plus saintes; elles tiennent de la tige sauvage sur quoi 
elles sont entées." (p.1073; B.920)
The derogatory implications of the expression "tige sauvage" in this context
are sufficiently indicative of Pascal's anti-rationalism. Moreover, by
equating from an ethical standpoint 'good* Jesuit maxims with 'evil' ones,
(l) M. Brunschvicg, in the introduction to the Provinciales in the Grands 
Ecrivains edition, cites numerous examples to show how the Jesuit replies to 
the letters completely miss the mark. The main reason for this lies in the 
Jesuits' failure to comprehend that, after joining battle over a question of 
moral theology, Pascal should refuse to debate the issue according to the 
juristic conceptions with which the subject had become overlaid in the course 
of a long and almost exclusive association with the scholastic tradition, of. 
G.E. IV, p.xxxviii ff.
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simply because both have a common origin in mere human authority, and 
by setting up "sainteté" as the criterion of judgement, he emphasizes the 
conception of true moral principles as grounded in the authority of
t •
divinely revealed precepts.
The influence of his pessimistic view of human nature on Pascal's
attitude toward the Jesuit moral theology comes out in a significant passage
from the Factum. He there alleges that the Jesuits' casuistry amounts
to a complete reversal of the groundwork of Christian ethics, which is
essentially orientated to the task of raising human motives to a different
plane in order that they may measure up to divine standards. The
principle of casuistry on the other hand, by definition, involves the
attempt to achieve exactly the opposite - to water down those standards
so that they become more practical from the human point of view, and
(2)
more compatible with human nature as it actually is. Such a reversal
of the fundamental direction of Christian ethics results in a confusing 
of its true principle and aim, with man setting up his own reason as the 
yard-8 tick to which moral choices may be referred, and looking to the 
gratification of his sensual appetites and passions as the goal of his every 
act. Now although the context shows that even here it is his reverence 
for what 'tradition* leads him to regard as revealed authority which has
(1) cf. also above, p.
(2) There is a companion fragment to this passage in the Pensées, where 
Pascal again claims that the Jesuits' method of compromise lays axe to the 
very roots of Christian ethics by introducing modifications to the revealed 
precepts: "Ceux qui aiment l'Eglise se plaignent de voir corrompre les
moeurs; nais au moins les lois subsistent. Mais ceux-ci corrompent les 
lois: le modèle est gâté." (p.1332; B.894)
186
most weight in swinging Pascal's preference so decidedly away from the
Jesuit position, his low opinion of human nature plays at least a
contributory role. For two paragraphs earlier, justifying his allegation
that the Jesuits are exercising a particularly pernicious influence by
corrupting the "règle des moeurs" through their 'perversion' of the
scriptural 'laws', he writes:
"— comme la nature de 1'homme tend toujours au mal 
dès sa naissance, et qu'elle n'est ordinairement retenue 
que par la crainte de la loi, aussitôt que cette barrière 
est ôtée, la concupiscence se répand sans obstacle, de 
sorte qu'il n'y a point de différence entre rendre les 
vices permis, et rendre tous les hommes vicieux."
(p.907; G.E. Vif p.279)
Such a gloonqr view alone would be sufficient motivation for flinging
himself on a revealed system of authoritarian doctrine in ethics. Small
wonder then that Pascal refuses to take any account, at least on the
positive side, of the tendencies of human nature, or to concede any part
to human reason, where moral principles are concerned#
Another passage from the Factum, coming after some examples
cited of the way in which the Jesuits do convert ethics into an entirely
human affair, elevating reason into the criterion, further illustrates the
extent to which Pascal's estimate of human nature influences his outlook
in this regard:
"On voit en ce peu de mots l'esprit de ces casuistes, et 
comme en détruisant les règles de la piété ils font succéder 
aux préceptes de l'Ecriture qui nous oblige de rapporter 
toutes nos actions à Dieu, une permission brutale de les 
rapporter toutes à nous-mêmes;— " (p.908;G.E. VII, p.281-2)
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The expression "permission brutale" eloquently testifies to the light in
which Pascal regards this reversal of criteria. And that his opposition
stems at least in part from an unfavourable view of human nature in its
present state is made clear in the latter part of the s e n t e n c e . T h e
only palpable reason which emerges from the passage why man is disqualified
from the office of arbiter of his own acts, is that his judgement has been
warped consequent on the corruption of his nature. By contrast, the
primary assumption underlying the Jesuit moral theology, at least as Pascal
sees it, is that the human faculties are competent guides on ethical 
(2)questions.
The other and more decisive factor combining to make him set his 
face against the Jesuit approach is his conception of theology as a discipli­
ne. In this respect the attack on the Jesuits* casuistry in the Provinciales 
amounts to little more than a putting into effect of principles enunciated 
some nine years previously in the Preface pour le traité du vide. Pascal 
there draws the sharp distinction between the "sciences", where reason and 
observation must be left unhampered if knowledge is to expand, and those 
disciplines like history, geography and jurisprudence, where what he 
designates 'authority* is alone capable of adding to our knowledge. In 
order to ascertain, for example, who was the first king of the French, or 
what words were used in a *dead* language, he claims that it is necessary 
to have recourse to written records, and that knowledge on these points
(1)h— c'est-à-dire qu'au lieu que Jesus-Ghrist est venu pour amortir en 
nous les concupiscences du vieil homme et y faire régner la charité de 
l'homme nouveau, ceux-ci sont venus pour faire revivre les concupiscences— " 
(p.9Ô>8; G.E. VII, p.282)
(2) The implications of this for Pascal's assessment of casuistry are strik­
ingly brought out in the following fragment: "Les casuistes soumettent la 
décision à la raison corrompue et le choix des décisions à la volonté
cont. p.188
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cannot extend beyond the information which they contain* He continues:
"G'est l'autorité seule qui noua en peut éclaircir. Mais 
ou cette autorité a la principale force, c'est dans la 
théologie, parce qu'elle y est inséparable de la vérité, 
et que nous ne la connaissons que par elle: —  parce que 
ses principes sont au-dessus de la nature et de la raison,— "
(p.530; G.E. II, p.l3l)
The source of the authority in this case is the "livres sacrés". Further
on in the Préface he refers to the "malice" of those who rely on reason
alone in theology instead of the authority of Scripture and the Fathers, and
notes that it will be necessary to 'confound the insolence' of those who
have been rash enough to introduce novelties in theology.(p.531jG.E.II,
p.133) This clearly foreshadows the attitude of the Provinciales. And
Pascal sums up his own view in a short categorical assertion:
"—  les inventions nouvelles sont infailliblement des erreurs 
dans les matières que l'on profane impunément ;— "(ibid.,G.E.II, 
p.134)
The same distinction reappears in a slightly different form in 
the eighteenth Provinciale, where Pascal, in the course of refuting the 
Jesuit claim to have discovered heretical statements in the writings of
cont.from p.187 corrompue, afin que tout ce qu'il y a de corrompu dans
la nature de 1'homme ait part à sa conduite. (p.l06l; B.907)
(1) According to Nicole in his introduction to the Latin translation of the 
Provinciales. Pascal fully realized that as far as the subject matter of the 
Provinciales was concerned such a sharp break-away from the scholastic 
tradition entailed a fresh approach in both method and terminology: "II
croiot pouvoir traiter ces questions, qui faisoient alors tant de bruit, et 
les débarasser des termes obsours et équivoques des scolastiques, des vaines 
chicanes 'de mots,—  Il es per oit, dis-je, les expliquer d'une maniéré si 
aisée et si proportionnée à l'intelligence de tout le monde,— "(G.E.VII,p.68) 
Pascal's own remarks in this regard in the 12th letter endorse this view: 
"— quoique vous ayez pensé qu'en embrouillant les questions par des termes 
d'Ecole, les réponses en seraient si longues, si obscures et si épineuses 
qu'on en perdrait goût, cela ne sera peut-être pas tout à fait ainsi; car 
j'essaierai de vous ennuyer le moins qu'il se peut en ce genre d'écrire.—  
c'est vous qui m'engagez d'entrer dans cet éclaircissement,— "(p.793;G.£. V,
p.363)
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Jansenlus, outlines three principles of knowledge, the senses, reason and 
faith. Each of these has its own particular field of operation where it is 
capable of attaining certain knowledge. This means that the preliminary 
step in examining any proposition must always be to determine its nature 
in order to ascertain to which of the three principles it should be 
referred:
"S'il s'agit d'une chose surnaturelle, nous n'en jugerons ni 
par les sens, ni par la raison, mais par l'Ecriture et les 
décisions de l'Eglise. S'il s'agit d'une proposition non 
révélée, et proportionnée à la raison naturelle, elle en sera 
le propre juge." (p.898; G.E. VII, p.50)
Since Pascal also asserts in the same context that faith is the legitimate
arbiter of "choses surnaturelles et révélées" (p.897; G.E. VII, p.49),
it is plain that in his terminology the adjectives 'supernatural' and
'revealed', if they do not denote precisely the same thing, are used at
least to qualify things belonging to the same category. Scripture and
the decisions of the Church therefore, not reason, must be regarded as
the appropriate referees where anything relating to a 'revealed
proposition' is in question.
Elsewhere he insists that 'tradition* is the sole reliable
guide to revealed truth. Thus in the Cinquième; écrit des curés de Paris
it is claimed that:
"Comme notre religion est toute divine, c'est en Dieu
seul qu'elle s'appuie, et n'a de doctrine que celle
qu'elle a recÿie de lui par le canal de la tradition
qui est notre véritable règle, —  nous ne croyons aujourd'hui
que les choses que nos évêques et nos pasteurs nous ont
apprises, et qu'ils avaient eux-mêmes remues de ceux qui
les ont précédés —  et les premiers qui ont été envoyés par
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les apôtres, n'ont dit que ce qu'ils en avaient appris.
(p.932; G.E. VII, p.362)
The true Christian tradition can therefore be traced back in a direct
line to its divine source, a valuable safeguard for doctrine from
aberrations like those implicit in the Jesuit moral theology. A passage from
a fragment usually included in the Pensées further illustrates this
conception of the role of tradition:
"— l'Eglise aujourd'hui —  a toujours la maxime supérieure 
de la tradition, de la créance de l'ancienne Eglise; et 
ainsi cette soumission et cette conformité à l'ancienne 
Eglise prévaut et corrige tout."(2) (p.l336;B.867)
And in the fifth Provinciale the Jesuit doctrine of 'probable opinions'
is rejected on the following grounds:
"— comme si la foi, et la tradition qui la maintient, 
n'était pas toujours une et invariable dans tous les 
temps et dans tous les lieux; comme si c'était à la 
règle à se fléchir pour convenir au sujet qui doit lui 
être conforme; — "(p.706)@9^ .
Now since the true principles of ethics form part of a system
of revealed truth, it follows that those who treat of ethical questions
must abide by these categories. Revelation is a self-sufficient and
self-contained order of truth whose ultimate foundation is divine authority
and not natural reason. And in terms of the principles outlined in the
passages from the Préface and the eighteenth Provinciale the Jesuit
(1) cf. the Premier écrit sur la grâce, where Pascal maintains that in 
order to determine the truth of the Church's 'opinion' as against that of
her opponents "La règle que nous prendrons pour cet effet sera la tradition
successive de cette doctrine depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu'à nous." (p.957-8)
(2) Another fragment dealing with miracles contains the significant judgement 
that:"— la vraie source de la vérité—  est la tradition,— " (p.l066; B.832)
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casuistry amounts to illegitimately setting up "raison naturelle" as 
arbiter in matters quite beyond its compass. As a result the Jesuits 
have been induced to make innovations just as if moral theology were 
a branch of the 'sciences', whereas rightly they should have confined 
themselves to ascertaining and relating the decisions recorded by the 
Church and the Fathers. This deviation in itself would have sufficed to 
secure Pascal's opposition; but that they should go further and presume 
to attenuate the very revealed precepts themselves, transmitted "par le 
canal de la tradition", in order to bring them into line with what he 
regards as the corrupt tendencies of human nature, and having done so 
that they should defend "comme la vraie morale de l'Eglise cette morale 
corrompue",appears to him tantamount to rejecting the true Christian 
ethic in its entirety.
(vi) Pascal and the moral standards of the nobility.
(a) The rejection of casuistry
There also lies behind Pascal's attack on the Jesuit casuistry in 
the Provinciales what is essentially a demand for a reversal of the moral 
values prized by the contemporary nobility. Several passages attest his 
belief that the various casuistical devices employed by the Jesuits are 
designed to make the Christian ethic more palatable to the worldly 
aristocracy.
(l) Second écrit des curés de Paris, p.919; G.E. VII, p.310
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In the Second écrit des curés de Paris he remarks that the
Jesuits form the most powerful and numerous order in the Church, "qui
gouverne les consciences presque de tous les grands."(p.926;G.E. VII,
p*323) And some notes for the Provinciales contain two significant
references to the Jesuits* 'politics', the word used by Pascal to designate 
their attempt to come to terms with the code of behaviour accepted by 
that class;
"Politique. - Nous avons trouvé deux obstacles au dessein 
de soulager les hommes: l'un, des lois intérieures de 
l'Evangile, l'autre, des lois extérieures de l'Etat et de 
la religion. Les unes, nous en sommes maîtres, les 
autres,— " (p.1056; B.926)
"Le monde veut naturellement une religion, mais douce,
— On ne vit pas longtemps dans l'impiété ouverte, ni 
naturellement dans les grandes austérités. Une religion 
accommodée est propre à durer."(2) (p,1056-7; B.956)
One of the means whereby the Jesuits seek to achieve their aim
of a"religion douce", whose demands will not prove offensive to their
aristocratic clientele, is the doctrine of "grace actuelle" which greatly
restricts the range of acts that can be imputed sins. In the fourth
letter Pascal claims that this plays into the hands of those whose whole
life is taken up with;
"— une recherche continuelle de toutes sortes de plaisirs, 
dont jamais le moindre remords n'a interrompu le cours."
(p.695; G.E. IV, p.255)
(1) Pascal emphasizes the influential position occupied by the Jesuits with 
respect to the privileged classes in two brief passages from some notes for 
the Provinciales; "Je suis seul contre trente mille? Point. Gardez, vous la 
cour, vous l'imposture; moi la vérité."(p.1052;B.921) Again he implies that 
they specially cater for those of royal blood: "II importe aux rois et aux 
princes d'être en estime de piété. Et pour cela, il faut qu'ils se 
confessent à vous." (p.l053;B.924)
(2) M. Bénichou describes the sort of compromise which the Jesuits set them­
selves to effect as; "— à la fois une conquête du christianisme sur la société 
laïque et un recul du christianisme devant les valeurs issues spontanément des 
conditions de la vie noble." Morales du grand siècle.(Paris.1948).p.81-2.
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And in reply to the Jesuit's attempt to get round this difficulty by
alleging that even such persons as these do experience a God-given desire
to avoid their sinful actions, Pascal objects:
"— je me tiens oblige —  de vous désabuser, et de vous dire 
qu'il y a mille gens qui n'ont point ces désirs, qui pèchent 
sans regret, qui pèchent avec joie, —  Et qui peut en savoir 
plus de nouvelles que vous? Il n'est pas que vous ne 
confessiez quelqu'un de ceux dont je parle; car c'est parmi 
les personnes de grande qualité qu'il s'en rencontre d* 
ordinaire." (p.696; G.E. IV, p.257)
Similarly in the seventh letter the method of 'directing the
intention' is represented as having been developed specifically with a
view to condoning the 'dominant passion' of the privileged classes for the
"point d*honneur", and the violent means usually resorted to in vindicating
it.^  ^ When the Jesuit describes the gulf separating the "loi de
l'Evangile" from the "lois du monde", which the casuists believe they
have managed to bridge by this principle, Pascal is forced to admit that
his first reaction of astonishment at their success was not strong enough.
"Je tiendrais la chose impossible, si, après ce que j'ai 
vu de vos Pères, je ne savais qu'ils peuvent faire 
facilement ce qui est impossible aux autres hommes.
C'est ce qui me fait croire qu'ils en ont bien trouvé 
quelque moyen,— "(p.728; G.E. V, p.85)
The restrained irony of this purported reply shows plainly enough that
Pascal regards the two terms which the Jesuits attempt to reconcile in
this way - "piété" and "honneur" - as utterly irreconcilable.
Moreover, according to him the whole doctrine of probabilism has 
its roots in the desire to come to terms with current aristocratic values.
(1) By means of this method the casuists are allegedly enabled to permit 
"les violences qu'on pratique en défendant son honneur. Gar il n'y a qu'à 
détourner son intention du désir de vengeance, qui est criminel, pour la 
porter au désir de défendre son honneur, qui est permis selon nos Pères. Et 
c'est ainsi qu'ils accomplissent tous leurs devoirs envers Dieu et envers 
les hommes." (p.728-9;G.E.V, p.86-7) In Pascal's terms this procedure
cont.p.194*
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"Que serait-ce que les Jesuites sans la probabilité, et 
que la probabilité sans les Jésuites? Otez la probabilité, 
on ne peut plus plaire au monde; mettez la probabilité, on 
ne peut plus lui déplaire." (p.l063;B.935)
"Peut-ce être autre chose que la complaisance du monde qui 
vous fasse trouver les choses proliables? Nous ferez-vous 
accroire que ce soit la vérité, et que, si la mode du duel 
n'était point, vous trouveriez probable qu'on se peut battre, 
en regardant la chose en elle-même?"(l) (ibid.,B.910)
By decreeing that any opinion which can claim the authority of even just
a single doctor is 'probable*, and may therefore be followed in conscience,
the Jesuits are enabled to expunge, or at least to play down to such an
extent that they cease to obtrude, those elements in the Christian ethical
system which the worldly aristocracy finds obnoxious. And it is clear that
Pascal regards the terms of the Jesuit moral theology as not merely
orientated toward, but in effect dictated by, what is current practice
among the mass of those men who count socially.
Pascal nowhere questions that the design of embracing the whole 
world within the arms of the Christian faith, which leads the Jesuits to 
adopt this "conduite 'obligeante et accommodante* "(p.705;C.E. IV,p.300) 
toward the code of behaviour favoured by the privileged classes, is in 
itself a perfectly laudable one; but he alleges that in their case it has 
its springs in self-esteem, in the desire for the advancement of their own
cont.from p. 193. amounts to effecting a compromise of "les lois humaines 
avec les divines." (ibid.)
(l)Brunetière maintains that the Jesuits saw in probabilism "un moyen de 
concilier les exigences de la morale chrétienne avec le train du monde;—
Les textes sont formels sur ce point; 'Combien n'ont-ils pas tort,s'écrie 
Escobar, dans le Préambule de sa' grande Théologie morale, ceux qui se 
plaignent qu'en matière de conduite, les docteurs leur produisent tant et 
de si diverses décisions! Mais ils devraient plutôt s'en réjouir, en y 
voyant autant de motifs nouveaux de consolation et d'espérance. Car la 
diversité des opinions en morale, c'est le joug du Seigneur rendu plus facile 
et plus doux!— * Et il dit encore plus loin, —  ; 'La Providence a voulu, dans 




cause rather than that of the Christian religion itself. Furthermore 
he considers that, in order to realize .their ideal of a Church co-extensive 
with the world, they are stooping to unworthy compromises. His own 
insistence in this regard is that the Christian ethic requires the world 
to be levelled up and not the Church to be levelled down. And the reason 
why the casuistical decisions authorizing such aristocratic pastimes as 
duelling should be singled out so frequently for condemnation is, not 
simply because this represents the most vulnerable point in the Jesuit 
armour, but more basically because the aristocratic way of life requires 
more numerous and more serious attenuations than any other in the standard 
of Christian conduct prized so highly by Pascal if the sort of compromise 
aimed at by the Jesuits is to be secured.
(b) Rejection of the 'ethical'values of the contemporary aristocracy
M. Bénichou describes in the following terms the code of values 
subscribed to by the great majority of Pascal's aristocratic contemporaries:
cont. from p.194. morale, et que les voies de la vertu fussent larges, 
'patescere', afin de vérifier la parole du Psalmiste: 'Vias tuas. Domine, 
demonstra mihi.' Voilà le dernier terme du probabilisme.— " Etudes 
critiques sur l'histoire de la littérature française. Quatrième série,
(Paris 1898) p.9 3 - 4 . ^
(l) cf. from the 5th letter: "Ils ont assez bonne opinion d'eux-mêmes pour 
croire qu'il est utile et comme nécessaire au bien de la religion que leur 
crédit s'étende partout, et qu'ils gouvernent toutes les consciences." Hence 
the scriptural precepts are enforced with full rigour or relaxed as the 
circumstances require.(p.704-5;G.E.,IV p.299-300; In the l6th letter Pascal 
comments on the permission granted by Numerous casuists to take communion 
after committing even the most abominable sins: "Voilà ce que c'est, mes 
Pères, d'avoir des Jésuites par toute la terre. Voilà la pratique univers­
elle que vous y avez introduite —  Il n'importe que les tables de Jésus- 
Christ soient remplies d'abominations, pourvu que vos églises soient
cont.p.196.
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"Dans ce qui subsistait alors de la société féodale, les valeurs suprêmes
étaient l'ambition, l'audace, le succès. Le poids de 1'épée, la hardiesse
des appétits et du verbe faisaient le mérite; le mal résidait dans la
faiblesse ou la timidité, dans le fait de désirer peu, d'oser petitement,
de subir une blessure sans la rendre; on s'excluait par là du rang des
maîtres pour rentrer dans le commun t r o u p e a u . " A  passage from the
fourteenth Provinciale shows very plainly that it is precisely these values
which Pascal rejects so emphatically in his attack on the Jesuit casuistry.
Adapting Saint Augustine's division between the "civitas Dei" and the
"civitas terrena" to his own purposes, he notes that;
"II y a deux peuples et deux mondes répandus sur toute la 
terre, —  le monde des enfants de Dieu qui forme un corps 
dont Jésus-Christ est le chef et le roi; et le monde 
ennemi de Dieu, dont le diable est le chef et le roi."
(p.830; G.E. VI, p.l$2)
Christ, Pascal daims, has established in the Church, his 'empire', such
laws as seemed good to him, and the devil has done likewise in the
world, his 'kingdom'.
"Jésus-Christ a mis 1'honneur à souffrir; le diable à ne 
point souffrir. Jésus-Christ a dit à ceux qui re<^ oivent 
un soufflet de tendre l'autre joue; et le diable a dit à 
ceux à qui on veut donner un soufflet de tuer ceux qui 
voudront leur faire cette injure.
Jésus-Christ déclare heureux ceux qui participent à son
cont. from p. 195 pleines de monde." (p.854jG.E.VI, p.270) And in a 
brief fragment included in the Pensées he maintains; "Ils ne peuvent avoir 
la perpétuité, et ils cherchent l'universalité; et pour cela ils font toute 
l'Eglise corrompue, afin qu'ils soient saints." (p.1332; B.898)
(l)op.cit., p. 19. In his chapter entitled "la démolition du héros,"
M.Bénichou shows how the Jansenist strain in French Literature generally 
in the 17th century tended to undermine the 'heroic' values to which the 
nobility looked as their ideals in conduct. What represented to the 
contemporary aristocracy an ideal, was treated by the pessimistic moralists 
as basically vicious, the manifestation of man's fallen condition, cf. 
also Love joy, op.cit., ch^i^2 .
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ignominie, et le diable déclare malheureux ceux qui sont 
dans l'ignominie. Jésus-Christ dit: Malheur à vous, quand 
les hommes disent du bien de vous! et le diable dit: . .
Malheur à ceux dont le monde ne parle pas avec estime!
(p.830-1} G.E. VI, p.153)
The values which Pascal here declares to be of diabolical origin, a judge­
ment which vividly attests his own estimate of their worth, mirror in all 
important respects those enumerated by M. Bénichou. Thus the position 
Pascal adopts on this question involves him in a thorough-going rejection 
of the whole basis of the current aristocratic code of behaviour, with 
which the Jesuits set themselves to effect a workable compromise from 
the nobility's point of view.
Further judgements significant in this respect occur earlier in 
the same letter, when Pascal takes the Jesuits to task over their endeavour 
to adjust the demands of the Christian moral law to those of the "point 
d*honneur" cherished by the nobility. He maintains that no amount of 
equivocation on their part can disguise the fact that their casuists 
make it permissible to kill in order to defend one's honour, thereby 
authorizing duels. The only authority which can be adduced in support of 
such "maximes diaboliques" is a piece of what Pascal describes as "raisonne­
ment impie":
(l) Pascal goes on to point out that on this reckoning the Jesuit decisions 
making it permissible to kill in the event of receiving an affront, rather 
than to turn the other cheek, and agreeing that to let an affront go unavenged 
would involve loss of honour, classify their authors as "enfants du^.- diable". 
(p.831;G.£.VI,p.l54) It is this 'honour', which they, in common with their 
aristocratic clientele, show themselves so anxious to preserve unsullied, 
that the devil "a transmis de son esprit superbe en celui de ses superbes 
enfants. C'est cet honneur qui a toujours été l'idole des hommes, possédés 
par l'esprit du monde.— 1'honneur des Chrétiens consiste dans l'observation 
des ordres de Dieu et des règles du christianisme, et non pas dans ce fantôme 
d'honneur que vous prétendez, tout vain qu'il soit, être une excuse légitime 
pour les meurtres." (p.831-2; G.E. VI, p.154-5)
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" 'L'honneur est plus cher que la vie. Or, il est permis 
de tuer pour défendre sa vie. Donc il est permis de tuer 
pour défendre son honneur?' Quoi! mes Peres, parce que 
le dérèglement des hommes leur a fait aimer ce faux honneur 
plus que la vie que Dieu leur a donnée pour le servir, il 
leur sera permis de tuer pour le conserver? C'est cela 
même qui est un mal horrible, d'aimer cet honneur-là, 
plus que la vie. Et cependant cette attache vicieuse, 
qui serait capable de souiller les actions les plus 
saintes, si on les rapportait à cette fin,— " (p.825;
G.E. VI, p.142-3)
Despite the considerable element of clever tactics here, Pascal's own 
standpoint, as distinct from what he claims to be the 'Christian* one, 
emerges clearly enough in regard t) the aristocratic practices which the 
Jesuits set out to condone. For it is by no means just the Jesuit 
casuistry that comes in for denunciation in this passage. When he describes 
maxims which no French aristocrat of the time would have hesitated to 
endorse, at least in word if not in deed, as "raisonnement impie", and 
adherence to them as a "mal horrible" and "attache vicieuse", which stems 
from man's "dérèglement", Pascal undermines the foundations of a whole 
body of accepted values, and sets up by contrast a criterion which vould 
have found little favour in the eyes of the privileged classes.
Pascal's use of the term "honneur" elsewhere without the 
derogatory implications which it carries in the foregoing extracts, suggests 
that his opposition to it as the principle determining conduct is limited 
to the interpretation placed on it in such a context by the worldly 
aristocracy. Thus in the last-quoted passage when he designates as "faux" 
this aristocratic honour,devotion to which if looked to as the 'end' in
(l) cf. also from the Second écrit, where Pascal again denounces this 'false' 
honour % "Nous les voyons— autoriser opiniâtrement la vengeance, l'avarice, la 
volupté, le faux honneur,— " (p.926;G.E. VII,p.323)
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conduct suffices to contaminate even the holiest acts, the implication is
that there is a true honour which may legitimately be proposed as a criterion
of action. And in the fourteenth letter he actually refers to "1*honneur
des Chrétiens", which prompts them to act in accordance with the divine
will,(l^ contrasting it with what in the nobility*s case is a mere
"fantôme d*honneur" since this forms the motivating force behind such
depraved practices as duelling. Again, in some notes obviously intended
for the Provinciales. he describes the Jesuits as:
"Gens sans parole, sans foi, sans honneur, sans vérité,— "
(p.l053; B.924)
Honour is here accorded a very definite positive value in a moral context,
since it is placed hy implication on a par with such virtues as keeping one*s
word and speaking the truth*
Moreover, when occasion demands Pascal shows himself quite ready
to vindicate his own personal * honour *. In his second letter to M. de Ribeyre,
protesting against the accusation that he claimed Torricelli's experiment
as his own invention, he writes:
"—  le reproche —  de larcin est de telle nature, qu'un 
homme d'honneur ne doit point souffrir de s'en avoir accuser, 
sans s'exposer au péril que son silence tienne lieu de 
conviction. Ainsi étant très ponctuellement averti comme 
j'étais,—  de toutes les circonstances de cet acte, jugez.
Monsieur, si je pouvais m'en taire à mon honneur; et, 
puisque cet acte avait été public, si je ne devais pas 
repousser cette injure de la même manière*"(p*410;G.E.II,p.301)
(1) cf. passage cited above, p.
(2) cf. also from the Cinquième écrit des curés de Paris, where Pascal 
alleges that in the present state of confusion, which has resulted from the 
Jesuits treating as Calvinists all those not subscribing to their views, and 
from the Calvinists classifying all Catholics as Jesuits, it is impossible 
to postpone the work of clarification "sans exposer 1'honneur de l'Eglise
et le salut d'une infinité de personnes." (p.935;G.E.VII, p.367)
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The action which Pascal seeks to justify here in the name of 'honour' 
can scarcely be defined as 'turning the other cheek*, nor does such concern 
for his own 'honour' tally in the least with his critical attitude in the 
Provinciales to the interest which the nobility displays in that regard.
In the seventh letter the account of the decisions which have
resulted from the application of the Jesuit principle of 'directing the
conscience* to concrete instances again draws strictures from Pascal on
the aristocratic "point d'honneur" that lies behind it. Commenting on
the judgement of Hurtado and Escobar, that it is permissible to fight
a duel in order to defend one's honour, he notes:
"J'admirai sur ces passages de voir que la piété du roi 
emploie sa puissance à défendre et à abolir le duel dans 
ses Etats, et que la piété des Jésuites occupe leur 
subtilité à le permettre et à l'autoriser dans l'Eglise."
(p.731; G.E. V, p.92)
And following the Jesuits' exposition of Escobar's maxim, that it is
legitimate to kill in order to avenge an affront and so preserve one's
honour, Pascal remarks:
"Gela me parut si horrible, que j'eus peine a me retenir; 
mais, pour savoir le reste, je le laissai continuer ainsi— "
(p.734î G.E. V, p.96)
(1) cf. the similar example in the letter to Le Paillenr, where Pascal gives 
his reasons for discontinuing his correspondence with Noël. In compliance 
with Noël's express wish that the contents of his last letter be kept private 
Pascal has refrained from replying. As a result he has been accused by 
other Jesuit adversaries of concealing the contents of the letter because 
they carry a decisive refutation of his own views. And Pascal appeals to 
Le Bailleur as follows: "Voyez, Monsieur, combien cette conjoncture m'était 
contraire, puisque je n'ai pu cacher sa lettre sans désavantage, ni la 
publier sans infidélité; et que mon honneur était également ménacé par ma 
réponse et par ma silence,— " (p.378;G.E.II,p.l80) In the Pensées however, 
care for honour is classified as a "divertissement". "Divertissement. - On 
charge les hommes, dès 1'enfance, du soin de leur honneur,— on leur fait 
entendre qu'ils ne sauraient être heureux sans que— leur honneur— soit en 
bon état,— " (p.ll45; B.143) Elsewhere it is described as a manifestation 
of that desire for the esteem of our fellèws which leads us eventually to 
replace our real selves by the facade we wish to appear as: "— nous voulons
cont, p.201.
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A little further on he describes his reaction when asked by the Jesuit if 
he desired additional proof of the general acceptance of this tenet by the 
casuists:
"Je I'en remerciai, car, je n'en avais que trop entendu.
Mais pour voir jusqu’ou irait une si damnable doctrine,— "
(ibid.; G.E. V, p.98)
When allowances have been made for the tactical devices which Pascal
employs, his evident approval of the king's action in prohibiting duels,
together with the use in this context of such expressions as "si horrible",
"si damnable", and indeed the whole tone of the two last-quoted extracts,
still amply attest his rooted antipathy not merely to the Jesuit principle
in question, but also to the aristocratic 'right' and practice it is
designed to sanction.
Yet further examples of this criticism of Jesuit concessions 
to contemporary social standards occur in the ninth letter in connection 
with the conception of what Christian devotion entails. Pascal's Jesuit 
is there represented as saying that since the worldly are commonly frightened 
off by the uninviting aspect under which 'devotion' is presented, the 
members of his order have considœed it a step of the first importance for 
the success of their ministry to the privileged classes to remove this 
obstacle:
"— pour vous faire voir en détail combien nos Pères en 
ont ôté de peines, n'est-ce-pas une chose bien pleine de 
consolation pour les ambitieux, d'apprendre qu'ils 
peuvent conserver une véritable dévotion avec un amour 
désordonné pour les grandeurs?'^' Eh quoi! mon Père, avec
cont.from p.200. vivre dans l'idée des autres d'une vie imaginaire, et nous 
nous efforçons pour cela de paraître.— qui ne mourrait pour conserver son 
honneur, celui-là serait infâme, (p.1128; B.147)
(l) cf. from the same letter: "Voilà, lui dis-je, de belles décisions en 
faveur de la vanité, de l'ambition, et de l'avarice." (p.758;G.E.V,p.20l)
And in the Pensées Pascal affirms: "Les conditions les plus aisées a vivre
cont. p. 202.
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quelque excès qu'ils les recherchent? Oui, dit-il;— "
(p.756-7; G.E. V, p.l99)
Once again it is not merely the Jesuit attempt to accommodate the require­
ments of what he claims to be true Christian piety to worldly ambition that 
Pascal is here concerned to expose to odium; the criticism, veiled though 
it may be, goes deeper. ’ What he is attacking behind the Jesuits is the 
way in which the influential element in society has come to regard such 
ambition as normal and even desirable, accepting it as the basis of their 
code of behaviour.
Similar implications lie behind the charge brought against the 
casuists' attenuations, in favour of the wealthy, of the established 
Christian practice of giving alms to relieve the poor. Having cited 
passages from Cajetan and Aquinas in support of the view that Christians 
are obliged to give all their 'superfluous* wealth in alms, Pascal 
continues :
"Et cependant il ne plaît à Vasquez qu'on soit obligé 
d'en donner une partie seulement, tant il a de complaisance 
pour les riches, de dureté pour les pauvres, et d'opposition 
à ces sentiments de charité qui font trouver douce la 
vérité de ces paroles de Saint Grégoire, laquelle paraît 
si rude aux riches du monde:— " (p.797;G.E.V, p.372)
The phrase "tant il a de complaisance pour les riches" indicates the
mainspring, as Pascal would have it, of the Jesuit ethical system - to
conform 'Christian' morality to current values. However, despite this
strategic opposition, it is plain that the view to which he subscribes on
cont. from p. 201 selon le monde sont les plus difficiles à vivre selon 
Dieu; et au contraire:—  Rien n'est plus aisé que d'être dans une grande 
charge et dans de grands biens selon le monde; rien n'est plus difficile 
que d'y vivre selon Dieu, et sans y prendre de part et de goût." (p.1308;
B.906)
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this question, at least as it is sunmarized in the passage quoted from 
Saint Gregory, involves a complete transvaluation of such values. It 
is because his opinion - that alleviating the hardship of the poor means 
simply restoring to them what is legitimately their/^ s - implies the 
absolute denial of a worldly code grounded in ambition orientated toward 
self-aggrandizement, that the truth it sets forth appears "si rude aux 
riches du monde".
Finally a passage from the Second écrit des curés de Paris is 
particularly significant in this regard, since Pascal there implies that 
the aristocratic values which he is concerned to repudiate are the off­
shoots of man's corrupt nature. Thus one of the reasons advanced for 
calling the Jesuits to account is that;
"Nous les voyons malgré tous les avertissements charitables 
qu'on leur a donnés —  autoriser opiniâtrement la vengeance, 
l'avarice, la volupté, le faux honneur, 1'amour-propre et 
toutes les passions de la nature corrompue,— "(p.926; G.E.VII,p.323)
The Jesuits therefore, in their quest for easier terms of sympathy between 
God and the nobility, degrade religious values to conformity with what 
Pascal regards as the corrupt tendencies of human nature, thereby under­
mining what is for him the whole purpose of ethics - to direct men to live 
up to their own true nature. The evil of casuistry, as practised in 
relation to the privileged classes, lies in the attempt to reconcile two 
fundamentally disparate orders of values simply by permitting the individual 
to persist in his pursuit of values belonging to the lower order while 
guaranteeing him access to those of the higher without having to fulfil the 
essential condition, viz eliminating from his conduct of life precisely those 
values which go to make up the content of the lower order.
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Chapter three: The primacy of the 'endl in I^aoal'3 moral values
(i)(a) The pursuit of truth and happiness interpreted as the pointer 
to man's 'end'
The importance vh ich Pascal assigns in a moral context to man's 
desire and pursuit after truth and happiness is brought out by implication 
in several fragments from the Pensées, where he employs his stock 'proof 
that something has gone awry with human nature from the fact of its present 
dichotomy and manifest incompleteness. The form of argument is familiar 
enough: despite the fact that man is impelled by his very nature to embark 
upon the quest for truth and h a ppiness,and that his native potential 
in this direction seems unimpaired, yet the quest inevitably results in 
disillusionment. And in this universal consciousness (as he claims it to 
be) of the hiatus in man's nature Pascal finds evidence of an historic 
fall from a state where that nature was complete - a notion which he 
develops along lines rather similar to those of the Platonic theory of 
reminiscence.
"Nous souhaitons la vérité, et ne trouvons en nous qu'incert­
itude. Nous recherchons le bonheur, et ne trouvons que 
misère et mort. Nous sommes incapables de ne pas souhaiter 
la vérité et le bonheur. et sommes incapables ni de certitude 
ni de bonheur." (p.1158; B.437)
(1) In view of the constant association of these two terms in the ensuing 
passages, and since Pascal leaves the precise nature of the 'truth' here 
in question undefined, it seems legitimate to infer that he believes the 
attainment of ultimate happiness consists in vision of the truth. It is 
clear that he considers the satisfaction of the yearning for full and 
perfect truth, for knowledge of the inmost core and reality of things, can 
only be achieved in some form of beatific vision. In the Pensées he not 
only expresslv identifies truth with God - "Dieu, qu'on sait être la vérité" 
(p.lll5;B.536) - but even goes so far as to virtually deprive of all 
positive value any truth apart from God: "On se fait une idole de la vérité 
même; car la vérité hors de la charité n'est pas D^u, et est son image 
et une idole qu'il ne faut point aimer, ni adorer;— " (p.l277;B.582)
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«— c'est être malheureux que de vouloir et ne pouvoir.
Or l'homme veut être heureux, et assuré de quelque vérité; 
et cependant il ne peut ni savoir, ni ne désirer point de 
savoir." (p.1184; B.389)
"Voilà l'état dû les hommes sont aujourd'hui. Il leur 
reste quelque instinct Impuissant du bonheur de leur 
première nature, et ils sont plongés dans les misères 
de leur aveuglement et de leur concupiscence,— "(p.l224sB.430)
"Instinct, raison. - Nous avons une impuissance de prouver, 
invincible k tout le dogmatisme. Nous avons une idée de la 
vérité, invincible à tout le pyrrhonisme." (p.ll59;B.395)
"Tous les hommes recherchent d'être heureux; cela est sans 
exception; quelques différents moyens qu'ils y emploient, 
ils tendent tous à ce but." (p.1184; B.425)
"Notre instinct nous fait sentir qu'il faut chercher notre 
bonheur hors de nous." (p.ll90;B.464)
"Nonobstant ces misères, il veut être heureux, et ne veut 
être qu'heureux, et ne peut ne vouloir pas l'être;— "
(p.ll47; B.169)
"— enfin si l'homme n'avait jamais été corrompu, il jouirait 
dans son innocence et de la vérité et de la félicité avec 
assurance; et si l'homme n'avait jamais été que corrompu, 
il n'aurait aucune idée ni de la vérité ni de la béatitude.
Mais, malheureux que nous somraes, et plus que s'il n'y 
avait point de grandeur dans notre condition, nous avons une 
idée du bonheur et ne pouvons y arriver; nous sentons une 
image de la vérité, et ne possédons que le mensonge:— "
(p.1207; B.434]
The very fact that Pascal does thus construe the presence of 
these seemingly incompatible components in our nature, as it now is, as 
evidence that "nous avons été dans un degré de perfection dont nous sommes 
malheureusement déchus" (ibid), testifies to the importance which he ascribes 
to the pursuit of truth and happiness in the moral life of man. For in 
the last passage quoted the present dim, but unmistakable, awareness of 
truth and happiness, which persists in despite of all vicissitudes, and 
renders us incapable of finding any real or lasting satisfaction among
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the objects that surround us in our actual condition, is expressly stated 
to be the residuum of our previous "grandeur". The desire for truth and 
happiness is therefore but the expression of man's desire to regain what 
Pascal holds to be his truestatus.
It is this, viewed in the perspective of the Fall, that enables
him to go further and identify the object that will give completion
to man's desire for happiness with the 'end^  for which he has been created.
The fragment from the Pensées where Pascal contrasts the two standpoints,
from which he alleges it is possible to judge human nature, is illuminating
in this regard since it shows how he envisages the question of the 'end'
in terms of the familiar "grandeur - misère" opposition, and also how he
sets up this 'end' as the criterion of action.
"La nature de l'homme se considère en deux manières: 
l'une selon sa fin, et alors il est grand et incomparable: 
l'autre selon la multitude, comme on juge de la nature du 
cheval et du chien, par la multitude, d'y voir la course,
'et animum arcendi'; et alors 1'homme est abject et vil.
Et voilà les deux voies qui en font juger diversement,— "
(p.1155; B.415)
Man's nature when regarded in the light of the 'end', to which Pascal 
believes his potential and aspirations point, is adjudged therefore 
"grand et incomparable": a judgement which reflects back on the value of the 
pursuit of truth and happiness. M. Brunschvicg's interpretation of this 
contrast between "multitude" and "fin", to mean the opposition of the 
generality of cases, which defines man's real nature, to the ideal nature 
which is his true destiny, seems to me misleading. Quite apart from the 
fact that the whole drift of the Pensées is to demonstrate that what is 
(1) ed. min., p.$14, w.l.
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here designated "la multitude" does not correspond to man's 'real* nature, 
the term "fin" in Pascal's vocabulary is never synonymous with "nature" 
even construed in an ideal sense. Man's 'end', wherein he finds fulfilment, 
is always ascribed to a centre and source beyond the self. Nor does his 
'true destiny' consist in the attainment of any 'ideal nature', precisely 
because that destiny is an othei^j/orldly one, which can be realized only 
by attaining to union with God. It is for this reason Pascal displays 
such concern to affirm that in man which points beyond the self to the 
infinite and eternal, as the 'end' wherein alone it can find rest. Thus 
he claims that man's nature, with its unrealized capacity for truth and 
happiness, bears witness to this otheii^orldly destiny.
However, there is a curious inconsistency in Pascal's reasoning 
in this passage, for the derogatory adjectives, "abject et vil", alleged 
to be appropriate to describe man's nature when assessed according to his 
actual performance in the course of life^^^ ("selon la multitude"), carry 
a very definite adverse moral judgement. Clearly therefore this estimate 
has not been made "selon la multitude", from a purely external point of 
view, as it might be in the case of a horse or dog. That view-point 
presupposes a close relation between what actually is and what ought to be, 
and sets up as standard of judgement the normal specimen of the particular 
class in question. Since Pascal is plainly using the noun "1'homme" in 
the generic sense to denote mankind at large, he must, in order to adjudge
(l) Both the further qualifying phrase, "d'y voir la course", and the 
fact that the worth of a horse or dog is assessed in this way, make it 
clear that such is the meaning which Pascal here intends to convey.
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it "abject et vil", appeal beyond what men's performance shows their 
nature to be to some further criterion. Even when he professes to be 
judging man's nature "selon la multitude" therefore, Pascal is in fact 
measuring his achievements against the end for which his aspirations after 
truth and happiness show him to be destined.
(b) The goal of this pursuit identified with the 'trvEgood*
Yet not merely does Pascal see in this desire for truth and
happiness the pointers to man's final 'end', but he also explicitly aligns
the pursuit of them with the "recherche du vrai bien". In a long fragment
from the Pensées, having declared that all men without exception seek
happiness in an indeterminate s e n s e , a n d  that this desire forms the
dominant motive actuating all human behaviour, he goes on;
"Et cependant, depuis un si grand nombre d'années, jamais 
personne, sans la foi, n'est arrivé à ce point ou tous 
visent continuellement. —  Une épreuve si longue, si 
continuelle et si uniforme, devrait bien nous convaincre 
de,notre impuissance d'arriver au bien par nos efforts ;— "
(p.ll8$; B.425)
Men universally desire to be happy therefore, but there is no universal 
desire for happiness in what Thomas Aquinas calls its "specific notion, 
no agreement about the object external to the self in which happiness is
(1) cf.above, p. % or, "Tous les hommes recherchent d'etre heureux: cela est 
sans exception: quelques différents moyens qu'ils y emploient, ils tendent 
tous à ce but."
(2) S.T. la Ilae. q.5, a.8.
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to be attained. And Pascal concludes his account of the great variety of
opinions as to the quarter in which the "veritable bien" is to be looked
for, with the reflection that they have come closest to the truth in
this matter who claim that it cannot consist in particular things, in
which one man's gain is another's loss, but that it must be such that all
men may possess it at once without anyone being wrse off in respect of it
because another has it:
"Ils ont compris que le vrai bien devait être tel —  et 
leur raison est que ce désir étant naturel à l'homme, 
puisque'il est nécessairement dans tous, et qu'il ne 
peut pas ne le pas avoir,— " (p.1186; B.425)
Thus, despite the insistence that all men's attempts to realize 
it by their own strength have left this most fundamental need of their 
nature unsupplied, the desire after truth and happiness is identified with 
the pursuit of the 'true good*. Moreover, Pascal's language here makes 
it plain that he intends by the expression "vrai bien" something quite 
apart from man's own peculiar good^ness, in the sense of a native potential 
which merely requires to be developed.
(ii) Man's power of conscious thought has value in so far as it enables 
him to pursue the 'end'.
This identification of man's pursuit of truth and happiness with 
that of the true good, and of the attainment of them with the attainment by 
man of his 'end', has important implications for Pascal's conception of the 
dignity that attaches to human thought. For this dignity is seen to consist
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precisely in the fact that man's power of reflection enables him to act 
deliberately in view of what he recognizes to be conducive to the 
attainment of his end and final happiness. It is this that raises him 
above the level of the purely instinctive behaviour which characterizes 
other animals.
Pascal follows the Aristotelean tradition of the Schoolmen in
considering the capacity for conscious thought as the 'differentia' that
marks off man from inanimate things and the sentient brutes.
"Je puis bien concevoir un homme sans mains, pieds, tête,
—  Mais je ne puis concevoir l'homme sans pensée: ce serait 
une pierre ou une brute." (p.1156; B.339)
For Pascal it follows not only that, looked at simply as one object
among others in nature, man's whole dignity resides in this capacity,
but further that 'ethics' can be defined as the right exercise of it;
"Tout notre dignité consiste donc en la pensée. C'est
de là qu'il faut nous relever —  Travaillons donc à
bien penser: voilà le principe de la morale." (p.ll57;B.347)
This view is reiterated in another very significant fragment, where
Pascal goes on to outline the framework within which this 'right thinking'
should be conducted:
"L'homme est visiblement fait pour penser; c'est toute sa 
dignité et tout son mérite, et tout son devoir est de 
penser comme il faut. Or l'ordre de la pensée est de 
commencer par soi, et par son auteur et sa fin."(p.ll46;B.146)
Now although Pascal thus replaces the objective scholastic conception of
the 'end' by an entirely, subjective one stipulating a personal enquiry on
the part of the individual, this cannot be taken to mean that he envisages
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the 'end* in terms of some ideal human nature. To equate the 'end* with 
man's dignity as a rational animal, or anything of that sort, results in 
his terms in something very like tautology, viz man's dignity lies in the 
fact that it is in his nature to be a rational animal and this constitutes 
his 'end*: man's end is to attain the dignity of his true nature which is 
to be a rational animal.
When the last sentence quoted is considered in the light of the 
definition in the previous extract, and of Pascal's alignment of man's 'end' 
with that which fulfils the desire of happiness and truth inalienable from 
his nature, it becomes apparent that the individual, his needs and their 
satisfaction, are of supreme moment in Pascalian 'ethic'. Such a frankly 
egocentric moral outlook, characteristic of his age,^ ^results in a 
conception of 'ethics' as primarily concerned, not with abstract notions 
of justice or duty, nor even with practical "bienfaisance", but with 
problems relating to the individual's hopes and fears regarding his estate 
and destiny. For Pascal the vital question is: What is the ultimate good
in which happiness is to be found? And it is not until the satisfactory 
answer to this question has been found that he considers it possible to 
go on and ask the further question: What course of action will be
appropriate for a particular individual in a given instance? Thus ethical 
action in his view is motived hy the desire for the supreme good that
(l) According to Lanson even in the 18th century in France this kind of 
outlook was predominant: "Si l'on excepte la morale de Rousseau, — toutes
les morales se ramènent à la morale du bonheur, à celle de 1'intérêt bien 
entendu, et à celle de la bienfaisance." art.cit.,p.7-8. Cassirer also 
emphasizes the originality of Rousseau's approach to ethics in this regard, 
op.cit., p.153 ff.
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constitutes man's true,end wherein his yearning for happiness will be 
assuaged, and not by the desire to do what one ought. Nowhere in his 
extant writings does he recognize acts done for duty's sake as the 
distinctive tvoe of ethical behaviour.
That Pascal does conceive of the dignity of human thought as
wholly dependent on its being used to direct man to the attainment of the
goal of his existence is sufficiently attested by two further passages
from the Pensées. In the second half of the fragment already quoted,
where he insists on the rightful priority in the "ordre de pensée" of
man's own nature, ground and end, he goes on to enumerate what supersedes
these in the thinking of the mass of men;
"Or à quoi pense le monde? Jamais à cela; mais à danser, 
à jouer du luth, à chanter, à faire des vers, à courir 
la bague, etc., à se battre, à se faire roi, sans penser 
à ce que c'est qu'être roi, et qu'être homme."(p.ll46; B.I46)
The picture presented by this misus^e, as he regards it, of the precious
capacity which alone sets man at an advantage over the natural and physical
orders by enabling him to reflect on the ends of his actions - . allowing it
to become absorbed in such aimless and frivolous pursuits - draws from
Pascal the following conclusion;
"Pensée; - Toute la dignité de l'homme est en la pensée.
Mais qu'est-ce que cette pensée? Qu'elle est sotte!
La pensée est donc une chose admirable et incomparable 
par sa nature. Il fallait qu'elle eût d'étranges défauts 
pour être méprisable; mais elle en a de tels que rien 
n'est plus ridicule. Qu'elle est grande par sa nature! 
qu'elle est basse par ses défauts !" (p.1156; B.365)
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Since the 'defects' of thought here referred to consist simply in its 
being engrossed in what Pascal regards as futile distractions, he 
obviously overlooks, in bringing out the contrast between the promise and 
condition of this natural capacity, the distinction between the power 
of thought and the actual content of thought, which latter is determined 
by the objects upon which the former is directed. Such an oversight 
does not however weaken the force of his contention that man's power of 
conscious thought retains its dignity only so long as it is occupied with 
such objects as conduce to the attainment of his supreme good and final 
happiness*
(iii) Non-values opposed to the true good; the passions.
In view of the preceding discussion of the meaning of "morale" 
in its peculiar Pascalian sense, when Pascal shows himself anxious that 
men should come to see the true value of the ends they pursue in life, and 
that they should be brought to realize what principle they should order 
their lives on, it is hardly surprising that he should again emphasize 
the desire inherent in the nature of all men for truth and happiness as 
the guiding purpose in conduct;
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"Contrariétés. —  Que l'homme maintenant s'estime son 
prix. —  il a en lui la capacité de connaître la 
vérité et d'être heureux; mais il n'a point de vérité, 
ou constante, ou satisfaisante.
Je voudrais donc porter l'homme à désirer d'en trouver, 
à être prêt, et dégagé des passions, pour la suivre ou 
il la trouvera, sachant combien sa connaissance s'est 
obscurcie par les passions; je voudrais bien qu'il hait 
en soi la concupiscence qui le détermine d'elle-même, 
afin qu'elle ne l'aveuglât point pour faire son choix, 
et qu'elle ne l'arrêtât point quand il aura choisi."
(p.1170; B.423)
The programme of moral direction that Pascal outlines for
himself here has as its sole object the promotion of man's pursuit of
truth and happiness. And a short passage from the De l'art de persuader.
in which he describes the "principes et les premiers moteurs des actions
de la volonté", sets out the reason why it is necessary to take such steps
to ensure that man will not allow deceptive influences in the form of
the passions to sway him in this matter:
"Ceux de la volonté sont de certains désire naturels et 
communs à tous les hommes, comme le désir d'être heureux, 
que personne ne peut pas ne pas avoir, outre plusieurs 
objets particuliers que chacun suit pour y arriver, et qui, 
ayant la force de nous plaire, sont aussi forts, quoique 
pernicieux en effet, pour faire agir la volonté, que s'ils 
faisaient son véritable bonheur." (p.593;G.E.IX, p.273)
The will therefore is the faculty in virtue of vhich man is drawn to desire
conclusive happiness, and as to that he has no option, since this desire
is part of his inmost nature. However, diverse means may be adopted to
gratify this desire which will not in fact serve that purpose. Part of
(1) '
a fragment from the Pensees. quoted earlier, amplifies the basic notion 
here:
(l) cf. above, p. lOf,
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"Tous les hommes recherchent d'être heureux: —  quelques 
différents moyens qu'ils y emploient, ils tendent tous à 
ce but, —  La volonté ne fait jamais la moindre démarche 
que vers cet objet. C'est le motif de toutes les actions 
de tous les hommes,— "(1) (p.1184-5; B.425)
It is clear then that Pascal's concern to promote the desire
for happiness, which he declares to be natural and common to all men and
to form the most potent motivation of human behaviour, by no means involves
an indiscriminate sanctioning of whatever has the power to give pleasure
to man. For some things which have this power, and announce themselves as
necessary steps to the attainment of happiness, are in fact steps away
from it. And it is because the will is apt to be misled by these
pretenders from the proper path to truehappiness, the goal of its desires,
that Pascal declares himself anxious to ensure that man's whole attention
(2)is focussed thereon.
This tendency on the part of the will to yield to the
importunity of passing passions, the gratification of which presents
itself as the condition of happiness whereas it is really the reverse,
is accounted for by the Augustinian conception of man's enslavement to
concupiscence since the Fall.
"La concupiscence nous est devenue naturelle, et a fait 
notre seconde nature. Ainsi il y a deux natures en nous: 
l'une bonne, l'autre mauvaise." (p.1262; B.660)
"La concupiscence et la force sont les sources de toutes 
nos actions ; la concupiscence fait les volontaires;— "
(p.1154; B.334)
(1) Pascal therefore endorses the Thomist view that the will is necessarily 
set toward the final or ultimate good of man, possession of which constitutes 
happiness, and that it is under the impulse of this innate orientation of the 
will that all particular choices are made, cf.Aquinas.S.T.la Ilae,q.13,art.6. 
Contra Gentiles, lib III, cap.3.
(2) cf.from the Pensées ; "L'esprit croit naturellement, et la volonté aime 
naturellement; de sorte que, faute de vrais objets, il faut qu'ils s'attachent 
aux faux." (p.1115-6; B.8I)
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"— la concupiscence est la source de tous nos mouvements;— "
(p.ll26; B.41)
"— la malice de la concupiscence se plaît à faire tout le 
contraire de ce qu'on veut obtenir de nous sans nous donner 
du plaisir, qui est la monnaie pour laquelle nous donnons 
tout ce qu'on veut."(l) (p.1099; B.24)
Concupiscence is therefore a rival with man's natural desire for happiness
in providing the springs of action that chiefly move him, and, as earlier
fragments showed, Pascal believes it frequently hoodwinks the will into
choosing mere pleasure as the object of pursuit instead of true happiness.
And the way in which concupiscence, as the result of Adam's sin, thus
seduces the will from the proper path to the consummate happiness, which
in Pascal's eyes represents man's end, is elaborated in the Deuxième écrit
sur la grâce.
"La concupiscence s'est donc élevée dans ses membres et a 
chatouillé et délecté sa volonté dans le mal, et les ténèbres 
ont rempli son esprit de telle sorte que sa volonté, auparavant 
indifférente pour le bien et le mal, sans délectation ni 
chatouillement ni dans l'un ni dans l'autre, mais suivant, 
sans aucun appétit prévenant de sa part, ce qu'il connaissait 
de plus convenable à sa f é l i c i t é , s e  trouve maintenant 
charmée par la concupiscence— " (p.965;G.E.XI, p.147)
(1) Pascal nowhere defines the precise relation between "concupiscence" and 
"passions", but the following passages from the Pensées make it plain that, 
if not exactly synonymous, the two terms at least refer to the same basic 
psychological phenomenon. In the "Pari" fragment the passions are alleged 
to be the chief obstacles to belief in God: "Travaillez donc —  à vous 
convaincre —  par la diminution de vos passions. —  cela diminue les passions, 
qui sont vos grands obstacles."(p.1215-6;B.233) "Alors Jésus-Christ vient 
dire aux hommes —  que ce sont leurs passions qui les séparent de Dieu,— " 
(p.l295;B.783) "— Jésus-Christ et les apôtres— nous ont appris— que les 
ennemis de l'homme sont ses passions." (p.l266;B.678) "— le mot d'ennemi 
dépendant de la dernière fin, les justes entendaient par la leurs passions,— " 
(p.l271;B.57l) cf. also above p.
(2) In the De^l'art de persuader also Pascal insists that the act of volition 
should follow on the conscious recognition b y the intellect that something is 
congenial to our happiness and therefore desirable. The fact that in practice 
it is the passions which govern the process of volition, so that the will 
makes its choice independently of the intellect, is a sign of disorder. The 
intellect ("esprit") is reduced to merely claiming that it should be "juge
cont. p.217.
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It follows from this, according to Pascal, that the freewill ("le libre
arbitre"), though retaining its power of choice, nevertheless:
"— a une suavité et une délectation si puissante dans 
le mal par la concupiscence qu'infailliblement il s*y 
porte de lui-même comme à son bien, et qu'il le choisit 
volontairement et très librement et avec joie comme 
l'objet dû il sent sa béatitude."vl) (po966;G.E.XI,p.l48)
The first of these two passages from the Ecrits sur la grace 
makes it clear that Pascal adopts the traditional scholastic 'psychology', 
according to which the will is the faculty that makes man choose and 
appropriate to his affections something which the intdligence has presented
cont. from p.216 des choses que la volonté choisit," while the will "s'est
toute corrompue par ses sales attachements." (p.592; G.E.IX,p.272) Thus 
"bien peu de vérités entrent dans l'âme par l'esprit, au lieu qu'elles y sont 
introduites en foules par les caprices téméraires de la volonté, sans le 
conseil du raisonnement." (p.593;G.£.IX, p.273)
(l) Descartes's conception of the relation between the passions and the 
will provides a marked contrast to Pascal's views as set out in these two 
extracts. In his treatise on the Pasâons de l'âme Descartes maintains 
that the will, although powerless to subdue violent passions, is not 
necessarily carried away by them itself, and moreover possesses the means 
whereby to thwart even such passions as these. "Le plus que la volonté 
puisse faire pendant que cette émotion est en sa vigueur, c'est de ne pas 
consentir à ses effets et de retenir plusieurs des mouvements auxquels elle 
dispose le corps. Par exemple, si la colère fait lever la main pour frapper, 
la volonté peut ordinairement la retenir;— " (Pléiade éd.,p.718). The will 
has a power of veto therefore which prevents the force of passions from 
issuing in any action. Besides on Descartes's view the passions in themselves 
are equally susceptible of being directed to either good or bad ends, and 
are thus morally indifferent. In an article entitled "Quel est le mouvement 
des esprits en ces passions", he writes: "— je ne vois point de raison qui 
empêche que le même mouvement des esprits qui sert à fortifier une pensée 
lorsqu'elle a un fondement qui est mauvais, ne la puisse aussi fortifier 
lorsqu'elle en a un qui est juste;— "(ibid.,p.772) And the utility of the 
passions consists mainly in the fact that they serve to strengthen intellect­
ual conviction:"— l'utilité de toutes les passions ne consiste qu'en ce 
qu'elles fortifient et font durer en l'âme des pensées, lesquelles il est 
bon qu'elle conserve, et qui pourraient facilement, sans cela, en être 
effacées." (ibid., p.730) In the same treatise he argues that if the 
enquiry is limited to the physiological level the passions appear for
cont. p.218.
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to him as g o o d . T h u s  Pascal's criticisms of the misuse of the power
(2)of conscious thought, wherein lies man's whole dignity, are not called 
forth merely because those who permit the thought of illusory pleasures to 
assume the central place in their consciousness, and direct their whole 
attention to frivolous pastimes, controvert the fundamental principle of 
ethics as he defines it. More serious than this, they are guilty thereby 
of actively conniving at deluding the will, already weakened through having 
the harmony of its impulses disturbed by the attacks of concupiscence, 
in presenting objects to it as congenial to its supreme desire of happiness 
which are in reality obstacles to its attainment.
Pascal's claim in these extracts, that when his will is led astray 
by concupiscence from the pursuit of what is "convenable à sa félicité" 
man's conduct becomes evil, implies that right conduct in his view is 
synonymous with the pursuit of true happiness, the right direction of the 
self toward its final 'end'. However, in the Deuxième écrit he goes on to 
affirm that the only effective remedy to the domination of the will by 
concupiscence, the sole means whereby it may be reorientated toward such 
objects as do truly conduce to happiness, is the redemptive grace of Christ.
cont.from p.217 the most part as geared to meet man's physical requireimts, 
and hence beneficial. Thus he claims that; "— nous voyons qu'elles sont 
toutes bonnes de leur nature, et que nous n'avons rien à éviter que leurs 
mauvais usages ou leurs excès,— "(ibid.,p.794) Thomas Aquinas likewise regards 
the passions as in themselves morally indifferent: when in accordance with 
right reason and subject to its control they are good, but when allowed to 
obscure reason they are bad.(S.T.Ia IIae,q.l4,art.2;q.59fSirt.2.) Should they 
anticipate the action of the will however, even if they make for the good, 
their influence is injurious and detracts from the moral quality of the act.
On the other hand they may be called into existence and 'used* by the will, 
and in this case the passions will increase the goodness of the act. (De 
veritate, q.26, art.7.) cf.A.D.Sertillanges: La philosophie morale de Saint 
Thomas d'Aouin. (Paris 1916), p.68-72.
(1) It is clear that Pascal's "will" is properly the scholastic intellectual 
appetite, by which man desires a good consciously apprehended by the
cont. on p.219.
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With respect to this he alleges that*
"— elle n'est autre chose qu'une suavité et une délectation 
dans la loi de Dieu, répandue dans le coeur par le Saint - 
Esprit, qui non seulement égalant, mais surpassant encore la 
concupiscence de la chair, remplit la volonté d'une plus 
grande délectation dans le bien, que la concupiscence ne 
lui en offre dans le mal, et qu'ainsi le libre arbitre, 
charmé par les douceurs et par les plaisirs que le Saint- 
Esprit lui inspire, plus que par les attraits du péché, 
choisit infailliblement lui-meme la loi de Dieu par cette 
seule raison qu'il y trouve plus de satisfaction et qu'il 
y sent sa béatitude et sa félicité."(l) (p.966-7;G.E.XI,p.l48-9)
Thus even the operation of divine grace takes the form of a 'delectation'
of the will, by means of which it is redirected to the pursuit of man's true
happiness. Like Thomas Aquinas, Pascal seems to regard the will as most
'free' when, all alternatives having been excluded by the final supremacy of
(2)
the ultimate 'end', it adheres to this and rests in it. And the implication 
of this passage is that the efforts of man, when reduced to his own natural 
resources, to progress toward the goal of his desires, to conform to right 
conduct, will be of no avail in the face of a will enthralled by
cont. from p.218 intelligence. For the Schoolmen the primary function of
the will is "electio", by which man recognizes, and takes to himself as his 
good, that which his intelligence has already represented as desirable, (cf.
P.H. Wicksteed: The Reactions between Dogma and Philosophy Illustrated from 
the Works of S. Thomas Aquinas. Exct^us l) According to Pascal however, the 
will has become so enthralled by concupiscence since the Fall that all 
conscious choice is excluded from its purview, so that the resultant action 
does not follow upon the 'election' of that which the judgement has presented 
as good.
(2 from p.218) Cited above, p.%li.
(1) The substance of this passage has been derived from St.Augustine, De 
Sniritu et Littera. 5, where Augustine sums up his teaching on the "delectatio 
institiae". Pascal also follows St.Augustine in holding that, as the result of 
the enslavement of man's will, "our activity must be directed in accordance 
with that which delights us the more".(Exp.Ep.ad.Gal.,49) Thus in the Troisième 
écrit, where he quotes this statement, Pascal alleges that man is "maintenant 
esclave de la délectation; ce qui le délecte davantage l'attire infailliblement: 
— l'on fait toujours ce qui délecte le plus," (p.l003;G.E.XI,p.226)
(2) cf. the following extract from the Prière pour le bon usage des maladies;
"OhI qu'heureux sont ceux qui avec une liberté entière et une pente
cont.p.220.
220
concupiscence. Indeed, as Martineau has said, on this view "man--
as an ethical agent sinks into nonentity, and becomes the mere prize
(2)contended for by the spirits of darkness and of light". Since the
powers of concupiscence and grace are conceived of as rival 'delectations', 
the will becomes a sort of mechanical reflex which responds to the pull 
of the 'delectation' strongest at the moment.
cont. from p.219 invincible de leur volonté aiment parfaitement et 
librement ce qu'ils sont obligés d'aimer nécessairement!" (p.609; G.E.IX, 
p.329) The description in the 18th Provinciale of the action of divine 
grace on the human will concludes on the same note: "— trouvant sa plus
grande joie dans le Dieu qui le charme, l'homme s'y porte infailliblement 
de lui-même, par un mouvement tout libre, tout volontaire, tout amoureux;— " 
(p.887; G.E.VII, p.29) cf. Aquinas, De veritate. q.22, art.6; S.T. la Ilae 
q.5, art.8.
(1) cf. also the cryptic but telling assertion in the Pensées: "—  toute 
la morale consiste en la concupiscence et en la grâce." (p.1299; B.523)
(2) Referring to the moral implications of the 'Augustinian theology' in: 
Types of Ethical Theory. (Oxford, 1886, 2nd ed.) p.l8.
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(iv) The true good and its attainment.
In the long fragment from the Pensées, where he affirms that the
(1)
desire for happiness is natural and common to all men, Pascal once again
argues, from the fact that this basic desire to happiness remains
unsatisfied by the outcome of all the particular choices it dictates, to
a state of happiness previously enjoyed by man, and of which but an empty
trace now survives. Man tries in vain to fill this with the various finite
things which surround him, but:
t!— ce gouffre infini ne peut être rempli que par un objet 
infini et immuable, c'est-à-dire que par Dieu même.
Lui seul est son véritable bien; et depuis qu'il l'a quitté, 
c'est une chose étrange, qu'il n'y a rien dans la nature qui 
n'ait été capable de lui en tenir la place:— "(p.ll85;B.425)
In the context of a fragment where the expressions, "ie vrai bien"
and "son véritable bien", are used as synonymous with that which when
attained will satisfy man's desire "d'etre heureux", such an argument
indicates that Pascal sees man's unlimited potency in respect of truth
and happiness as pointing to an infinite object God, alone cspsble of
(2)
realizing it, as the good connatural to him, and hence as the goal, "fin", 
to which he is destined. And that Pascal regards man's supreme good, the 
good and God as synonymous terms, that he even conceives of the very 
possibility of man being able to attain to his sovereign good as in some 
sense dependent on there being a God, comes out in the Entretien avec M. de
(1) Cited above, p.lor
(2) cf. from an early letter to Mme. Périers "— il n'y a que Dieu qui doive
être la dernière fin comme lui seul est le vrai principe." (p.484-5;G.E.II,
p.250) In the brief Sur la conversion du pécheur, the soul in its aspiration 
after God is represented as desiring that he should be "lui-même son chemin, 
son objet et sa dernière fin." (p.551; G.E.X, p.426)
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Saci. He there claims that Epictetus and Montaigne are the most illustrious
exponents of the two most famous philosophical 'sects', which are alone;
"— conformes à la raison, puisqu'on ne peut suivre qu'une 
de ces deux routes, savoir; ou qu'il y a un Dieu, et lors 
il y place son souverain bien; ou qu'il est incertain, et 
qu'alors le vrai bien l'est aussi, puisqu'il en est 
incapable." (p.571; G.E.IV, p.51)
Further examples of this alignment occur as follows in the Pensées;
"Que les biens temporels sont faux, et que le vrai bien
est d'être uni à Dieu, Ps.l43*" (p.1232; B.610)
"— ces oppositions que nous avons à Dieu et à notre
propre bien." (p.1223; B.430)
"Le bonheur n'est ni hors nous, ni dans nous; il est en 
Dieu, et hors et dans nous." (p.1190;B.465)•
"Si l'homme n'est fait pour Dieu, pourquoi n'est-il 
heureux qu'en Dieu?" (p.1200; B.438)
"Seconde partie; Félicité de l'homme avec Dieu."
(p.1103; B.60) ^
"Le Dieu des Chrétiens est un Dieuifait sentir à l'âme 
qu'il est son unique bien, que tout son repos est en lui,— "
(p.1308; B.544)
In the short treatise. Sur la conversion du pécheur, the soul is depicted
as recognizing that it is a condition of attaining to full and indefectible
"félicité,"
" de se joindre à un bien véritable et subsistant
par lui-même, qui peut la soutenir et durant et après
cette vie." (p.549; G.E.X, p.423)
And the culmination of its "r^erche du véritable bien" (p.550; G.E.X, p.424)
is reached when it is brought to realize that God constitutes the "bien
souverain" (p.551; G.E.X, p.425) for which it thirsts, and that "il n'y a
rien de plus aimable que Dieu".(p.550). Similarly in the fifth strophe of
the Prière pour le bon usage des maladies Pascal writes;
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"0 mon Dieu, qu'un coeur est heureux qui peut aimer un objet 
si charmant,—  0 mon Dieu, qu'une âme est heureuse dont vous
êtes les délices, --
Que son bonheur est ferme et durable,— " (p.608;G.E.IX, p.328-9)
Finally in a passage from the eighteenth Provingia]e God, the good and
man's ultimate happiness are identified with one another:
"— Dieu change le coeur de l'homme par une douceur céleste
qu'il y répand, qui fait que l'homme conçoit du
dégoût pour les délices du péché qui le séparent du bien 
incorruptible; trouvant sa plus grande joie dans le Dieu 
qui le charme, il s'y porte infailliblement de lui-même;— "
(p.887;G.E. VII, p.29)
Man's desire for happiness is therefore fully realized, according to
Pascal, only when he is cleaving to God, his "end" and the sole self-subsist-
(1)
ing true good. But although this good is proportionate to man's nature, in 
the sense that the desire for it is natural to him, Pascal is emphatic that
(l) There is a radical divergence discernible between Pascal's approach to 
this question of the 'good', and that adopted by Descartes. The latter, 
in a letter to Queen Christina 20.11.1647, affirms that: "On peut considérer 
la bonté de chaque chose en elle-même, sans la rapporter à autrui, auquel 
sens il est évident que c'est Dieu qui est le Souverain* Bien, parce qu'il 
est incomparablement plus parfait que les créatures; mais on peut aussi 
la rapporter à nous, et en ce sens, je ne vois rien que nous devions estimer 
bien, sinon ce qui nous appartient en quelque façon, et qui est tel, que 
c'est perfection pour nous de l'avoir." (Pléiade éd., p.1281-2) Now Pascal 
in effect telescopes these alternative standpoints. He declares that man is 
unable to find what will appease his natural desire for happiness in himself 
(cf. Sur la conversion — p.550), and that since the sovereign good considered 
objectively, God, is alone capable of giving him complete and eternal 
happiness, it must also constitute the individual's particular good.
Descartes, on the other hand, enlarges on the above definition as follows :
"— le Souverain Bien —  d'un chacun en particulier --  ne consiste qu'en une
ferme volonté de bien faire, et au contentement qu'elle produit. Dont la 
raison est que je ne remarque aucun autre bien qui me semble si grand, ni 
qui soit entièrement au pouvoir d'un chacun." (ibid., p.1282) In an earlier 
letter to the Princess Elizabeth, 18.8.1645, Descartes distinguishes between 
the 'sovereign good' and the 'contentment' it produces, denominating the 
latter 'beatitude', (p.1198) The definition of 'beatitude' which is then 
given corroborates that of the 'sovereign good' in the later letter: " la
cont. p.224.
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it transcends his natural powers of attainment. Indeed, the unenviable
position assigned in this regard to the centuries antedating the Christian era,
and the repeated assertions of the inadequacy of the attempts of the secular
philosophers to discover by their unassisted intellectual effort what is
the supreme good for man, testify to Pascal’s conviction that not merely
the power to progress toward the goal of his desires, but also the knowledge
as to the way, and as to what actually consitutes it, must come to man from
outside himself.
"Le pyrrhonisme est le vrai. Car, après tout, les hommes, 
avant Jèsus-Christ, ne savaient ou ils en étaient, ni s’ils 
étaient grands ou petits. Et ceux qui ont dit l’un ou 
l’autre n’en savaient rien, et devinaient sans raison et 
par hasard; et même ils erraient toujours, en excluant 
l’un ou l’autre. *Quod ergo ignorantes quaeritis, religio 
annuntiat vobis’ (p.ll89;B.432)
In other words, in the pre-Christian era of history man was
completely debarred from any genuine knowledge with respect to his nature
and end for the simple reason that the Christian revelation had not then
occurred - an outlook which coincides with Pascal’s uncompromising attitude
(l)toward the ’virtuous pagans*.' * Unlike others of his contemporaries he
cont. from p.223 beatitude ne consiste qu’au contentement de l’esprit, c’est- 
à-dire au contentement en général; —  pour avoir un contentement qui soit 
solide, il est besoin de suivre la vertu, c’est-à-dire d’avoir une volonté 
ferme et constante d’exécuter tout ce que nous jugerons être le meilleur, et 
d’employer toute la force de notre entendement à en bien juger." (p.1199-1200) 
Since ’beatitude’ has already been described as the ’contentment of mind’ 
which results from possession of the ’sovereign good’, it follows that the 
’sovereign good’ is equivalent to "vertu" as Descartes has defined it; and the 
reason why "vertu*' is ascribed as the source of ’beatitude’ is because it in 
turn is the product of man’s free will, the distinctive characteristic of 
human nature .(to Christina,p.1282, and 4) An extract from another letter to 
Elizabeth, 4*B.1645, shows how far Descartes is from agreeing with Pascal in 
placing man’s end, wherein alone the aspirations of his nature can find 
fulfilment, in an infinite and eternal good incommensurable with any data of 
finite human experience: ’’— 'vivere beate’, vivre en béatitude consiste, ce 
me semble, en un parfait contentement d’esprit et une satisfaction intérieure,
 il me semble qu’un chacun^e peut rendre content de soi-même et sans rien
cont. p.225.
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inherited none of that gentle spirit of tolerance displayed two centuries 
previously by Nicolas of Cusa, when he asserted that all religions can be 
seen to reflect some rays of the Eternal Truth. Furthermore, in quoting 
from memory the line from Acts. 17.23. where Paul announces to the Areopagites 
that he has come to declare to them the true God whom they already worship 
in the guise of the "Unknown God", Pascal, as M.Brunschvicg has noted, 
introduces significant modifications to the sense of the original. Paul 
believed that the pagans had glimpsed the truth, whereas, according to Pascal, , 
they have never emerged from error.
The Pensées contain numerous references to the fruitless endeavours
on the part of the secular philosophers to locate what constitutes the final
end of man and his supreme good:
"Recherche du vrai bien. - Le commun des hommes met 
le bien dans la fortune et dans les biens du dehors, ou 
au moins dans le divertissement. Les philosophes ont
montré la vanité de tout cela et l’ont mis ou ils ont pu."
(p.ll87; B.462)
"Que l’homme sans la foi ne peut connaître le vrai bien,— "
(p.1184; B.425)
"280 sortes de souverains biens dans Montaigne."(p.1135;B.74)
"Le souverain bien. Dispute du souverain bien. - — Il y a 
contradiction, car ils conseillent enfin de se tuer."
(p.llB7;B.36l)
"C’est en vain, ô hommes, que vous cherchez dans vous-mêmes 
le remède à vos misères. Toutes vos lumières ne peuvent arriver 
qu’à connaître que ce n’est point dans vous-mêmes que vous 
trouvez ni la vérité ni le bien. Les philosophes vous l’ont 
promis, et ils n’ont pu le faire. Ils ne savent ni quel est 
votre véritable bien,— ’ (p.1225; B.430)
cont. from p.224 attendre d’ailleurs, pourvu seulement qu’il observe trois 
choses, auxquelles se rapportent les trois règles de morale, que j’ai mises 
dans le Discours de la Méthode." (p.1193)
p.224-(l) cf. below, p.33^ /1
(l) ed.min., p.528, n.l.
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(v) The ’end’ and duty
Yet so important does Pascal esteem the natural desire for
happiness that, having adjudged man’s own efforts powerless to direct him
to the supreme good wherein this desire will find completion, he goes on
to require of the ’true religion’ that it comply with the following conditions:
’’ que, pour rendre l’homme heureux, elle lui montre qu’il
y a un Dieu; qu’on est obligé de l’aimer; que notre unique 
félicité est d’être en lui, et notre unique mal d’être 
séparé de lui; qu’elle reconnaisse que nous sommes pleins 
de ténèbres qui nous empêchent de le connaître et de l’aimer; 
et qu’ainsi nos devoirs nous obligeant d’aimer Dieu, et nos 
concupiscences nous en détournant,— " (p.1223; B.430)
Thus man’s fundamental to, and capacity for, happiness dictates a
priori the content of the revelation which the ’true religion’ must proffer.
Not only this, but Pascal here derives the concept of duty from this desire.
Man has a duty to love God, he implies, not in virtue of any universal
moral law that conmands him to do so, but because in God alone can be find
(2)
the full satisfaction of his whole nature. An earlier variant of
another part of the same fragment also illustrates this*
’Ne cherchez pas de satisfaction dans la terre:--- Votre
bien n’est qu’en Dieu, et la souveraine félicité consiste 
à connaître Dieu, à s’unir à lui pour jamais dans l’éternité.
Votre devoir est à l’aimer de tout votre coeur."(p.1225,n;B.p.524,n.l.)
(1) The process whereby Thomas Aquinas also arrives at an a priori definition 
of the conditions with which an authentic revelation must comply, although 
more complex than Pascal’s, is basically the same. Revelation must make 
available the supplementary information both as to the ultimate goal wherein 
man’s natural desire for blessedness will find fulfilment, and to the 
appointed means for its attainment, which his own unaided faculties are 
incapable of providing. S.T. la, q.l, art.l; Contra Gentiles. libJUI, cap.118, 
(cf. Wicksteed, op.cit., p.154-6)
(2) Saint Augustine had been Pascal’s predecessor in making the ethical
cont. p. 227
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In this way it becomes apparent to what extent the idea of the good for man is
paramount in Pascal’s ethical thinking, and how its realization, demanded by
the promise implicit in man’s very nature, in the shape of a yearning for
ultimate happiness which his own powers cannot satisfy, determines duty
(1)in an almost logical fashion.
A further fragment from the Pensées shows how Pascal sets up man’s
supreme good or ’end’ as the moral criterion, assigning the labels ’good’
and ’bad’ to human acts and finite objects of desire according as they
conduce or not to the attainment of this ultimate goal;
’Or, la dernière fin est ce qui donne le nom aux choses.
Tout ce qui nous empêche d’y arriver est appelé enneM. Ainsi
les créatures, quoique bonnes, sont ennemies des justes quand 
elles les détournent de Dieu, "(2) (p.1271;B.571)
cont. from p.226 quality of any action thus directly dependent on its
relation to God as the supreme good for man* ’Non arbitror cum de moribus 
et vita fit quaestio, amplius esse requirendum, quod sit hominis summum 
bonum, quo referenda^ sunt omnia. Id enim esse patuit, et rations quantum 
valuimus, et ea quae nostrae rationi antecellit auctoritate divina, nihil 
aliud quam ipsum Deum. Nam quid erit aliüd optimum hominis, nisi cui
inha er ere est beatissimum? Id autem est solus Deus, " De moribus Ecclesiae
Gatholicae. cap.14,
(l) Domat’s treatment of the ’end’ in his Traité des lois, as the basis of all 
law, shows a remarkable affinity with Pascal’s conception of it as the 
determining factor in morals. Domat maintains that because laws are no more 
than the rules of human conduct, and because conduct can be defined as "les 
démarches de l’homme vers sa fin", in order to discover the first principles 
of law it is necessary to know what this ’end’ is "— parce que la destination 
de l’homme à sa fin sera la première règle de la voie et des démarches qui 
l’y conduisent, et par conséquent sa première loi et le fondement de toutes 
les autres." Now to know what constitutes the ’end* of anything is to know 
why it has been created. Since an inspection of man’s nature reveals that 
he possesses the faculties of mind for knowing and of heart for loving, it is 
evident that God has created man to know and love, and "par conséquent pour 
s’unir à quelque objet, dont la connaissance et l’amour doivent faire son 
repos et son bonheur; et que c’est vers cet objet que toutes ses démarches 
doivent le conduire. D ’oh il s’ensuit que la première loi de l’homme est 
sa destination à la recherche et à l’amour de cet objet qui doit être sa fin, 
ou il doit trouver la félicité,—  De tous les objets qui s’offrent à l’homme
cont. p.228
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Thus in a particular context certain things or actions will be condemned 
as bad or wrong, not because they are bad or wrong in themselves, but because 
they are recognized to be such as will deter man from achieving his true 
good. Action therefore should be regulated by considering what will lead 
up to the goal of man’s desire. It is from this ’end’ that everything must 
hang, and it provides the fixed point from which man must work down, by 
connecting it with the things which will lead up to it, until he comes 
to the particular choice open to him as a step towards reaching the ’end’.
And not only do human acts thus derive their moral quality in Pascal’s 
view from their relation to man’s final ’end’, but the value-determinant 
of finite things themselves is their tendency to promote this ultimate good 
of man.
Qont. from p.227. dans tout l’univers, en y comprenant l’homme lui-même,
il ne trouvera rien qui soit digne d’être sa fin. -- il faut enfin
apprendre de celui qui a formé l’homme, que c’est lui seul qui, étant son 
principe, est aussi sa fin, et qu’il n’y a que Dieu seul qui puisse remplir 
le vide infini de cet esprit et de ce coeur qu'il a faits pour lui.’’ 1,3.
(2) from p. 227. M. Gilson has shown how this conception of the ’end’, 
as identified with the sovereign good, God, distinguishes the specifically 
Christian ethic from that propounded by the philosophers, who also conceived 
of the ’end’ as determining morals. He points out that for Aristotle 
the ’end* is not something which transcends and completes the moral life; 
the sole ’end’ and true good is the moral life itself. L’esprit de la 
philosophie médiévale, p.336 f.f. The practice of declaring human acts 
and objects of desire morally good or bad in so far as they are compatible 
or not with the attainment of man’s final ’end’seems to have been generally 
adopted by Jansenist writers. Arnauld, echoing Saint Augustine, maintains 
that: ’—  la principale distinction des vertus d’avec les vices, et des 
bonnes actions d’avec les péchés, se doit prendre de la fin à laquelle
elles doivent être rapportées, et cette fin n’est autre que Dieu, ’’
Seconde apologie pour Monsieur Jansénius. Oeuvres. (Paris, 1775) vol.17,
p.342. Nicole likewise asserts: "--  la religion est si étroitement liée
a toutes les choses du monde, par le rapport qu’elles ont à la fin dernière 
qui est Dieu, que l’on ne sauroit juger d’aucune que par ce rapport. C ’est 
par là qu’elles sont avantageuses ou désavantageuses, innocentes, ou danger­
euses, estimables, méprisables, bonnes ou mauvaises. Le prix qu’elles ont
cont. p.229*
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Indeed the two are inextricably bound up for, according to Pascal’s
’psychology’, it is the desire or love of some thing that dictates all man’s
motives, which are in turn effective in shaping his actual behaviour. The
need for grace to exercise a superior ’delectation’, in order to release man
from his enslavement to concupiscence, brought this out clearly enough.
Hence right conduct for Pascal consists simply in a steadfast cleaving to
right desires; i.e. to those conducive to the attainment of that which is
alone capable of yielding the sort of satisfaction necessary to effect man’s
total happiness. A passage from the Pensées, rather excessively ascetic
in tone, illustrates this:
’’S’il y a un Dieu, il ne faut aimer que lui, et non les 
créatures passagères. —  Donc tout ce qui nous incite à nous 
attacher aux créatures est mauvais, puisque cela nous 
empêche, ou de servir Dieu, si nous le connaissons, ou de 
le chercher, si nous l’ignorons." (p.1203-4; B.479)
Pascal’s suspicion of personal attachments likewise stems from the conviction
that they are apt to divert men’s desires from their proper ’end’ wherein
alone these will find true fulfilment;
cont. from p.228. en elles-mêm^n’est rien. Elles 1’empruntent du rapport
qu’elles ont au souverain bien." Essais de morale, vol.2, p.57. Jansénius 
himself insists on the importance, as far as virtue is concerned, of duly 
differentiating between "officium" and "finis", between the act itself and 
the ’end’ which the agent has in view in performing it. According to him 
the essential difference between vice and virtue lies not in the action 
considered in itself, bit in the ’end’ which alone ’specifies’ the action 
and makes it what it is. It is the ’end’ that determines the will, thus 
motivating the action; and man’s final ’end’, to which all his acts must be 
referred, is God. Augustinus. t.II, bk.IV, ch.12. Despite the different 
connotation which the term itself bears in his case, Descartes too considers 
that the ’end’ should rightly determine conduct. In his letter to Elizabeth, 
18.8.1645, he notes ; ’—  la dernière fin ou le but auquel doivent tendre nos 
actions: —  par la fin de nos actions, on peut entendre le souverain bien 
et la béatitude; car le souverain bien est sans doute la chose que nous nous 
devons proposer pour but en toutes nos actions, et le contentement d’esprit 
qui en revient, étant l’attrait qui fait que nous le recherchons, est aùssi 
à bon droit nommé notre fin." (Pléiade éd., p.1198)
(1) cf. also from the De l’art de persuader; ’ aussitôt qu’on fait
cont. p.230.
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"Il est injuste qu’on s’attache à moi, quoiqu'on le 
fasse avec plaisir et volontairement. Je tromperais 
ceux à qui j'en ferais naître le désir, car je ne 
suis la fin de personne et n’ai pas de quoi les 
satisfaire." (p.1343; B.471.)
In Pascal’s terms no finite being can be the ’end’ of ary other finite
being, since he (or she) is by definition incapable of giving completion
to the desire for an infinite good that characterizes human nature. And
to get things so far out of perspective as to allow finite objects to
usurp the rank of ’final end’ of one’s desires, amounts to sacrilege.
In an early letter to &^ne. Périer, Pascal writes concerning such objects
that;
"— l’on voit que dans les ténèbres du monde on les suit 
par un aveuglement brutal, que l’on s’y attache et qu’on 
en fait la dernière fin de ses désirs, ce qu’on ne peut 
faire sans sacrilège, car il n’y a que Dieu qui doive être
la dernière fin comme lui seul est le vrai principe.’’
(p.484-5; G.E. 11^ p*%so)
It was pointed out earlier that Pascal sees the root of such a
failure to rightly direct oneself toward the true ’end’, as the result of
blindly yielding to the desire uppermost at the moment whose satisfaction
does not lead to it, in the monopolizing influence exercised over man’s
will by concupiscence. It is for this reason that he concludes the fragment
cited above, urging man’s duty to love God rather than transitory creatures,
with the following reflection;
"Or nous sommes pleins de concupiscence; donc nous sommes 
pleins de mal; donc nous devons nous haïr nous-mêmes, et 
tout ce qui nous excite à autre attache qu’à Dieu seul."
(p.l204;B.479)
cont. from p.229 apercevoir à l’âme qu’une chose peut la conduire à ce 
qu’elle aime souverainement, il est inévitable qu’elle ne s’y porte avec joie." 
(p.594; G.E.IX, p.274)




"La vraie et unique vertu est donc de se hair (car 
on est haïssable par sa concupiscence), et de chercher 
un être véritablement aimable, pour l’aimer."
(p.l306; B.485
"Qui ne hait en soi son amour-propre, et cet instinct 
qui le porte à se faire Dieu, est bien aveugle."
(p.l204;B.492)
"Il y en a qui voient bien qu’il n’y a pas d’autre 
ennemi de l’homme que la concupiscence, qui le
détourne de Dieu, -- ni d’autre bien que Dieu, —
Ceux qui croient que le bien de l’homme est en la 
chair, et le mal en ce qui le détourne des plaisirs 
des sens, qu’il s’en soûle et qu’il y meure."
(p.1268; B.692)
This advocacy of the hatefulness of the self, as the proper channel for
moral effort and the source of true virtue, does not however represent any
reversal of the fundamentally egocentric character of Pascal’s ethics, for 
it is precisely in man’s own ultimate interest, as furthering his pursuit 
of happiness, to thus redress the balance upset by the enslavement of his 
impulses to concupiscence. Human nature, as the result of its corruption by 
the Fall, has become the seat of this concupiscence, which sets up as objects 
of pursuit what are really obstacles to be overcome if man is to attain his 
sovereign good.
contd. from p.230. as they tend to promote man’s progress toward his 
supreme ’end’, God, Pascal believes the individual is required, if he is to 
perform morally good actions and so ultimately achieve his own happiness, to 
act from the motive of conforming to the divine will. To treat God as his 
final end and as the source of all good involves for the individual the 
necessity of suTmitting his will to the will of God. Thus in the Pensées 
Pascal urges % "Changeons la règle que nous avons prise jusqu’ici pour juger 
de ce qui est bon. Nous en avons pour règle notre volonté, prenons maintenant 
la volonté de Dieu: tout ce qu’il veut nous est bon et juste,— " (p.l294;B.668) 
And in the fifth letter addressed to Mile, de Roannez, he writes: "II est 
temps de commencer à juger de ce qui est bon ou mauvais par la volonté de 
Dieu, qui ne peut être ni injuste ni aveugle, et non pas par la nôtre propre, 
qui est toujours pleine de malice et d’erreur." (p.511;G.E.VI, p.159) cf. also 
p.508;G.E. VI, p.84) Moreover, in a fragment from the Pensées, introduced
cont. p.232
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This is clear from the form in which concupiscence chiefly 
manifests itself - the stimulus of the flesh that induces man to seek 
pleasure for its own sake as the supreme goal, and a tendency on the part 
of the individual to treat himself as God, seeking the ultimate satisfaction 
of his desires in his own finite nature. To indulge either of these 
inclinations is, in Pascal’s terms, to be led astray from the true path to 
one’s final ’end*, and so to leave unfulfilled the supreme desire for 
happiness which controls even such false choices as these. That even his 
seemingly ascetic recommendations should in fact be prompted the conviction 
that only an infinite object can satisfy man with his unlimited desires, 
and that life should therefore be uniformly directed toward the fruition 
of this ultimate object of desire, strikingly attests the extent to which 
Pascal considers ’’morale’ should be geared to promoting man’s pursuit of 
happiness.
(vi) The ’end’ as the criterion of judgement.
In much of his adverse criticism of the modes of life and thought 
adopted by his contemporaries Pascal clearly uses as criterion of judgement 
his own belief that all the individual’s actions should be ultimately 
affiliated to the supreme goal of his desires, and that his whole life
cont. from p.231 under the rubric "Morale". where he develops the theory 
of the "membres pensants", and where the context makes it plain that the 
terms "âme universelle" and "âme entière" are used to denote God as the 
ultimate source of all derived existence, Pascal alleges that it is a pre­
condition of happiness for individual "membres" that they have bonne volonté 
pour consentir a celle de l’âme universelle", and that "leur beatitude, aussi 
bien que leur devoir, consistant à consentir à la conduite de l’âme entière 
à qui ils appartiennent, " (p.1305; B.482)
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should be ordered to the eternal felicity which the promise of his nature 
demands. The great danger, as it seems to Pascal, that confronts men in 
their present fallen condition is cryptically outlined in the following 
fragment;
"La vraie nature étant perdue, tout devient sa nature; 
comme le véritable bien étant perdu, tout devient son 
véritable bien." (p.1184; B.426)
This temptation for men to accept the actual state of their natire as
the true one, and, having lost sight of that which alone constitutes their
true good, to replace it with whatever finite object happens to come to
hand, must, if yielded to, result in the abandonment of all ’moral* effort,
Consequently in his judgements Pascal is concerned, not so much with the
various activities in themselves, which absorb men’s attention, as with
the attitude of mind behind them, and the factors that contribute to make
this what it is.
It is for this reason that he deplores the control exercised by
the ’imagination’ over the rest of man’s faculties.
"Je rapporterais presque toutes les actions des hommes
qui ne branlent presque que par ses secousses. Car la
raison a été obligée de céder, et la plus sage prend 
pour ses principes ceux que l’imagination des hommes a 
témérairement introduits en chaque lieu. —  Il faut, 
parce qu’il lui a plu, travailler tout le jour pour des 
biens reconnus pour imaginaires; et quand le sommeil hous 
a délassés des fatigues de notre raison, il faut incontinent 
se lever en sursaut pour aller courir après les fumées et 
essuyer les impressions de cette maîtresse du monde. - Voilà 
un des principes d’erreur, " (p.1117-8; B.82)
When Pascal labels the ’imagination’ here "un des principes d’erreur", he
refers, not to the fact that the deception it practises is intermittent.
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so that it cannot be accepted as a reliable guide to either truth or 
falsehood (p.1116; B.ibid), but to the way in which it positively leads 
men astray by deluding them as to the value of the ends they pursue. Its 
subjugation of our reasoning powers, together with the monopoly it holds 
of our springs of action, results in a general incapacity to perceive the 
vanity of the existence we lead. And the futile particulars ("des biens 
imaginaires"), which engross the attention while we are under its sway, 
must crowd out all thought of our supernatural destiny, and so finally 
blur our sense of the true character of the final goal.
For the same reason Pascal considers the influence which ’habit’ 
exerts in determining men to a particular line of conduct ’morally’ 
pernicious.
L^bl prévention induisant en erreur. - C ’est une chose 
déplorable de voir tous les hommes ne délibérer que des 
moyens, et point de la fin. Chacun songe comme il 
s’acquittera de sa condition; mais pour le choix de la 
condition, et de la patrie, le sort nous le donne. C’est 
une chose pitoyable, de voir tant de Turcs, d’hérétiques, 
d’infidèles, suivre le train de leurs pères, par cette 
seule raison qu’ils ont été prévenus chacun à chaque 
condition que c’est le meilleur." (p.1122; B.98)
Thus in the case of what Pascal regards as their most far-reaching decisions
men allow themselves to be moved by the circumstances which they are used
to, for it is traditional habit that guides them even in their belief as
to the possibility and character of the supernatural goal wherein alone
in his terms they can find true fulfilment. And the adjectives "déplorable"
and "pitoyable", used to describe the state things have come to when men
permit themselves to shut out of sight in this way the bearing of the
’end’ on all their choices, indicate plainly enough that it is Pascal’s
I
preoccupation with man’s otherwoijdly destiny which determines his judgement
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here.
However, that which he holds to be above all else responsible for 
inducing men to turn their back on the things which it should be their first 
concern to call before their minds if they are to direct themselves toward 
their end, is the dread of what they will find if they do so. It is to 
avoid this, Pascal believes, that men give themselves over to those 
pastimes which he classifies as "divertissement" in the Pensées. His 
own reaction to this sort of attitude is amply illustrated in the following 
fragment:
"Misère. - La seule chose qui nous console de nos misères 
est le divertissement, et cependant c’est la plus grande 
de nos misères. Car c’est cela qui nous empêche 
principalement de songer à nous. —  Sans cela, nous serions 
dans l’ennui, et cet ennui nous pousserait à chercher 
un moyen plus solide d’en sortir. Mais le divertissement nous 
amuse, et nous fait arriver insensiblement à la mort."
(p.ll47; B.171)
Pascal sees the real danger in allowing ourselves to dwell under the illusion 
that "divertissement" provides a genuinely effective means of alleviating 
our misery in the fact that, while rendering us temporarily happy, it also 
prevents us from being compelled by the very consciousness of this misery 
to take steps to arrive at a permanent solution. "Divertissement" lulls 
us into insensibility, so that all incentive is lost to take thought as 
to the sort of conduct which is compatible with the attainment of the goal 
postulated by the desires inherent in our very nature. Once again therefore 
it is Pascal’s concern to urge men to regulate their conduct in accordance 
with their own ultimate good and final end which lies at the root of this 
searing critique of "divertissement".
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(vil) The question of immortality subordinated to the "end"
Pascal’s conception of "morale", as primarily concerned to
emphasize the urgency for men to find out what course of action is best
adjusted for them, in the sense of conducing to their own complete and
conclusive happiness, comes out very plainly when he undertakes to censure
those whom he pictures as priding themselves on having'shaken off the yoke’,
and now displaying the utmost indifference to the truth or otherwise of
the Christian doctrines relating to their own destiny. In his view their •
(l )behaviour in this respect is not merely irrational and irresponsible,
(2)but is totally lacking in regard for their own interests also. The
argument which he repeatedly advances to convict this sort of conduct
of extravagance runs as follows ;
"— il est indubitable que le temps de cette vie n’est qu’un 
instant, que l’état de la mort est éternel, de quelque 
nature qu’il puisse être, et qu’ainsi toutes nos actions 
et nos pensées doivent prendre des routes si différentes 
selon l’état de cette éternité, qu’il est impossible de 
faire une démarche avec sens et jugement qu’en la réglant 
par la vue de ce point qui doit être notre dernier objet.
—  Que l’on juge donc là-dessus de ceux qui vivent sans 
songer à cette dernière fin de la vie,— ’’ (p. 1171; B.195)
(1) Pascal even goes so far as to condemn this nonchalant attitude as 
unnatural. Thus he maintains that; "De tous leurs égarements, c’est sans 
doute celui qui les convainc le plus de folie et d’aveuglement, et dans 
lequel il est le plus facile de les confondre par les premières vues du 
sens commun et par les sentiments de la nature." (p.1171;B.195) cf. also 
p.1176; B.194)
(2)cf. "— cette négligence n’est pas supportable. Il ne s’agit pas ici de 
1’intérêt léger de quelque personne étrangère, —  il s’agit de nous-même, et 
de notre tout." (p.ll73jB.194) "Cette négligence en une affaire oh il 
s’agit d’eux-mêmes, de leur éternité, de leur tout, m'irrite plus qu’elle
ne m'attendrit; —  Je ne dis pas ceci par le zèle pieux d'une dévotion 
spirituelle. J’entends au contraire qu’on doit avoir ce sentiment par un 
principe d ’ intérêt humain et par un intérêt d ' amour-propre : il ne faut pas 
pour cela que voir ce que voient les personnes les moins éclairées.’’ (p. 1174;
B.ibid.)
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The two adverbs., "ainsi" and "selon", in the context of this passage, 
attest the extent to which Pascal considers the whole management and 
direction of human life depends upon the question whether or not there 
is a future state of human existence offering good or evil for the individualP-) 
These alternatives represent two fundamentally different views of the 
nature of things, which, so far as he consistently attends to them (and 
Pascal is insistent that it is impossible to act reasonably without doing 
80^^ )), must affect the whole of a man’s conduct, and make it quite 
different in the one case from what it would be in the other. And Pascal’s I
practice of suspending obligation from what men’s natural desires show to j
be their ultimate ’end’, leads to the concurrence in this instance of the
’moral’ imperative, which directs the taking of means to this ’end’, and
rightly conceived self-interest. Having emphasized the supreme significance
of the question he concludes: I
"Ainsi notre premier intérêt et notre premier devoir est 
de nous éclaircir sur ce sujet, d’oû dépend toute notre 
conduite." (p.11735B.ibid)
!' ’
Now although the term "dernière fin" is used in the above context p
in reference to the temporal end of human existence, rather than to its 
purposive goal, yet the fact that the attainment of the latter is put only
(1) Another passage very similar to the foregoing makes this even more 
explicit. ”L’immortalité de l’âme est une chose qui nous importe si fort. —  
Toutes nos actions et nos pensées doivent prendre des routes si différentes 
selon qu’il y aura des biens éternels à espérer ou non, qu’il est impossible 
de faire une démarche avec sens— " (p.1173; B.194)
(2) Thus the paragraph that follows on directly after "dernier objet" runs:
"II n’y a rien de plus visible qua cela et qu’ainsi, selon les principes de 
la raison, la conduite des hommes est tout à fait déraisonnable, s’ils ne 
prennent une autre voie." (p.1171; B.195)
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in a future state explains why the question of immortality is made to loom
so large in affecting the whole cast of a man’s conduct and the whole
course of his life. For, if the present life is all that the individual
has to look forward to, then his nature, as Pascal depicts it in the Pensées.
is doomed to miss its mark, and the goal postulated by his infinite desire
after happiness is but an illusion. Such is the force of one of the
alternative arguments used by Pascal to prove the overriding importance
of the question;
"11 est sans doute qu’il n’y a point de bien sans la 
connaissance de Dieu, qu’à mesure qu’on en approche 
on est heureux, et que le dernier bonheur est de le 
connaître avec certitude, qu’à mesure qu’on s'en 
éloigne on est malheureux, et que le dernier malheur 
serait la certitude du contraire."(l) (p.1174 (a);B.194,n.)
It is plain therefore that it is because it bears so unquestionably on
the possibility of men attaining the ultimate good wherein their desire
for happiness will find completion that the problem of immortality is one
which Pascal considers should be debated by every human individual.
And it is for this reason also that he is so emphatic that
"morale" is not and cannot be independent of opinions on this question;
"II est indubitable que, que l’âme soit mortelle ou 
immortelle, cela doit mettre une différence entière 
dans la morale. Et cependant les philosophes ont 
conduit leur morale indépendamment de cela;— "(2)
(p.1181; B.219)
As the preceding discussion shows, Pascal does not mean by this merely that
(1) The first sentence of an earlier variant from the long fragment 
entirely devoted to the problem of immortality.
(2) Pascal in fact maintains that the failure to take this question into 
account suffices to disqualify anyone from the title of ’philosopher’; 
"Fausseté des philosophes qui ne discutaient pas l’immortalité de l’âme."
(p.1181; B.220)
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an individual convinced of his own immortality will attach an 
immeasurably greater importance to the distinction between right and 
wrong, than one who simply calculates the effects of right and wrong 
actions on the supposition that this present world is the whole of life.
The"difference entière", to which he refers, goes deeper and relates to 
the question. What is right action? For on his view, since the rightness 
of any act depends on its relation to man’s ’end’, the business of "morale" 
is to discern the acts necessary to the attainment of that final ’end’, 
and to order them while forbidding their contraries. Thus the question 
of immortality bears upon "morale" in so far as it is decisive in regard 
to the possibility of the individual attaining his ’end*. In order to 
validly object to Pascal here that it does not make any practical difference 
to ethics whether there is, or is not, a future life, that right and wrong 
are quite independent of this hypothesis either way, it would be necessary 
to refute his method of deriving the ’moral’ imperative from the final 
’ end’
The egoistic twist which Pascal gives to the scholastic teleo- 
logical morals is most readily apparent in regard to this question of 
immortality. Not that the idea of a future life is any less integral to 
the Thomist ethical system; that final fruition of the divine aspect, which 
Aquinas considers to be alone capable of satisfying the demand of human 
nature for ultimate blessedness, and which he sets up as the ’end’ to 
which the will should be directed and all action ordered, is impossible 
to any man in this life. Aquinas was too convinced a follower of Aristotle
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on questions of knowledge ever to believe that human nature has in itself 
any power of apprehending immaterial things in a direct fashion. The mind 
receives all the material on which it works through the gates of the bodily 
senses, so that even by abstraction knowledge can never be freed entirely 
from sense images. Hence the possibility of anticipating the unimpeded 
"visio Dei" while we are yet in the body is definitely excluded. let, since 
these limitations with respect to beatific vision are inherent in the 
conditions of earthly life, they point to a future state when God will 
confer on man powers that lie above and outside his own n a t u r e . A n d  since 
the final ’end*, relation to which determines the moral quality of all acts, 
is synonymous with man’s supreme good wherein alone he can find full and 
conclusive blessedness, Aquinas is able to dispense with any system of 
external rewards and punishments. Human actions carry their own sanctions 
built in as it were, for on this view right acts must of necessity lead to 
ultimate blessedness whereas their contraries must tend by effect toward the 
eternal privation of the good.
However, the question of a future life is not proposed by Aquinas 
with the almost lurid emphasis of Pascal on the element of self-interest 
involved, nor does he attempt to bring out its relevance for ethics, as he 
conceives of them, by dwelling on the e^daemonism implicit in his theory of
(1) cf. the extracts quoted by Wicksteed, op. cit. Excursus ii.
(2) P. Sertillanges describes the way in which the ’ultimate' sanctions 
project into the present in the following terms: "En ce monde —  nous ne 
sommes pas moins reliés à 1’éternel par chacun de nos états. Tel de ceux-ci 
vaut pour notre abontissement; tel autre pour notre perte; —  Notre sort se 
joue a chaque determination que nous prenons en face de l’absolu qui nous 
juge. Nous-mêmes, en disant oui ou non au bien, qui est la condition du 
bonheur, nous pronon(^ ons notre jugement." op.cit., p.579.
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the good. Unlike Pascal he does not set out to bring the individual to 
his senses, as it were, by confronting him with a choice between the 
alternatives of eternal happiness on the one hand and eternal misery 
on the other.
(l) Nicole adopts much the same approach as Pascal to the whole question 
of the bearing of a future life upon the individual's conduct: "..ce qu'il 
y a de plus étonnant et qui fait connoître mieux que toutes choses l'excès 
de l'aveuglement des hommes c'est la légèreté prodigieuse avec laquelle 
ils embrassent les plus importantes maximes de leur conduite, ...Il s'agit 
de leur tout, puisqu'il s'agit pour eux d’une éternité de bonheur ou de 
malheur. Chaque pas qui les avance vers la mort, les approche de l’une ou 
de l'autre de ces deux éternités. Ne semble-t-il donc pas que leur 
principal soin et leur principale application devrait être de s'instruire 
des règles véritables.qu'ils doivent suivre dans la conduite de toute leur 
vie, et de tâcher de les discerner de ce nombre innombrable de fausses 
règles quj^ sont suivies par ceux qui s'éloignent de la vérité." Discours sur 
la nécessité de ne se pas conduire au hasard et m r  les règles de fantaisie. 
Essais. II. p.10. (cf. ibid.. p.2-3) "La vie présente par laquelle l'homme 
doit passer, ne lui est donnée que pour faire choix de l’un ou de l'autre 
de ces deux états (Paradis et Enfer); et ce choix doit être l'unique 
exercice de sa vie. Car il ne se fait pas par une seule action. Elles y 
contribuent toutes, et servent toutes à l'avancer vers l'un ou vers l'autre." 
De la mort. Essais. IV, p.180.
S E C T I O N  T H R E E




Chapter one; Social and political values.
1. Natural law #
(i) Positive attitude to natural law
(a) Natural law as the basis of all law.
In the opening paragraph of the fourteenth Provinciale Pascal
reproaches his Jesuit opponents on the following highly significant counts :
"...vous êtes éloignés des sentiments de l'Eglise, et 
même de la nature. ... vous avez tellement oublié la 
loi de Dieu, et tellement éteint les lumières naturelles, 
que vous avez besoin qu'on vous remette dans les principes 
les plus simples de la religion et du sens commun; car 
qu'y a-t-il de plus naturel que ce sentiment: 'Qu'un
particulier n'a pas droit sur la vie d'un autre?' "
(p.8l9; G.E.VI, p.1301)
Similarly in a fragment from the Pensées he notes :
"C'est une plaisante chose à considérer, de ce qu'il y a 
des gens dans le monde qui, ayant renoncé à toutes les 
lois de Dieu et de la nature, s'en sont fait eux-mêmes 
auxquelles ils obéissent exactement, ... Il semble que 
leur licence doive être sans aucunes bornes ni barrières, 
voyant qu'ils en ont franchi tant de si justes et de si 
saintes." (p.ll6l; B.393)
In these two passages Pascal does not merely recognize the authority of
natural law, thus assigning it considerable positive value, but even goes
so far as to assimilate it to the law of divine origin. Moreover, if the
pair of epithets at the end of the second extract are appropriately coupled
with the substantives occurring earlier, to which they refer back via
"bornes" and "barrières", the natural law can claim at least to be
acknowledged as .iust.
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However, perhaps even more significant in this respect than 
Pascal's express assertions, are the implications of the position he adopts 
in the fourteenth Provinciale. The passage from Saint Chrysostom, the 
source of the maxim that no private individual has any right over another's 
life, continues as quoted with the reflection that, since this is a common 
law natural to all humanity, God did not consider it necessary, when 
enunciating the commandment not to kill, to add as a reason that homicide 
is evil. And this, according to Chrysostom, because:
" * la loi suppose qu'on a déjà appris cette vérité de
la nature.' "
Pascal then goes on to affirm that this commandment has been binding on 
men at all times; the Gospel confirmed the precept set down in the 'law*, 
and the Decalogue itself merely renewed the command which man had received 
from God in the person of Noah, from whom all men are descended. In this 
'historical' approach he follows closely the traditional scholastic theory, 
according to which natural law forms a fundamental part of the law vrtiich 
God made known to Israel through Moses, and then reaffirmed in Christ. On 
this view, as elaborated by Thomas Aquinas, natural law is the law which, 
in the Biblical scheme, God implanted in the mind of Adam, and therefore of 
man as man. But because the capacity for discerning this law was weakened 
by the Fall, God again revealed its precepts to men first through Noah, 
and then, more fully, through Moses.
The endorsement of the corollary of this traditional conception of 
natural law, that man even in his fallen state can recognize it as the norm 
of reason, is definitely implied in the claim that, in regard to the dictate
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forbidding the taking of human life:
" * Nous en sommes tellement instruits de nous-mêmes,... * "
(p.819; G.E.VI, p.131)
A little further on in the letter Pascal outlines the procedure whereby
God, whose sole prerogative it is to deprive any human individual of his
life, has deputed the temporal powers to be the instruments of his supreme
justice where capital offences are concerned. Having pointed out that in
order to avoid committing sin in the exercise of this delegated power it is
necessary in the case of capital offences to act both by the authority and
according to the justice of God, he adds:
"Voilà, .... les principes du repos et de la sûreté 
publique qui ont été reçus dans tous les temps et dans 
tous les lieux, et sur lesquels tous législateurs du 
monde, saints et profanes, ont établi leurs lois, sans 
que jamais les païens mêmes aient apporté d'exception 
à cette règle, ..." (p.821; G.E.VI, p.135)
In claiming universality for these 'principles', which are alleged to
constitute the groundwork of all existing legal codes, Pascal is in fact
reaffirming the classical conception of natural law as a universal standard
of conduct morally binding on all men, and discernible by the light of
reason.
In view of the relation in which natural law stands to the 
Decalogue, the divine positive law whose function is to disclose the purpose 
and content of the former, two extracts from the Pensées take on a 
particular significance in this respect. While undertaking what purports 
to be an examination of the claims of the Jewish people to be chosen of 
God, Pascal comments as follows on the precepts laid down in the Pentateuch:
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"Je considère cette loi qu'ils se vantent de tenir de 
Dieu, et je la trouve admirable. C'est la première loi 
de toutes, ...je trouve étrange que la première loi du 
monde se rencontre aussi la plus parfaite, en sorte que 
les plus grands législateurs en ont emprunté les leurs, 
comme il paraît par la loi des Douze Tables d'Athènes, 
qui fut ensuite prise par les Romains, ..." (p.119$;B.619)
il est aisé de juger de la perfection de cette loi 
par la simple lecture, oû l'on voit qu'on a pourvu à
toutes choses avec tant de sagesse, tant d'équité, tant
de jugement, que les plus anciens législateurs grecs et 
romains, en ayant eu quelque lumière, en ont emprunté
leurs principales lois; ..." (p.1196; B.620)
The historical accuracy of this account is, to say the least, questionable.
However, the important point is that, as a result of the borrowings made by
the jurists from the Decalogue, of which natural law forms a basic part,
the positive law of Greece and Rome must in Pascal's terms be regarded as
founded on and subordinate to the principles of natural law. Here again
therefore he adopts the traditional view, of natural law made operative by
being translated into positive law, which simply applies the fundamental
principles in detail according to concrete social and historical
circumstances.
Considering this largely traditional approach, and particularly 
since his ethics are decidedly teleological in character, it is rather 
curious that Pascal does not follow the Thomist line further to maintain 
that natural law is binding on all men because it corresponds to the true
nature of man, in the sense that it delineates in some measure the pattern
of activity whereby his true 'end* will be attained. Thomas Aquinas defines 
as the 'eternal law' the divine wisdom directing and guiding the whole
I.
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universe of created things to their proper act and due 'end'i^^ 'Natural 
law* he regards as the 'participation* of the 'eternal law' in a rational
(2)
creature# It is the rational creature's own knowledge of his purpose as 
manifested in his nature and in the exigencies of his nature, and of the way 
in which that 'end' of his nature is to be attained by the means at its 
disposal. Thus Aquinas believes that man's reason, in response to his own 
fundamental tendencies and needs, promulgates the natural law, the body of 
precepts setting out the good to be pursued and the evil to be eschewed, 
which human nature imposes on all mankind. Positive law should ideally 
be derived from this natural law, and any laws enacted which run counter 
to its dictates not only forfeit the title of 'law', but cannot claim to
(3)be regarded as binding in conscience.
Now although Pascal follows Aquinas in holding that man's 
'end*, to which the desires inherent in his nature act as the pointers, 
should determine his rule of action, he nowhere attempts to develop this 
into a system of natural law, upon the principles of which all positive law 
should be grounded. Such a divergence on his part from the traditional 
conception appears the more striking in view of the approach adopted 
in this respect by his friend, and fellow Port-Royalist, the jurisconsult 
Domat. Like Pascal Domat maintains that it is man's 'end' which should 
rightly determine his conduct; indeed in his opinion conduct can be defined 
as "les demarches de l'homme vers sa fin". And because laws are no more 
than the 'rule^ of human conduct, it follows that:
(1) S.T., la II ae, q.93, art.l~
(2) S.T., la II ae, q.91, art.2.cf.A.-D. Sertillanges; La philosophie morale 
de Saint Thomas d'Aouin. p.139 f.f.
(3) S.T., la II ae, q.96, art.4#
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la destination de l'homme à sa fin sera la première 
règle de la voie et des démarches qui l'y conduisent, et 
par conséquent sa première loi et le fondement de toutes 
les autres." (i,3)
A summary analysis of human nature, of its needs and aspirations, suffices to
reveal that God alone is capable of constituting man's 'end' and his
'summum bonum', synonymous terms for Domat as for Pascal. Whence it
results that the primary law, which directs man to the pursuit of his 'end'
and sovereign good, also forms "1'esprit de la religion". But Domat is
insistent that the universal character of these principles of the laws
governing both individual conduct and the civil order is such that even
those uninstructed in the religion where they are to be learned should;
"... au moins les reconnaître en eux-mêmes, puisqu'ils 
sont gravés dans le fond de notre nature. ...on jugera 
du caractère de la^  certitude de ces principes par la
double impression que doivent faire sur notre esprit
des vérités que Dieu nous enseigne par la religion, et 
qu'il nous fait sentir par notre raison; ... les premiers
principes des lois, et le détail des règles essentielles à
ces principes, ont un caractère de vérité dont personne n' 
eât incapable, et qui touche également l'esprit ét le 
coeur." (i;2)
Revealed precepts and natural law therefore proceed from the same source, 
so that Domat would agree with Thomas Aquinas in seeing a certain conformity
between the teleology of man's nature and the divine commandments. And
this conception of the relation between natural law and the divine command­
ments obviously precludes Domat from endorsing Grotius's classic affirmation
(l) i,6. (All references to Domat's writings, unless otherwise stated, are to 
the Traité des lois, contained in the first volume of his Oeuvres complètes. 
Paris 1835) "C est cette première loi qui est le fondement et le premier 
principe de toutes les autres; car cette loi qui commande à l'homme la 
recherche et l'amour du souverain-bien, étant commune à tous les hommes, elle 
en renferme une seconde qui les oblige à s'unir et s'aimer entre eux;..." 
(i,7) cf. below p.
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that the principles of natural law would retain their validity even "if 
we were to grant, what we cannot grant without wickedness, that there is 
no God, or that he bestows no regard on human affairs."
It is from the basic principle, common to all men and discernible 
by the light of natural reason, that man should regulate his acts in accord­
ance with his 'end* and chief good, that Domat claims, not merely that all 
law should be, but as an empirical fact that all laws have been derived.
Thus his treatise is taken up with demonstrating how this applies in the 
case of the whole body of the civil law of his own country. The passages 
from Pascal's writings however, Where he has been shown to accord definite 
value to natural law, implying furthermore that it achieves recognition and 
actualization through positive law, contain no hint that the natural law 
there in question is simply an expansion of the principle that men's actions 
should be ordered to the attainment of their 'end*.
(%) De iure belli ac pacis. Prolegomena xi. Translation by W.Whewell, 
Cambridge, 1853.
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(b) Natural law of equality of status and ownership
In the Trois discours sur la condition des grands Pascal endorses
the great Stoic principle, which passed into the Christian tradition through
the Fathers, of the equality and natural liberty of all men.^^^ In the
course of the first "discours", while instructing his aristocratic pupil
in the truanature of his rank and of the privileges which attach to it, he
states quite unequivocally that:
"Votre âme et votre corps sont d'eux-mêmes indifférents
à l'état de batelier ou à celui de duc; et il n'y a nul
lien naturel qui les attache à une condition plutôt qu'à
une autre. ... vous n'avez rien naturellement au-dessus
du commun des hommes ... une parfaite égalité avec tous
les hommes; ... c'est votre état naturel."'^)(p.6l7;G.E.IX,p.367)
Thus differences of worldly dignity and wealth are not to be mistaken for
real differences in nature, for in nature all men are equal persons, and
know no form of lordship. Pascal underlines this judgement in the second
"discours" when he distinguishes sharply between two different sorts of
"grandeurs". "Grandeurs d'établissement" are of purely human institution,
and depend entirely on the will of men, who have seen fit, with reason
however, to honour certain estates and to accord corresponding respects:
"Les dignités et la noblesse sont de ce genre. En un 
pays on honore les nobles, en l'autre les roturiers;
... Pourquoi cela? Parce qu'il a plu aux hommes.
(1) cf. 0.Gierke: Political Theories of the Middle Age (Cambridge, 1900), p.38, 
and notes 16 and 137.
(2) Nicole alleges in a rather similar vein that:" Etre de naissance et de 
qualité selon les hommes, c'est être né de personnes considérables dans
l'ordre du monde. Mais cette naissance ne donne par elle-même aucun
avantage ni d'esprit, ni de corps ;....Il n'y a donc aucune raison solide 
qui rende les personnes de qualité plus estimables par là, que ceux qui ne 
le sont pas." Essais.II.p. 80 cf. also Traité de 1'éducation d'un prince, 
ibid, II, p. 259.
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La chose était indifférente avant 1'établissement:.."
(p.618; G.E.IX,p.369)
"Grandeurs naturelles" on the other hand occur irrespective of rank, and
are also independent of the "fantaisie des hommes", because they comprise
real and effectual physical and mental attributes.
Although Pascal does not conceive of a system of basic human 
rights, grounded in the truth about human nature, issuing from and corresp­
onding to this principle of natural equality, he nonetheless does not limit 
it to status alone. It applies to property as well, which is just as much a 
fiction from the 'nature* standpoint as dominion. Under the law of nature 
not only liberty and equality prevailed among men, but community of goods 
also. Pascal assures the young nobleman:
"Vous n'avez aucun droit de vous-même et par votre nature 
aux richesses dont vous vous trouvez maître, ... Vous tenez, 
dites-vous, vos richesses de vos ancêtres;... Vous imaginez- 
vous aussi que ce soit par quelque loi naturelle que ces biens 
ont passé de vos ancêtres à vous? Cela n'est pas véritable.
Cet ordre n'est fondé que sur la seule volonté des législateurs 
qui ont pu avoir de bonnes raisons, mais dont aucune n'est 
prise d'un droit naturel que vous ayez sur ces choses. S'il 
leur avait plu d'ordonner que ces biens, après avoir été 
possédés par les pères durant leur vie, retourneraient à la 
république après leur mort, vous n'auriez aucun sujet de vous 
en plaindre. Ainsi tout le titre par lequel vous possédez 
votre bien n'est pas un titre de nature, mais d'un établissement 
humain." (p.6l6;G.E.IX, p.366)
(1) In the Pensées the element of 'force' is also ascribed some part in this
process: "Comme les duchés et royautés et magistratures sont réelles et
nécessaires à cause de ce que la force règle tout, il y en a partout et
toujours.Mais parce que ce n'est que fantaisie qui fait qu'un tel ou tel le
soit, cela n'est pas constant, cela est sujet à varier, etc." (p.ll62;B.306)
(2) cf. also from the Pensées: "Faiblesse. - Toutes les occupations des
hommes sont à avoir du bien; et ils ne sauraient avoir de titre pour montrer 
qu'ils le possèdent par justice, car ils n'ont que la fantaisie des hommes,.." 
(p.ll37; B.436)
252
M. Jacques Denis in his commentary on this passage takes Pascal to task over 
the denial it implies of the existence of any natural law of entail: "II y
a ici un sophisme ou une idée mal démêlée. Sans doute que le droit naturel 
ne dit pas que tel ou tel individu ... ait droit sur telle ou telle choses 
mais cela empeche-t—il que le droit naturel ne dise que les biens acquis 
par les pères doivent passer à leurs enfants?" It appears to have
escaped M. Denis's notice that it is precisely this last point which Pascal 
is concerned to refute, when he maintains that rights of ownership are in 
every case the creature of positive law, by showing that, had the legislature 
so determined, property would revert to the state on the death of the holder 
instead of, as actually happens in this particular instance, passing to 
his heirs. Pascal clearly believes that something else, common ownership, 
is natural, as against legal division which is conventional.
Mile. Demahis similarly goes astray when she alleges that: "pour 
Pascal la propriété existe avant la loi: la loi ne fait que consolider un 
état préexistant," and daims that in this way Pascal gets round the 
'danger* inherent in a theory of property like that of Montesquieu or 
Bentham, that: "si la loi a fait la propriété elle peut de même la défaire 
quand bon lui semble; #* .''(<2) y et the passage cited above shows unmistakably 
that it is against this sense of property as of absolute dominion, which has 
dominated modern Europe through the Roman Civil Law, that Pascal sets himself 
in these Discours. Not merely does he expressly affirm that ownership is 
the creature of law, thus implying the power of revising it, but he even
(1) J.F. Denis: Vues politiques et sociales de Pascal. Mémoires de l'Académie 
nationale des sciences, arts, et belles-lettres de Gaen. 1893^P*211, n.l.
(2) E. Demahis: La pensée politique de Pascal (Saint-Amand,1931)» p.261-2
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envisages exactly the state of things which Mile. Demahis looks upon as the 
'dangerous'aspect of other theories.
Neither of these commentators, and in particular M. Denis, seems
to have recognized that Pascal here harks back to the general opinion of
the Fathers, and following them of the canonists, that the very existence
of lordship and ownership constitutes a breach of the law of n a t u r e , s o
that the conception of a natural law regulating succession to property
would be to him a contradiction in terms. He does however go on to say
that despite the breach they entail in the natural order of things, God
has sanctioned the laws which determine the right of succession to property;
"Je ne veux pas dire que vos biens ne vous appartiennent 
pas légitimement, et qu'il soit permis à un autre de vous 
les ravoir; car Dieu, qui en est le maître, a permis aux 
sociétés de faire des lois pour les partager; et quand ces 
lois sont une fois établies, il est injuste de les violer."
(p.6l6-7; G.E.IX, p.366-7)
(1) cf. A.J. Carlyle; Medieval Political Theory in the West. (Edinburgh,
1903 ), vol.II, ii,6. Pascal could well have found the notion in embryo 
at least in Saint Augustinus The City of God, especially bk. XIX, ch. 15.
(2) Pascal's views on the questions of lordship and property thus bear a 
striking resemblance to those of Wycliffe, who also stressed the difference 
between 'natural' dominion, according to which all men have everything in 
common - the corollary in his opinion of the Scriptural conception that all 
should be lords and all servants one of another - and the much inferior
'civil' dominion, the consequence of the Fall, which, like Pascal's 
"grandeurs d'établissement", should not pretend to any essential character, 
and which will, like them, be liable to modification according to different 
national traditions. Yet Wycliffe also held that this 'civil* dominion has 
divine sanction, so that the violent assertion of natural rights with respect 
to property was as far from his mind as it was from Pascal's, cf. R.L. Poole; 
Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning (London, 1920),
p.258-261.
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(ii) Negative attitude to natural lav.
In contrast to these contexts, where a definitely positive attitude
to natural law is implied, must be set the passages from the Pensées where
Pascal is concerned, not so much to deny the value of natural law, as simply
to point out that it plays no part in moulding the civil law operative in
various states. In the long fragment devoted to displaying the wholly
relative character of 'justice* on the human plane he alleges that;
"Ils confessent que la justice n'est pas dans ces coutumes, 
mais qu'elle réside dans les lois naturelles, communes en 
tout pays. Certainement ils le soutiendraient opiniâtrement, 
si la témérité du hasard qui a semé les lois humaines en 
avait rencontré au moins une qui fut universelle; mais la 
plaisanterie est telle, que le caprice des hommes s'est si 
bien diversifié, qu'il n'y en a point. .... Il y a sans
doute des lois naturelles; mais cette belle raison corrompue
a tout corrompu; ...." (p.ll50;B.294)
Thus on the empirical level the concept of law does not extend beyond the
mere practice of mankind; and in this sense Pascal would deny the existence
of any objective order of justice independent of and anterior to all positive
law, of which the principles of natural law are a determination and a putting
into concrete terms.
A further fragment sets forth the significant judgement that;
"Les seules règles universelles sont les lois du pays aux 
choses ordinaires, et la pluralité aux autres." (p.ll52;B.299)
The effect of this claim, that 'universal laws' are no more than the
enactments of a competent legislative authority or a majority opinion,
regardless of the material content, is to deprive the idea of law of its
universal and immutable character and to turn it into something purely formal,
f
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The reason advanced for adopting such a sceptical view is simply that 
natural law is by definition universal, and that since an empirical survey 
can bring to light no law which is actually recognized as binding by all 
men, therefore, as a plain matter of fact, there are no natural laws in 
force. Pascal takes up his stand behind this unanswerable objection, that 
it is impossible to cite any law which would fulfil the test 'quod semper 
quod ubique quod ab omnibus *•
Domat on the contrary believes that even in his present sinful 
condition natural law can still be referred to the play of the natural light 
of man's reason, which has remained unimpaired after the Fall as his 
infallible guide to the natural rules of e q u i t y . H e  maintains that 
certain common duties are universally apprehended in varying degrees as 
binding, even if, in the present state of man's nature under the domination 
of "amour-propre", they are not always observed. Indeed he even goes so 
far as to assert that reason is nothing other than the awareness and 
application of these laws, without which no society could be maintained.
(1) . cette lumière restée à l'homme après sa chute, qui lui fait
connaître les règles naturelles de l'équité..." (ix 14)
(2) The natural awareness of the principles of equity, which remains to man 
after the Fall, is the subject of the following passage; "G'est cette 
lumière de la raison qui, faisant sentir à tous les hommes les règles 
communes de la justice et de l'équité, leur tient lieu d'une loi qui est 
restée dans tous les esprits, au milieu des ténèbres que 1'amour-propre y
a répandues; ainsi, tous les hommes ont dans l'esprit les impressions de 
la vérité et de l'autorité de ces lois naturelles, 'qu'il ne faut faire tort 
à personne; qu’il faut rendre à chacun ce qui lui appartient; qu'il faut 
être sincère dans les engagemens, fidèle à exécuter ses promesses', et des 
autres règles semblables de la justice et de l'équité; car la connaissance 
de ces règles est inséparable de la raison, ou plutôt la raison n'est elle- 
même que la vue et l'usage de toutes ces règles.
Et quoique cette lumière de la raison, qui donne la vue de ces vérités 
à ceux qui en ignorent les premiers principes, ne règne pas en chacun de 
telle sorte qu'il en fasse la règle de sa conduite, elle règne en tous de
cont. p.256
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Pascal's aphorism; "II y a sans doute des lois naturelles; mais 
cette belle raison corrompue a tout corrompu", indicates how far he differs 
from Domat in his conception of the function and value of reason in this 
respect. M. Funck-Brentano, commenting on Domat*s usage of the term "raison", 
notes; "La raison n'est done pas pour Domat une entité abstraite qui 
impose ses vérités à la pensée humaine, mais elle est simplement la vue et 
l'usage des lois naturelles; et sous cette forme elle n'a rien pu corrompre, 
comme le veut Pascal, mais, étant incomplète par elle-même, dépendante de 
son développement, elle ne peut interpréter et appliquer les lois naturelles 
que dans la mesure ou elle les connaît." As an interpretation of Domat's
idea of reason this is rather tendentious, but it does serve to bring out 
the fundamental contrast. Domat's "raison" cannot exercise a corrupting 
influence on natural law just because it is neither more nor less than the 
expression of that law. Doubtless it could itself have become corrupted, 
but he is emphatic that its soundness has survived the Fall unimpaired.
Pascal's statement on the other hand shows that he regards the apprehension 
of natural law as taking place prior to the mental activity of "raison", and 
as therefore presumably belonging to the class of intuitive first principles 
registered lay the "coeur" or "instinct". In this case it would be quite 
possible for a corrupt "raison", in the sense of the discursive faculty, to
(continued from p.255) telle manière, que les plus injustes aiment assez 
la justice pour condamner 1'injustice des autres et pour la haïr,... ce qui 
fait sentir que Dieu a gravé dans tous les esprits cette espèce de connaissance 
et d'amour de la justice, sans quoi la société ne pouvait durer; et c'est par 
cette connaissance des lois naturelles, que les nations mêmes qui ont ignoré 
la religion ont fait subsister leur société." (ix, $)
(l) Th.Funck-Brentano; Le droit naturel au XVIle siècle. Revue d'histoire 
diplomatique^ p.498-9.
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contaminate natural law. And that Pascal does indeed believe "raison" has
been permanently vitiated in all men as the result of the Fall is evident
from the justification he approves, in the short Comparaison des chrétiens.
for lowering the bs.ptismal age of children:
"L'Eglise prévient l’usage de la raison, pour prévenir les 
vices ou la raison corrompue entraînerait les enfants;.."
(p.557; G.E.X, p.557)
Now when Domat affirms that: "... la raison ... ne nous est donnée
que pour sentir la justice et la vérité..." (xi, 20) "... cette lumière de
la raison qui, faisant sentir à tous les hommes les règles communes de la
justice..." (ix, 5) "...des vérités que Dieu...nous fait sentir par notre
raison.." (i,2), it is plain that he believes the activity of ’reason’
extends to that domain from which it is Pascal’s predominant concern to
exclude it. Despite the inconsistencies that mark his terminology where
questions of knowledge and perception are concerned, such a correlation of
"raison" and "sentiment" would in Pascal’s terms amount to the grossest of
confusions. He differentiates clearly between the faculties responsible
for "sentiment", which in his vocabulary denotes direct awareness or vision,
not merely of an idea as in the case of the Cartesian intuitive reason, but
of the actual object of perception, and for "raison", which is strictly
limited in meaning to the discursive reasoning-power, the source of all
(2)mediate knowledge. Domat on the other hand recognizes no such distinction, 
but comprehends under the single heading "raison" both the perception of
(1) cf. the fragment from the Pensées, particularly significant in this regard 
"La corruption de la raison paraît par tant de différentes et extravagantes 
moeurs." (p.1202; B.440)
(2) cf. above, p.SSff.
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natural laws and the sort of deductive reasoning necessary to derive a 
code of civil law from them as principles.
Since Pascal concedes that natural laws do exist, although 
nowhere are they to be found in operation as the result of the activity of 
"raison”, and especially in view of the maxims he quotes in support of his 
assertion to this effects " ’Nihil amplius nostrum est; quod nostrum 
dicimus artis est. Ex senatus consultis et plebiscitis crimina exercentur.
Ut olim vitiis, sic nunc legibus laboramus* ", it is legitimate to conclude 
that he believes they have been overlaid and obscured by positive law, the 
product of "raison".
The hypothesis that Pascal in his survey confuses natural and 
positive laws - a possibility envisaged by Domat,whose theory allows
(2)for variation in the latter according to time and place - does not hold 
water, for several of the laws which he cites as indifferently observed or
(1) cf. xi, 23.
(2) Domat distinguishes as follows between ’immutable’ (natural) and 
’arbitrary’ (positive) laws: "Les lois immuables s’appellent ainsi, parce
qu’elles sont naturelles et tellement justes toujours et partout, qu’aucune 
autorité ne peut ni les changer, ni les abolir; et les lois arbitraires sont 
celles qu’une autorité légitime peut établir, changer et abolir, selon le 
besoin. Ces lois immuables ou naturelles sont toutes celles qui sont des 
suites nécessaires des deux premières, et qui sont tellement essentielles aux 
engagemens qui forment l’ordre de la société, qu’on ne saurait les changer 
sans ruiner les fondemens de cet ordre; et les lois arbitraires sont celles 
qui peuvent être différemment établies, changées, et même abolies, sans 
violer l’esprit des premières lois, et sans blesser les principes de l’ordre 
de la société." (xi, l) And it is while comparing the different quality of 
justice which these two sorts of law embody that Domat shows why positive 
law will vary according to time and places "La justice universelle de toutes 
les lois consiste dans leur rapport a l’ordre de la société, dont elles sont
les règles; ..." But whereas natural laws are ’essentially’ just because they
are ’essential’ to the two primal laws and to the "engagemens" which flow 
from these, the positive "... étant indifférentes è ces fondements de 
l’ordre de la société, de sorte qu’il n’y en a aucune qui ne puisse être
changée ou abolie sans les renverser, la justice de ces lois consiste dans
l’utilité particulière qui se trouve à les établir, selon que les temps et 
les lieux peuvent y obliger." (xi, 20)
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(l)disregarded fall within Domat*s natural law category. Nor can
M. Funck-Brentano*s claim be upheld that Domat has answered Pascal’s basic
objection, that so-called natural laws are not universal, by allowing that
despite their immutable character nonetheless some natural laws do admit of
exceptions. For although Domat does not actually consider the examples
adduced by Pascal, his provision for exceptions is based upon the fact that:
’Les lois n’ont de justice et d’autorité que par leur 
rapport à l’ordre de la société et à l’esprit des premiers 
lois; de sorte que, s’il arrive qu’il soit de cet ordre 
et de cet esprit d’en restreindre quelques-unes, ou par 
des exceptions ou par des dispenses, elles rec^ oivent 
ces tempéramens...’ (xi, 20)
The cases of non-observance referred to ty Pascal however are not justified
by any such incompatibility with ’’l’ordre de la société’, but are merely
capricious.
Law does not have for Pascal, as it does for Domat, that aura of
dignity peculiar to the embodiment of the deepest principles of justice, and
to the highest expression of human reason, nor does it represent for him,
as for Bossuet, something divine and mysterious, good in itself beyond the
power of those who make it - on the contrary he sees in it simply the
(2)
embodiment of irrational custom. The ultimate basis of all existing 
laws in his view is only custom, and their authority, he contends, derives 
solely from the fact that they have become entrenched:
(1) ’’Le larcin, l’inceste, le meurtre des enfants et des pères, tout a eu sa 
place entre les actions vertueuses." (p.1150; B.294)
(2) This of course, without Pascal’s derogatory implications, was the normal 
Mediaeval view, which regarded laws as simply the records of the customs of 
various communities. As A. J. Carlyle has noted: "... the law was during 
the Middle Ages primarily the custom of the community." Political Liberty 
(Oxford, 1941), p.13-14, of. p.28.
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"La coutume fait toute l’équité, par cette seule raison 
qu’elle est reçue; c’est le fondement mystique de son 
autorité." U) (p. 1150; B.294)
Domat’s assertion that:
"...l’autorité des coutumes et des usages est fondée sur 
cette raison qu'on doit présumer que ce qui a été long­
temps observé est utile et juste..." (xii,5),
represents from Pascal’s point of view a petitio principii; for it as
precisely the grounds for accepting this supposition which, after submitting
them to merciless scrutiny, he dismisses as mere fancy.
(l) By contrast Domat holds that the authority which the, two types of 
law command corresponds to the variation in their inherent justice: "Les
lois naturelles étant la justice même, elles ont une autorité naturelle 
sur notre raison; car elle ne nous est donnée que pour sentir la justice 
et la vérité, et nous y soumettre". However, since men sometimes lack 
"une raison assez pure pour reconnaître cette justice, ou le coeur assez 
droit pour y obéir", these natural laws are enforced by the authority of 
the temporal powers. On the other hand the authority of positive law 
derives solely from the power of those who possess the right to make law. 
And Doirat concludes: "Cette différence entre la justice et l’autorité
des lois naturelles, et celle des lois arbitraires a cet effet, qu’au lieu 
que les lois arbitraires ne pouvant être naturellement connues aux hommes, 
elles sont comme des faits qu’on peut ignorer, les lois naturelles étant 
essentiellement justes, et l’objet naturel de la raison, on ne peut dire 
qu’on les ignore, non plus qu’on ne peut dire qu’on manque de la lumière 
de la raison qui nous les enseigne." (xi, 20)
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2. The general good.
(i) The pursuit of the general good should form the basis of society.
One of the arguments which Pascal employs in the Pensées in order
to demonstrate the fundamental injustice and depravity of human nature,
although cast in a somewhat paradoxical form, sheds valuable light on what
he regards as the rightful basis of society. After claiming that it is
unjust to bias our wills to desire the love of others, he points out that
this is an inborn tendency in men and concludes:
"...nous naissons donc injustes, car tout tend à soi. Cela 
est contre tout ordre; il faut tendre au général; et la 
pente vers soi est le commencement de tout désordre, en 
guerre, en police, en économie, dans le corps particulier 
de l’homme. La volonté est donc depravée. Si les membres
des communautés naturelles et civiles tendent au bien du
corps, les communautés elles-mêmes doivent tendre à un 
autre corps plus général, dont elles sont membres. L’on 
' doit donc tendre au général. Nous naissons donc injustes 
et dépravés." (p.1304; B.477)
The argument advanced here to prove the depravity of the human will, on 
the ground that it leads men to disregard "ordre", according to which they 
should seek the general good, is unconvincing. Pascal records it as an 
observed and recognized fact that the members of civil and natural 
communities "tendent au bien du corps", and infers from this fact the univers­
al duty to look to the general good. In view of this procedure it is diffi­
cult to see how the conclusion, which assumes that we have an inborn 
preference for the self, "Nous naissons donc injustes et dépravés", is 
reached. Likewise, if, as he maintains, men are born unjust and depraved, 
with an ineluctable "tendance à soi", then ipso facto it will be impossible 
to discover evidence that when living together in communities they work
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for the common good.
Despite these non sequiturs however, the passage makes it quite
clear that Pascal believes the duty to seek the general good, which should
be recognized as binding by all men, properly forms the groundwork of society.
Considering the importance which it thus assumes it is rather curious that
he should be content to rest this obligation, at least in the case of
secular s o c i e t y , o n  such a purely empirical basis. In this respect
his approach stands in sharp contrast to that of Domat, who derives this
fundamental social obligation from the primary principle of natural law
(2)
enjoining on man the duty to seek after and love his sovereign good.
(1) cf. below, p.â'i'1'Pffor the Church in this regard.
(2) Domat argues that this primary law, "....qui commande à l’homme la 
recherche et l’amour du souverain-bien, étant commune à tous les hommes, 
elle en renferme une seconde qui les oblige à s’unir et s’aimer entre eux; 
parce qu’étant destinés pour être unis dans la possession d’un bien unique, 
qui doit faire leur commune félicité, ....ils ne peuvent être dignes de 
cette unité dans la possession de leur fin commune s’ils ne commencent leur 
union en se liant d’un amour mutuel dans la voie qui les y conduit." (i, 7) 
Implicit in the first law therefore is the all-important fact (for Domat)
that God has destined man to an essentially social existence. "Quoique l’homme 
soit fait pour connaître et pour aimer le souverain-bien, Dieu ne l’a pas 
mis d’abord dans la possession de cette fin, mais il l’a mis auparavant dans 
cette vie, comme dans une voie pour y parvenir..." (ii, l) And Domat daims 
that, just as it is possible to detect in human nature that man is destined 
to possess this ’supreme good’, "...on y verra aussi sa destination à la 
société et les divers liens qui l’y engagent de toutes parts;..." (i,9)
Domat conceives of society itself as entirely built up on the principle of 
"engagemens" - the relationships formed between individuals as the result of 
natural family ties, of the development of intellectual life which involves 
communication with others, and of the organised work which man must share in 
with his fellows if his economic and bodily needs are to be adequately 
provisioned for, and nature’s bounties put to profitable use. (ii,2) And in 
Le droit public he alleges that it is on the analogy of a body composed of 
members who fulfil diverse functions that society is properly envisaged; "Tout 
le monde sait que la société des hommes forme un corps dont chacun est membre; 
et cette vérité que l’Ecriture nous apprend et que la lumière de la raison nous 
rend évidente, est le fondement de tous les devoirs qui regardent la conduite 
de chacun envers tous les autres et envers le corps. Car ces sortes de 
devoirs ne sont autre chose que les fonctions propres aux engagemens ou chacun 
se trouve par le rang qu’il tient dans ce corps." (i, préface) But the
cont. p.263.
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A further fragment from the Pensées relating to the doctrine of
the "membres pensants", according to which the social organism is conceived
of on the analogy of the human body, shows that as far as the individual is
concerned "ordre" consists simply in the recognition and fulfilment by
him of his duty to work for the common good:
"Si les pieds et les mains avaient une volonté particulière, 
jamais ils ne seraient dans leur ordre qu'en soumettant cette 
volonté particulière à la volonté première qui gouverne le 
corps entier. Hors de là, ils sont dans le désordre..."
(p.1304; B.475)
In the previous fragment Pascal appears to use the term to denote what 
results from such conformity on the part of individuals. "Ordre" in this 
context therefore represents that condition of social harmony which comes 
about when the various components of the body politic act together in 
pursuit of the common good, each performing his proper function in the 
appropriate sphere.
Elsewhere in the Pensées it is alleged to be the mark of man’s 
"grandeur" that, despite his enthralment to concupiscence, he has succeeded 
in achieving a certain "ordre" in his social relations:
(cont. from p.262) primary duty which is imposed in this way on all 
individuals is "à procurer le bien commun, et à maintenir l’ordre dans 
l’Etat." (ibid).
(l) Domat also uses the term "ordre" with much the same connotation 
throughout the Traité des lois, cf. above, p.'Î^ S’nA.and below, p.its" n.i.
The following definition occurs at the outset of title nine of Le droit public, 
headed "Des divers ordres de personnes qui composent un état": "Ce sont ces
diverses sortes de conditions et professions dont l’assemblage compose 
l’ordre général de la société des hommes dans un état; et c'est par l’usage 
de leurs fonctions qu’il doit subsister, de même que dans le corps, l’union 
des membres en forme la symétrie, et que l’usage de leurs fonctions y donne 
la vie." And in the preface to the first book of the same work he notes 
that: "... comme l’ordre public ne peut subsister que par le concours des
fonctions de tous les membres qui composent le corps de la société, la
dépravation des fonctions des membres ou leur seule cessation y fait comme
une maladie qui en trouble et dérègle l’ordre."
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"Grandeur. - Les raisons des effets marquent la grandeur 
de l'homme, d'avoir tiré de la concupiscence un si bel 
ordre." (p.ll60; B.403)
"Grandeur de l'homme dans sa concupiscence même, d'en avoir 
su tirer un règlement admirable, et d'en avoir fait un 
tableau de charité."(ï) (ibid; B.402)
(ii) Society is actually grounded on "amour-proore".
Although Pascal does concede that men have succeeded in so 
regulating concupiscence that it is possible for them to live together in 
some sort of harmony and accord, he is insistent that the "ordre" which has 
thus been produced does not result from the pursuit of the general good.
On the contrary such "ordre" merely cloaks the underlying "amour-propre", 
the motive which actuates all man's social conduct. It is Pascal's adherence 
to the Augustinian conception of the effects of original sin that is largely 
responsible for giving such a deeply pessimistic colouring to his outlook in
(l) Nicole likewise holds that social harmony has been achieved by regulating 
men's discordant selfish impulses: "Qui n'admirerait un homme qui aurait
trouvé l'art d'apprivoiser les lions, les ours, les tigres et les autres bêtes 
farouches, et de les faire servir aux usages de la vie? Or c'est ce que fait 
l'ordre des Etats; car les hommes pleins de cupidité, sont pires que des 
tigres, des lions et des ours. Chacun d'eux voudrait dévorer les autres: 
cependant par le moyen des lois et des polices, on apprivoise tellement ces 
bêtes féroces, que l'on en tire tous les services humaines que l'on pourroit 
tirer de la plus pure charité." De la grandeur, ch.VI, Essais.II. p.l60.
And he alleges that in the event of the dissolution of the "ordre politique": 
"...tous les hommes seroient ennemis les uns des autres, et il y auroit une 
guerre générale entre eux, qui ne se décideroit que par la force." ibid.,
p.158-9.
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this regard. The corollary which he draws from this doctrine, that human
nature has been permanently vitiated by the Fall to such an extent that man
is now powerless to achieve any good of his own volition and by his own
efforts, has obvious social and political ramifications. Indeed he seems
to hold that it is in the sphere of social relations that the effects of
man's vicious tendencies are most easily discerned. Thus it is this view
of man, as dominated by the concupiscence which has become his second nature,^ ^^
with the corresponding anti-social bias it gives to all his motives, that
lies behind the strange statement in the Pensées that all men hate each
other 'naturally':
"Tous les hommes se haïssent naturellement l'un l'autre.
On s'est servi comme on a pu de la concupiscence pour la 
faire servir au bien public; mais ce n'est que feindre, et 
une fausse image de la charité; car au fond ce n'est que 
haine." (p.1126; B.451)
"On a fondé et tiré de la concupiscence des règles 
admirables de police, de morale et de justice; mais dans 
le fond, ce vilain fond de l'homme, ce figmentum malum. 
n'est que couvert; il n'est pas ôté." (p.1126;3.453;
A further fragment shows how it is that "amour-propre" prompts man to such
a 'hatred* of his fellows, and sets out the reason why his anti-social
desires are so much stronger and commoner than social ones in this state
of enthralment to concupiscence:
"Le moi est haïssable: ...si je le hais parce qu'il est 
injuste, qu'il se fait centre du tout, je le haïrai toujours.
En un mot le moi a deux qualités ; il est injuste en soi, 
en ce qu'il se fait centre du tout; il est incommode aux 
autres, en ce qu'il les veut asservir: car chaque moi 
est l'ennemi et voudrait être le tyran de tous les autres."
(p.1126-7; B.455)
(1) cf. above,
(2) cf. also from the Pensées: "La nature de 1*amour-propre et de ce moi 
humain est de n'aimer que soi et de ne considérer que soi." (p.ll23;B.100)
cont. p. 266
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What particularly distinguishes Pascal's views on this subject 
from those of his fellow Port-Royalists Domat and Nicole is the intransigent 
attitude reflected in the foregoing extracts. Despite his readiness to 
agree with them in recognizing that men have succeeded in so modifying their 
concupiscence and adapting it to social ends that it now to some extent
(cont. from p.26$) Domat's account of the effects of "amour-propre" on 
society has many similarities with that of Pascal. He maintains that;
"Tout ce que l'on voit dans la société de contraire à l'ordre, est une 
suite naturelle de la désobéissance de l'homme à la première loi qui 
commande l'amour de Dieu;..." (ix, l) Discord arises in consequence of 
man's attempt to find in the "biens sensibles", to which he has transferred 
his affections, the two qualities peculiarly characteristic of the 
"souverain-bien" - i.e. that it allows of possession by all, and that it 
is capable of constituting the complete happiness of each; "... c'est 
ensuite de cet état ou l'homme s'est mis, que ceux qui mettent leur bonheur 
à posséder des biens de cette nature, venant à se rencontrer dans les 
recherches des mêmes objets, se divisent entre eux, et violent toutes 
sortes de liaisons et d'engagemens ..." (ix, 3) Thus Domat can claim with 
respect to this Hobbesian state of universal and continual striving after 
finite objects, with the resultant conflict between aspirants, that; "G'est 
done le dérèglement de l'amour qui a déréglé la société, et, au lieu de 
cet amour mutuel dont le caractère était d'unir les hommes dans la recherche 
de leur bien commun, on voit régner un amour tout opposé dont le caractère 
lui a justement donne le nom d'amour-propre, parce que celui en qui cet 
amour domine ne recherche que des biens qu'il se rend propres, et qu'il 
n'aime dans les autres que ce qu'il en peut.rapporter è soi." (ix, 2).
In Le droit oublie he asserts that if social conduct is examined from the 
standpoint of the "corps-membres" relationship, which involves each 
individual in the duty of working for the common good and for the maintenance 
of civil order, it will be apparent that, far from regarding themselves in 
this light "... la plupart ne se regardent qu'eux-mêmes, sans aucun rapport 
au corps dont ils sont les membres, et règlent toute leur conduite sans 
aucune vue de l'ordre et du bien commun de ce corps. Mais chacun se fait 
son tout de soi-même, et son amour-propre se rapportant à soi toute sa 
conduite,..." (I, préface) Nicole also echoes Pascal in his view of what 
"amour-propre" entails in fallen man; "..il n'aime que soi; il rapporte 
tout à soi. Il se désire toutes sortes de biens, d'honneurs, de plaisirs, 
et il n'en désire qu'à soi-même, ou par rapport a soi-même. Il se fait le 
centre de tout; il voudroit dominer sur tout, ...Ces dispositions 
tyranniques étant empreintes dans le fond du coeur de tous les hommes, les 
rendent violents, injustes, cruelç,....Voilà le monstre que nous renfermons 
dans notre sein. ...Mais si nous l'aimons dans nous-mêmes, il s'en faut bien 
que nous le traitions de même, quand nous l'apercevons dans les autres. Il 
nous paraît alors au contraire sous sa forme naturelle, et nous le haïssons 
même d'autant plus que nous nous aimons, parce que 1'amour-propre des autres 
hommes s'oppose à tous les désirs du nôtre." De la charité et de l'amour- 
nropre. Essais. III, p.123-5•
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mirrors c h a r i t y , h e  refuses to look beyond the underlying selfishness 
and injustice to what for them is the real worth of the condition of .civil
(2)
order which results from this process. Thus the alleged conversion of
"amour-propre" into a means for preserving social harmony, which Domat
0)maintains is the chief one utilized by God for this purpose, is the 
target for his fiercest scorn in the fragment where he affirms that all
(1) Thus Nicole claims that: "...pour réformer entièrement le monde, c'est-
a-dire pour en bannir tous les vices et tous les desordres grossiers, et 
pour rendre les hommes heureux dès cette vie même, il ne faudroit, au défaut 
de la charité, que leur donner à tous un amour-propre éclairé, qui sût
discerner ses vrais intérêts, et y tendre par les voies que la droite raison
lui découvrirait. Quelque corrompue que cette société fût au dedans et aux 
yeux de Dieu, il n'y auroit rien au dehors de mieux réglé, de plus civil,
de plus juste, de plus pacifique, de plus honnête, de plus généreux; et, 
ce qui seroit le plus admirable, c'est que, n'étant animée et remuée que 
par 1'amour-propre, on ne verroit partout que la forme et les caractères 
de la charité." De la charité et de 1'amour-oronre. Essais. III,p.164-$.
(2) In this respect, as Ernst Cassirer has pointed out, Pascal's outlook 
bears a singular resemblance to that of Rousseau. "Regarding the forces which, 
in the present state of society, tend to bring individuals together, Rousseau 
entertains the same opinion as Pascal. He stresses repeatedly that there is 
no original moral impulse^ no desire for community in its true sense ...nor 
any natural sympathy uniting one man to another. All social ties are based 
on mere illusion. Egotism and vanity, the impulse to dominate and to 
impress others; such are the real bonds that hold society together." The 
Philosophy of the Enlightenment, p.155.
(3) "...on voit dans sa conduite sur la société, que d'une aussi méchante 
cause que notre-* amour-propre, et d'un poison si contraire à l'amour mutuel 
qui devait être le fondement de la société. Dieu en a fait un des remèdes 
qui la font subsister; .." Domat then proceeds to demonstrate that God 
has simply transformed the "amour-propre", which menaced the very foundation 
of society, into an integrative force fostering the growth of the vital 
"engagemens", for "...la chute de l'homme ne l'ayant pas dégagé de ses 
besoins et les ayant au contraire multipliés, elle a aussi au^enté la 
nécessité des travaux et des commerces, et en même temps la nécessité des 
engagemens et des liaisons; ...Cet état des hommes porte ceux qui ne se 
conduisent que par 1'amour-propre, a s'assujettir aux travaux, aux commerces 
et aux liaisons que leurs besoins rendent nécessaires; et pour se les rendre 
utiles, et y ménager, et leur honneur, et leur intérêt, ils y gardent la 
bonne foi, la fidélité, la sincérité, de sorte que 1'amour-propre s'accommode 
à tout pour 8'accommoder de tout; et il sait si bien assortir ses différentes 
démarches à toutes ses vues, qu'il se plie à tous les devoirs, jusqu'à
cont. on p.268
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men hate each other 'naturally'. Not that Domat labours under any illusions 
as to the possible eradication of "amour-propre" by this means - he too 
acknowledges that it is merely 'hidden', that it "contrefait toutes les 
vertus", and "s'enveloppe sous les apparences des v e r t u s " . However, it 
is a measure of the difference both of aim and outlook of the two writers 
that whereas the latter should be content to point out not only that 
"amour-propre" is in practice a valuable instrument in the preservation of 
the fabric of organized society, but furthermore that it actually promotes 
the development of this along the lines originally laid down by God, Pascal 
on the other hand seems intent on tearing aside, in Machiavellian fashion, 
what is for him merely a mask from the underlying selfishness which it veils. 
He belongs to that tradition of "painters of human nature in black", adept 
in the art of tracing socially desirable actions to basically vicious 
tendencies, for whom, as Professor Lovejoy has recently shown, "the 
doctrine of man's total depravity was a great stimulator of the quest for 
...hidden motives behind even outwardly good acts." Hence Pascal
believes that men disguise egotism under the mask of a high moral and social 
ideal, and claims that even sympathy and humility may be the cloaks of
(cont from p.267) contrefaire toutes les vertus; et chacun voit dans les 
autres, et s'il s'étudiait, verrait en soi-même les manières si fines que 
1'amour-propre sait mettre en usage pour se cacher, et s'envelopper sous les 
apparences des vertus mêmes qui lui sont les plus opposées." (ix,3) Nicole 
similarly maintains that: "..les hommes étant vides de charité par le 
dérèglement du péché, demeurent néanmoins pleins de besoins, et sont dépend­
ants les uns des autres dans une infinité de choses. La cupidité a donc pris 
la place de la charité pour remplir ces besoins, et elle le fait d'une manière 
que l'on n'admire pas assez, et ou la charité commune ne peut atteindre.
De la grandeur, ch.VI, Essais. II, p.159
(l) Nicole likewise asserts that although the anti-social tendencies of 
"amour-propre" - the "monstre que nous renfermons dens notre sein" - may be 
controlled, and even directed to beneficial ends, yet: "II vit et règne 
absolument en nous à moins que Dieu n'ait détruit son empire en versant un 
autre amour dans notre coeur." De la charité et de 1'amour-propre. Essais.III
(2) Reflections on Human Nature.p.25.cf. ch.I, passim. p.124*
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self-indulgence, pride and ambition:
"Plaindre les malheureux n'est pas contre la concupiscence.
Au contraire, on est bien aise d'avoir à rerdre ce témoignage 
d'amitié, et à s'attirer la réputation de tendresse, sans 
rien donner." (p.1126; B.452)
"Les discours d'humilité sont matière d'orgueil aux gens 
glorieux,..." (p.ll35; B.377)
This dominant concern on Pascal's part to underline the glaring 
contrast, as it appears to him, between the nominal altruism of man's 
social conduct and the actual motives inspiring it, together with his 
insistence that no shaping of these motives will suffice to produce any 
disinterested, and therefore ultimately worthwhile, act, serves to mark the 
fundamental point of divergence between his ideas and those of Domat, and 
reflects the differences in the seriousness with which they take the Fall. 
While the latter regards men as fallen from the state of primitive innocence 
where they lived in mutual effection and peace, he also believes they retain 
some sense of moral principles and obligations. The natural law they had 
obeyed in their state of innocence, which forms the groundwork of the social 
organism,is still in some measure known to t h e m , a n d  Domat is emphatic 
that its intrinsic justice continues to impress itself quite naturally on 
human reason. Indeed, were this not the case, no form of organized society
(1) "G'est par 1'esprit de ces deux premières lois que Dieu, destinant les 
hommes à l'union dans la possession de leur fin commune, a commencé de lier 
entre eux une première union dans l'usage des moyens qui les y conduisent; il 
a fait dépendre cette dernière union, qui doit faire leur béatitude, du bon 
usage de cette première qui doit former leur société." (i, 8)
(2) Domat, unlike most champions of the natural law theory in the 17th 
century, clung to the Mediaeval conception in this respect, (cf.Cassirer, op. 
cit., p.241, and Gierke, op.cit., p.76) He maintains that: "..quoique les 
hommes aient violé ces lois capitales, et que la société soit dans un état 
étrangement différent de celui qui devait être élevé sur ces fondements et 
cimenté par cette union, il est toujours vrai que ces lois divines et essent­
ielles à la nature de l'homme subsistent immuables, et qu'elles n'ont pas 
cessé d'obliger les hommes à les observer;..." (i, 8).
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could be maintained. To Pascal on the contrary, the effects of the
deterioration of human nature caused by the Fall, with its hereditary
consequences in the shape of a transmitted bias toward sin, have been so
drastic that in his present state:
"..1'homme sans la foi ne peut connaître .. la justice."
(p.ll84; B.425)
Clearly such a conviction of the worthlessness of human effort in this 
regard, apart from grace, conduces to the pessimistic view of all social 
activity as mere sham.
And the way in which "amour-propre", manifesting itself in the
impulse to dominate, replaces the duty to seek the general good as the basis
of society, is illustrated in Pascal's account of the origin and growth of
the hierarchical form of society with which he himself was best acquainted.
In its evolution the sociability and benevolence toward his fellows, which
were natural to man before the Fall, play no part. On the contrary, in
common with the rest of the original traits of human nature, they have been
warped beyond recognition, and man is envisaged as finding himself in a
state relative to others of his kind strongly reminiscent of that which
Hobbes argued to be his natural one - there is the same 'perpetual and
restless desire of power after power', which the latter posited as 'a
general inclination of all mankind*, and which inevitably ensues in 'that
condition which is called war':
"Les cordes qui attachent le respect des uns envers
les autres, en général, sont cordes de nécessité; car
il faut qu'il y ait différents degrés,tous les
(l) cf. also from the Pensées: "Il est nécessaire qu'il y ait de 1'inégalité
parmi les hommes, cela est vrai;..." (p.1149; B.380)
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hommes voulant dominer, et tous ne le pouvant pas, mais 
quelques-uns le pouvant.
Figurons-nous donc que nous les voyons commentant à se 
former. Il est sans doute qu'ils se battront jusqu'à ce 
que la plus forte partie opprme la plus faible, et qu'enfin 
il y ait un parti dominant.Mais quand cela est une fois 
déterminé, alors les maîtres, qui ne veulent pas que la 
guerre continue, ordonnent que la force qui est entre leurs 
mains succédera comme il leur plaît; les ims la remettent 
à 1'élection des peuples, les autres à la succession de 
naissance, etc." 12) (p.1162; B.304)
One striking difference discernible between Pascal's and Hobbes's 
views on the formation of the structure of any body politic is that what may 
here, for the purposes of comparison, be considered Pascal's equivalent of 
the 'Leviathan' is established in every instance by simple right of 
conquest. The possibility of some sort of contract between man and man, 
such as that envisaged by Hobbes as the more normal alternative to achieve 
this end, just does not seem to have ever suggested itself to his mind - 
indeed it may well be that he regarded even the very slight measure of 
disinterestedness required to undertake such negotiations as exceeding the 
present capacity of man's moral nature. Nicole on the other hand, although 
in agreement with respect to the forces making for the establishment of a
(1) In a further fragment Pascal enlarges the theatre of this continual 
striving after power from inter-faction to inter-national dimensions. Relating 
the unique character of the Jews' survival of the vicissitudes of time as a 
single, united people, he notes : "..Ils subsistent toujours, et malgré les 
entreprises de tant de puissants rois qui ont cent fois essayé de les faire 
périr, comme leurs historiens le témoignent, et comme il est aisé de le juger 
par l'ordre naturel des choses,..." (p.1196;B.620) The last phrase here 
definitely implies that according to the normal course of events any nation 
must expect to be threatened by imperialistic ventures from without which will 
know no limits.
(2) The fragment continues as follows; "Et c'est là oà 1 'imagination commence 
à jouer son rôle. Jusque-là la pure force le faits ici c'est la force qui se 
tient par 1'imagination en un certain parti, en France des gentils hommes, en 
Suisse des roturiers, etc. Or ces cordes, qui attachent donc le respect à tel 
en particulier, sont des cordes d'imagination." (ibid.)
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social hierarchy, emphasizes that the solution is above all the product 
of the demands of r e a s o n . I n  Pascal's view however there is no 
alternative to the inescapable struggle for power, which must continue 
until finally the fact that one party really is stronger than the others, 
and has got and will be able to maintain the upper hand, has been proved by 
direct experiment. Having once attained to this position of ascendancy 
the party in question is enabled to enforce the rights of succession to the 
sovereignty won by force of arms as it sees fit, and to bring coercive 
sanctions to bear in order to ensure their immediate observance.
Dr. Werner Stark appears to have missed the whole point of this 
fragment when he glosses it in the following terms? "...tradition or custom, 
or habit, or convention, call it what you like, is the groundwork and the 
informing and inspiring principle of society."This interpretation 
overlooks the central fact that, as Pascal‘describes it, the mainspring of 
society, in the sense of what first sets in motion the process which 
culminates in the establishment of a particular order of society, is 
plainly the desire common to all men to prevail each over all the rest.
(1) "Chaque homme voudroit être le maître et le tyran de tous les autres: et 
comme il est impossible que chacun réussisse dans ce dessein, il faut par 
nécessité, ou que la raison y apporte quelque ordre, ou que la force le fasse, 
et que les plus puissants devenant les maîtres, les faibles demeurent 
assujettis. La raison ne reconnaît pas seulement que cette assujettissement 
des hommes à d'autres hommes est inévitable, mais aussi qu'il leur est très- 
avantageux et très-nécessaire. Elle sait que la lumière de l'homme est trop 
faible depuis le péché, pour pouvoir le conduire même dans les choses qui ne 
regardent que la vie civile, et que sa volonté est trop corrompue pour le 
faire demeurer en paix dans une condition réglée. Elle voit donc qu'il est 
nécessaire qu'il y ait quelque loi grossière qui le lie à ses devoirs, qui 
est celle de l'empire et de la domination. ...non seulement elle consent à
1'établissement de la grandeur, mais elle regarde cet ordre comme le chef- 
d'oeuvre de l'esprit humain;...." De la erandeur.ch.il. Essais.II. p.140-1
(2) Pascal's Meditations on Society. Hibbert Journal, vol.47, 1948-9,
p. 28—9*
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Only when this has attained to its inevitable outcome does custom begin to 
fulfil any 'socializing* role. Pascal does believe that the 'cake of custom* 
holds society together, that it is a precious conservative agent, but it is 
clear that he regards it as coming into operation only at the second stage.
Any doubts as to Pascal's opinion of the legitimacy of this desire
to prevail over others, which constitutes the motive force behind the whole
process, are dispelled by a passage from the letter written at the time of
his father's death where he sets out to account for the now corrupt nature
of "amour-propre". For Adam in his state of innocence "amour-propre" was
natural and just, since it then pointed beyond the self to God, and was
furthermore counterbalanced by an infinite love of God. As the result
of his sin however, Adam, while retaining intact the capacity for this
infinite love, deprived himself of its rightful object, and the consequent
telescoping of the finite love and the infinite capacity produced a single
infinite self-love. Pascal goes on;
"Voilà la source de cet amour, et la cause de sa défectuosité 
et de son excès. Il en est de même du désir de dominer, de
la paresse, et des autres. L'application en est aisée."
(p.496; G.£.II,p. 551)
Thus Pascal, like Saint Augustine, regards the will to power, the impulse
to dominate, which is the chief contributory cause to the growth of the
social order, as founded on the perversion of the rightful motive. Hence
it is evident that the necessity for the existence of a graduated social
structure, assumed as a basic principle at the outset of the previous
fragment, is a purely pragmatic sort of necessity with no foundation in
(1) cf. The City of God. I, I; III, X; IV, III.
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natural law. Pascal, in accordance with strict Augustinian teaching,
holds that man in the state of creation enjoyed a legitimate ascendancy
over the 'lower animals', but not over his fellow human-beings-dominion
as applied to man instead of to animals is a consequence of sin, and made
its first appearance at the Fall.^  ^ And in the Trois discours he states
quite explicitly that man's natural condition is one of * perfect equality
(2)
with all his fellows', which Implies that instituting dominion over
them involves violating nature.
In all this Pascal harks back to the old ecclesiastical notion
(4)that civil institutions are the consequence of the Fall, so that his
(1) cf. from the Pensées: "La dignité de l'homme consistait, dans son
innocence, à user et dominer sur les créatures, .." (p.1202; B.486) 
l'homme, dans l'état de la création, ou dans celui de la grâce, est élevé 
au-dessus de toute la nature, rendu comme semblable à Dieu,..." (p.l208;B.434) 
"J'ai créé l'homme saint, innocent, parfait;.. Il s'est soustrait de ma 
domination; et, ... révoltant les creatures, qui lui étaient soumises, je
les lui ai rendues ennemies:..." (p.1224; B.430) And cf. The Gitv of God. 
XIX, XV: "Thus has nature's order prescribed, and man by God was thus
created. *Let them rule*, saith He, over the fishes of the sea, and the 
fowls of the air, and over every thing that creepeth upon the earth.* He
made him reasonable, and lord only over the unreasonable, not over man but
over beasts. Whereupon the first holy men were rather shepherds than kings, 
God showing herein both what the order of creation desired, and what the 
merit of sin exacted."
(2) of. below, p.27<j.
(3) Nicole affirms in a similar vein that: "... si les hommes étoient 
demeurés dans l'innocence, il n'y auroit point eu de Grands parmi eux, 
puisqu'ils seroient nés égaux, et qu'ils seroient demeurés dans cette égalité 
de la nature. ...Si la grandeur n'est donc pas toujours un désordre en elle- 
même, elle est au moins toujours un effet du désordre de la nature et une 
suite nécessaire du péché; car comme l'état d'innocence ne pouvoit admettre 
l'inégalité, l'état du péché ne peut souffrir d'égalité." De la grandeur, 
ch,II, Essais. II, p.139-40.
(4) It is necessary to distinguish here between the political implications 
of Pascal's view and of that held by earlier writers like Gregory VII. For 
Gregory the state is the outcome of human nature impaired by the Fall, and 
he treats civil government as so deeply polluted its sinful origin as to 
be by itself helpless and criminal; but, unlike Pascal, he uses this as an 
argument for its need of the assistance and authorization of the Church, cf. 
Gierke, Political Theories, p.12. For the contrary view of Thomas Aquinas, 
according to whom man is by nature a social animal, so that even if there had
cont. p.276
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justification for urging acquiescence in the irrationalities, which an
hierarchical society and a monarchical form of government entail, is not
limited merely to the desirability of preserving the status quo inviolate, in
(1)
order that peace may be secured. More than mere expediency is in question
here since he believes that, as far as the Christian is concerned, an
obligation to submit to such an illogical state of things has been imposed on
him in return for the violation of the natural order at the Fall. Civil
society is God's judgment - as a punishment - and must be borne:
"Les vrais chrétiens obéissent aux folies néanmoins ; non 
pas qu'il respectent les folies, mais l'ordre de Dieu, qui, 
pour la punition des hommes, les a asservis à ces folies;
'Ûmnis creatura subiecta est vanitati, Liberabitur'."(2)
(p.ll67; B.338)
God therefore in Pascal's view wills the state, but he wills it as Augustine
(3)had affirmed "propter remedium peccatorum". The purpose assigned in
the divine plan to man's life in society is that he should serve a term of
(cont. from p.27$) been no Fall the inequality which results from social 
organisation would have developed by itself, of. R.L. Poole, op.cit., p.214.
(1) cf. below, p.
(2) A further fragment from the Pensées also bears upon this question: 
"Raison des effets.- Gradation: le peuple honore les personnes de grande 
naissance; les demi-habiles les méprisent, disant que la naissance n'est 
pas un avantage de la personne, mais du hasard; les habiles les honorent, 
non par la pensée du peuple, mais par la pensée de derrière; .... mais les 
Chretiens parfaits les honorent par une autre lumière supérieure. Ainsi se 
vont les opinions succédant du pour au contre, selon qu'on a de lumière."
(p.1167; B.337) The "lumière supérieure", in the light of which Christians 
respect the nobility, is the knowledge that an obligation to this end has 
been imposed on them as part of the divinely ordained punishment for original 
sin.
(3) cf. The City of God. XIX, XV.
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probation, in the course of which, if he would enjoy a relative peace, 
he must resign himself to such unnatural conventions as the hereditary 
succession to important administrative posts, or the according of ’external’ 
respects to those who belong to higher ranks in the social hierarchy than
he. (2)
(1) This conception of probation as willed by God is also stressed in the 
following passages; "0 Dieu, qui ne laissez subsister le monde et toutes les 
choses du monde que pour exercer vos élus,..." (Prière pour le bon usage des 
maladies. p.606; G.E.IX, p.324) "Les chrétiens doivent reconnaître Dieu en 
tout. Les afflictions temporelles couvrent les biens éternels ou elles 
conduisent." (è Mlle, de Roannez, p.$10; G.E.VI, p.90) "...toutes les 
créatures ne sont pas la première cause des accidents que nous appelons 
maux, mais....la providence de Dieu étant l’unique et véritable cause, 
l’arbitre et souveraine, ..." (à M. et Mme. Périer, p.491; G.E.II, p.$39)
(2) Arnauld's outlook in regard to the origin and purpose of society closely 
resembles that of Pascal. Like the latter he regards the secular social 
order, which for him consists essentially in the exercise of power by some 
men over others with resultant inequalities, of fortune and status, not as 
natural but as the only practical alternative to the anarchy that would be 
produced by the effects of original sin on human nature. Thus he writes
to M. Deslions concerning "...la distinction des conditions parmi les 
hommes, qui ne se sont introduites que depuis le péché; mais qui, dans 
l’état o^ le péché les a réduites, sont devenues comme nécessaires; ..." 
(29.12.1668, Oeuvres. I, p.646) The Christian however, aware that men are 
fundamentally equal both by nature and through Christ’s redemption, while 
he outwardly conforms to convention, and recognizes social distinctions out 
of respect for the divine providence that sanctions them as a probation, yet 
does not permit himself to take them seriously. In a letter to the Marquise 
de Rolicy, "sur les devoirs d’une Dame par rapport à ses domestiques," Arnauld 
emphasizes that; "Un des premiers est de regarder ceux qui vous servent comme 
vous étant égaux par nature et par la grâce du Baptême, qui les a rendus 




(i) Positive attitude to justice
(a) The_limits to sovereign power and the conception of lordship as office.
Although Pascal endorses a view of sovereignty which sharply 
separates the person (or set of persons) in a state in whom power is vested 
from all the rest, and superimposes him on the rest, Implying that there is 
no effective remedy against the ruler’s authority except in that authority, 
in some of his writings at least he emphasizes that such power should not 
be exercised in an arbitrary fashion.
Thus in the fourteenth Provinciale he points out that the power 
of the sovereign, in certain respects at least, is tempered by the duty 
to administer it in accordance with the purpose of God, from whom it is 
derived:
"..coime c’est Dieu qui leur a donné ce droit, il les oblige 
a l’exercer ainsi qu’il le ferait lui-même, c’est-à-dire avec 
justice, ... Et cette restriction rabaisse si peu leur 
puissance qu’elle la relève au contraire beaucoup davantage;.*."
(p.820; G.E.VI, p.133)
Again in the same letter he upholds the principle that the sovereign
cannot be judge in his own case, but must submit himself to receive justice
from his officers, who in this respect are the deputies of God;
"...les rois chrétiens ne se font pas justice à eux-mêmes 
dans les crimes même de lèse-majesté au premier chef, et ils 
remettent les criminels entre les mains des juges, pour les 
faire punir selon les lois et dans la forme de la justice, .. 
les juges tiennent la place de Dieu, dont ils sont les 
ministres, ..." (p.828-9; G.E.VI, p.148)
(l) cf. below, p. 1 7 ff.
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Both these extracts take for granted the existence of an objective order 
of justice, of a higher law than any represented by the powers of this 
world, to which the sovereign power in the state must subserve if it is to 
be legitimate and to possess genuine authority. Moreover, the implication of 
the second passage is that the ruler is not above even the positive laws, 
but is bound in conscience to obey them and to govern according to their 
prescriptions.
Pascal’s statement in the fourteenth Provinciale of the Church’s 
attitude to the powers that be, which enjoins unconditional obedience to 
magistrates and superiors,since it specifically covers unjust actions 
on their part, suggests that he believes the ruler or governing body in a 
state has a trust to fulfil which may be abused. Mne. Perier’s account of 
his views on non-resistance also indicates this lAen it depicts him as 
envisaging the possibility of princes not acquitting themselves properly 
of their duty. A n d  that he does regard lordship in any form never as 
a mere right, but primarily as a duty, is evident from the Trois discours sur 
la condition des grands where, in the course of the instructions to his 
young aristocrat, he dwells at length on the duties which his future rank 
will impose upon him. Although at liberty, should he so desire, to keep 
’the people’ in the dark as to the wholly artificial nature of "noblesse", 
he must take care never to abuse his position or allow himself to forget 
that his ’natural state’ is "une parfaite égalité avec tous les hommes." 
Pascal goes on to point out how unlikely it is that;
(1) quoted below, p.3oi.
(2) cf. below, p. 3oy f.
(3) p.617; G.E.IX, p.367.
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"•••ceux qui se regarderaient intérieurement comme égaux 
a tous les hommes, et qui seraient bien persuadés qu’ils 
n’ont rien en eux qui mérite ces petits avantages que 
Dieu leur a donnés au-dessus des autres, les traitassent 
avec insolence. Il faut s’oublier soi-même pour cela, et 
croire qu’on a quelque excellence au-dessus d’eux; en quoi 
consiste cette illusion que je tache de vous découvrir,"
(p.6l7-8; G.E.IX, p.368)
Having thus expressly repudiated the idea that some men in virtue
of their intrinsic superiority can justifiably claim and exercise authority
over others, Pascal in the third Discours undertakes to show what lordship
does consist in;
"Qu’est-ce, à votre avis, d’être grand seigneur? C’est être 
maître de plusieurs objets de la concupiscence des hommes, 
et ainsi pouvoir satisfaire aux besoins et aux désirs de 
plusieurs." (p.619-20; G.E.IX, p.371)
The ties that bind his followers to the future duke are rooted in
concupiscence, since their object in attaching themselves to a person of
his rank is to obtain satisfaction for their material wants. Hence he is
"proprement un roi de concupiscence", and equal in his own dominion to the
most powerful monarchs because, like him, they too derive their authority
from the fact that it lies in their power to dispose of the objects of
men’s desires. Finally Pascal urges:
"Mais en connaissant votre condition naturelle, usez des moyens
qu’elle vous donne, et ne prétendez pas régner par une autre
voie que celle qui vous fait roi. Ce n’est point votre
force et votre puissance naturelle qui vous assujettit
toutes ces personnes. Ne prétendez donc point les dominer
par la force, ni les traiter avec dureté. Contentez leurs
justes désiras; soulagez leurs nécessités; mettez votre
plaisir à être bienfaisant; avancez-les autant que vous le pourrez,
et vous agirez en vrai roi de concupiscence." (i)
(p.620; G.E.IX, p.372)
(l) cf. also from the Pensées; "Connaissez-vous donc et sachez que vous 
n’êtes qu’un roi de concupiscence, et prenez les voies de la concupiscence." 
(p.ll54; B.314)
281
Since the power to be exercised by the young nobleman will be analogous 
in all respects to that of the greatest potentates, differing only in the 
extent of its sway, the conception of lordship as office rather than 
privilege, which emerges in this extract, implies that rulers are instituted 
for the sake of the people, not the people for the sake of the ruler. And 
the attitude which Pascal recommends his pupil to adopt in his dealings with 
dependents is directly contrary to the policy of his contemporary Richelieu, 
whose Testament politique bears witness to the fact that he considered the 
repression and the burdening of the people a desirable, if not essential, 
end in his political programme.
(b) The opposition to tyranny
The admonition to the young aristocrat in the Trois discours, to 
make certain that he wields his authority in the manner appropriate to its 
source, with the implication that to do otherwise will be to abuse his 
position, foreshadows the more developed theory of the Pensées, according 
to which every transgression of the bounds of a particular social order 
degrades legitimate lordship to injustice and tyranny.
(l) "Tous les politiques sont d’accord que si les peuples étaient trop à 
leur aise, il serait impossible de les contenir dans les règles de leur 
devoir. ...La raison ne permet pas de les exempter de toute charge, parce que, 
en perdant en tel cas la marque de leur sujétion, ils perdraient aussi la 
mémoire de leur condition, et que s’ils étaient libres de tributs, ils 
penseraient l’être de l’obéissance. Il faut les comparer aux mulets, qui, 
étant accoutumés è la charge, se gâtent par un long repos plus que par le 
travail." Testament politique, ch. III, sect.l. Quoted by Paul Janet in 
Histoire de la science politique dans ses rapports avec la morale. (Paris, 
1913), vol. II, p. 265-6.
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This applies even in regard to the various forms of deference 
which should be paid to different members of the social hierarchy. In the 
second Discours Pascal maintains that the different sort of respect due 
to "grandeurs d'établissement" and "grandeurs naturelles" respectively is 
analogous to the particular character of each. Thus, since the "grandeurs 
d'établissement" are not the mark of any "qualité réelle" in the 
individual one is required to accord them merely formal respect, 
whereas "grandeurs naturelles" call for genuine esteem. And Pascal alleges 
that;
"...l'injustice consiste à attacher les respects naturels 
aux grandeurs d'établissement, ou à exiger les respects 
d'établissement pour les grandeurs naturelles." (p.6l9;
G.E.IX, p.370)
In a concrete instance a duke, not content that people should simply take
their caps off to him, but desirous further of being esteemed, if unable
to produce evidence that he possesses the qualities entitling him to this
would be unjust to ask for it, and:
"...assurément il n'y réussirait pas, fusse-t-il le plus 
grand prince du monde." (ibid; G.E.IX, p.371)
However, not only does injustice result from the failure to 
observe these rules, but a breach of them amounts to tyranny as it is 
defined in the Pensées ;
(l) cf. also Pensées, p.1164-5; B.317, where Pascal details what such formal 
respect entails. Nicole disagrees with Pascal as to the nature of the respect 
due to "grandeurs d 'établissement": "Par ou les Grands sont dignes de respect? 
Ce n'est, ni par leurs richesses, ni par leurs plaisirs, ni par leur pompe. 
C'est par la part qu'ils ont à la royauté de Dieu que l'on doit honorer en 
leur personne, selon la mesure qu'ils la possèdent; c'est par l'ordre par 
lequel Dieu les a placés, et qu'il a disposé par sa providence. Ainsi cette 
soumission ayant pour objet une chose qui est vraiment digne de respect, elle 
ne doit pas seulement être extérieure et de pure cérémonie, mais elle doit 
aussi être intérieure, c'est-à-dire, ou'elle doit enfermer la reconnoissance 
d'une supériorité et d'une grandeur réelle dans ceux qu'on honore:.,."
cont. p.283
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"La tyrannie consiste au désir de domination, universel 
et hors de son ordre. Diverses chambres, de forts, de beaux, 
de bons esprits, de pieux, dont chacun règne chez soi, non 
ailleurs; et quelquefois ils se rencontrent, et le fort et 
le beau se battent, sottement, à qui sera le maître l'un 
de l'autre: car leur maîtrise est de divers genre. Ils 
ne s'entendent pas, et leur faute est de vouloir régner 
partout. Rien ne le peut, non pas même la force; elle 
ne fait rien au royaume des savants ; elle n'est maîtresse 
que des actions extérieures.
Tyrannie. - Ainsi ces discours sont faux et tyranniques.
'Je suis beau, donc on doit me craindre. Je suis fort, 
donc on doit m'aimer.
La tyrannie est de vouloir avoir par une voie ce qu'on 
ne peut avoir que par une autre. On rend différents 
devoirs aux différents mérites: ...
On doit rendre ces devoirs-là, on est injuste de les 
refuser, et injuste d'en demander d'autres. Et c'est 
de même être faux et tyrannique de dire: 'Il n'est pas 
fort, donc je ne l'estimerai pas; il n'est pas habile , 
donc je ne le craindrai pas'. " (p.1153; B.332)
Pascal is therefore concerned to point out that the only way in which it
is possible to harmonize the discords of society, and to avert the constant
danger of tyranny is by relating the activities of the diverse components of
the body politic to their proper 'orders' or 'genres'. Each social order
must have its own peculiar domain assigned to it, which it shall not itself
overstep, and upon which others shall not encroach. In this way each will
be enabled to pursue its appropriate function without thwarting or perverting
the others. Thus Pascal attaches considerable value to a negative sort of
liberty, in the sense of freedom to recognize the proper authority in every
activity or social sphere, and to take one's proper place in the hierarchy.
(cont. from p.282) De la grandeur, ch.III. Essais. II, p.148. cf. also ibid., 
ch.IV, p.151-3, where Pascal's views on this subject are actually criticized. 
Nicole however is not altogether consistent in this regard, cf. Essais. II, 
p.80-15 and VI, p.192, where he tends rather to adopt Pascal's standpoint.
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The strength of every authority lies in its own nature: the strength of
sheer physical authority is physical, the strength of intellectual authority
is intellectual. And not only can no one kind override another without
ultimately injuring both, but Pascal claims that no amount of coercion
suffices to actually bring about such illegitimate domination.His
advice to the young nobleman in the Trois discours makes it quite clear
that he also considers the qualities men should use when they have attained
to positions of authority ought to be the qualities by means of which they
(2)
rise to such positions.
Although he nowhere discusses the question of the interrelation of
these different spheres of authority, his writings do furnish adequate
evidence that he does not believe it can be solved simply by allowing one
single authority to become supreme and to control all the rest. Herein
lies the significance of the distinction between king and tyrant, and the
emphasis on the need to make known what is the function proper to each sphere:
"Roi et tvran. - J'aurai aussi mes idées de derrière la 
tête. .«• Le plaisir des grands est de pouvoir faire des 
heureux. Le propre de la richesse est d’être donnée 
libéralement. Le propre de chaque chose doit.être cherché.
Le propre de la puissance est de protéger."(p.1153;B.310)
(1) This is again emphasized at the conclusion of the 12th Provinciale, where 
Pascal affirms that: "C'est une étrange et longue guerre que celle oh la
violence essaie d'opprimer la -vérité. Tous les efforts de la violence ne 
peuvent affaiblir la vérité, et ne servent qu'à la relever davantage. Toutes 
les lumières de la vérité ne peuvent rien pour arrêter la violence, ... Quand 
la force combat la force, la plus puissante détruit la moindre; quand l'on 
oppose les discours aux discours, ceux qui sont véritables et convaincants 
confondent et dissipent ceux qui n'ont que la vanité et le mensonge: mais la 
violence et la vérité ne peuvent rien l'une sur l'autre." (p.805;G.E.V,p.386-7)
(2) cf. the passage quoted above, p.280.
(3) In the light of the previous fragment the title of this extract, whether 
such is in fact Pascal's intention or not, recalls the standard mediaeval 
conception, which endured at least until the l6th century, of the king as one 
who rules according to law, and the tyrant as one who ignores or violates the 
laws. cf. R.L. Poole, op.cit., p.210 f.; and A.J. Carlyle, op.cit., p.18.
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This need to ensure that the individual orders in society occupy their
appropriate place in the overall scheme and discharge their part without
interfering with the functions of others, and the disorder and incongruity
that result when they do not, are again referred to in a rather different
context in another brief but expressive fragment:
"Un artisan qui parle des richesses, un procureur qui parle 
de la guerre, de la royauté etc; mais le riche parle bien 
des richesses, et le roi parle froidement d'un grand don
qu'il vient de faire, et Dieu parle bien de Dieu." (p.1316-7;
B.799)
The importance which Pascal ascribes to this notion is attested by the 
conjmentary of the author of the preface to the 1670 Port-Royal edition of 
the Pensées, when he cites this passage as an example of Pascal's elliptical 
style, and adds that its meaning would be difficult to grasp "si on ne lui 
avait souvent oui dire de bouche la même pensée.
However, despite such insistence that by any transgression of the 
bounds of its appropriate order a legitimate authority degenerates into 
tyranny, thus implying that its right is conditioned by the observation of 
those bounds, Pascal nowhere indicates that he considers such conduct 
justifies resistance or any alteration of the existing framework of govern­
ment. Nor does he ever explicitly affirm with respect to the ruler of the 
state that every command which exceeds the limits of his authority is null 
and void, and obliges no one to obedience. His marked aversion for tyranny
in all spheres never inclines him to mitigate^in favour of the mediaeval
doctriney that the duty of obedience is in every case conditioned by the
(l) p.1469. Although the context in which Pascal is alleged to have 
customarily made this observation is one predominantly concerned with questions 
of style, that does not diminish its significance for the present discussion.
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rightfulness of the command,  ^  ^ the drastic and unqualified conclusion 
which he reaches on the subject of unconditional obedience to the powers
(2)that be after his appeal to Scriptural authority.
(ii) Negative attitude to .justice
Despite the positive attitude to the concept of justice implied 
in the mode of social organization which Pascal favours in his reaction 
against tyranny, as well as in the criterion which he tacitly employs in 
defining the limits to sovereignty and the duties of lordship, his 
judgement on that natural knowledge of justice which Domat regards as 
implicit in man's reason even after the Fall and as forming the mainstay 
of any social structure, is predominantly sceptical.
Thus in a long fragment from the Pensées he sets out to show
that the idea of justice is filled with a variable content according to
the practice of societies of men in different places at different times:
"Certainement, s'il la (la justice) connaissait, il n'aurait 
pas établi cette maxime, la plus générale de toutes celles 
qui sont parmi les hommes, que chacun suive les moeurs de 
son pays; l'éclat de la véritable équité aurait assujetti
(1) cf. Gierke, op.cit., p.34-6. Unlilc-o Thomas Aquinas, and mediaeval 
political thinkers generally^-4Paeeal-dees-net believe that a tyrant can 
legitimately be deposed on the ground that he is guilty of abusing his 
position and power, unless the measures required to do so are such lliat they 
will do more harm than would be done by tolerating tyranny, cf. A.*D. 
Sertillanges, op.cit., p.399-400. Wvr,
(2) cf. below, p.SOf,
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tous les peuples, ...On la verrait plantée par tous les 
états du monde et dans tous les temps, au lieu qu'on ne 
voit rien de juste ou d'injuste qui ne change de qualité
en changeant de climat......De cette confusion arrive que
l'un dit que l'essence de la justice est l'autorité du 
législateur; l'autre, la commodité du souverain; l'autre, 
la coutume présente, et c'est le plus sûr: rien, suivant 
la seule raison, n'est juste de soi; tout branle avec le 
temps." (1) (p.1149-50; B.294)
A further fragment from the Pensées purports to be an account of Pascal's
own gradual disillusionment in regard to the possibility of discovering
true justice on the human plane:
"J'ai passé longtemps de ma vie en croyant qu'il y avait 
une justice; et en cela je ne me trompais pas: car il y 
en a, selon que Dieu nous l'a voulu révéler. Mais je ne 
le prenais pas ainsi, et c'est en quoi je me trompais;
car je croyais que notre justice était essentiellement
juste, et que j'avais de quoi la connaître et en juger.
Mais je me suis trouvé tant de fois en faute de jugement 
droit, qu'enfin je suis entré en défiance de moi et puis 
des autres. J'ai vu tous les pays et hommes changeants; 
et ainsi, après bien de changements de jugement touchant 
la véritable justice, j'ai connu que notre nature n'était 
qu'un continuel changement, et je n'ai plus changé depuis;.."(2)
(p.ll55; B.375)
Pascal's thought as explicated in the foregoing passages may be 
taken as exhibiting a confusion between the concept of justice, and the
various attempts to embody this in codes of positive law as they have been
(1) The influence of his familiarity with the thought of Montaigne, and 
especially with the ideas developed in the Apologie de Raimond Sebond. on the 
sceptical approach which Pascal adopts here is very marked, and, as M.
Brunschvieg has noted, many of Pascal's expression reproduce almost verbatim 
phrases from Montaigne.
(2) Arnauld cites this fragment in a letter to Pascal's brother-in-law 
Perier, as one of the few in the Pensées collection "qu'il sera absolument 
bon de changer", and gives as his reason for thinking so that: "vous reconn­
aîtrez si vous y prenez garde, que Monsieur Paschal n'y parle pas de la 
justice vertu, qui fait dire qu'un homme est juste, mais de la justice, *quae 
ius est*, qui fait dire qu'une chose est juste; comme il est juste d'honorer 
son père et sa mère, de ne point tuer, ...Or en prenant le mot de justice en 
ce sens, il est faux et très-dangereux de dire qu'il n'y ait rien parmi les 
hommes d'essentiellement juste." Lettres. (Nancy, 1727) t.IX, p.186-7
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evolved in different societies. Such confusion is merely apparent however, 
for the criticism is not limited simply to applied forms of justice - 
these Pascal holds to be defective because the concept on which they are 
modelled is defective. His approach is empirical: he catalogues divergencies, 
and concludes from his findings that the idea of what is just varies from 
race to race, and even from individual to individual; that humanly speaking 
therefore there is no absolute justice, nothing in itself just which can be 
accepted as a universal standard; and that since the notion 'justice' 
properly includes that of absoluteness, no such thing as true justice is 
to be found on the human plane.
But where Pascal does leave himself wide open to the charge of
inconsistency is in regard to the revealed divine justice to which he
appeals as criterion, and which he claims has no common measure with human
justice. Elsewhere in the Pensées he urges the need to recognize the will
of God not only as the principal sanction in morals, but also as the guide
toward ascertaining what is right and just and what is not.^^^ And the
conception of the radical difference between man's justice and God's justice
is illustrated by means of the following analogy:
"L'unité jointe à l'infini ne 1'augmente de rien, ...
Le fini s'anéantit en présence de l'infini, et devient 
un pur néant. Ainsi notre esprit devant Dieu, ainsi 
notre justice devant la justice divine. Il n'y a pas 
si grande disproportion entre notre justice et celle 
de Dieu, qu'entre l'unité et l'infini." (p.l212;B.233)
(l) "Changeons la règle que nous avons prise jusqu'ici pour juger de ce qui 
est bon. Nous en avons pour règle notre volonté, prenons maintenant la 
volonté de Dieu; tout ce qu'il veut nous est bon et juste, tout ce qu'il ne 
veut pas, mauvais et injuste. ...la volonté de Dieu, qui est seule toute la 
bonté èt toute la justice, (p.1294; B.668) cf. also above, p.230h.l.
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Although the disparity between the two sorts of justice is alleged to be
less than that between a unit and the infinite this is small consolation,
for Pascal positively derides human justice when he adduces the mystery of
the transmission of guilt incurred by Adam's sin to show how man's inability
to conceive God's justice disqualifies him from judging what is or is not
consistent with it:
"...il est sans doute qu'il n'y a rien qui choque plus 
notre raison que de dire que le péché du premier homme 
ait rendu coupables ceux qui, étant si éloignés de cette 
source, semblent incapables d'y participer. Cet écoulement 
ne nous paraît pas seulement impossible, il nous semble même 
très injuste; car qu'y a-t-il de plus contraire aux règles 
de notre misérable justice que de damner éternellement un 
enfant incapable de volonté, pour un péché oti il paraît 
avoir si peu de part, qu'il est commis six mille ans avant 
qu'il fût en être?" (p.1207; B.434)
When Pascal attempts to justify God's action in this way, in
imputing the guilt which has accrued from Adam's sin and is transmitted
by 'seminal identity' to all men, by affirming that in the things of God
reason is beyond its depth, one of his own cautionary jottings seems to
have slipped his memory:
"Si on choque les principes de la raison, notre religion 
sera absurde et ridicule." (p.1089; B.273)
Since he himself admits that nothing is more 'shocking' to human reason 
than the doctrine he defends, it must in his own terms be deemed 'absurd' 
and 'ridiculous'. In this case our justice, far from being 'miserable' as 
Pascal describes it, turns out to be the correct criterion to which to refer 
the doctrine in question. Moreover, when he maintains that our human concep­
tion of justice is no measure of what 'justice' is as applied to God, which 
means that the justice ascribed to God is not merely the justice we know 
in a greatly intensified degree, but is another quality altogether, he is  ^ X
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guilty of intentionally using the same word to signify things he plainly 
regards as entirely different.
Pascal's attitude to the Calvinist doctrine of predestination
and grace, as he represents it in the Premier écrit sur la grâce, is
particularly interesting in this regard. The summary which he proposes
includes the tenets of absolute predestination, the divine causation of
Adam's sin, the restriction of Christ's redemptive grace to those originally
(2)marked out for salvation and the irrevocable deprivation of the remainder.
It is immaterial for the present purpose whether or not this is an accurate
account of the Calvinist position, since it is Pascal's comments upon it
which are significant. The expose concludes as follows:
"Voilà l'opinion épouvantable de ces hérétiques, injurieuse 
à Dieu et insupportable aux hoimes. Voilà les blasphèmes 
par lesquels ils établissent en Dieu une volonté absolue et 
sans aucune prévision de mérite ou de péché pour damner ou 
pour sauver ses créatures. ...cette opinion abominable ... 
elle blesse le sens commun...elle est si horrible, et frappe 
d'abord l'esprit avec tant de force par la vue de la cruauté 
de Dieu envers ses créatures, qu'elle est insupportable."
(p.951-2; G.E.XI, p.133-4)
Now it is quite evident that Pascal condemns this doctrine because it
contains elements which affront his moral consciousness, his own sense of
justice, and what he conceives by analogy to be the nature of divine justice.
(1) There is no indication in Pascal's writings however that he extends 
this belief in the impossibility of knowing the justice which marks the 
divine nature to that of the purely negative character of all words applied 
to God. In the Prière pour le bon usage des maladies for example, he 
addresses God in the following terms: "Seigneurdont l'esprit est si bon 
et si doux en toutes choses ... faites-moi la grace de n'agir pas en païen 
dans l'état ou votre justice m'a réduit:.." (p.60$;G.E.IX,p.323) Yet on 
what grounds, especially in such a context, can Pascal predicate the normal 
human attributes goodness and gentleness of the divinity when he holds so 
emphatically that the justice which characterizes his dealings with men is 
utterly unlike all human conceptions of it?
(2) p.951; G.E.XI, p.133.
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Yet despite this he rigidly disallows any claim to similar and equally 
justified objections in the case of the doctrine of completely arbitrary 
and capricious selection of the 'elect' from the 'massa damnata' which he 
himself defends,' ' and which is every bit as ’injurious to God' and 
'insupportable to men' as the Calvinist one.
Elsewhere he makes a tacit condemnation of precisely the sort of
anthropomorphism which he himself is guilty of in this denunciation of the
Calvinist doctrine*
"Les hommes, n'ayant pas accoutumé de former le mérite, 
mais seulement le récompenser oh ils la trouvent formé, 
jugent de Dieu par eux-mêmes." (p.1212; B.490)
Thus when men project on to God their notion of justice, which consists
essentially in a system of penalties and rewards meted out to the appropriate
acts, they entirely fail to recognize that it is God himself who inspires
or motivates any good action worthy of reward that man may perform. This
means that divine justice has a 'creative* dimension totally lacking in
human justice, which sets it outside the range of human experience in the
positive sense.
Nevertheless it is the idea of recompense which is uppermost in
Pascal's mind when he speaks of God's 'justice' toward the reprobate,
contrasting it with the mercy he shows to his elect, for in this context the
word clearly carries the meaning of punishment*
"II faut que la justice de Dieu soit énorme comme sa 
miséricorde. Or, la justice envers les réprouvés est moins 
énorme et doit moins choquer que la miséricorde envers les 
élus." (p.l212; B.233)
(l) cf. also the following fragment which sets forth what amounts to a 
complete denial of the validity of the moral consciousness as a test of the 
veracity of doctrine: "Mon Dieu! que ce sont de sots discours'. Dieu aurait-il
fait le monde pour le damner? demanderait-il tant, de gens si faibles? etc. 
Pyrrhonisme est le remède à ce mal, et rabattra cette vanité." (p.ll89;B.390)
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And the most frequent usage of the term in the Ecrits sur la grâce is in
this same sense of distributive or retributive justice:
"Dans l'état d'innocence, Dieu ne pouvait avec justice damner 
aucun des hommes, ...Dans l'état de corruption. Dieu pouvait 
avec justice damner la masse entière; (p.952;G.E.XI,p,135)
"Pour sauver ses élus. Dieu a envoyé Jésus-Christ pour 
satisfaire à sa justice, et pour mériter de sa miséricorde 
la grâce de Rédemption,..." (p.966; G.E.XI, p.149)
It would be difficult to provide a more apt illustration of the system of
sanctions, which for Pascal represents human justice in application, than
the procedure envisaged in this last extract. A sin has been committed;
someone must atone, and, by submitting to the punishment, induce the judge
to forego the sentence in respect of those who have won his favour; and
the fact that it is Christ who does so, and that it is God who is responsible
for his substitution, in no way alters the conclusion that on this principle
the cornerstone of divine justice is the absolute necessity of requital.
Furthermore, on those occasions in the Provinciales where Pascal 
mentions divine justice it is almost invariably to point out that it is not 
essentially different from human; that those-crimes which infringe positive 
laws, and are hence offensive to man's sense of justice, of which the laws 
are the concrete embodiment, are immeasurably more abhorrent in the eyes of 
God; that divine justice is undoubtedly superior to and much more perfect 
than human, but that there exists no fundamental contradiction between them. 
Indeed, some of the most telling criticism of what he considers to be the 
immoral consequences of Jesuit casuistry rests upon precisely this assumption. 
Thus in regard to the practice of permitting an act in theory, even though it 
may be contrary to the commandments of God, while prohibiting its actual 
performance out of respect for the civil authorities, Pascal objects:
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"Je ne vous reproche pas de craindre les juges, mais de 
ne craindre que les juges. C'est cela que je blâme; parce 
que c'est faire Dieu moins ennemi des crimes que les hommes.
...quand vous prétendez que ce qui est trop criminel pour 
être souffert par les hommes, soit innocent et juste aux 
yeux de Dieu qui est la justice même, que faites-vous autre 
chose, sinon montrer à tout le monde que,...vous êtes hardis 
contre Dieu, et timide envers les hommes?" (p.8l5;G.E.VI,p.37-8)
Pascal is in effect arguing here that what affronts man's sense of justice
must affect God in the same way but in a greatly intensified degree, since,
as justice itself, he is the ultimate source of man's sense of justice - a
form of argument that comes very close to constituting an inference drawn
from the nature of man to the nature of God. Yet in view of his categorical
assertions that there is no common measure between human justice and divine
justice, and that the latter may differ as far from the former as God himself
differs from man, Pascal, if he were strictly consistent, would have to
concede as a possibility that what men refuse to permit as too criminal
is innocent and just in the sight of God. Since man does not know what
justice is as it exists in God, it is clearly just as impossible for him
to say what it is not as to say what it is. . Pascal's agnosticism in this
respect, whether he likes it or no, is a two-edged weapon that cuts both
ways.
In the fourteenth letter he maintains, in accordance with Pauline
teaching,(l) that God has bestowed on temporal princes the right to
administer the power of life and death over their subjects, but that;
".comme c'est Dieu qui leur a’donné ce droit, il les oblige 
à l'exercer ainsi qu'il le ferait lui-même, c'est-à-dire avec 
justice,..." (p.820; G.E.VI, p.133)
y
(l)cf. Romans. 13, 1-6.
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Since God is 'justice and wisdom itself, in the course of exercising this 
right:
"...pour être exempts d'homicide, il faut agir tout ensemble 
et par l'autorité de Dieu, et selon la justice de Dieu;.."
(p.821; G.E.VI, p.134)
But if men, whatever may be their office, are to act in accordance with
the canons of divine justice, this necessarily presupposes that they have
the capacity to do so, and therefore that there is no prima facie reason
why they should be unable to comprehend its workings.
And at the end of this letter, in connection with the Jesuits'
authorizing of the custom of duelling, Pascal writes:
"Mais on doit louer Dieu de ce qu'il a éclairé l'esprit du 
roi par des lumières plus pures que celle de votre théologie.
Ses edits si sévères sur ce sujet ....Il a arrêté par la 
crainte de la rigueur de sa justice ceux qui n'étaient pas 
arrêtés par la crainte de la justice de Dieu;.." (p.831;
G.E.VI, p.155)
Here again the context makes it plain that the divine justice differs from 
the regal justice only as greater in degree, with the characteristic element 
of both, as he describes them, consisting in the threat of punishment to 
the transgressor.
Thus it is clear from Pascal's linguistic usage in this respect 
that when he distinguishes between what he claims are two different sorts 
of justice he is simply using the term 'justice' in an arbitrarily equivocal 
way, so that it undergoes no regular and uniform change in meaning when he 
transfers it from one sphere to the other. Although he denies the possibility 
of any common measure between the two, on those occasions when divine justice 
is actually in question he speaks of it in terms which indicate quite
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unmistakably that it operates in exactly the same fashion as human justice -
(1)
i.e. on the principle that merit should be rewarded and shortcomings punished. 
This, together with the fact that in the passages considered from the 
Provinciales the divine justice is administered and dispensed by human 
agents, points to the conclusion that Pascal never really bothered to 
think out the relations holding between them. Moreover, the sceptical 
attitude adopted in some of the fragments from the Pensées toward human 
justice, may well be the result, in part at least, of Pascal's deliberate 
aim to safeguard certain Catholic dogmas from criticism or rejection, on 
the grounds that they are repugnant to human conceptions of what is just, by 
convincing his reader that human and divine justice are so utterly disparate 
that the former cannot legitimately be proposed as the criterion by which to
judge of the equity of the latter.
Yet it is plain that the value-judgement contained in the fragment
from the Pensées where he compares the difference between human and divine
justice with that between the finite and infinite, and asserts that human 
justice is as nothing when measured against the divine, which is equivalent 
to divesting it of any positive value whatever, does not by itself explain 
the total scepticism in regard to man's ability ever to ground his laws on 
principles of true justice. In this instance Pascal is 'empirically* convinced 
rather that man's efforts to this end, as they are realized in the various 
codes of positive law adopted in different countries, are sufficient evidence 
that he is completely unaware of what constitutes such principles, and that
(l) In fact one of the criticisms levelled at the Calvinist doctrine of 
predestination is that it represents God as failing to take account in his 
election of 'merit' and 'sin' - in other words, as acting otherwise than 
according to the principle that merit should be rewarded and shortcomings 
punished, cf.passage quoted above, pc%Cjo.
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human conceptions of 'justice* are entirely relative. It is for this reason 
that he rejects as unfounded the notion, which lies at the root of every 
part of Domat * s theories, of a justice natural to man, antecedent to, 
and by right formative of, all law.
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4. Political tranquillity.
(i) Fear of civil strife produces a reaction in favour of absolutism.
Despite the fact that his scepticism makes nonsense of any 
distinction on the human plane between justice and injustice, and indeed 
empties these concepts of all meaning, Pascal, with an eye to the need to 
provide some justification for inculcating the duty of obeying the powers 
that be and abiding by the laws of the community, sets about trying to work 
a new application of the terms just and unjust. He points out that justice, 
unlike force, is a relative thing open to dispute, and that it is clearly 
impossible for force, a 'palpable* quality, to be brought into the service 
of justice, a 'spiritual* quality, in order to fulfil the purposes of justice 
which anyway by reason of its 'spirituality* is perfectly malleable. If 
conflict between the two is to be avoided there is no option but to resolve 
all right into might, and bestow the sanction of justice on the policies 
of the strongest party. In this way power becomes in Pascal's scheme not 
merely a necessary aspect of organized society, but for all practical
i
purposes the sole significant element in it.
"Justice, force. - II est juste que ce qui est juste soit 
suivi, il est nécessaire que ce qui est le plus fort soit 
suivi. La justice sans la force est impuissante; la force 
sans la justice est tyrannique. ...Il faut donc mettre 
ensemble la justice et la force, et, pour cela, faire que 
ce qui est juste soit fort, ou que ce qui est fort soit juste.
La justice est sujette à dispute, la force est très 
reconnaissable et sans dispute. Ainsi on n'a pu donner la 
force à la justice, parce que la force a contredit la justice 
et a dit qu'elle était injuste, et a dit que c'était elle qui 
était juste. Et ainsi, ne pouvant faire que ce qui est juste 
fût fort, on a fait que ce qui est fort fût juste."
(p.1160-1; B.298)
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"Si l'on avait pu, l'on aurait mis la force entre les 
mains de la justice: mais comme la force ne se laisse 
pas manier comme on veut, parce que c'est une qualité 
palpable, au lieu que la justice est une qualité 
spirituelle dont on dispense comme on veut, on l'a 
mise entre les mains de la force; et ainsi on appelle 
juste ce qu'il est force d'observer."(l) (p.l337-8;B.878)
Such a view of justice made subservient to force is at once a
corollary of, and a commentary upon, Pascal's theory of the origin and
(2)institution of political power.'  ^ By subordinating justice in this way 
to the established power he is enabled to set up conformity with the 
requirements of that power as the criterion to which political actions 
should be referred. And whatever objections may be raised to this analysis 
of the relations of power and justice and the solution which he proposes, 
it must be allowed that he does take account of the facts and conditions of 
the polity of his time. Indeed, the point at which he can be most effectively 
criticized in this regard is the failure to adopt a sufficiently detached 
standpoint in relation to the contemporary political scene - the treatment 
of the foregoing problem is too closely based on current forms of government
(3^which Pascal simply accepts as axiomatic.'^ ''
This acquiescence in the identification of justice with power, 
together with the fact that Pascal nowhere discusses the possibility of the
(1) cf. also from the Pensées: "Veri iuris. - Nous n'en avons plus: si nous 
en avions, nous ne prendrions pas pour règle de justice de suivre les moeurs 
de son pays. C'est là que ne pouvant trouver le juste on a trouve le fort, 
etc." (p.1151; B.297)
(2) cf. above,
(3) Pascal therefore is no exception to the rule that French political 
thinkers of his age allowed their conceptions to be all too readily determined 
by the contemporary form of government. As Henri Sée has noted: "En un mot, 
pendant le règne de Louis XIII, la doctrine absolutiste se perfectionne, et il 
n’est, pour ainsi dire, pas de voix discordante. Tous les écrivains, dont 
nous avons analysé les idées, s'inspirent directement des pratiques gouverne­
mentales et des institutions qui fonctionnent sous leurs yeux. Chez aucun 
n'apparaît l'idée que la société puisse être organisée autrement qu'elle ne
cont. p.299
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two forces of law and the sovereign authority in a state coming into
collision, points to the conclusion that he regards positive law as nothing
but the command of the law-giver. His writings contain no explicit statement
upon the question as to whether the ruler has absolute and sovereign power
to make or unmake laws as he pleases, or whether it is rather the case that
his authority is subject to the law. But that he would have endorsed
the view, expounded later in the century by Bossuet in his Politique tirée
(2)
de l'Ecriture Sainte. that no power can coerce the sovereign, who is in
that sense independent of all human authority, is attested by the following
fragment from the Pensées;
"Les seules règles universelles sont les lois du pays aux 
choses ordinaires, et la pluralité aux autres. D'ou vient 
cela? de la force qui est. Et de là vient que les rois, 
qui ont la force d'ailleurs, ne suivent pas la pluralité 
de leurs ministres." (p.1152; B.299)
This certainly implies the supremacy of the sovereign over the positive law,
and in fact mirrors the attitude of Louis XIV himself, for whom, as Henri
sée remarks, "le principe essentiel, c'est la toute-puissance du monarque,
(3)qui n'a de comptes à rendre à personne."
An illuminating contrast to Pascal's views in this respect is 
provided by those of his contemporary Claude Joly, in his Recueil de Maximes
(cont. from p.298) I'est, que les institutions politiques ou sociales 
puissent être modifiées d'une façon quelconque." Les idées politiques en 
France au XVIIe siècle. (Paris, 1923), p.83.
(1) cf. above, p.SpSf. for the evidence which points to his having believed 
that sovereignty should be combined with the rule of law; a view which implies 
that although the sovereign has a duty to enforce the law he does not create 
it in the first instance.
(2) e.g. iv, 1, prop.2.
(3) op.cit., p.132.
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/ (1) véritables et importantes pour 1*institution du Rov. The fundamental
principle by which Joly takes his stand is that the authority of the sovereign
is not absolute, but is limited by its function to uphold justice and
therefore the law, for, according to Joly, what does not conform to approved
(2)
and received laws cannot be just. Such a position implies that the
three concepts authority, justice and law are perfectly distinct, and that 
the two former are dependent for validity on conformity to the latter.
Pascal on the contrary telescopes the three, and, by equating law and justice 
with power, makes the notion of a sovereign limited by the laws, or using 
his authority unjustly by not acting in accordance with them, quite 
meaningless. Whereas Joly maintains that authority is derived from the 
community and entrusted to the sovereign to administer the laws to which he 
is subject, so that he is not above the law and cannot amend it at his 
pleasure, on Pascal’s view the sovereign, in virtue of his superior power, 
literally is the law.
The readiness which Pascal thus displays to espouse the cause of 
political absolutism is explained by the fundamental assumption, which 
colours the whole of his political outlook, of the imperative need for the 
continuous existence of the established government in a state of stable 
equilibrium. And it is with a view to further ensuring the maintenance of 
stable government that he resorts to the contrivance of basing political
(1) H. Sée describes this work, which first appeared in 16$2, as ”...une 
oeuvre remarquable dans laquelle toutes les aspirations libérales de cette 
époque troublée ont trouvé leur expression la plus nette." op.cit., p.110.
(2) cf. Sée, ibid, p.110-111.
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authority on divine right, and proclaiming the consequent duty of non-
resistance. The fourteenth Provinciale contains a typically Lutheran
statement of the conditions attaching to this religious duty of non-
resistance to secular authority. Pascal challenges the Jesuits to produce
any canon of the Church granting permission to kill magistrates or judges,
however unjust or tyrannical they may be, and alleges that:
"L"esprit de l’Eglise est entièrement éloigné de ces maximes 
séditieuses qui ouvrent la porte aux soulèvements auxquels 
les peuples sont si naturellement portés. Elle a toujours 
enseigné à ces enfants qu’on ne doit point rendre le mal 
pour le mal; qu’il faut céder à la colère; ne point résister à la 
violence; rendre k chacun ce qu’on lui doit, honneur, tribut, 
soumission: obéir aux magistrats et aux supérieurs, même 
injustes; parce qu’on doit toujours respecter en eux la 
puissance de Dieu qui les a établis sur nous." (p.828;G.E.VI,p.148)
The reference in this context to the natural bent of the populace to indulge
in insurrections, which would threaten political disintegration and the
destruction of social order, indicates plainly enough what recommends the
doctrine of non-resistance to Pascal. The principles of the duty of
obedience to the powers that be, and of the wickedness of rebellion, even
if provoked by the irresponsible actions of those powers, are obviously
based on the standard Biblical texts I Peter 2, 13-25, and Romans 13, 1-6,
and Pascal in fact quotes from the latter in a similar context earlier in
the l e t t e r . H i s  version of the doctrine lacks however the redeeming
corollary of the Lutheran creed - the conception of the "godly prince" -
for one searches in vain in his writings for any hint of that high esteem
of the office of the Christian ruler whence stems Luther’s support of
passive obedience, and which thus provides the most striking contrast
(1) (p.820; G.E.VI, p.133)
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(1)
between the otherwise similar views of the two thinkers in this regard.
Earlier in the same letter Pascal also claims that coercive
authority is vested in the sovereign, whether in the shape of a man, or of
a body of men, by divine right:
"... il a plu à la Providence (de Dieu) de conserver les 
sociétés des hommes, et de punir les méchants qui les 
troublent, ...ayant établi des lois pour faire mourir 
les criminels, (Dieu) a rendu les rois ou les républiques 
dépositaires de ce pouvoir; ..." (p.820; G.E.VI,p.l32-3)
A. L. Smith has noted that "Divine right was one way of expressing obedience,
orderliness, continuity",and Mme. Périer’s account of Pascal’s attitude
toward the established political authority shows quite clearly that as far
(1) Pascal shows himself to be very much of his age merely by adopting this 
doctrine, since none had a more universal appeal to political thinkers in the 
17th century. Henri Sée claims in this regard that: "La conception de
1’autorité souveraine nous apparaît donc comme la doctrine fondamentalè au 
XVIIe siècle. Mêmes les rares écrivains, qui pensent que l'Etat a été créé 
pour le bien des individus, n’accordent à ceux-ci aucun moyen prajtique, non 
seulement de contrôler effectivement les agissements de l’Etat, mais même de 
se défendre contre ses actes arbitraires." op.cit., p.181. Even the great 
exponents of the natural law theory of society tended to be advocates of the 
sovereignty of the ruler rather than of the people. Grotius himself "goes out 
of his way to condemn the theory of resistance, to show that ty the ’lex regia’ 
popular power is wholly transferred to the prince." J.N. Figgis: Political 
Thought from Gerson to Grotius. (Cambridge, 1916), p.242. Pufendorf too was 
on the side of authority. As Sir Ernest Barker has put it, "Nature could 
be used to consecrate the monarch as well as the people." Introduction to 
Gierke: Natural Law and the Theory of Society. (Cambridge, 1934), vol.I,
p.xlviii. Nicole also maintains that in the light of his principle that 
"la grandeur est une participation de la puissance de Dieu sur les hommes", 
it is perfectly plain that:"...il n’est jamais permis à personne de se 
soulever contre son souverain, ni de s'engager dans une guerre civile. ...C’est 
en vain qu’on prétendrait les justifier par les désordres de l’Etat, auxquels 
ils font semblant de vouloir remédier. Car il n’y a point de désordre qui 
puisse donner droit à des sujets de tirer l’épée, puisqu'ils n’ont point de 
droit de l’épée, et qu’ils ne s’en peuvent servir que par l’ordre de Dieu."
De la grandeur, ch.II, p.145.
(2) Political Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries. Cambridge Modern History. (Cambridge, 1909), vol.VI, p.804.
303
as he is concerned the merit of the theory lies in the possibility it holds
out of achieving security of state, in his view the first of all political
objects. She recounts that it was her brother's zealous devotion to the
task of ensuring the due execution of the "ordre de Dieu" in all spheres which:
"...le rendait si ardent pour le service du roi, qu'il 
résistait à tout le monde dans le temps des troubles de 
Paris. Il appelait des prétextes toutes les raisons 
qu'on donnait pour autoriser la rébellion. Il disait 
qu'en Etat établi en République comme Venise, c'était 
un très grand mal de contribuer à y mettre un Roi et à 
opprimer la liberté des peuples à qui Dieu l'a donnée; 
mais que, dans un Etat ou la puissance royale est établie, 
on ne pouvait violer le respect qu'on lui devait sans une 
espèce de sacrilège, parce que la puissance que Dieu y a 
attachée étant non seulement une image, mais une participation 
de la puissance de Dieu, on ne pouvait s'y opposer sans s' 
opposer manifestement à l'ordre de Dieu;(1) et de plus que 
la guerre civile, qui en est une suite, étant le plus grand 
mal que l'on puisse commettre contre la charité du prochain,
(l) Domat likewise sees God's over-arching providence not only manifested 
in the life of his Church, but as working itself out in the social and 
political sphere as well. Indeed Domat believes that such activity on the 
part of God constitutes one of the stabilizing forces at \c rk in society, 
and he expands this conception into a wholehearted espousal of the divine 
right theory: "O'est par sa providence, universelle sur le genre humain qu'il 
[Dieu] partage la terre aux hommes, et qu'il distingue les nations par cette 
diversité d'empires, de royaumes, de républiques et d'autres étatés;qu'il 
en règle et 1'étendue et la durée par les événemens qui leur donnent leur 
naissance, leur progrès, leur fin; et que, parmi tous ces changemens, il 
forme et soutient la société civile dans chaque état, par les distinctions 
qu'il fait des personnes pour remplir tous les emplois et toutes les places, 
et par les autres manières dont il règle tout." (ix, 6) And after pointing 
out that God entrusts the sovereign power to different agents in different 
states - to the king in a monarchy,,to the elected magistrates in a republic, 
and so forth - Domat adds by way of explanation: "...c'est toujours la 
conduite toute-puissante de Dieu qui dispose de cette suite et de cet 
enchaînement d'événemens qui précèdent 1'élévation de ceux qu'il appelle au 
gouvernement. Ainsi c'est toujours lui qui les y place; c'est de lui seul 
qu'ils tiennent tout ce qu'ils ont de puissance et d'autorité; et c'est le 
ministère de sa justice qui leur est commis; et comme c'est Dieu meme qu'ils 
représentent dans le rang qui les élève au-dessus des autres, il veut qu'ils 
soient considérés comme tenant sa place dans leurs fonctions..." (ix,7)
Thus, despite his insistence elsewhere that man is by nature a social being, 
Domat is as far as Pascal from embracing any doctrine of the ultimate 
sovereignty of the people, considered as coming together to create a fund
cont. p.304.
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on ne pouvait assez exagérer la grandeur de cette faute; 
que les premiers chrétiens ne nous avaient pas appris la
révolte, mais la patience, quand les princes ne s'acquittaient
pas bien de leur devoir. Il disait ordinairement qu'il 
avait un aussi grand éloignement de ce péché que pour 
assassiner le monde ou voler sur les grands chemins;,.."
The obvious aim of this version of divine right is simply to 
preserve the status quo inviolate by proclaiming that the established form 
of government, regardless of its nature, has the sanction of divine ordinance. 
Since the freedom enjoyed by the people of the Venetian Republic is God- 
given, to attempt to curtail it, and impose a monarchy there, would be 
evil. But in a state where the form of government is already monarchical 
the establishment must be considered even more sacrosanct, since the power 
with which God has invested the sovereign in this case is no mere replica 
of the divine power, but is in fact a participation in this, so that to 
offer any opposition to it would be to fly in the face of the "ordre de Dieu", 
All established governments therefore, whatever be their form, represent 
divine authority, and it is clear from the fact that Pascal does not regard 
any particular form of government as divinely ordained for all men that he 
sees the question of sovereignty in itself as merely incidental to the
(cont. from p.303) of governing power, which is then transferred to some 
person or set of persons in authority. On the contrary he expressly asserts 
that the authority of the sovereign power in any state derives directly from
God. He does however escape the inconsistency into which Pascal falls when,
intent on doing his utmost to preserve the status quo inviolate, the latter 
(at least according to Mine. Périer) urges the duty of invariable obedience 
to the constituted authority on the grounds that any attempt to modify an 
established government would involve a dislocation of the course of divine 
providence. Domat on the other hand is not concerned to advocate any such 
absolute non-resistance, but is content to point out that the powers that be 
are, and always have been, ordained of God, who is ultimately responsible 
for their rise and decline, and is thus enabled to take cognizance of 
political change and social evolution in a way quite impossible for Pascal 
if he were strictly consistent.
(1) Vie, p.27-8; G.E.I, p.
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(1)
practical object of inculcating non-resistance. He maintains that the 
power wielded by the secular authority, even in the case of a presumably 
elective republic, springs direct from God - there is no hint in his 
writings of the widely-held current view that sovereign power resides 
ultimately in the hands of the people, and is transferred by them, as the 
result of an expressed or tacit contract, to the ruler who enjoys only
(2)usufruct of it. However, the close link which he sets up between
disregard for the "ordre de Dieu", the source of political authority, 
and civil disorder makes it plain that the real motive force behind the 
advocacy of such a policy of unconditional acquiescence in the status quo 
is his deep-seated conviction that the practical evils arising from the 
civil strife, which he holds to be the inevitable outcome of any attempt 
to supplant an established form of government, are not justified by the 
end result.
(1) It is true however that many of the most fervent advocates of the 
doctrine of divine right in the 17th century held that all established govern­
ments were entitled to similar rights, and that non-resistance is just as much 
a duty in one case as in another, cf.J.N. Figgis : The Divine Right of Kings. 
(Cambridge, 1914), p.237-8.
(2) Nicole's views in this respect provide an interesting point of contrast 
with those of Pascal. Having asserted on Scriptural basis that "la grandeur 
est une participation de la puissance de Dieu sur les hommes", Nicole goes
on to claim that if this fact is borne in minds "..il est facile de comprendre 
qu'encore que la royauté, et les autres formes de gouvernement, viennent 
originairement du choix et du consentement des peuples: néanmoins, l'autorité 
des rois ne vient point du peuple mais de Dieu seul. Car Dieu a bien donné 
au peuple le pouvoir de se choisir un gouvernement; mais, ...ce n'est point 
le seul consentement des peuples qui fait les rois; c'est la communication 
que Dieu leur fait de sa royauté et de sa puissance qui les établit Rois 
légitimes, et qui leur donne un droit véritable sur leurs sujets." De la 
grandeur, ch.II, Essais.II. p.143-4. Although Nicole can hardly be said to 
subscribe here to the view that sovereignty comes to the sovereign via the 
people, he does hold that a political society is created in the first instance 
by agreement among those who found it, and thus sets himself within the 
tradition of Hooker, Hobbes, A1 thusius and Grotius. And in consequence of his 
belief that once a form of government is established, those who are governors 
are so by divine right, he is led, after the fashion of Hobbes and Grotius,
cont. p.306
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In assessing the factors which determine this predominantly 
conservative note of Pascal's political thinking account must be taken of 
his own historical position - the preponderance in the political life of 
his century of the problem of security,and the fact that a large part 
of his own life was lived during the period when either Richelieu or Mazarin 
was at the helm in France, with the result that at that stage at least the 
prevailing phase of monarchy could scarcely be said to have favoured the 
propounding of liberal political theories. And just as it is possible to 
regard the fact that Richelieu's childhood had been spent in the period of 
disorder during the religious wars as at least a contributing cause for 
his dominant conviction that "always the ultimate good for society - from
(2)peasant to prince - lay in maintaining order by authority", so in the 
case of Pascal it is clear from explicit references that similar influences
(3)were at work to a similar end as the result of his experience of the Fronde. 
The tension, insecurity and unrest, which followed the breaking down of the 
restraints of law in that period, must,have thrown into higher relief the 
ordered, authoritarian government of the preceding one, and helped produce in 
Pascal a reaction in favour of absolutism. The gloomy view, based on personal 
experience, of all revolts against an established government merely leading
(cont. from p.305) to deny 'the people* any right to alter it; "...car 
1'autorité de faire des lois ne réside plus dans le peuple qui s'en est 
dépouillé, et qui a raison de s'en dépouiller, n'y ayant rien de plus 
avantageux pour son propre bien; mais réside dans le Roi à qui Dieu communique 
sa puissance pour le régir." ibid., p.145.
(1)"No political thinker could escape the problem of security which dominated 
the whole epoch and constituted an important, though often hidden and unad­
mitted basis of their confrontation with political reality." S.Skalweit in 
New Cambridge Modern History. (Cambridge, I961), vol.V.p.l09.
(2) C.V. Wed^ood; Richelieu and the French Monarchy. (London, 1949),p.I68.
(3) E.Lavisse maintains that the same is true of Louis XIV also: "...la 
Fronde observée et comprise par 1'enfant Roi explique, pour partie, les idées 
et les sentiments politiques de Louis XIV." Histoire de France (Paris 1905) 
t. VII,l,p.44.
307
to the horrors of intestine strife is in his case, as in Hobbes’s, the real 
reason for vesting absolute power in the sovereign.Moreover, when he 
argues in support of his policy of political quietism that it is always
(2)
'the people’ who fare worst from the aftermath of a popular insurrection, 
it is difficult not to see obtruding his first-hand experience of the 
ferocity with which Seguier and Gassion put down the revolt of the ’Va-nu-
^ (3)
pieds’ in Normandiè in 1639*
The extent to which Pascal’s observation of the social upheaval
of the Fronde, which coincided with the so-called "mondain" period of his
(4)career, does dominate his political outlook can be measured by the fact
that civil war symbolizes the most malignant evil, while its contrary peace
represents the supreme good in his political scheme. This basic judgement
underlies his endorsement of the might is right principle, as the following
fragment from the Pensées clearly shows:
"Sans doute, l'égalité des biens est juste; mais, ne pouvant
faire qu'il soit force d’obéir à la justice, on a fait qu'il
soit juste d'obéir à la force; ne,pouvant fortifier la justice, 
on a justifié la force, afin que la justice et la force fussent 
ensemble, et que la paix fût, qui est le souverain bien."(5)
(p.1152; B.299)
(1) cf. Leviathan, 18: "But a man may here object that the condition of
subjects is very miserable, as being obnoxious to the lusts and other irregular
passions of him or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands. And 
commonly they that live under a monarch think it the fault of monarchy; and 
they that live under the government of democracy, or other sovereign assembly, 
attribute all the inconvenience to that form of Commonwealth;....not consider­
ing that the estate of roan can never be without some incommodity or other;
and that the greatest that in any form of government can possibly happen to 
the people in general is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries and 
horrible calamities that accompany a civil war, or that dissolute condition of 
masterless men without subjection to laws, and a coercive power to tie their 
hands from rapine and revenge:..."
(2) cf. below, p.3(4-.
(3) On Pascal's sojourn in Normandi^ cf. V.Giraud: La vie héroïque de Blaise 
Eaacal, (Paris, 1923), p.30-2
(4) of. E. Demahis, op.cit., p.219-221.
(5) cf. also the quotation from Luke, XI, 21, significant in this context:
cont. p.308.
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Equality of ownership, which in Pascal's own terms characterizes man's
'natural' e s t a t e , i s  therefore regarded as of small import compared with
peace and the avoidance of the evils of disorder, which would be the
inevitable outcome of any attempt to bring such a state about. And his
acquiescence in the custom of according "respects d'établissement" to 
(2)
persons of rank also stems from this prejudice:
"Que l'on a bien fait de dis tinker les hommes par l'extérieur, 
plutôt que par les qualités intérieures! Qui passera de nous 
deux? ...Il a quatre laquais, et je n'en ai qu'un: cela est 
visible; ...c'est à moi à céder, et je suis un sot si je le 
conteste. Nous voilk en paix par ce moyen; ce qui est le 
plus grand des biens." (p.ll64; B.319)
Similarly it is the maintenance of stable equilibrium in government
which Pascal advances as the justification for accepting the theory of
hereditary kingship. Such a seemingly illogical way of determining succession
to the most important secular office in the community is fully warranted in
the interests of political stability, since if it were awarded on a strictly
merit basis, given the present constitution of human nature, perpetual
wrangling and dispute would ensue:
"Opinions du peuple saines. - Le plus grand des maux est 
les guerres civiles. Elles sont sûres, si on veut récompenser 
les mérites, car tous diront qu'ils méritent. Le mal à 
craindre d'un sot, qui succède par droit de naissance, n'est 
ni si grand, ni si sûr." (p.1163; B.313)
"Les choses du monde les plus déraisonnables deviennent les 
plus raisonnables a cause du dérèglement des hommes. Qu'y 
a-t-il de moins raisonnable que de choisir, pour gouverner 
un Etat, le premier fils d'une reine? ...Mais parce qu'ils 
le sont et le seront toujours, elle devient raisonnable et
(cont. from p.307) " 'Quand le fort armé possède son bien, ce qu'il possède
est en paix.' " (p.1152; B.3OO)
(1) cf. above, p.25if.
(2) cf.above, p.
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juste; car qui choisira-t-on? Le plus vertueux et le plus 
habile? Nous voilk incontinent aux mains: Attachons
donc cette qualité à quelque chose d'incontestable. C’est 
le fils aine du roi; cela est net, il n'y a point de 
dispute. La raison ne peut mieux faire, car la guerre 
civile est le plus grand des maux." (ibid.; B.320)
Nicole reproduces parts of this last fragment word for word when he too
argues that the great merit of the doctrine of hereditary right consists in
its substitution of peaceful government for the otherwise certain conflict
(1)
between competing aspirants after the coveted position. And it is evident
from Pascal's extension of the sanction of divine right to all forms of
established authority that his object in this respect is not so much the
indiscriminate support of monarchical government, as yet further provision
for the security of the state, on which the ultimate justification of his
version of divine right is therefore based. As None. Perier's account also
testifies, he believes that in France the monarchy is the appropriate
resource for achieving this object, and hence his concern to ensure that its
(2)interest becomes dominant.
(1) "L'injustice naturelle et ineffaçable du coeur des hommes, rend ce choix, 
non seulement raisonnable, mais le chef-d'oeuvre de la raison. Car qui 
chois irons-nous? le plus vertueux, le plus sage, le plus vaillant? Liais 
nous voilk incontinent aux mains: chacun dira qu'il est ce plus vertueux, ce 
plus vaillant, ce plus sage. Attachons donc notre choix à quelque chose
d'extérieur et d 'incontestable. Il est le fils aîné du Roi; cela est net;il 
n'y a point à douter; la raison ne peut mieux faire; car la guerre civile est 
le plus grand de tous les maux." De la grandeur. Essais. II, p.154-5.
(2) The marked similarity between the position which Pascal thus adopts with 
respect to the monarchy and that of the "Politiques" during the religious wars 
of the previous century, when, in opposition to the Huguenots and the Ligue, 
they set out to promote regal authority against aggression from religious and 
aristocratic factions, tallies with Sainte-Beuve*s sociological classification 
of the Port-Royalists generally: "..on peut dire qu'au XVIIe siècle la 
tentative de Saint-Cyran et des Arnauld fut ... une reprise ...d'organisation 
religieuse pour la classe moyenne élevée, la classe parlementaire, celle qui, 
sous la Ligue, était plus ou moins du parti des politiques. Port-Royal fut
1'entreprise religieuse de la classe moyenne en Franco." Port-Roval. Discours 
préliminaire. Pléiade ed. t.I, p.99
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Again, Pascal's reverence for established laws and customs derives
from the fact that, having become hallowed by tradition, they give a certain
stability to the body politic:
"Pourquoi suit-on les anciennes lois et anciennes opinions? 
est-ce qu'elles sont plus saines? non, mais elles sont 
uniques, et nous ôtent la racine de la diversité." (p.1152;B.301)
In his view therefore the value of such laws resides solely in their removal
of one potent source of civil strife. And there can be little doubt that
his opposition to the natural law theory, which postulates the existence of
a law anterior to all positive law on which this should be based, would be
enforced, if nothing more, by his seeing in it a threat to the status quo.
The current notion, that natural law somehow overbears positive law, would
appear to Pascal a ready-made justification for repudiating the ties of
political allegiance, since on this view enactments of state which run
contrary to matural law prescriptions are strictly null and void. If
established institutions are to be measured by reference to some ideal
natural frame of government their finality would be denied, and all hope
of maintaining political equilibrium lost.
That Pascal should be so disgusted by the excesses of the Fronde, 
through which he lived, as to thus consider virtually all other political 
evils as mere dust in the balance when weighed against the one evil of civil 
strife and confusion, is a striking instance of the far-reaching effect of 
contemporary events, and the personal prejudices stemming from them, on his 
‘ outlook. His judgements in this regard would be corroborated by his 
acquaintance with those of Montaigne, who viewed the much more distressful
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civil disorders of his time with similar repugnance, and drew similar 
inferences from his personal experience as to the value of any form of 
insurrection. The essay entitled De la ohisionomie in particular contains 
much in the way of reflection upon the current disorders which would be 
grist to Pascal's mill.
(ii) Opposition to political change dictates respect for established laws.
As the result of his scepticism with respect to the two generally 
recognized bases of all law - the idea of a common law natural to all 
huiranity, having the same validity everywhere, and man's natural sense of a 
'core of justice' beyond place and time - law becomes for Pascal simply an 
empirical f a c t . T h e r e  can be no question of penetrating to the essence
(1) "J'escrivois cecy environ le temps qu'une forte charge de nos troubles se 
croupit plusieurs mois, de tout son pois, droict sur moy. .. Monstrueuse 
guerre: les autres agissent au dehors; cette-cy encore contre soy se ronge et 
se desfaict par son propre venin. Elle est de nature si maligne et ruineuse 
qu'elle se ruine quand et quand le reste, et se deschire et desmembre de rage. 
Nous la voyons plus souvent se dissoudre par elle mesme que par disette 
d'aucune chose nécessaire, ...Elle vient guarir la sedition et en est pleine, 
veut chastir la desobeyssance et en montre l'exemple, et, employée à la
deffence des loix, faict sa part de rebellion à 1'encontre des siennes propres, 
Ou en sommes-nous? Nostre medecine porte infection, ...Mais est il quelque 
mal en une police qui vaille estre combatu par une drogue si mortelle? Non 
pas, disoit Faonius, l'usurpation de la possession tyrannique d'un estât. 
Platon de mesme be consent pas qu'on face violence au repos de son pays pour 
le guérir, ...En un temps ordinaire et tranquille, on se prepare à des 
accidens modérez et communs ; mais en cette confusion ou nous sommes depuis 
trente ans, tout homme franc^ ois, soit en particulier, soit en general, se voit 
à chaque heure sur le point de l'entier renversement de sa fortune." Essais.
III, ch.12, p.285-291 (Gamier ed.) _ . . . .
(2) For a lively criticism, from a Thomist point of view, of this empiricist
cont.p.312
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of a particular law because there is no such essence, and since any law 
comprises merely an established custom which possesses no intrinsic justice, 
it follows that laws themselves are not just but purely and simply laws*
Having claimed with Montaigne^^^ that custom is the basis of equity, Pascal 
continues:
"Qui la (l'équité) ramènera à son principe l'anéantit.
Rien n'est si fautif que ces lois qui redressent les 
fautes; qui leur obéit parce qu'elles sont justes, obéit 
a la justice qu'il imagine, mais non pas à l'essence de 
la loi: elle est toute ramassée en soi; elle est loi, et 
rien davantage." (p.1150; B.294)
"Montaigne a tort: la coutume ne doit être suivie que parce 
qu'elle est coutume, et non parce qu'elle soit raisonnable 
ou juste, (p.llèl; B.325)
And Pascal's ideal in this regard is that the laws in existence should be
adhered to for no other reason than that they are laws:
"II serait donc bon qu'on obéît aux lois et aux coutumes, 
parce qu'elles sont lois; qu'il sût qu'il n'y en a aucune 
vraie et juste à introduire, que nous n'y conlaissons rien, 
et qu'ainsi il faut seulement suivre les recrues: par ce 
moyen on ne les quitterait jamais." (ibid).
i
He is however aware that this sort of argument is unlikely to
carry much weight with the mass of manicind who respect laws in the belief
that they are grounded on principles of reason and justice, and who could
(2)
never be persuaded of the need to do so just because they are laws. Thus 
in order to safeguard against attempts on the part of the populace to over­
throw such laws, if they should come to see what is the real basis on which
(cont from p.311) approach cf. J. Maritain; La politique de Pascal. La revue 
universelle. t.l4, 1923, p.253.
(1) cf. Essais III, ch.13, p.320 (Gamier ed.)
(2) "Mais le peuple n'est pas susceptible de cette doctrine; et ainsi, comme
il croit que la vérité se peut trouver, et qu'elle est dans les lois et ^
coutumes, il les croit, et prend leur antiquité comme une preuve de leur vérité 
(et non de leur seule autorité sans vérité.) Ainsi il y obeit;^  mais il est 
sujet k se révolter dès qu'on lui montre qu'elles ne valent rien;..." (p.1161;
B.325)
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these rest, it is necessary to impress continually on them the inviolable
obligation of obedience:
"Injustice. - II est dangereux de dire au peuple que les
lois ne sont pas justes, car il n'y obéit qu'à cause qu'il
les croit justes. C'est pourquoi il lui faut dire en même 
temps qu'il y faut obéir parce qu'elles sont lois, comme 
il faut obéir aux supérieurs, non pas parce qu'ils sont 
justes, mais parce qu'ils sont supérieurs. Par là voilà 
toute sédition prévenue si on peut faire entendre cela, 
et ce que c'est proprement que la définition de la 
justice." (p.1161; B.326)
In view of his scepticism Pascal strictly speaking has no right to call on
the concept of obligation in its normal sense in a political context. But
if he does try to capitalize in this way on the notion of duty implicit in
the verb "falloir" to achieve his own constant object, he also takes pains
to make it clear that it has no reference past the laws themselves, and
the established authority, to any idea of objective right or justice.
The reference to the doctrine of non-resistance to the powers that 
be is especially significant in this context, since the last sentence quoted 
shows that Pascal's aim in endeavouring to promote such a law-abiding habit­
ude in the populace is the very same as that which lies behind his advocacy 
of non-resistance - the preservation of the stability of the state. J.N. 
Figgis, commenting upon the writings of the seventeenth century English 
political theorists Filmer and Nalson, notes that: "If acuter minds have 
come to the conclusion that a revolution is always inexpedient, the only 
method of making their opinion practically effective will be by inducing the 
vulgar to believe that it is always iniquitous. This was the great source 
of strength to the upholders of Passive Obedience, as the plain teaching of
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the Gospel."Pascal's emphatic recommendations in the preceding extract 
are plainly the result of his having reached such a conclusion, and it is 
his keen awareness of the nee d for a widespread prevalence of a law-abiding 
tendency, if the great object of maintaining political equilibrium is to be
(2)secured, which explains this insistence on his part.
Furthermore, this basic conviction of the paramount importance of
continuity in political institutions leads him to connive at a programme of
wholesale deception, provided that the essential law-abiding habitude can
be induced in the people;
"L'art de fronder, bouleverser les Etats, est d'ébranler 
les coutumes établies, en sondant jusque dans leur source, 
pour marquer leur défaut d’autorité et de justice. Il faut, 
dit-on, recourir aux lois fondamentales et primitives de 
l'Etat, qu'une coutume injuste a abolies. C'est un jeu 
sûr pour tout perdre; rien ne sera juste à cette balance.
Cependant le peuple prête aisément l'oreille à ces discours.
Ils secouent le joug dès qu'ils le reconnaissent; et les 
grands en profitent à sa ruine ...C'est pourquoi le plus 
sage des législateurs disait que, pour le bien des hommes, 
il faut souvent les piper; ...Il ha faut pas qu'il sente 
la vérité de l'usurpation:..."'^^ (p.1150-1; B.294)
(1) The Divine Right of Kings. p.l65.
(2) This in some ways brings Pascal within the general trend of the politic­
al thought of his day vhLch also taught, as a necessary corollary to the 
theory of nonfresistance to the secular authority, the duty of obedience to 
law. "The law to which obedience is due may be Canon Law, 'Discipline', 
Positive Law, Custom. But obedience to what is conceived as law of some 
sort, truly and not metaphorically speaking, is the universal maxim ... With 
very few exceptions, all political thinkers in the 17th century regard as 
absolute the claims of law, as they define it, to unquestioning, unvarying 
obedience." Figgis, op.cit., p.227. cf. also H. Sée, op.cit., p.172.
(3) The fragment continues: "...elle a été introduite autrefois sans raison, 
elle est devenue raisonnable; il faut la faire regarder comme authentique, 
éternelle, et en cacher le commencement si on ne veut qu'elle ne prenne 
bientôt fin." (ibid.)
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Thus the fact that the proposed plan of amelioration invariably results in 
a worse state of things than the one which it was designed to remedy is urged 
as justification for adopting this î^achiavellian policy of deliberately 
keeping the people in the dark as to the rightness of their beliefs when this 
will serve the ends of state. Those who press for reform, it is claimed, in 
addition to acting upon the baseless assumption that they have found the 
core of justice which laws should embody, entirely fail to realize that the 
insurrections they stir up will produce a general reaction in favour of 
strong government, and so end in the imposition of an even harsher tyranny 
than that borne at present. But while inculcating this doctrine of complete 
political quietism, Pascal himself fails to appreciate that if the laws in 
question are bad or irksome no amount of propaganda of this sort to prevent 
their infringement can ever make them the reverse, or teach the people to 
regard them as good and beneficent to themselves; and that nothing in the 
long run will keep them from debating whether continued submission to such 
laws is not, after all, a greater evil than a period of anarchy with its 
chances of a change for the better.
His attitude in this respect toward those who, refusing to
subscribe to his view that utility and not justice is the object of politics,
persist in their conviction that attempts should be made to bring the existing
state of things more into line with principles of justice and right, clearly
owes much to his reading of Montaigne. The latter was similarly sceptical
as to the worthwhile outcome of such attempts, and his judgements, backed
by the testimony of personal experience,must have had the effect of
(l) cf. "..ès affaires publiques, il n'est aucun si mauvais train, pourveu 
qu'il aye de l'aage et de la constance, qui ne vaille mieux que le changement 
et le remuement, ...de nos loix et usances, il y en a plusieurs barbares et
cont. p.316.
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confirming Pascal's leaning to political quietism with the consequent opposit­
ion to any movement to achieve a measure of political reform, even though he 
shows himself to be as aware as Montaigne of the shortcomings and manifest 
injustice of many established practices.
The use of the term "justice", at the end of the fragment cited
previously, in the sense of respect for the established order of things and
adherence to existing laws has two parallels in the Trois discours. Pascal
there alleges of the laws instituted to regulate succession to property that;
"..quand ces lois sont une fois établies, il est injuste de 
les violer." (p.617; G.E.IX, p.367)
And in reference to the different forms of respect awarded to various ranks
in any particular country, he affirms:
"La chose était indifférente avant 1'établissement: après 
1'établissement elle devient juste, parce qu'il est unjuste 
de la troubler." (p.6l8; G.E.IX, p.369)
The purpose behind this usage is plain from the way in which it ties in
with Pascal's subordination of justice to force. By dint of equating justice
with force, which in effect means the constituted authority, he is enabled
to provide law and the status quo with the sanction they require:
"La justice est ce qui est établi; et ainsi toutes nos lois 
établies seront nécessairement tenues pour justes sans être 
examinées, puisqu'elles sont établies." (p.1152; B.312)
(cont. from p.315) monstrueuses; toutesfois, pour la difficulté de nous mettre 
en meilleur estât, et le danger de ce crollement, si je pouvoy planter une 
cheville à nostre roue et 1'arrester en ce point, je le ferois de bon coeur: 
.." Essais.II. ch.17, p.376 (Garnier ed.) "Il y a grand doute, s'il se 
peut trouver si evident profit au changement d'une loy receue, telle qu'elle 
soit, qu'il y a de mal à la remuer, ...Je suis desgousté de la nouvelleté, 
quelque visage qu'elle porte, et ay raison, car j’en ay veu des effets très- 
dQmmageables. ...Ceux qui donnent le branle à un estât sont volontiers les 
premiers absorbez en sa ruyne. Le fîruict du trouble ne demeure guere à celuy 
qui l'a esmeu; il bat et brouille l'eaue pour d'autres pescheurs. ...Le 
meilleur pretexte de nouvelleté est très-dangereux: ...Il y a grand à dire.
cont. p.317
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This doctrine reflects both Pascal's political 'realism* and his dominant 
concern to secure stable government through universal obedience to established 
laws, for, taken as a whole, it amounts to saying that where there is no 
force there can be no sanction, and where there is no sanction there can be 
no law, for laws can be laws only when they are enforced ty superior power.
It follows therefore that from their very nature laws must always be 
expressions of force, so that, as in the case of Hobbes, it is not the content 
of rules which makes them laws but their authoritative source and the sanction 
they command. Like H o b b e s P a s c a l  thus repudiates the notion that the 
terms justice and injustice can have any meaning apart from the established 
authority. And in this way he undermines the justification of those who 
press for the reform of the status quo because of the injustice it fosters, 
since, in his terms, the possibility of justice conflicting with what is 
established cannot arise, when justice is simply what is established.
Yet if Pascal's account of the genesis and growth of law be accepted 
obviously no government can have any foundation except a de facto foundation, 
and such endeavours as the foregoing to furnish it with a de iure one must 
fall victim to his own remorseless logic. Not only does the arbitrary 
elevation of what is no more than a mere personal conviction to the status 
of a principle valid for all constitute an example of precisely the sort of 
thing at which his critique of human justice is directed, but a successful
(cont. from p.3l6) entre la cause de celui qui suyt les formes et les loix 
de son pays, et celui qui entreprend de les regenter et changer. Celuy là 
allégué pour son excuse la simplicité, 1'obéissance et 1'exemple; ..L'autre 
est en bien plus rude party, car qui se mesle de choisir et de changer, usurpe 
1'authorité de juger, et se doit faire fort de voir la faute de ce qu'il 
chasse, et le bien de ce qu'il introduit." Essais, I, ch.23, p.125-8
(l) Leviathan. 13.
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rebellion must in the nature of the case have an identical foundation.
Indeed, as the result of Pascal's espousal of the might is right theory
its claim would be superior to any advanced by a beleaguered establishment,
Hence the inconsistency vbich marks the statement occur^ng at the end of
the fragment where he equates justice with forces
"De là vient le droit de l'épée, car l'épée donne un 
véritable droit; autrement on verrait la violence d'un 
côté et la justice de l'autre, ...De là vient l'injustice 
de la Fronde, qui éléve sa prétendue justice contre la 
force." (p.1338; B.878)
Pascal does not see that, according to his own argument, if the Fronde
proved strong enough to dispossess the established authority and set a
different one in its place, then justice would be on its side. Although
his purpose in resorting to such arguments is clearly to bolster up the
established government, he apparently fails to realize the essentially
precarious nature of any body politic based on the principle that might
is right, which stems from the fact that the strong man armed is always
liable to be overthrown by a stronger than he.
(iii) Peace, the supreme political value.
Despite his belief that security of state is the highest political 
end, and his rooted antipathy to political change as the great evil to be 
avoided under all conceivable contingencies, Pascal's political teaching 
cannot be finally summed up in the maxim "salus populi supreme lex", or in
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a conception of the object of the state as "pax vitaeque securitas." He does,
it is true, in common with Hobbes and Spinoza,and with the same
individualistic motive, reduce the criteria of political conduct ultimately
to one, success in guaranteeing peace and security - a concurrence of
opinion to some extent attributable to the tenor of the age in which all
three writers lived. Yet for Pascal peace, the supreme political value, is
not an end in itself, but finds its "raison d'être" in turn in the guarantee
of continued security to the material possessions of the individual. Any
threatened danger to these justifies abandoning its
"Comme la paix dans les Etats n'a pour objet que de conserver 
les biens des peuples en assurance ... la paix n'étant juste 
et utile que pour la sûreté du bien, elle devient injuste et 
pernicieuse quand elle le laisse perdre et la guerre qui peut 
le défendre devient juste et nécessaire; .." (p.l338;B.949)
Here again there is a fresh application of the terms just and unjust,
with the criterion consisting this time in the protection of property.
Although convinced that such property has no foundation in nature, since
(2)it is contrary to the natural order of .things, and that it originally 
came into being only as the result of the sort of usurpation he here
(3)condemns,' Pascal evidently considers it one of the inevitable 
concomitants of life in society for, in the Expériences nouvelles touchant
(1) Spinoza's experiences in the Netherlands during the collapse of John de 
Witt's regime in 1672 led him to alter his original dictum, that "the true 
purpose of the State is liberty", in his last work to; "the function of the 
State is purely and simply to guarantee peace and security; it follows that the 
best State is that in which men live their lives in concord..." Quoted by S. 
Skalweit in New Cambridge Modern History. vol.V, p.108.
(2) cf. above,
(3) "Mien, tien. - Ce chien est k moi, disaient ces pauvres enfants; c'est 
Ik ma place au soleil. - Voilk le commencement et l'image de l'usurpation 
de toute la terre." (p.1151; B.295)
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le vide, he refers to:
"..l'inclination générale qu'ont tous les hommes de se maintenir
dans leurs justes possessions..." (p.364: G.E.
In the fragment from the Pensées he goes on to compare the conditions 
arising in Church and State under which the abandoning of peace for war is 
warranted, and asserts that while an obvious threat to personal possessions 
furnishes the only legitimate ground in the latter sphere, it is permissible, 
and indeed imperative, to violate ecclesiastical peace in the interests of 
truth. The obvious conclusion to which such a comparison points is that he 
ascribes to private property in the political sphere a value somehow 
analagous to that which he attributes to truth in the spiritual order.
Like his attitude of individualism in regard to property, this comparison 
also serves to emphasize, with its implication that truth has no place in 
the realm of politics, the peculiarly secularist view Pascal takes of 
political organizations, and to show just how far his occasional appeals to 
the doctrine of divine right are dictated by considerations of utility»
Since he does not look to security as providing the means which 
makes it possible for the individual to pursue other higher aims, the state 
in his view has no moral end. On the contrary he regards it as a purely 
human institution orientated to the worldly end of securing peace and the 
private goods of the individual. Thus, in common with other political 
thinkers of his age, in whom the anarchy and suffering caused by past civil
(1) Some indication of the place occupied by truth in the spiritual order 
can be gleaned from two extracts from the Provinciales; "..la vérité subsiste 
éternellement ... parce qu'elle est éternelle et puissante comme Dieu même." 
(I2th, p.805; G.E.V, p.387) "..la plus grande ,des vertus chrétiennes, qui 
est l'amour de la vérité." (I9th, p.904; G.E.VII, p.173)
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strife produced a reaction in favour of absolutism and a 'peace at any 
price' attitude, Pascal propounds what amounts to a completely 
utilitarian theory of government. In keeping with his conception of its 
characteristic end, he believes that political tranquillity is the very 
essence of any state, as well as the great object for which it exists, 
and consequently looks upon any form of political change as evil.
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Chapter two: Church and state
(i) The superiority of the Church over secular society.
Although Pascal nowhere expressly defines the relations between 
Church and State as such, or the limits of their respective powers, the 
evidence on this question which can be pieced together from his writings 
indicates that he conceives of them as two distinct entities functioning on 
widely different planes, and of correspondingly varying significance and 
value. On the one hand is the civil state, a separate and exclusively 
secular institution, ordered to the purely utilitarian end of securing 
private property, and, so far as is consonant with that, of maintaining 
peaces on the other hand is the Church, which he seems to regard as 
constituting a sort of 'societas perfecta', the embodiment of the "ordre de 
charité", modelled on his doctrine of the "membres pensants". These two 
independent societies have perfectly distinct objects in view, each of which
is to be attained by the use of means altogether unfit for the attainment of
(1)
the other.
The nature of the complete severance of Church and secular society 
is brought out in tw<a> highly figurative fragments from the Pensées, based 
on Saint Augustine's paraphrase of Psalm 137:
(l) The usual cleavage between Pascal's views and those of Domat emerges here. 
Domat regards Church and State as merely different aspects of the same society, 
for, though he is careful to separate the two spheres of power, civil and 
ecclesiastical, he nonetheless conceives of them as ideally co-operating within 
the same social and political whole to achieve the same end - a view which 
results logically from his conception of natural law, and of the origins and 
evolution of society. "On doit enfin regarder la religion comme le fondement 
le plus naturel de l'ordre de la société. Car c'est l'esprit de la religion 
qui est le principe du véritable ordre ou elle devait être. ...il est vrai que, 
dans les lieux l'on professe la véritable religion, la société est dans 
l'état le plus naturel et le plus propre pour être maintenue dans le bon ordre,
cont. p. 323
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" 'Tout ce qui est au monde est concupiscence de la chair, 
ou concupiscence des yeux, ou orgueil de la vies libido 
sentiendi, libido sciendi, libido dominandi.' Malheureuse 
la terre de malédiction que ces trois fleuves de feu 
embrasent plutôt qu'ils n'arrosent! Heureux ceux qui, 
étant sur ces fleuves, non pas plongés, non pas entraînés, 
mais jjrmiobilement affermis sur ces fleuves, non pas debout, 
mais assis dans une assiette basse et sûre, d'oû ils ne se 
relèvent pas avant la lumière, mais, après s'y être reposés 
en paix, tendent la main à celui qui les doit élever, pour 
les faire tenir debout et fermes dans les porches de la 
sainte Hiérusalem, ok l'orgueil ne pourra plus les combattre 
et les abattre; et qui cependant pleurent, non pas de voir 
écouler toutes les choses périssables que ces torrents 
entraînent, mais dans le souvenir de leur chère patrie, 
de la Hiérusalem céleste, dont ils se souviennent sans 
cesse dans la longueur de leur exil! " (p.1302; B.458)
"Les fleuves de Babylone coulent, et tombent et entraînent.
0 sainte Sion, ou tout est stable et ou rien ne tombe! Il 
faut s'asseoir sur les fleuves, non sous ou dedans, mais 
dessus; et non debout, mais assis s pour être humble, étant 
assis, et en sûreté, étant dessus. Lfeiis nous serons debout 
dans les porches de Hiérusalem.
Qu'on voie si ce plaisir est stable ou coulants s'il passe, 
c'est un fleuve de Babylone." (ibid; B.459)
That these two fragments are complementary, and that the "fleuves de
Babylone" are identical with the "trois fleuves de feu", is sufficiently
attested by the linguistic similarities in the description of the attitude
which the 'pilgrim' must adopt toward them, and by the appearance in both
of the striking image that when once the porches of the heavenly Jerusalem
will have been reached he will be 'raised up* to the appropriate upright
stance. The gist of the passages is clearly enough an account of the career
of the Churcti, that part of the Kingdom of God in a state of earthly
pilgrimage. The Church, a pilgrim society living by faith and looking to
the hereafter, provides the sole secure refuge where it is possible to
(cont. from p.322) par le concours de la religion et de la police, et par
l'union du ministère des puissances spirituelle et temporelle." Traité des
lois, ix, 8.
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escape being swept away by the ravages of sin and lust represented by the
"fleuves". And the sitting posture, so insistently prescribed, plainly
stands for the humility and contrition which membership of this body
entails,and by means of which the 'pilgrim* will be on the watch
against the sin that continually lies at the door to surprize him. The
reminiscence, that ever calls before his mind's eye the "chère patrie" to
which he belongs, symbolizes the dim but unmistakable awareness of the
higher and nobler element in his nature which points in turn to some other
and better condition whose blessings he has been obliged to forego as the
result of some grave misdemeanour - this much at least is implied in the
notion of his serving a term of exile. Peace and stability are no enduring
(2)
condition here on earth, but belong of right only to the beyond. And the 
"terre de malédiction", synonymous with this world here and now, the 
wasteland through which the Church journeys, is set in sharp contrast to 
its ultimate destination, "sainte Hiérusalem", "sainte Sion"; for "sainte", 
or some form of that word, is the term in Pascal's vocabulary used to 
denote the transcendent against which the goods of human life are measured,
(1) cf. also from the Pensées; " 'Comrainuentes cor* (saint Paul), voilà le 
caractère chrétien." (p.1302; B.533)
(2) Despite the implication here, that peace and stability do not therefore 
attach, save in figure, to the Church in its state of earthly pilgrimage, 
elsewhere in the Pensées Pascal contrasts the eternal character of the 
Church as a society with the mutability of all earthly polities which 
change and pass away: "Perpétuité. - ..le Messie est venu enfin en la 
consommation des temps; et depuis, on a vu ... tant renverser d'Etats, tant 
de changements en toutes choses; et cette Eglise, ..a subsisté sans 
interruption. Et ce qui est admirable, incomparable et tout à fait divin, 
c'est que cette religion qui a toujours duré, a toujours été combattue. ...ce 
qui est étonnant est qu'elle s'est maintenue sans fléchir et plier sous la 
volonté des tyrans. Car il n'est pas étrange qu'un Etat subsiste, lorsque 
l'on fait quelquefois céder ses lois à la nécessité,..." (p.1327-8; B.613) 
"Les Etats périraient, si on ne faisait ployer souvent les lois à la
cont. p.325
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and in the light of which they are seen to be in themselves valueless*
Now the effect of setting such a transcendent goal for human 
aspirations is inevitably to make the mere civil state appear as of no 
worth, by comparison with the supreme interests which lie beyond its 
cognizance* Moreover, the interpretation of history developed in these 
fragments, which virtually reduces the meaning of providence to the 
protection and guidance of the Church, pictured as an immutable society 
in the midst of the wreck of human institutions, must empty belief in 
progress of any reference to the world of secular affairs* Pascal is 
emphatic in this context that it is only in the Church, the partial 
representative of the Kingdom of God, that any good is to be found in this 
life* It is the point at which the transcendent "ordre de charité" 
inserts itself into the world of here and now, and hence, within its 
divinely assisted life, provides man with his sole opportunity of 
attaining to the true good.
In Pascales view the basic factor preventing any real similarity 
or even a measure of co-operation between the Church and the civil state is
(2)the universal predominance, since the Fall, of self-interest ("concupiscence"
(cont. from p.324) nécessité. Mais jamais la religion n*a souffert cela, et 
n*en a usé. **I1 n^est pas étrange qu'on se conserve en ployant, et ce n'est 
pas proprement se maintenir; et encore périssent-ils enfin entièrement: * * *
Mais cette religion se soit toujours maintenue, et inflexible, cela est divin*" 
(p.1328; B*614) Thus over against the civil state, which is forced to modify 
its laws in accordance with the prevailing political wind, and even by so 
doing can enjoy only a limited period of survival of temporal vicissitudes, 
Pascal sets the eternal Church (it is clear from the context that the terms 
"Eglise" and "religion" are used synonymously here), which has continued the 
same throughout all time, without ever stooping to compromise even in the 
face of the hostile will of earthly t^ T^ ants. Although the accuracy of 
Pascal's view^of history may be called in question, the same does not apply 
to the sincerity of his conviction that this historical fact, as he plainly 
regards it, affords proof of the supremacy and divine character of the Church.
(1) cf* below, p.8<;:zff.
(2) cf * above,
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and "amour-propre"), which only the power of the Holy Spirit, mediated hy
the Church, can counteract. Hence it is within the Church alone that he
conceives a life of true corporate fellowship possible, and herein lies its
superiority in purely social terms over any secular community.
Such a life of fellowship he envisages on the lines of the great
Stoic conception, appropriated and applied to the Church by Saint Paul,
of individual men as severally so many members of the one universal city
of h u m a n i t y . I n  Saint Paul's restatement of the image the Stoic city
was identified with Christ's body, and individual Christian believers were
described figuratively as members of this body, thus participating in the
(2)
very life of God. The following extracts illustrate Pascal's adoption
of this organic view of the Church, as a body composing and composed of
various members with Christ as its head:
"...le monde des enfants de Dieu, qui forme un corps dont 
Jésus-Christ est le chef et le roi; ... l'Eglise, qui est 
son empire, ..." (I4th Provinciale, p.830; G.E.VI, p.152)
et ceux que Dieu, par la régénération, a retirés
gratuitement du péché .. pour leur donner une place dans
son Eglise qui est son véritable temple; ..doivent sans 
cesse aspirer à se rendre dignes de faire partie du Corps
de Jésus-Christ." (3) (â Mme.Périer, p.485;G.E.II, p.485)
(1) cf. Epictetus, Discourses. II, 10: "Consider who you are. In the
first place you are a man; ..Further, you a re a citizen of the world, ..What
then does the character of a citizen promise? To hold nothing as profitable
to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he were detached from the 
community, but to act as the hand or foot would do, if they had reason and 
understood the constitution of nature, for they would never put themselves 
in motion nor desire any thing otherwise than with reference to the whole." 
(Trans. G.Long) cf. ibid., II, 5.
(2) Colossians. ii, 9 ; Corinthians, xii, 12, 26-7; Romans, xii, 5; 
Ephesians, iv, 15-16.
(3) The best account of the development of this conception of the Church is 
by E. Mersch, Le corns mvstiaue du Christ. (2 vols. Brussels, 1936, 2nd ed.)
327
This allegorical conception, which proved so fruitful when
applied to mankind at large as well as to every permanent human group by
(1)
the great Mediaeval political thinkers, is exclusively confined by
Pascal to the structure of the Church. The latter in his opinion has a
monopoly of the elements of perfect fellowship, for outside of it the
"tendance à soi", the product of "amour-propre", and the "commencement de
(2)
tout desordre", reigns unchecked. And Pascal is insistent that any
community which lives by merely cloaking this "vilain fond de l'homme" in
its members is but a hollow and seeming fellowship. Only within the
society of the Church is it possible for man to act in accordance with
"ordre", by conforming to the pattern of behaviour which in Pascal's view
forms the groundwork of the social organism: "L'on doit tendre au général".
(p.1304; B.477) And the means whereby the deadlock, caused by the
opposition of the radically anti-social bias of man's "tendance à soi" to
the socially - vital "tendance au général", is resolved in the organization
of the Church is set out at length in a fragment from the Pensées:
"Etre membre, est n'avoir de vie, d'être et de mouvement que 
par l'esprit du corps et pour le corps.
Le membre séparé, ne voyant plus le corps auquel il appartient, 
n'a plus qu'un être périssant et mourant. Cependant il croit être 
un tout, et, ne se voyant pas de corps dont il dépende, il 
croit ne dépendre que de soi, et veut se faire centre et corps 
lui-même. Mais n'ayant point en soi de principe de vie, il ne 
fait que s'égarer, ...Enfin, quand il vient à connaître, il 
est comme revenu chez soi, et ne s'aime plus que pour le 
corps....
(1) cf. Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, p.22-30
(2) of. above, p.76h
(3) cf. above, p.i^sf.and also Mme. Perier's Vie;^"Ce qu'il avait coutume de 
dire sur le sujet d'amour-propre est 'que la piété chrétienne anéantit le 
moi humain, et la civilité humaine le cache et le supprime';..." (p.29; 
G.E.I, p.101)
(4) This line by itself testifies to Pascal's debt to Epictetus in this 
regard.
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Il ne pourrait pas par sa nature aimer une autre chose 
sinon pour soi-même et pour se l'asservir, parce que chaque 
chose s'aime plus que tout, Mais en aimant le corps, il 
s'aime soi-même, parce qu'il n'a d'être qu'en lui, par 
lui et pour lui: 'Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est'.
Le corps aime la main; et la main, si elle avait une 
volonté, devrait s'aimer de la même sorte que l'âme 
l'aime. Tout amour qui va au delà est injuste.
'Adhaeretïs Deo unus spiritus est'. On s'aime, parce 
qu'on est membre de Jésus-Christ. On aime Jésus-Christ, 
parce qu'il est le corps dont on est membre. Tout est un, 
l'un est en l'autre, comme les trois Personnes."
(p.1305-6; B.483)
The adoption of the Pauline analogy of the Church as the I^stical 
Body^^^ enables Pascal to identify in this way God in Christ, as the source 
of all derived existence, with the "corps" to which the individual 
"membres" belong. Since the body and the individual members belonging to 
it have a common principle of being and basis of life, it is possible for 
the individual to love the whole while loving himself. Although so 
constituted that hy a law of his present nature he is incapable of devoting 
himself to anything apart from himself, man is quite capable of loving the 
"corps" since in so doing he is in fact loving his very self. In this 
unique instance the "tendance au général" and the "tendance à soi" coincide.
(l) Although Pascal's version of the doctrine of the mystical body is 
clearly based primarily on that adumbrated by Saint Paul, his familiarity 
with the thought of Saint Augustine must also have had some part in shaping 
his conceptions in this respect. In The City of God the latter refers
to "that advent of the Saviour by which he is coming through all the present
time in his Church, that is to say im his members,...for it is all his 
Body." (XX, V) Again in one of his letters he writes of the 'civitas Dei' 
that; "The only basis and bond of a true city is that of faith and strong 
concord when the object of love is the universal good - which is, in its 
highest and truest character, God himself - and men love one another, with
full sincerity, in Him, and the ground of their love for one another is the
love of him..." Quoted by E. Barker in his Introduction to The City of God 
(Everyman ed.), p.xxvii. For further references cf. Mersch, op.cit., vol.II, 
p.49-60.
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By applying the category of organism in this way Pascal therefore ensures
that in the Church the conception of a common weal supersedes that of self-
interest, which lies at the root of all secular associations.Moreover,
since he insists that the Christian stands to the Church in the relation of
an organ to the body, so that the individual member is dependent on the
mystical body in the same way as a hand or foot is dependent on the huioan
(2)
body, it follows that the Church in this sense is indispensable to the
member, who depends upon it for full existence, which can only be had by
participating in its life, ihid in thus assimilating the society of the
Church to the human body, and its members to bodily organs, Pascal
effectively combats what he regards as a false conception of the self as an
isolated unit concerned with its own satisfaction. On the organic view
the individual is no mere isolated self but part of a whole, nor is he
intended to pursue the interest of the isolated self but to fill a place
and purpose in the whole, whereby his own fullest satisfaction will be
(3)found.
(1) cf. above, p.sA&f.
(2) cf. the further fragment from the Pensées; "Si le pied avait toujours * 
ignore qu'il appartînt au corps, et qu'il y eût un corps dont il dépendît, 
s'il n'avait eu que la connaissance et l'amour de soi, et qu'il vînt à 
connaître qu'il appartient à un corps dont il dépend, quel regret,...d'avoir 
été inutile au corps qui lui a influé la vie, qui l'eût anéanti s'il l'eût 
rejeté et séparé de soi, comme il se séparait de lui! ..." (p.1304-5; B.476)
(3) cf. from the Pensées; "Si les pieds et les mains avaient une volonté 
particulière, jamais ils ne seraient dans leur ordre qu'en soumettant cette 
volonté particulière à la volonté première qui gouverne le corps entier.
Hors de là, ils sont dans le désordre et dans le malheur; mais, en ne voulant 
que le bien du corps, ils font leur propre bien." (p.l304jB.475) Thus to 
selfishly seek one's own satisfaction without regard for the "corps" to 
which one belongs, thereby refusing to subordinate oneself to God who wills 
that each individual should aim at the good of all, is to ultimately thwart 
one's own supreme desire for happiness. Pascal finds it impossible or 
undesirable to divest his ethics of their basically egocentric tendency even 
when engaged in recommending an organic way of life, for he here declares 
that in the last analysis to aim at the good of the whole is nothing else 
than to aim at one's own good.
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The intimacy of the union which binds the "membres" to each other
and to Christ, in whom the organism has its root of existence and principle
of unity, is emphasized fcy the comparison which Pascal makes with the unity
of the three persons in the Trinity.And not only is the Church not
conceived of apart from Christ, but in Pascal's opinion it is simply the
prolonging of his life, for he continues present and immanent in it, as
the vitalizing principle from which comes its growth and strength. Whence
the numerous assertions that the sufferings of Christians are the filling-up,
as it were, of the sufferings of Christ himself:
"...nous savons que ce qui est arrivé en Jésus-Christ doit 
arriver en tous ses membres." (à M.et Mme.Périer, p.492;
G.E.II, p.542)
"C'est un des grands principes du christianisme, que tout 
ce qui est arrivé à Jesus-Christ doit se passer ét dans 
l'âme et dans le corps de chaque Chrétien;.." (ibid.,
G.E. ibid)
"Entrez dans mon coeur et mon âme pour y porter mes 
souffrances, et pour continuer d'endurer en moi ce 
qui vous reste à souffrir de votre Passion, que vous 
achevez dans vos membres jusqu'à la consommation parfaite 
de votre Corps;..." fPrière pour le bon usage des 
maladies, p.614; G.E.IX p.339-AO)
"Il faut ajouter mes plaies aux siennes, et me joindre 
à lui,..." (Mvstèï*e de Jésus, p.1315; B.553)
Since membership of this mystical body of Christ, which represents
the Church, pre-supposes as a necessary step some form of union of man with
God Pascal believes that it can only be finally achieved through grace:
"Si on vous unit à Dieu, c'est par la grâce, non par la 
nature." (p.1225; B.430;
"..l'homme, par la grâce est rendu comme semblable à Dieu 
et participant de sa divinité..." (p.1208; B.434)
(1) cf. also; "M.de Condren: Il n'y a point, dit-il, de comparaison de 
l'union des saints à celle de la Sainte Trinité. Jésus-Christ dit le 
contraire." (p.l306; B.943)
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The value which Pascal accords to grace in this respect as a socializing
power is evident from the fact that he attributes to its agency the
eradication from man of those selfish tendencies which undermine all purely
secular social endeavours:
"...Jésus-Christ qui, d'un homme plein ... de concupiscence, 
d'orgueil et d'ambition, a fait un homme exempt de tous ces 
maux par la force de sa grâce, .." (p.l311;B.550)
Pascal forcefully underlines the antithesis between Church and
state as two opposing societies, based the one on supernatural grace the
other on concupiscence, assigning to each its relative worth, at the
conclusion of the Trois discours sur la condition des grands. Having shown
his aristocratie pupil that he is destined by virtue of his title to become
a "roi de concupiscence", and that in this sphere his authority will
represent in miniature that of the greatest temporal monarchs, so that
what applies to him individually can be said to apply to the whole realm
of secular politics, Pascal rounds off his advice with the following
exhortation: ;
"II faut mépriser la concupiscence et son royaume, et 
aspirer à ce royaume de charité ou tous les sujets ne 
respirent que la charité, et ne désirent que les biens 
de la charité." (p.620-1; G.E.K, p.373)
Thus when it is alleged in the Pensées that "Dieu donne dans la 
morale la charité, qui produit des fruits contre la concupiscence," and 
then one of the long fragments taken up with the exposition of the "membres"
(2)theory is introduced under the rubric "Morale". this implies in Pascal's 




type of conduct on which the Church sets its ,corporate mind and will.
Moreover, the fact that these "fruits" are directed against concupiscence,
the mainspring of all secular conduct, points to the existence of a sharp
cleavage in this respect between the Church and any other community. The
following extract^attest Pascal's conviction that this is the case;
"Dieu fera une Eglise pure au dedans, qui confonde par 
sa sainteté intérieure et toute spirituelle 1'impiété 
intérieure des sages superbes et des pharisiens; et 
l'Eglise fera une assemblée d'hommes, dont les moeurs 
extérieures soient si pures, qu'elles confondent les 
moeurs des païens." (p.1337; B.905)
"...les lois ecclésiastiques, qui doivent être 
incomparablement plus saintes que les lois civiles et 
païennes,puisqu'il n'y a que l'Eglise qui connaisse 
et qui possède la véritable sainteté." (l4th Provinciale. 
p.826; G.E.VI, p.145)
"...au lieu que les créatures qui composent le monde 
s'acquittent de leur obligation en se tenant dans une 
perfection bornée, parce que la perfection du monde est 
aussi bornée, les enfants de Dieu ne doivent point mettre 
de limites à leur pureté et à leur perfection, parce qu'ils 
font partie d'un corps tout divin et infiniment parfait;.(^)
(à Ntoe.Périer, p.4B5;G.E.II, p.252)
- t u
As Pascal sees it therefore both^external framework of the Church, and the 
inward life of its members, bear upon them, in virtue of their supernatural 
inspiration, the stamp of "sainteté", which sets them apart from, and 
immeasurably higher than, their pagan or secular counterparts. Nor does 
Pascal consider himself constrained by the attitude he adopts to the Jesuit 
moral theologians to posit these conditions of an 'ideal' Church - he simply 
resorts, when they are in question, to a definition of the Church as the
(1) On the triple gradation apparent in this and the preceding extract - 
"païennes, civiles, ecclésiastiques"; "païens, sages, Eglise" - cf. below,p.3^
(2) cf. also from the Pensées; "Preuve.- ..(2) La sainteté, la hauteur et 
l'humilité d'une âme chrétienne." (p.1228; B.289)
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'ecclesiastical body*, from which all such "religieux relâchés et casuistes 
corrompus" are excluded.
(ii) Authority in the Church; the 'Christian Republic'
The difference between authority in its origin, form and function 
in Church and in state is no less marked than that between their respective 
social structures and qualities of life. Thus in the Pensées Pascal notes 
that:
"Le pape est premier. Quel autre est connu de tous?
Quel autre est reconnu de tous ayant le pouvoir d'insinuer 
dans tout le corps, parce qu'il tient la maîtresse branche, 
qui s'insinue mrtout? Qu'il était aisé de faire dégénérer 
cela en tyranni^ C'est pourquoi Jésus-Christ leur â posé 
ce précepte; 'Vos autem non sic'." (p.l335;B.972)
"Les rois disposent de leur empire; mais les papes ne 
peuvent disposer du leur." (ibid.; B.877)
Since he cites in the same fragment Luke's account of Christ setting the
dominion of kings in contrast to the mutual love and service of the Kingdom
of God ("The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them...But ye
shall not be so"...XXII, 25-6), Pascal obviously does not intend his
assertion that the pope is foremost as an acknowledgement that in a political
context the pope is above the law, that his see holds primacy or that he
has 'plenitude potestatis'. If his own definition of the term 'tyranny'
be applied to that word in the present context, it is clear that he would
(l) p.1332; B.889. cf. "...le Corps de la hiérarchie en quoi consiste 
proprement l'Eglise..." (Pro.iet de mandement, p.941; G.E.VII, p.383) 
"..l'Eglise étant proprement dans le corps de la hiérarchie..." (p.l333;B.889j
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consider the perversion of the papal 'cura' into 'dominium', even in the 
spiritual realm, to be the outcome of a "désir de domination universel et 
hors de son o r d r e " , a  translation into spiritual terms of temporal 
sovereignty. He believes it is of the essence of the Church to be different 
from the civil state, and hence that care must be exercised to ensure that 
its distinctive character is preserved, particularly in those aspects where 
there is most danger of this being assimilated to the secular. In the 
case in point the disparity is made plain by the fact that the pope, unlike 
a secular monarch, cannot be lord but must be minister of all as Christ 
affirmed.
And although Pascal's views on the crucial question of the nature 
of papal supremacy in the Church exhibit some inconsistency, on the whole
(2)he inclines to the opinion that the papal power is only representative,
and that the real authority in the Church is that which exists diffusively
in the whole 'communitas fidelium';
"Eglise, pape. Unité, multitude. - En considérant l'Eglise 
comme unité, le pape, qui en est le chef, est comme tout.
En la considérant comme multitude, le pape n'en est qu'une 
partie. Les Pères l'ont considérée, tant&t en une manière,
tantôt en l'autre; et ainsi ont parlé diversement du pape....
Mais en établissant une de ces deux vérités, ils n'ont pas 
exclu l'autre. La multitude qui ne se réduit pas à l'unité 
est confusion; l'unité qui ne dépend pas de la multitude est 
tyrannie. Il n'ya presque plus que la France ou il soit 
permis de dire que le Concile est au-dessus du pape."(3)
(p.1335; B.871)
(1) cf. above, p . ^ 9 3 ,
(2) %his cornes out very plainly in the following assertions "Toutes les fois 
que lés Jésuites surprendront le pape, on rendra toute la Chrétienté parjure." 
(p.l073; B.882)
(3) Pascal here endorses the standpoint of the Concilier Party, whose views 
were advanced so forcefully in the later Middle Ages by Marsilius of Padua, 
Ockham and Nicolas of Cusa, according to which supreme power in the Church 
is in the last resort the Church itself in the shape of a general council
cont. p.335
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" ' Duo aut très in unum'. L'unité et la multitudes 
Erreur à exclure l'une des deux, comme font les papistes, 
qui excluent la multitude, ou les huguenots, qui excluent 
l'unité." (p.l335; B.874)
"Je loue de tout mon coeur le petit zèle que j'ai reconnu 
dans votre lettre pour l'union avec le Pape. Le corps n'est 
non plus vivant sans le chef, que le chef sans le corps.
Quiconque se sépare de l'un ou de l'autre n'est plus du
corps, et n'appartient plus à Jésus-Ghrist." (à Mlle, de
Roannez, p.513; G.E.VI, p.216-7)
"..le pape...qui est le souverain chef de l'Eglise..."
(I7th Provinciale, p.894; G.E. VI, p.343)
"...de représenter au pape, avec toute la soumission que 
des enfants doivent à leur père, et les membres à leur 
chef, qu'on peut l'avoir surpris..." (l8th Provinciale, 
p.894; G.E.VII, p.42)
Despite the fact that the last two extracts here show a tendency to gather
all authority in the Church at the centre, as in the civil state, it is
evident from Pascal's insistence on the equal importance of the two factors
"unite" and "multitude" that the papacy in his view is but the instrument
and incorporation of the visible unity of the Church. The pope is merely
one member among others of the body politic of the Church, even if he is
the terrestrial symbol of its corporate unity. And Pascal's opposition in
this regard to the theories of the Ultramontanist party is clear when he
uses their stock argument, from the necessity for connection with the
(cont. from p.334) formed of clergy and laity alike, (cf.Gierke, op.cit., 
p.49-61, and Poole, op.cit., p.234 and 24J) The stipulation that the 
occupant of the papal office, itself regarded as essential only in order to 
preserve the unity of the Church, should be as far as possible fully 
representative, points to a much more 'liberal' attitude in ecclesiastical 
politics than was apparent in the theory of civil government outlined in 
the previous chapter. For such a view of the almost popular origin of 
authority in the ecclesiastical sphere has no coi^erpart in the secular 
sphere, nor is there any suggestion that, as i&%former councils act as 
restraints on papal authority, so in the latter similar regulative functions 
should be exercised 1:^ parliaments in a monarchy or by magistrates in a 
republic. On the contrary Pascal's theory of sovereignty leaves no room 
at all for the consent of the people at large in the foundation of political 
authority; he sees the relationship holding between a prince and his
cont. p.336
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rightful head if the body is not to languish, to show that, just as the 
Church cannot exist without the pope, so the pope cannot exist without the 
Church.
Since he regards the pope as before all else representative, as the 
exponent almost of the Church, this means that for Pascal the true 
depositary of sovereignty in the Church lies elsewhere. As the first of 
the preceding passages amply attests, he believes that it is in the whole 
society of the Church, in the organic expression of a Council, that true 
authority resides. By making the papal power subject in this way to the 
general voice of Catholic Christendom the danger of its taking on the form 
of civil dominion is removed. For it is not as a body held together by 
common obedience to one divinely-appointed spiritual authority, the pope, 
that Pascal envisages the Church, but much rather as a body whose unity, 
of which the love spread abroad in the hearts of its members by the Holy 
Spirit is the foundation and bond, is merely symbolized the pope.
This basically corporate nature of the Church as it appears to 
Pascal is further illustrated by his references to it as the "république 
chrétienne" t
(cont. from p.335) "parlement" as exactly parallel to that between God and 
his Church - just as the Church would cease to be the Church in the event 
of its proceeding to grant absolution without God, so a "parlement" acting 
in like fashion would cease to be a "parlement" and become a "corps revolte", 
(p.1336; B.870)
(l) In view of the essentially democratic system of the Church which he 
thus formulates, and of his recognition that it possesses its own inherent 
power of life, it is surprising that Pascal does not further develop the 
organic conception in this context along the lines of Althusius's profound 
and fruitful idea of an ascending series of independently functioning 
associations, particularly when he adumbrates elsewhere something very 
closely resembling this. cf. above, p.^i^hYet for all the fact that the aim 
of his doctrine of the "membres pensants" is to relate, under the inspiration 
of divine grace, the corporate effort of an organic community to a common 
end, there is a total absence of any form of association intervening 
between the individual "membres" and the general "corps".
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"Deux lois suffisent pour régler toute la République 
chrétienne,vl) mieux que toutes les lois politiques."
(p.1306; B.484)
"République. - La république chrétienne, et même 
judaïque, n'a eu que Dieu pour maître, ...Quand ils 
combattaient, ce n'était que pour Dieu; ils n'espéraient 
principalement que de Dieu;.." (p.1233; B.6II)
The choice of the substantive "république" is %mrticularly significant in
this context for, although the expression is clearly figurative, it does
serve to underline the importance which he attaches to the fundamental
equality of all the members, pope included, of the corporate society of
the Church.
(iii) Unitv as a criterion of value.
The primacy viiich Pascal accords to unity, as indispensable for the 
Church if it is to form a social organism whose members act in view of a 
common aim and object, has its corollary in a view of schism as the supreme 
evil in this respect. Thus, despite the fact that the moral teaching of the 
Jesuit casuists must tend to besmirch the characteristic "sainteté" of the 
Christian rule of life, yet the respect which they show for the Church's 
unity entitles them, in Pascal's opinion, to the fraternal affection of their 
fellow "membres", and radically distinguishes them from the heretics, however 
saintly the latter may be to all outward appearances;
(1) The'two laws' alluded to here are plainly the two commandments which 
Christ, according to Mathew (XXII, 35-40), cited as constituting the basis 
of "all the law and the prophets".
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"...ils sont dans l’unité de l’Eglise, ils sont membres 
de notre Corps, et ainsi nous avons intérêt k les conserver, 
au lieu que les hérétiques sont des membres retranchés 
qui composent un Corps ennemi du notre; ce qui met une 
distance infinie entre eux, parce que le schisme est un 
si grand mal, que non seulement il est le plus grand des 
maux, mais qu’il ne peut y avoir aucun bien où il se 
trouve, ...
..••le schisme des hérétiques qui se séparent de la 
communion de leurs frères, et usurpant ainsi le jugement 
de Dieu, tombent dans le plus détestable des crimes."
(Cinquième écrit des curés de Paris, p.936-7;G.E.VII, 
p.368-371)
Schism therefore, the breach of the bond of love and fellowship which should
unite the members of the %stical Body, represents the assertion of self-
sufficient individualism, characteristic of man moved by concupiscence,
as against the recognition and acceptance by all of complete interdependence,
which constitutes the groundwork of the Church as a society. And so vital
does Pascal deem this organic unity of the "corps", compacted by the mutual
love and service of all the individual "membres", that he denies to the
heretics any capacity for good:
"... il est certain, selon tous les‘Pères, qu’il n’y a 
aucun bien dans les hérétiques, quelque vertu qui y 
paraisse, puisqu’ils ont rompu l’unité. ...parmi les 
hérétiques, nul n’est exempt d’erreur, et tous sont 
certainement hors de la charité, puisqu’ils sont hors 
de l’unité." (ibid; G.E.VII, p.371-2)
By setting up unity in this way as the criterion Pascal is in 
effect saying that those without the Church are incapable of any real 
good, that their ’virtue’ is sham, and this because they are "hors de la 
charité". Thus to cut oneself off from the Church's stream of communal
(l) "charité" is elsewhere described as "l'âme et la vie des vertus 
chrétiennes". (5th Provinciale, p.706;G.E.IV, p.303) Saint Augustine in On 
Christian Doctrine, refers to "charity itself, which holds men together in a 
knot of unity,.." (Prologue, 6) Later in the same treatise, he writes of the 
Church that Christ "binds His body, which has many members performing diverse 
offices, in a bond of unity and charity which is, as it were, its health." 
(XVI, 15) cf. also Mersch, op.cit., vol.II, p.51 ff.
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life is, in his view, not merely to inflict a wound on its unity, but is
furthermore to deprive oneself of the sine qua non of right conduct. This
relativist outlook is even more marked in the letters to Mlle.de Roannezs
"..hors de l’Eglise il n’y a que malédiction." (3rd, 
p.509; G.E.VI, p.85)
"Nous savons que toutes les vertus, le martyre, les 
austérités et toutes les bonnes oeuvres sont inutiles
hors de l’Eglise, et de la communion du chef de l’Eglise,
qui est le Pape." (6th, p.513; G.E.VI, p.217)
The visible Catholic Church therefore is not simply the exclusive pale of
salvation, but is also the sole dispenser of what may be described as the
condition of merit with respect to conduct.
A further consequence of thus restricting virtuous actions to the 
members of the Church, the only true society, is that any possibility of 
virtue must also be denied to the aeons between Adam and Jesus Christ, 
which should strictly speaking include even the Jews. Indeed, arguments 
from unity aside, since human nature apart from grace is so depraved it 
will be impossible for the heathen to possess genuine virtue, even though 
they may perform actions which in the Christian would be symptoms of that 
very quality:
"Les exemples des morts généreuses des Lacédémoniens et 
autres ne nous touchent guère. Car qu’est-ce que cela nous 
apporte? Mais l’exemple de la mort des martyres nous 
touche; car ce sont ’nos membres’. Nous avons un lien 
commun avec eux: leur résolution peut former la nôtre, 
non seulement par 1’exemple, mais parce qu'elle a peut- 
être mérité la nôtre. Il n'est rien de cela aux 
exemples des païens; nous n'avons point de liaison à 
eux; comme on ne devient pas riche pour voir un étranger 
qui l'est, mais bien pour voir son père ou son mari qui 
le soient." (p.l306-f; B.481)
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One may question the factual basis in everyday life of this final analogy, 
but the important point is the absolute cleavage which Pascal sees fixed 
between these two groups, which form as it were two completely watertight 
compartments. The relativist attitude which results from such a conception 
what would call for admiration and emulation if done by Christians becoming 
a matter of total indifference when it occurs in the pagan camp - also 
appeared in his treatment of the heretics. And the sense of the exclusive 
unity of the Church, which stems from the common root of existence of all 
its members, is particularly marked in this passage - Pascal considers the 
solidarity of the ’communio sanctorum’ to be such that the social bonds of 
the Christian stretch beyond the confines of this life to those who have 
gone before.
This notion of a sharp contrast between pagan and Christian, which 
underlies the whole of Pascal’s thought and produces such a harsh attitude 
to the ’virtuous pagans’, has its roots in the Jansenist tradition. 
Jansenius himself, in his chapters dej^^ed to the ancient philosophers 
and the infidels, claims that, according to Saint Augustine, when pagans 
appear to perform some virtuous act they are in fact committing sins, and 
categorically affirms that: "..nullum ab hominibus qui carent fide posse 
fieri opus bonum, sed solum raendacia atque peccata".^^^ Since he lacks 
faith the infidel’s acts must proceed according to the dictates of his own 
will, without the inspiration of divine grace which alone can make them 
meritorious; and Jansenius therefore concludes that: "Omnia omnino opera
(l) Augustinus, t.II, l.iv, c.l. For Augustine’s views in this respect cf. 
Gilson, L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, p.335 f.
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infidelium, nullo excepto, ess© vera peccata, nec esse posse nisi
p e c c a t a . T h i s  position is duly endorsed by Arnauld in his Seconde
apologie pour Monsieur Jansenius;
" la foi nous apprend deux choses. L'une, que la 
conniption d'Adam a passé en toute sa races l'autre, 
que le seul et unique remède qui la peut guérir, est 
la foi en ce Nom divin, ...de sorte qu'on ne peut douter 
que cette corruption ne soit toute entière dans les 
Payens et les infidèles; puisque c'est en celle que 
consiste, ou en tout ou en partie, le péché originel, 
qui vit et qui règne nécessairement dans les infidèles, 
tant qu'ils demeurent infidèles. D'db il s'ensuit que 
...quoiqu'ils fassent, quoiqu'ils entreprennent, 
quelque résolution même de bien vivre qu'ils puissent 
prendre, ils retombent toujours dans cette dépravation 
générale,..."(2)
(iv) Ideal values in the Church; justice and truth.
Since Pascal believes that the Church has a monopoly of the 
elements of true fellowship, as well as of the springs of true virtue, it is 
hardly surprising that he should look to it for those values which he asserts 
to be conspicuously absent from the civil state. In regard to justice, he 
shows in one fragment from the Pensées how on the secular level this must 
be aligned with force because, given the peculiar characteristics of the two, 
it is impossible to reverse the procedure, and "autrement on verrait la
(1) Augustinus. loc.cit., c.3-
(2) Oeuvres. XVII,p.325. Maurice Pellisson, in his article. La sécular­
isation de la morale au XVIIIe siècle, points out that this harsh attitude to 
virtuous and illustrious pagans was the rule rather than the exception in 
moralistic literature in France in the latter part of the 17th century, and 
cites from Bossuet, Fléchier, Bourdaloue, Massillon and others in support of 
this view. La révolution franchise. 1903> 388-90.
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violence d'un côté et la justice de l'autre". The fragment concludes 
however with the following statement;
"II n'en est pas de même dans l'Eglise; car il y a une 
justice véritable, et nulle violence." (p.l338;B.878)
The civil state therefore can never hope to incorporate even a measure of
true justice in its laws or socia.1 structure, but, in order to preserve
some sort of concord, is obliged to arbitrarily ordain that what is by sheer
brute force is just, in the sense that it must be respected. In the Church,
on the other hand, the opposite holds good - it is the embodiment of true
(2)
justice, and hence has no place for violence in its organization.
A similar contrast is implied when Pascal maintains that the
Christian's happiness in the present life is not entirely an anticipatory
one, and proceeds to show in what it consists:
"L'espérance que les Chrétiens ont de posséder un bien 
infini est mêlée de jouissance effective aussi bien que 
de crainte; car ce n'est pas comme ceux qui espéreraient 
un ro3raume dont ils n'auraient rien, étant sujets; mais 
ils espèrent la sainteté, 1'exemption de 1'injustice, et 
ils en ont quelque chose." (p.1301; B.540)
An interesting question posed by the phraseology of this fragment is how
far Pascal intends the second component of the Christian hope to constitute
a definition of the first, so that "justice" would be synonymous with
(1) Pascal is a good deal more radical in this regard than Saint Augustine 
even, for the latter holds that the true basis of civil law is not in mere 
human convention or expediency, but in the divine eternal law; there 
is no element of justice or righteousness in temporal laws except what has 
been derived by men from that eternal law." Of Free Will. 1,15. "He who 
draws up temporal laws, if he is a good and wise man, takes eternal life 
into account, ...He determines for the time being vhat is to be commanded 
and forbidden according to the immutable rules of eternal life." Of True 
Religion. XXXI, 58.
(2) Pascal's consistency on this point is attested by the following cryptic 
note;"L*Inquisition et la Société, les deux fléaux de la vérité."(p.1073; 
B.920)
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" s a i n t e t é " . The juxtaposition of the pair of substantives certainly 
admits of this interpretation, and at all events the syntax shows how 
closely linked in meaning the two are in his eyes. Such a hope of release 
from injustice bears with it obvious derogatory implications in regard to 
the actual conditions of the society to which the expectant belongs. And 
in Pascal's terms the actual enjoyment here and now, the foretaste as it 
were, of the true justice and beatitude which he believes awaits him in 
the hereafter, can only be had by the Christian through his participation
in the life of the Church. It is there alone, by means of the grace of
which it is the sole medium, that men are able in this life to live with
(2)
one another in that relationship of true justice synonymous with "charité".
The fundamental contrast between Church and civil state is further
emphasized with respect to the different ends in view of which both strive
to maintain peace:
"Comme la paix dans les Etats n'a pour objet que de conserver
les biens des peuples en assurance, de même la paix dans
l'Eglise n'a pour objet que de conserver en assurance la 
vérité, qui est son bien, et le trésor où est son coeur."
. (p.l338; B.949)
The fragment continues with a comparison of the conditions in Church and
(3)state under which it is justifiable to abandon peace for way. Since it 
is legitimate for the state to resort to arms only in the face of an obvious 
threat to private property, whereas it would be criminal to attempt to keep
(1) cf. from the Pensées: "..sans la faim des choses spirituelles on s'en 
ennuie. Faim de la justice; béatitude huitième." (p.1155; B.264)
(2) cf. also; "..le libérateur, le Saint des saints, amènera la justice 
éternelle, non la légale, mais l'éternelle." (p.1269; B.692) "..la continuation 
de la justice des fidèles n'est autre chose que la continuation de 1'infusion 
de la grâce,..." (à Mme.Périer, p.488; G.E.II, p.380)
(3) cf. above, p.3i<j.
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peace in the Church if this were detrimental to the interests of truth,
Pascal concludes that as far as the Church is concerned in this regard;
"La vérité est donc la première règle et la dernière fin 
des choses," (ibid.)
It is clear from this comparison that in his view, whereas the 
civil state is wholly utilitarian in bias, geared to the end of securing 
the private goods of the individual, the foremost concern of the Church on 
the other hand, the function which it exists to fulfil, is to guarantee the
truth. And this preoccupation of the Church with truth is brought out
again in a rather similar context in the Second écrit des curés de Paris. 
Pascal there sets himself to refute the Jesuit charge, levelled at his 
colleagues and himself, that they are guilty of disturbing the peace and 
tranquillity of the Church in hampering the Jesuits in the free propogation 
of their doctrines;
..1'Ecriture nous enseigne que Jésus-Christ est venu 
apporter au monde non seulement 'la paix', mais aussi 
'1'épée et la division', parce que toutes ces choses 
sont nécessaires chacune en leur temps pour le bien de 
la vérité, qui est la dernière fin des fidèles, au lieu
- que la paix et la guerre n'en sont que les moyens, et
ne sont légitimes qu'à proportion de l'avantage qui en revient 
à la vérité." (p.924; G.E.VII, p.319-20)
Nor does Pascal simply believe that the Church is by its nature
orientated to the end of 'conserving the truth' - he even goes so far as
to identify the fortunes of truth with those of the Church;
"L'histoire de l'Eglise doit être proprement appelée 
l'histoire de la vérité." (p.1328; B.858)
And here again the Church's superiority over any mere civil state, which on
Pascal's theory has no place among its objectives for truth but is confined
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to a purely material sphere of activity, stems from its divine institution.
Thus in the Abrégé de la vie de Jésus-Ghrist. he interprets Christ's
promise to the apostles, that he will be with them until the consummation
of time through his grace, authority and spirit, as follows;
"En quoi il promet deux choses, l'une que jamais l'Eglise 
ne périra,..; l'autre que jamais elle ne sera destituée 
de la connaissance de la vérité." (p.654-5; G.E.XI,p.90)
(v) The dualism implicit in Pascal's estimate of Church and seculay 
society; its inconsistencies
Pascal's emphasis on the Church, with its paramount significance
as the depositary and dispenser of the social means of grace, is in a sense
the indispensable corollary of his view of original sin. Since his belief
in the providential ordering of human affairs leads him to envisage the
Fall as the beginning of all secular and profane history, it is necessary
for him to set up another order, a society of grace, through which Christ's
redemptive sacrifice can be made effective. Thus he holds that;
"La foi chrétienne ne va presque qu'à établir ces deux 
choses; la corruption de la nature, et la rédemption de 
Jésus-Christ;,,."^^') (p.1176; B.194)
As a result the coming of Jesus Christ represents the turning-point of
history in his opinion. For, precisely as men by their origin are in
communion with Adam's sin and participate in his death, so those who enter
into communion with Christ become partakers of his life and righteousness;
(l) Thus, if men "ne servent pas à montrer la vérité de la rédemption par la 
sainteté de leurs moeurs, ils servent au moins admirablement à montrer la 
corruption de la nature", by their indifference to their own destiny.(ibid).
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"o..Jésus-Christ par sa nouvelle vie a communiqué la vie 
k tous ceux qui sont renés en lui, comme Adam avait \
communiqué la mort à tous ceux qui étaient nés de lui."^ ^
(Abrégé de la vie de Jésus-Christ. p,625-6;G.E.XI, p.7)
And this corporate life in Christ is, in Pascal's view, a power entering
into history and unfolding there in social form, just as sin transmitted
by descent from Adam had done. Whence the origin of the Church:
"Alors Jésus-Christ vient dire aux hommes ...qu'il vient 
pour détruire leurs passions, et pour leur donner sa grâce, 
afin de faire d'eux tous une Eglise sainte,..."
(p.1295; B.783)
From this time forth therefore history is ambivalent - the 
direction of secular history is absolutely determined, since man, without 
the grace which operates a change in his moral climate, has an ineluctable 
propensity toward evil ty reason of original sin and the concupiscence 
which follows in its train. For Pascal the problem of secular progress 
simply does not arise. As he sees it secular history is essentially 
unprogressive: a tenet which he accepts quite unreservedly, and from which 
it is an easy step to deduce that no form of civil society can be better
(3)or worse than any other. The civil state has its own course separately 
from any contact with grace, which is mediated through the instrument of 
the corporate society of the Church. Secular history therefore is a record
(1) For Saint Augustine's similar view of all history as a great drama with
its supreme crises in the Fall and the Redemption, which have set moving the
course of two opposing societies, cf. Mersch, op.cit., vol.II p.66-9
(2) This ideally all-embracing character of the Church, as the society of the 
redeemed, is further emphasized in this fragment: "..qu'il vient ramener dans 
cette Eglise les païens et les Juifs;.." (ibid), and also in the Premier écrit 
sur la grâce, when Pascal alleges that even to those who reject the sacrament
of baptism as administered by its priests, which confers membership of the
Christian society, the Church does not close its doors, but "..en imitant son 
chef, elle tend les bras aux uns et aux autres pour les appeler tous et les 
embrasser ensuite ensemble pour former une heureuse union." (p.955;G.E.XI,p.I40)
(3) This conclusion undoubtedly contributes to the attitude of unmitigated 
opposition to any form of political change noted above, p.Snfél
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of corruption and falling-away rather than of progress, for it is only 
through the process of redemption, worked by the action of the Holy Spirit 
in the body of the Church, by means of which hunan nature is released 
from its transmitted bias toward sin and restored to spiritual freedom, that 
the marks of any true progress can be detected in man.
Moreover, the extent to which Pascal regards the Redemption as
the one central event in history is evident from the fact that it is not
as a superior 'gnosis', but above all as a scheme of redemption, that he
commends Christianity:
"...la religion chrétienne consiste proprement au mystère 
du Rédempteur, qui unissant en lui les deux natures, humaine 
et divine, a retiré les hommes de la corruption du péché 
pour les réconcilier à Dieu en sa divine personne."
(p.1280; B.556)
And for Pascal the supreme.value of the Church as an institution derives 
from the fact that, as the body of Christ, it is the vehicle of this 
redemption, uniting regenerate humanity as the 'members' of its organic 
society under the law of charity.
However, such an abrupt contrast of the opposing secular and 
sacred orders leads him to the rather paradoxical position where a large 
number of persons must be simultaneously members of both, amphibious beings 
leading a double life in two worlds and serving both God and Mammon. The 
passage in the fourteenth Provinciale, where he details the obligations of 
the "enfants de l'Eglise" in regard to the civil authorities,attests his 
recognition of the necessity, as far as the Christian is concerned, of such 
a two-fold membership. Since he affirms in this context and elsewhere
(1) cf. also p.1292; B.$60 / p.1311; B.550, and the Entretien avec M. de Saci. 
p.571-2; G.E.IV, p.53-4.
(2) cf. above, p.301,
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that the state is of divine institution, and that its officers have 
authority hy divine appointment for the maintenance of civil order, it 
follows that in his terms the Christian at any rate is under two authorities, 
both d i v i n e y e t  wholly distinct in sphere. For Pascal exhibits no 
tendency to endorse the conception of a ’Christian State*, which assumes 
that Church and state comprise the same people in different capacities.
One can only conclude that he believes it possible somehow for 
the members of the two socie/ties to meet and mingle physically without 
establishing any form of spiritual contact, since he sees no prospect 
of the Christian inspiration permeating the secular consciousness and so 
implementing a process of gradual improvement there. The Church in his 
view is most definitely a 'kingdom not of this world', and must be jealously 
guarded lest it become tainted with the spirit of the world. Nor is there 
any question of its members fulfilling their Biblical role, and acting as 
the 'leaven of the lump' or as the 'salt of the earth'. They apparently 
exert no influence by their personal action on their social environment, and 
the superior qualities which are alleged to shine forth in their lives ("Nul 
n'est heureux comme un vrai chrétien, ni raisonnable, ni vertueux, ni 
aimable", p.1301; B.541) cannot be integrated or absorbed into the fabric 
of the society to which they belong, thus raising it a little nearer to 
"sainteté".
This radical disparity between the Church and all secular 
institutions receives its starkest treatment in the short work entitled
(1) The fact that the civil authority is ordained, or at least sanctioned, as 
a remedy for sin, and the violation of the natural order at the Fall, does not 
lessen its divine character.
(2) Thus the theory of divine right is not for Pascal, as for other political 
thinkers of his age, the expression of the idea that the civil state ought to
be the commonwealth of Christians.
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Comparaison des chrétiens des premiers temps avec ceux d'aujourd'hui, Pascal 
there claims that in the early days of the Church it was recognized, from 
the fact that an aspirant member was called upon to turn his back on the 
world before he could be received into the fold of the Church, that there 
existed:
"...une distinction essentielle du monde avec l'Eglise. On 
les considérait comme deux contraires, comme deux ennemis 
irréconciliables, ..En sorte que de ces deux partis contraires 
on quittait l'un pour entrer dans l'autre; ...et ainsi on 
concevait une différence épouvantable entre l'un et l'autre,.."
(p.556; G.E.X, p.412)
Since the context shows that this represents the state of things to which
Pascal would hark back it is clear that for him the Church has no pr^ical
aim; and his sharp separation of the sphere of Christianity from that of
secular society amounts indeed to professing a religion which he has no
intention of translating directly into practice. In this he exhibits
something of a "Reformation-tinged recoil"from the great Mediaeval
[
tradition, "according to which a complete separation between things secular
(2 )
and things spiritual was unthinkable".' ' For the Mediaeval Church had
asserted the whole compass of human interests to be the province of the
religion, and had accordingly set itself to ietorpenetrate society, law
and even politics with Christianity. Hence the contrast between Thomas
Aquinas's conception, for example, of the end of any well-governed community
(l)as the virtuous life, which leads in turn to the fruition of God, and 
Pascal's notion of social and political conduct forming a separate and self-
(1) The expression is used by A,L.Smith, Church and State in the Middle Ages. 
(Oxford, 1913), p.137.
(2) T.M. Parker, Christianitv and the State in the Light of History. (London, 
1955), p.152.
(3) De Regimine Princioum. 1,14. cf. Poole, op.eit., p.211.
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contained compartment of human affairs, the sphere of the powers of this
world. Although he regards the activities of the members of the Church as
ordered to a spiritual purpose, he has no conception of this spiritual
purpose giving an e^nd' to political and social efforts on the contrary he
interprets the distinctiveness of the Church as an aloofness from secular
affairs. Thus what has been said of Machiavelli, that he "detached the
State from the Church, making it an organization of force for the attainment
of merely earthly ends",  ^  ^ applies with singular aptness to the overall
effect of Pascal's pronouncements on Church and state.
This social dualism is even more radical than that of Pascal's
professed master in this respect, Saint Augustine. In the fourteenth
Provinciale he appeals to the letter's authority in support of his hard
and fast distinction:
"..des enfants de l'Evangile ...des ennemis de l'Evangile.
On ne peut être que d’un parti ou de l'autre, il n'y a point 
de milieu. ..Ces deux genres d'hommes partagent tous les 
hommes. Il y a deux peuples et deux mondes répandus sur 
toute la terre, selon saint Augustin: le monde des enfants 
de Dieu, qui forme un corps dont Jésus-Christ est le chef et 
le roi; et le monde ennemi de Dieu dont le diable est le chef 
et le roi. ..l'Eglise, qui est l'empire de Jésus-Ghrist ...le 
monde, qui est le royaume du diable.." (p.830;G.E.VI, p.152-3)
Now it is true that in The Citv of God Saint Augustine does regard the two
"civitates" as representing diametrically opposite principles, the one
founded on the love of God "usque ad contemptum sui", the other on the love
(2)of self "usque ad contemptum Dei";  ^ * and that he does argue that true
(1) J.W. alien, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Centurv. 
(London, 1928), p.A84.
(2) op.cit., XIV, XXVIII. J.N.Figgis has however pointed out the error of 
indiscriminately applying all that Saint Augustine says on the subject of the 
opposition between the "civitas Dei" and the "civitas terrena" to that 
between Church and civil state. The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's 
'City of God'. (London 1923), p.51 ff.
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virtue cannot exist apart from true religion, so that the virtues of the
heathen in fact constitute 'splendid v i c e s ' . Y e t  implicit in this
dualism is. a note of social optimism absent from Pascal's, for the
disparagement to which it leads, of all that properly falls within the
purview of secular government, only applies so long as this is not brought
into due subordination to the spiritual realm. Hence Saint Augustine's
insistence that the "civitas Del" supplies the best conditions for earthly
prosperity, and his claims as to the effects of the love of God and of
neighbour in teaching every kind of civic d u t y . I n  Pascal's view however
the gulf between secular and sacred is too wide to permit even this
hierarchical relation to operate. Besides, not only does Saint Augustine
allow that the state possesses a relative justice or righteousness of its
(3)own - even a robber band must have that - but the peace and order at 
which the civil state aims are acknowledged and used by the heavenly city 
in its earthly pilgrimage.And although the pessimistic view of all worldly 
activities is plain enoughcin The Citv of God, it is counteracted, to some 
extent at least, by the genuine appreciation which Saint Augustine also shows 
there of the positive goods of human life and of nature.Unlike Pascal 
he does not believe that relative degrees of moral goodness and badness on 
the secular level appear on a par when looked at from the otherworldly
(1) ibid., XIX, XXI, XXIV, XXV; XXI, XXV.
(2) cf. De Moribus Ecclesiae. I, xxx, and Ad Marcellinum, 138, c.l5.
(3) The Citv of God. XIX, XV.
(4) ibid., XIX, XVII. "The celestial society while it is here on earth, ... 
being unconcerned by the different temporal laws that are made; yet not 
breaking but observing their diversity in divers nations, so long as they 
tend unto the preservation of earthly peace, ...the heavenly city observes 
and respects this temporal peace here on earth, and the coherence of men's 
wills in honest morality, ...yea, and so far desires it, making use of it 
for the attainment of the peace celestial;..."
(5) ibid., XXII, XXII, XXIV.
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standpoint^^^
With respect to this rigid dualism however, Pascal's thought 
exhibits certain inconsistencies, which seem to vindicate that he does not 
altogether discard Christian principles in formulating his idea of political 
society. Thus in the fourteenth Provinciale he alleges that the complex 
juridical procedure, which it is necessary to go through in order to secure 
the conviction of a person, has been instituted for the express purpose of 
trying to assimilate as far as possible the civil law with that contained 
in the Gospels;
de peur que la pratique extérieure de la justice ne 
fût contraire aux sentiments intérieurs que des Chrétiens 
doivent avoir." (p.828; G.E.VI, p.149)
Yet is this not an illustration of the very process which Pascal's
absolute dualism rules out - the spilling-over as it were of the Christian
spirit from its own order into the purely secular sphere, where it exercises
a formative influence on the existing structures of the social order? And
there is no hint here that, as in the Pensées, the result of such an attempt
to carry the Christian spirit into the workings of secular justice
represents merely a thin veneer, a "fausse image", hiding the "vilain fond
de l'homme", which remains underneath unchanged.
(l) Such is the force of passages like the following; "...it is true 
that the fire of hell shall be more forcible against some than against 
others, according to the diversity of their deserts, whether it be adapted 
to the quality of their merits, or remain one fire unto all, and yet be 
not felt alike by all." op.cit., XXI, XVI. "...in the judgement of God 
not even this fact will be without its influence, - that one man will have 
sinned more, or sinned less, than another, even when both are involved in 
the condemnation of the same ungodliness." On the Spirit and the Letter. 48.
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Another example of the same inconsistency occurs earlier, in the
eighth Provinciale where, objecting to Escobar’s dictum that it is permissible
to steal when in 'grave necessity', on the grounds that it leaves the door
wide open for a huge increase in larceny, Pascal reproaches the Jesuits
pointing out that they have a much more real duty to repress this sort
of thing than the appropriate civil authorities;
"...vous qui devez maintenir parmi les hommes non seulement 
la justice, mais encore la charité, qui est détruite par 
ce principe." (p.746; G.E.V, p.148)
The expression "parmi les hommes" has all the appearance in this context of
being a generic term, referring in a comprehensive way to the members of
society without any notion of discrimination; and it certainly cannot be
intended as referring exclusively to the members of the Church, since
ex hypothesi they would be the least likely to have any inclination to
commit the offences in question. Moreover, Pascal uses the term "charité"
here, not in its specifically theological sense of love the product of
supernatural grace, but rather as signifying the purely civil respect for
property and person which forms the groundwork of the fabric of any
organized society. This is evident when he goes on to ask;
"Car enfin n*est-ce pas la violer, et faire tort à son 
prochain, que de lui faire perdre son bien pour en profiter 
soi-même?" (ibid)
Implicit in this recognition that the clergy therefore has a duty of
censorship over lay morals is a trace cf the old Mediaeval doctrine of
tutelage of the state by the Church. And in this way Pascal once again
accords to the Church a positive role in society, which must involve some
commerce between the two orders elsewhere asserted to be radically disparate.
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The Quatrième écrit sur la grâce provides yet a further, and 
slightly different, instance of this inconsistency on Pascal's part in 
regard to his own dualistic outlook. He answers the objection, that it is 
futile for the Church to condemn errors never yet embraced by any heretics, 
by drawing the following significant analogies:
par quel étrange renversement cette vigilance si 
salutaire qui est louable aux particuliers, aux familles, 
aux Etats et à toutes sortes de gouvernements, quoiqu'ils 
soient sujets à périr, deviendra-t-elle ridicule à l'Eglise 
dont les soins doivent être tout autrement étendus, par 
l'assurance qu'elle a de son éternelle durée?" (p.1017;
G.E.XI, p.270)
Pascal is here concerned to proclaim, in the most unequivocal terms, 
that what is good for the civil state in this respect is good also for 
the Church, thus implying that there is some measure at least of similarity 
between them as institutions.





Conclusion; the three orders
(i) The evolution of the conception as a scale of values
The notion of different orders, which underlies I^scal's valuations 
of all purely natural and human institutions and achievements, forms a sort 
of leit-motif running through nearly all his writings, so that its 
evolution can be traced from what appears to be the mathematical source up 
to the most complete expression in the Pensées.
The original definition of the term "ordre", in the sense of
category or class, occurs in a subsidiary treatise appended to the
Traité du triangle arithmétique, dating from the end of l6$4, and entitled
Usage du triangle arithmétique pour les ordres numériques. Pascal there
alleges that arithmeticians have already treated of the different
progressions, powers and degrees of numbers, but that those with which he
is concerned have suffered unwarranted neglect. He continues;
"...et même ils n'ont pas de nom; ainsi j'ai été obligé 
de leur en donner; et parce que ceux de progression, de 
degré et de puissance sont déjà employés, je me sers de 
celui d'ordres.
J'appelle donc 'nombres du premier ordre* les simples unités;
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, etc.
J'appelle 'nombres du second ordre' les naturels qui se 
forment par l'addition des unités;
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.
J'appelle 'nombres du troisième ordre' ceux qui se forment 
par l'addition des naturels, qu'on appelle triangulaires;
1, 3, 6, 10, etc.
C'est-a-dire, que le second des triangulaires, savoir 3, 
égale la somme des deux premiers naturels, qui sont 1,2; 
ainsi le troisième triangulaire 6 égale la somme des trois 
premiers naturels, 1, 2, 3, etc." (p.l08-9;G.E.III, p.466)
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This nomenclature, applied by Pascal to a particular type of numerical
series arrived at by means of his arithmetical triangle, which he claims
elsewhere "n* est autre chose que la table des ordres numériques", is
therefore an entirely formal definition signifying merely particular
arrangements of numbers that enjoy certain properties in common. It is
noteworthy however, that the term "ordre" as it is used in the above
context, although it has the sense of class or category, does not carry
with it the further notion of heterogeneity, since numbers belonging to
the second and third orders are formed simply by addition of those
contained in the first and second orders respectively.
Closely allied to the term "ordre" in Pascal's usage, and also
first occurring in his vocabulary in a mathematical context, is the word
"grandeur". The standard translation by Drion of the general rule with
which he concludes the short Po testa turn numericarum summa. reproduced by
Lahure, Brunschvicg and Chevalier in their editions of Pascal's works,
runs as follows ; ‘
"...on n'augmente pas une grandeur continue lorsqu'on 
lui ajoute, en tel nombre que l'on voudra, des grandeurs 
d'un ordre d'infinitude inférieur. Ainsi les points 
n'ajoutent rien aux lignes, les lignes aux surfaces, les 
surfaces aux solides; ou - pour parler en nombres comme 
il Convient dans un traité arithmétique - les racines ne 
comptent pas par rapport aux carrés, les carrés par 
rapport aux cubes ..... En sorte qu'on doit négliger, 
comme nulles, les quantités d'ordre inférieur." (2)
In Pascal's original Latin the principle is enunciated in these terms : "in
continua quantitate, quotlibet quantitates cuiusvis generis quantitati
(1) p.130; G.E.Ill, p. 504]
(2) Translation in notes, p.1432; G.E.Ill, p.367.
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superiorly generis additas nihil ei superaddere."The translator
therefore, and presumably those who reproduce his version, appear to have
understood Pascal as implying by the single Latin word "genus" (the
normal rendering of which in French would be "genre" or "ordre") the
phrase "ordre d'infinitude", although neither the actual text nor the
(2)
context require such a translation. Clearly the commentators have 
tacitly assumed that Pascal is here referring to the principle, developed 
at length in the De 1'esprit géométrique, that a particular roathematical 
concept even when raised to infinite degree is not thereby transformed 
into a different o n e . '
At all events the meaning of the term "grandeur" emerges very 
plainly from the passage under consideration, as a component of a given 
order. The idea of heterogeneity is also emphasized by Pascal's assertion 
that the magnitudes of lower orders should be disregarded, as if non­
existent, when any particular order is in question. And since the 
relevant portion of the Latin text contains the significant words 
"inferiores gradus, nullius valoris existantes", it is evident that he not 
only considers the various orders to be generically different one from 
another, but furthermore that he regards their value as wholly dependent
(1) p.171; G.E.Ill, p.366
(2) F.Strowski however, in his Pascal et son temps. (Paris, 1907), vol.II, 
p.288, translates the Latin word by the single French word "ordre", as does 
also R. Vernaux in his article La doctrine oascalienne des trois ordres.
Revue de philosophie. 1938, p.314.
(3)cf. p.$87 ff.; G.E.DC, p.261 ff. As Brunschvicg (ed.min.,p.l79,n.) and 
Chevalier (Pascal.o.182-4) have noted, Pascal there formulates, by implication 
at least, one of the basic principles of infinitesimal calculus, according to 
which there are different orders of infinitude between wh(|e components no 
comparison is possible. However, in the absence of any reference to the 
infinite in the passage under discussion, the transfer to that context of the 
notion from the De 1*esprit géométrique seems to me largely a matter of 
surmise.
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upon whether the particular order is considered in itself or in relation 
to a higher one.
The term "grandeur" appears again in the De I'esorit géométrioue.
where Pascal, in support of his contention that the difference between the
number one and any other number is merely quantitative and not qualitative,
cites the following Euclidean definition of 'homogeneous magnitudes':
"Les grandeurs, dit-il, sont dites être de même genre, 
lorsque l'une étant plusieurs fois multipliée peut arriver 
à surpasser l'autre." (p.589;G.E.IX, p.26$)
An illustration of concepts belonging to heterogeneous 'magnitudes' is
provided by the difference between zero and positive numbers;
"...car le zéro n'est pas du même genre que les nombres, 
parce qu'étant multiplié, il ne peut les surpasser;...
Et on trouvera un pareil rapport entre le repos et le 
mouvement, et entre un instant et le temps ; car toutes 
ces choses sont hétérogènes à leurs grandeurs, parce 
qu'étant infiniment multipliées, elles ne peuvent jamais 
faire que des indivisibles d'étendue,..."(p.$90; G.E.IX 
p.267—8)
Thus the definition proposed earlier of "grandeur", as a component of a 
given order, is confirmed in these extracts, where the word "genre" is clearly
used in a sense identical with that of "ordre" in previous passages. The
"grandeurs" included within the scope of any one order are homogeneous; 
but in relation to those belonging to a different order they are, like 
the orders which they compose, rigorously heterogeneous.
(l) This definition serves the purpose of clarifying Pascal's previous 
assertion regarding; "...les noms d'unité, binaire, quaternaire, dizaine, 
centaine, différents par nos fantaisies, quoique ces choses soient en effet 
de même genre par leur nature invariable, et qu'elles soient toutes proportion­
nées entre elles et ne diffèrent que du plus ou du moins..."(p.$88;G.E.IX,p.264) 
There is a striking resemblance in idea between these definitions of heterogen­
eous orders made up of homogeneous components and the second definition of the 
first part of Spinoza's Ethics; "That thing is said to be finite in its kind 
('in suo genere finita') which can be limited by another thing of the same 
kind. E.g. a body is said to be finite because we can conceive another larger
cont. p.360.
360
The earliest appearance in the non-niathematical writings of the
conception of things belonging to different watertight compartments, as it
were, is in the Préface pour le traité du vide, although the actual terms
"ordre” and ”grandeur” are not used there in the sense detailed above. In
the course of drawing his celebrated distinction between those fields where
rational and experimental enquiry is essential if knowledge is to advance,
and those on the other hand where the voice of authority must be maintained
supreme, Pascal states:
"Mais où cette autorité a la principale force, c'est dans 
la théologie, parce qu'elle y est inséparable de la vérité, 
et que nous ne la connaissons que par elles ...parce que 
ses principes sont au-dessus de la nature et de la raison, 
et que, l'esprit de l'homme étant trop faible pour y arriver 
par ses propres efforts, il ne peut parvenir à ces hautes 
intelligences s'il n'y est porté par une force toute- 
puissante et surnaturelle." (p.$30; G.E.II, p.131)
Then after describing how the current trend is precisely the reverse of
what he is recommending - to observe rigorously the authority of the
'ancients' in scientific matters, and to give free rein to rational
discussion and innovation in theology - he continues:
"Je laisse aux personnes judicieuses à remarquer 
1'importance de cet abus qui pervertit l'ordre des 
sciences avec tant d'injustice, et je crois qu'il y 
en aura peu qui ne souhaitent que cette liberté s' 
applique à d'autres matières, puisque les inventions 
nouvelles sont infailliblement des erreurs dans les 
matières que l'on profane impunément; et qu'elles sont 
absolument nécessaires pour la perfection de tant d'objets 
incomparablement plus bas, que toutefois on n'oserait 
toucher." (p.$31; G.E.II, p.133-4
(cont. from p.359) than it. Thus a thought is limited by another 
thou^t. But a body cannot be limited by a thought, nor a thought 
by a body." Everyman ed., p.l.
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It is possible to see in germ in the first of these two passages
(1)the three orders of the definitive fragment from the Pensées - "nature"; 
"raison"; "principes de théologie" - and furthermore Pascal ranges them in 
an ascending scale, for he explicitly affirms that the third category is 
superior to ("au-dessus") the two others. In fact it is absolutely 
transcendent, since there can be no natural progression to it by mind from 
the level of "raison"; the mind requires to be elevated to it by a force 
outside itself which must be supernatural. And the judgement contained in 
the second extract not only further stresses the heterogeneity of the 
different orders, as they may be termed, but also reintroduces the element 
of rank. Those fields where fresh discoveries and new thought are 
indispensable if they are to be brought to 'perfection', ("toutes les 
sciences qui sont soumises à 1'expérience et au raisonnement") are 
adjudged 'incomparably inferior to' theology.
A point of incidental interest is that the "ordre des sciences", 
which Pascal claims is 'perverted' by the abuses he attacks, represents the 
standard Jansenist conception and not that current in the Schools. Indeed 
Pascal is doing little more here than reaffirm the sharp break-away from
the traditional Scholastic view of the nature and scope of theology and
(2)
philosophy initiated by Jansenius himself in the Augustinus.
(1)cf. below p.
(2) cf. Augustinus, t.II,"Liber Prooemialis: De rations et auctoritate in 
rebus théologieis. cap.IV, Discrimen inter Philosophiam ac Theologian. Illi 
servit ratio, huic memoria;...Sic igitur, quemadmodum intellectus Philosophiae 
suscipiendae propria facultas est, ita memoria Theologiae. Ille quippe 
intellecta principia penetrando Philosophum facit; haec ea, quae sibi scripto 
aut praedicatione tradita sunt, recordando, Theologum Christianum". cf. also
A. Gazier, Blaise Pascal et Antoine Escobar. (Paris, 1912), p.51. Yet it 
should also be noted that Thomas Aquinas, although he believes that reason 
and faith cannot be inconsistent, nonetheless envisages them as dealing with 
radically different spheres, and lays it down that; "impossibile est quod de
cont. p.362
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In a letter to Queen Christina of Sweden, in reply to a request
for one of his arithmetical machines, Pascal sets up a very significant
contrast between physical domination and intellectual prowess;
"Las mêmes degrés se rencontrent entre les génies qu'entre 
les conditions; et le pouvoir des rois sur les sujets 
n'est, ce me semble, qu'une image du pouvoir des esprits 
sur les esprits qui leur sont inférieurs, sur lesquels ils 
exercent le droit de persuader, qui est parmi eux ce que 
le droit de commander est dans le gouvernement politique.
Ce second empire me paraît même d'un ordre d'autant plus 
élevé, que les esprits sont d'un ordre plus élevé que les 
corps, et d'autant plus équitable, qu'il ne peut être 
départi et conservé que par le mérite, au lieu que l'autre 
peut l'être par la naissance ou par la fortune. Il faut donc 
avouer que chacun de ces empires est grand en soi;..."
(p.503; G.E.III, p.30-1)
Although the "droit de persuader" exercised by "esprits" is depicted here
as equivalent in its appropriate sphere to the "droit de commander"
exercised by "rois", the notion of rank is also present, for, since the
dominion of monarchs over their subjects is merely an image of the eminence
of mind over mind, it must on that account alone be held inferior. Moreover,
Pascal explicitly asserts that the latter "empire", as he puts it, is of a
correspondingly more elevated order as minds belong to a higher order than
bodies. And a further, and very radical, ground for this superiority is
alleged to lie in the fact that the empire of mind over mind is more
equitable than temporal sovereignty, since it is dependent upon merit,
whereas accidents of birth or fortune determine the latter. Hence, when
allowances have been made for the circumstances of the letter, it must be
recognized that it provides valuable indication of the development of the
(cont. from p.36l) eodem sit fides et scientia." Philosophy relies on proofs 
which are exclusively rational, while theology depends always on authority. 
Qu.disp. de Veritate. XIV, art.9*
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conception of various orders of being, for, despite the fact that no mention 
is made of their heterogeneous character, the orders of bodies and of minds 
are quite clearly in evidence, and the term "degré" appears in place of 
"grandeur" to denote the component of a given order.
Despite the break in chronological sequence which it will involve,
it is convenient here, from a subject-matter point of view, to consider
the Trois discours sur la condition des grands, in so far as they bear on
the present discussion. In the second Discours the following important
statements are made:
"II y a dans le monde deux sortes de grandeurs ; car il 
y a des grandeurs d'établissement, et des grandeurs 
naturelles. Les grandeurs d'établissement dépendent 
de la volonté des hommes, ...Les dignités et la 
noblesse sont de ce genre. .♦
Les grandeurs naturelles sont celles qui sont 
indépendantes de la fantaisie des hommes, parce qu'elles 
consistent dans des qualités réelles et effectives de 
l'âme ou du corps, ...
Nous devons quelque chose à l'une et à l'autre de ces 
grandeurs; mais comme elles sont d'une nature différente, 
nous leur devons aussi différents respects.
Aux grandeurs d'établissement, nous leur devons des 
respects d'établissement, c'est-à-dire certaines 
cérémonies extérieures qui doivent être néanmoins 
accompagnées, ...d'une reconnaissance intérieure de 
la justice de cet ordre, ...
Mais pour les respects naturels qui consistent dans 
l'estime, nous ne les devons qu'aux grandeurs naturelles; 
et nous devons au contraire le mépris et l'aversion aux 
qualités contraires à ces grandeurs naturelles." (p.618-9;
G.E. IX, p.369-70)
The term "grandeur" appears here for the first time outside a purely
mathematical context; but it is clear that in this extract, despite a shift
of emphasis, the definition of it proposed earlier, as a component of a
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given order, still applies. Although Pascal refers only cursorily to the 
latter term, yet this single usage, together with the fact that the words 
"nature", in the phrase "mais comme elles les grandeurs sont d'une nature 
différente", and "genre" are used in an identical sense, suffices to make 
the meaning definite. But these "grandeurs" do not merely belong to 
different orders ; the fact that one is called upon to pay certain purely 
formal respects to "grandeurs d'établissement", whereas "grandeurs 
naturelles" demand esteem, and that it is quite legitimate, indeed in some 
cases one's duty, to despise a person of noble rank who does not possess any 
of the "grandeurs naturelles", indicates that in the scale of values the 
order of "grandeurs naturelles" occupies a considerably higher place than 
that of "grandeurs d'établissement".
The similarity between the two orders of "grandeurs" described 
in the above passage and the two "empires" outlined in the letter to the 
Queen of Sweden is very marked, and when it is recalled what constitutes the 
basis of monarchical power in Pascal's e y e s , i t  becomes apparent that 
the "pouvoir des rois" referred to in the latter context is merely an 
example of a "grandeur d'établissement", dependent on the will of men.
Since these Discours were delivered, according to Nicole, as late 
as the autumn of I66O it is not surprising to find reference made in them 
to the supernatural order of charity. In the third section, having 
contrasted the condition of his aristocratic pupil as a "roi de concupiscence" 
with that of God as a "roi de charité", and having pointed out to him the 
obligations which his rank entails, Pascal concludes with the following 
exhortation:
(1) cf. above, p.Z^ a-r and "La puissance des rois est fondée sur la 
raison et sur la folie du peuple, et bien plus sur la folie." Pense es., 
p.1163; B.33O.
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"Ce que je vous dis ne va pas bien loin; et si vous en 
demeurez là, vous ne laisserez pas de vous perdre;...11 
faut mépriser la concupiscence et son royaume, et 
aspirer à ce royaume de charité où tous les sujets ne 
respirent que la charité, et ne désirent que les biens 
de la charité." (p.620-1; G.E.IX, p.372-3)
Consequently the duke, even if he should succeed in combining the qualities
entitling him to "respect naturel" with his "grandeur d'établissement", thus
becoming both "due et honnête horme", and avoiding that "bassesse d'esprit"
which deserves "mépris intérieur", does not thereby come any nearer to
attaining the supernatural "royaume de charité". These Discours contain
therefore in a reasonably complete form the doctrine of the three orders
as it is set out in the Pensées, the chief divergence consisting in the
"grandeurs d'établissement" which by no means completely exhaust the "ordre
des corps", while the "grandeurs naturelles" include some elements which
in the Pensées are ascribed to the "ordre des corps" rather than to the
"ordre des esprits".
In strict chronological sequence the next work which should be 
considered after the letter to Queen Christina is the Entretien avec M.de Saci. 
Although no explicit mention is made there of different orders of being, a 
notable assertion occurs as to the absolute discontinuity of nature and grace# 
The error of Epictetus and Montaigne is to attribute respectively the 
greatness and weakness observable in man's behaviour to his own nature, 
whereas s
"...la foi nous apprend à les mettre en des sujets différents: 
tout ce qu'il y a d'infirme appartenant à la nature, tout ce 
qu'il y a de puissant appartenant à la grâce." (p.572; G.E.
IV, p.54)
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Pascal understands by the word "nature" here man's native capacity considered
in itself, quite apart from any divine assistance, so that nature may
therefore be regarded as subsuming both "corps" and "esprit", forming a 
purely human order which stands in sharp contrast to the supernatural order 
of grace. For, according to Pascal, all which has value in human life and 
achievment, all which is intrinsically good in human motive and aspiration, 
stems from the supernatural, while all which tends to the corruption and 
debasement of this proceeds from nature. Natural capacity is thus limited 
to the potentiality for evil, the sole outcome of its activity being to 
impair the few remaining noble sparks in man, whereas grace on the other 
hand is the sole effective source of good.
The seventh letter to Mile de Roannez contains a sketchy outline
of the notion which was to develop into the doctrine of the three orders, as
well as a pointed statement as to their relative value:
"..ce ne sont ni les austérités du corps ni les agitations 
de l'esprit, mais les bons mouvements du coeur qui méritent, 
et qui soutiennent les peines du corps et de l'esprit."
(p.515; G.E.VI, p.219)
The definitive fragment from the Pensées appears again here in germ -
"corps"; "esprit"; 'bharité" - for that Pascal regards the "bons mouvements
du coeur" as the product of divine grace, and hence as properly belonging
to the supernatural order, is attested both by the present context and by
further similar usages of the expression.The absolute discontinuity
(l) cf. in particular the sixth strophe of the Prière pour le bon usage des 
maladies ; "Achevez, 8 mon Dieu, les bons mouvements que vous me donnez. 
Soyez-en la fin comme vous en etes le principe. Couronnez vos propres dons; 
...tous les mouvements naturels de mon coeur, se portant vers les créatures 
ou vers moi-même, ne peuvent que vous irriter. Je vous rends donc grâces, 
mon Dieu, des bons mouvements que vous me donnez,..." (p.609;G.E.IX,p.329-30)
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of the human and the divine is brought out clearly in this short extract 
by the insistence that no amount of physical asceticism or intellectual 
effort by itself is capable of achieving any real good - it requires to be 
sustained, nourished and raised to a higher plane by divine grace. Once 
again the assignment of value is an entirely relative affair, since, by 
using the verb "mériter" to qualify the "bons mouvements du coeur" alone, 
Pascal ascribes all worth to them, although the actual context implies 
that they may in turn project value, as it were, on to the "austérités du 
corps" and the "agitations de l'esprit". In other words the two latter 
onlv have no worth when considered in themselves, apart from the supernatural 
element, which is in effect their sine qua non of value.
At the commencement of the second part of the De l'esprit
géométrique, where Pascal outlines the rules for what he designates the
Art de persuader, a sharp distinction is drawn between "vérités divines"
and "vérités de notre portée", the second group alone constituting the
subject-matter of Pascal's 'art's
"Je ne parle pas ici des vérités divines, que je n'aurais 
garde de faire tomber sous l'art de persuader, car elles 
sont infiniment au-dessus de la natures Dieu seul peut 
les mettre dans l'âme, et par la manière qu'il lui plaît.
Je sais qu'il a voulu qu'elles entrent du coeur dans 
l'esprit, et non pas de l'esprit dans le coeur,...
En quoi il paraît que Dieu a établi cet ordre surnaturel, 
et tout contraire è l'ordre qui devait être naturel aux 
hommes dans les choses naturelles." (p.592-3;G.E,IX,p.271-2)
The element of transcendence is very much in evidence here, and Pascal for
the first time makes use of the intensive "infiniment" in what is plainly
an attempt to convey a more precise notion of the absolute disparity of the
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natural and supernatural. However, the term "ordre" in the second 
paragraph, used of the supernatural order instituted by God completely 
contrary to that which should be natural for man, has the sense not so 
much of category or class as of method - it signifies the means whereby 
divine truths are borne in on the human soul.
Pascal's Prière pour le bon usage des maladies dates, according
to Mme. Périer,^^^ from the last four years of his life, and although the
actual terms "ordre" and "grandeur" do not occur in it, there is a striking
resemblance in phraseology between the passage which follows and the
fragment from the Pensées describing the three orders. Recognizing that
his heart has become so hardened that nothing, apart from "une assistance
extraordinaire de grâce divine", will suffice to effect even the first
beginnings of his conversion, he directs his appeal to God;
" C est pourquoi, mon Dieu, je m'adresse à vous. Dieu 
tout - puissant, pour vous demander un don que toutes 
les créatures ensemble ne peuvent m'accorder. Je n' 
aurais pas la hardiesse de vous adresser mes cris, si 
quelque autre pouvait les exaucer. ' Mais, mon Dieu, 
comme la conversion de mon coeur, que je vous demande, 
est un ouvrage qui passe tous les efforts de la nature, 
je ne puis m'adresser qu'à l'auteur et au maître tout- 
puissant de la nature et de mon coeur." (p.607-8;
G.E.IX, p.327)
This confrontation of nature and grace, of the human and the divine, reveals 
the utter discontinuity between the two, in addition to emphasizing the 
worthlessness of the former when contrasted with the power for good inherent 
in the latter. The two phrases "un don que toutes les créatures ensemble 
ne peuvent gi'accorder", and "un ouvrage qui passe tous les efforts de la
(1) Vie, p.20; G.E.I, p.83.
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nature", provide excellent illustrations of "choses hétérogènes à leurs
grandeurs", since no amount of effort on the part of individuals belonging
to the purely natural order will suffice to effect an operation which
(1)
requires supernatural initiative. Moreover, these two phrases bear
a striking resemblance to the expressions used in the Pensées to indicate
the qualitative difference between the various orders there.
It is usual with respect to the conception of different orders of
being to cite only one passage from the Pensées, although there are in fact
two separate fragments which bear upon the notion. Since the less well-
known and shorter fragment is also more sketchy in outline it can probably
be taken as representing a slightly earlier stage in the evolution of the
idea in Pascal's mind. However, since it is for the same reason rather
difficult to interpret in some places without seeking clarification from
the better-known passage, it will be more convenient to quote and analyse
this one first;
"La distance infinie des corps aux esprits figure la 
distance infiniment plus infinie des esprits à la charité; 
car elle est surnaturelle.
Tout l'éclat des grandeurs n'a point de lustre pour les 
gens qui sont dans les recherches de l'esprit.
La grandeur des gens d ’esprit est invisible aux rois, 
aux riches, aux capitaines, à tous ces grands de chair.
La grandeur de la sagesse, qui n'est nulle sinon de 
Dieu, est invisible aux charnels et aux gens d'esprit.
Ce sont trois ordres différents de genre.
Les grands génies ont leur empire, leur éclat, leur 
grandeur, leur victoire, leur lustre, et n'ont nul besoin 
des grandeurs charnelles, où elles n'ont pas de rapport.
Ils sont vus non des yeux, mais des esprits; c'est assez.
(l) It will be recalled that the Euclidean definition of homogeneous 
magnitudes, which Pascal endorses, is that "I'une étant plusieurs fois 
multipliée peut arriver à surpasser l'autre", cf. above,
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Les saints ont leur empire, leur éclat, leur victoire, 
leur lustre, et n'ont nul besoin des grandeurs charnelles 
ou spirituelles, ou elles n'ont nul rapport, car elles 
n'y ajoutent ni ôtent. Ils sont vus de Dieu et des anges, 
et non des corps ni des esprits curieux: Dieu leur suffit.
Archimède, sans éclat, serait en même vénération. Il n'a 
pas donne des batailles pour les yeux, mais il a fourni à 
tous les esprits ses inventions. 0 qu'il a éclaté aux 
esprits!
Jésus-Christ, sans biens et sans aucune production au 
dehors de science, est dans son ordre de sainteté. Il 
n'a point donne d'invention, il n'a point régné mais il 
a été humble, patient, saint, saint, saint à Dieu, terrible 
aux démons sans aucun péché. 0 qu'il est venu en grande 
pompe et en une prodigieuse magnificence, aux yeux du 
coeur et qui voient la sagesse!
Il eût été inutile à Archimède de faire le prince dans 
ses livres de géométrie, quoiqu'il le fût.
Il eût été inutile à Notre-Seigneur Jésus-Christ, pour 
éclater dans son règne de sainteté, de venir en roi; mais 
il y est bien venu avec 1'éclat de son ordre!
Mais il y en a qui ne peuvent admirer que les grandeurs 
charnelles, comme s'il n'y en avait pas de spirituelles;^* 
comme s'il n'y en avait pas d 'infiniment plus hautes 
dans la sagesse.
Tous les corps, le firmament, les étoiles, la terre 
et ses royaumes, ne valent pas le raoindre des esprits; 
car il connaît tout cela, et soi; et les corps rien.
Tous les corps ensemble, et tous les esprits ensemble, 
et toutes leurs productions, ne valent pas le moindre 
mouvement de charité. Cela est d'un ordre infiniment 
plus élevé.
De tous les corps ensemble, on ne saurait en faire 
réussir une petite pensée: cela est impossible, et 
d'un autre ordre. De tous les corps et esprits, on 
n'en saurait tirer un mouvement de vraie charité; . .
cela est impossible, et d'un autre ordre, surnaturel."
(p.13/11-2; B.793)
(l) Professor F.T.H. Fletcher, in his chapter on the three orders in Pascal 
and the Mystical Tradition. (Oxford, 1954), cites passages from Saint 
Augustine and Berulle, which he considers may have aided Pascal in formulating 
this fragment. Probable sources for the actual expression "ordre de charité" 
have been traced by E.Jovy, in vol.VIII of his Etudes paseaTiennes.p.120-36
** et d'autres qui n'admirent que les spirituelles.
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A mere cursory glance is sufficient to discern how far this passage is an 
amalgam of what has gone before; the use of the terms "ordre" and "grandeur", 
enriched by the added significance which they have gradually acquired as 
the result of their application to non-mathematical concepts, yet still 
retaining markedly mathematical overtones ; the insistence on the infinite 
qualitative distinction between each of the three orders, with the two 
higher absolutely transcendent in regard to the first, and the third in a 
similar relation to the second, so that nq degree or amount of the content 
of a lower order will ever suffice of itself to produce a higher one; and
finally the third order of charity envisaged as a supernatural one.
Perhaps the most striking fresh emphasis (for the idea was latent
in the extract quoted earlier from the Trois discours) is the reiterated
assertion that each of the three orders in question is self-contained, that
each forms a complete entity by itself, standing in no need of, nor in
any necessary relation to, any of the others. This development is particularly
interesting when considered in conjunction with the following passage from
the eighteenth Provinciale;
"D'où apprendrons-nous donc la vérité des faits? Ce 
sera des yeux, ...qui en sont les légitimes juges,
comme la raison l'est des choses naturelles et
intelligibles, et la foi des choses surnaturelles et 
révélées. ..ces trois principes de nos connaissances, 
les sens, la raison et la foi, ont chacun leurs objets 
séparés, et leur certitude dans cette étendue. Et comme 
Dieu a voulu se servir de l'entremise des sens pour 
donner entrée à la foi; 'Fides ex auditu*, tant s'en 
faut que la foi détruise la certitude des sens, que ce 
serait au contraire détruire la foi que de vouloir 
révoquer en doute le rapport fidèle des sens." (p.898;
G.E.VII, p.49-50)
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Now it is evident that these three principles correspond, approximately at
least, to the three o r d e r s : e a c h  has validity in its own domain and
cannot legitimately encroach on that of another; their results will always
remain heterogeneous, so that one cannot supply the place of another.
However, although each principle is thus regarded as having its own
particular field of operation within which it can achieve certain knowledge,
yet this in no way signifies a complete independence of faith from the
remaining two principles. On the contrary, if deprived of its point of
self-insertion through the senses faith is cut off at the roots. A
further extract from the Pensées illustrates this same difficulty:
"Lettre oui marque l'utilité des preuves, par la machine.
-La foi est différente de la preuve: l'une est humaine, 
l'autre est un don de Dieu. 'Justus ex fide vivit': c'est 
de cette foi que Dieu lui-même met dans le coeur, dont la 
preuve est souvent 1'instrument, 'fides ex auditu*;...
(p. 1220; B.2/18)
Although there is no question here as to the generic difference between 
faith and proof, the divine and the human, yet the former appears as in a 
sense dependent on the latter to provide the necessary medium through which 
its influence may be exerted. The divine action must be worked on human 
material.
Moreover, in the letter to Queen Christina Pascal maintains that
this relation of mutual dependence holds also between the two lower orders,
for he there asserts:
"Quelque puissant que soit un monarque, il manque quelque chose 
à sa gloire, s'il n'a pas la pré-éminence de 1'esprit; et 
quelque éclairé que soit un sujet, sa condition est toujours 
rabaissée par la dépendance." (p.503;G.E.III, p.3l)
(l) This correspondence has been worked out at length, and somewhat 
tendentiously it seems to me, by M.Jacques Chevalier in his article. La 
méthode de connaître d'après Pascal. Revue de métaphysique et de morale.
1923,
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The contrast is very marked between such a view and the predominant
one in the fragment on the three orders:
"Les grands génies ... n'ont nul besoin des gr^eurs 
charnelles, où elles n'ont pas de rapport. ...Les saints... 
n'ont nul besoin des gr^eurs charnelles ou spirituelles, 
où elles n'ont nul rapport,..."
This doctrine of different orders of being does not however represent 
merely a scale of ontological concepts - the notion of value also occupies a 
very important place. Pascal claims that the totality of the physical 
universe is not equal in value to the least "esprit", for the latter is 
cognizant of the material aspect of life and of itself, whereas the universe 
has no awareness of anything. It follows therefore that it is the cognitive 
power of the mind which secures for it a superior rank in the scale of 
value, and one cannot but recall that other well-known fragment, where 
Pascal contrasts the magnitude of the physical world with the seemingly 
puny power of thought possessed by man to the latter's a d v a n t a g e . T h e n  
again all bodies and minds, together with all their 'productions', are not 
equal in value to the least motion of charity, for charity is of an infinitely 
superior order.
The second fragment from the Pensées which is basically concerned
with the doctrine of the three orders runs as follows:
"Concupiscence de la chair, concupiscence des veux, orgueil. 
etc. - Il y a trois ordres de choses: la chair, l'esprit, 
la volonté. Les charnels sont les riches, les rois: ils ont 
pour objet le corps. Les curieux et savants: ils ont pour 
objet l'esprit. Les sages: ils ont pour objet la justice.
(1)"L'homme qu’^  roseau, le plus faible de la nature; mais c'est un
roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que 1'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser: une 
vapeur, une goutte d’eau, suffit pour le tuer. Mais, quand l'univers 1'écraser­
ait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, puisqu'il sait qu'il 
meurt, et l'avantage que 1'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien." 
(p.1156-7; B.347)
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Dieu doit régner sur tout, et bout se rapporter à lui.
Dans les choses de la chair, règne proprement la 
concupiscence; dans les spirituelles, la curiosité 
proprement; dans la sagesse l'orgueil proprement. Ce 
n'est pas qu'on ne puisse être glorieux pour les biens 
ou pour les connaissances, mais ce n'est le lieu 
de l'orgueil; car en accordant à un homme qu'il est 
savant, on ne laissera pas de le convaincre qu'il a 
tort d'être superbe. Le lieu propre à la superbe est 
la sagesse: car on ne peut accorder à un homme qu'il 
s'est rendu sage, et qu'il a tort d'être glorieux; car 
cela est de justice. Aussi Dieu seul donne la sagesse;
et c'est pourquoi 'Qui gloriatur, in Domino glorietur'."
(p.l3C3; B.46O)
There is no difficulty about the first two orders here as they clearly
correspond to the matching ones in the previous fragment, where the expressions
"les charnels" and les grands de chair", are in fact used of those who
belong to the "ordre des corps". But the use of the term "volonté" to
designate the third order is somewhat unexpected, since it is difficult
to conceive prim facie of a relationship between "volonté" as such and
charity. The word has a variety of meanings in Pascal's terminology
however, and in that part of the De 1'esprit géométrique from which a
quotation has already been made it is equated with "coeur", in a context
where the latter is described as the receptive organ for divine truths. The
"sages" therefore (and the use of this term to denote those who belong to the
third order has a parallel in the previous fragment, where Pascal speaks of
"la grandeur de la sagesse, qui n'est nulle sinon de Dieu"), the members of
the "ordre de la volonté", might be regarded simply as those to whom
(2)
knowledge of divine truth has been vouchsafed. A further usage of the term
"volonté", illuminating in this respect, occurs in the 'wager* passage:
(1) cf. above, p. 3 67.
(2) Thus in the previous fragment Christ is alleged to have come "en grande 
pompe et en une prodigieuse magnificence, aux yeux du coeur et qui voient la 
sagesse."
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’Vous avez deux choses à perdre: le vrai et le bien, et 
deux choses à engager; votre raison et votre volonté, 
votre connaissance et votre béatitude; ...Votre raison 
n’est pas plus blessée, en choisissant l’un que l’autre,
...Voilà un point vidé. Mais votre béatitude?”(p.1213-4;
B.233)
’’Béatitude”, which in Pascal's terms can only appertain to a supernatural 
order, is here seen to be, if not exactly synonymous with ’’volonté”, at 
least its proper and connate object.
Nor has the word "justice”, as used in the fragment under consider­
ation to designate the ’object’ of those belonging to the third order, any 
exact parallel in the previous extract; but three texts drawn from different 
writings show that its usage in such a theological context is not unique:
”o..Dieu étant la justice et la sagesse môme..." (I4th
Provinciale, p.820-1; G.E.VI, p.134)
’....la continuation de la justice des fidèles n’est autre 
chose que la continuation de l’infusion de la grâce...”
(à Mme.Périer, p.488; G.E.II, p.380)
"...sans la faim des choses çirituelles on s’en ennuie.
Faim de la justice: béatitude huitième.” (Pensées, p.1155;
B.264)
Clearly therefore, according to Pascal’s own terms of reference, it is quite 
consistent to represent the members of the supernatural order as directing 
their efforts towards "justice” as their goal.
Most difficult to account for however are the terms "orgueil”,
”glorieux”, "superbe”, employed to describe the appropriate state of soul 
of those who have attained to "sagesse”. Brunschvieg, in a note to this 
fragment,remarks; ”La gloire désigne, comme on sait, dans le language 
théologique, la béatitude en Dieu”. Yet it is precisely because Pascal does
(1) ed.min., p.544, n.l.
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not use the word "gloire” in this fragment that the difficulty arises, for 
nowhere in his extant writings is it possible to find the term "orgueil”,
”superbe”, "glorieux”, used to signify beatific "gloire”. Indeed they 
usually denote exactly the reverse - the state in which, ipso facto, it 
is impossible for man to be in any relation at all with G o d . B u t  
although such inconsistent linguistic usage tends to make Pascal’s meaning 
rather obscure in this respect, it must be allowed that this fragment has 
particular significance as indicating that he conceives of the three orders 
of being above all as moral categories, in which individuals range themselves 
according to the nature of the ’end* which they pursue as the goal of 
existence.
Professor C.G.J. Webb has advanced some important philosophical 
criticisms of this conception of heterogeneous orders as it is set out in 
the main fragment from the Pensées. He regards Pascal’s insistence on the 
disparateness of the first two orders of bodies and minds as simply an 
example of the normal Cartesian dualism, and alleges that:"The moment that 
one substitutes for bodies, as such, bodies regarded as organic to conscious­
ness and thought, you have left the disparateness behind and jumped, so to 
say, the problems which it raises. Yet this Pascal does when he assigns 
the life of captains and kings and the glory thereto belonging to the ’order
(2)
of bodies’.” And with respect to the third order of charity, Webb
The following examples, among others, occur in the Pensées: "Vos maladies 
principales sont l’orgueil, qui vous soustrait de Dieu...Si les philosophes 
vous ont donné Dieu pour objet, ce n’a été que pour exercer votre superbe:.." 
(p.l225;B.430) "Je vois mon abîme d ’orgueil, de curiosité, de concupiscence.
Il n ’y a nul rapport de moi à Dieu,.." (p.1314; B.553) "Gomme les deux sources 
de nos péchés sont l’orgueil et la paresse. Dieu nous a découvert deux qualités 
en lui pour les guérir: sa miséricorde et sa justice. Le propre de la justice 
est d’abattre l’orgueil.” (p. 1309;B.497) ’’..l’impiété intérieure des sages 
superbes et des pharisiens.” (p.1337; B.90$)
(2) Pascal’s Philos0T)hv of Religion. (Oxford, 1929), p.l08.
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maintains, contrary to Pascal, that: "...it is obvious that we are still 
speaking of thoughts and feelings. ...so that however superior in value the 
saint may be to Archimedes and spiritual wisdom to science, the latter is 
plainly not removed from the former by the same absolute disparateness as 
lies between a body ... and ’une petite pensée’."
Although these criticisms are not made without some justification, 
the fact that Webb appears to have overlooked the essentially moral 
connotation of the terms "corps", "esprit", "charité", as Pascal uses them 
in this context, invalidates much of his criticism. For example Pascal 
nowhere in the fragment in question intimates that when he refers to the 
qualitative division between the first two orders he has in mind the sort 
of rigid dualism between matter and thought - ’res extensa’ and ’res 
cogitans’ - envisaged by Descartes. Indeed the very fact that he does 
select persons as exemplifying his orders makes it plain how far this is 
from being the case. Pascal is quite as well aware as anyone else that 
it is impossible to refuse all power for conscious thought to the captains 
and kings who typify the "ordre des corps". Wliat he is concerned to point 
out is that they, and those of their ilk, are exclusively preoccupied with 
’material’ achievpient and satisfaction; that they direct all their intellectual, 
as well as physical, effort to this purely worldly end; and that they are 
therefore in his own terminology "charnels". Similarly with Archimedes and 
his fellow-members of the "ordre des esprits"; their lives are wholly taken 
up with the quest for knowledge to be acquired through the senses and 
reasoning. And both these types of individuals, characterized by the objects
(l) op.cit., p.109.
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which they set themselves to achieve, are cursed with the purblindness that 
results from preoccupation.
And when Webb, in regard to the division between the second and 
third orders, maintains that in the latter we are still dealing with 
’thoughts’ and ’feelings’, so that the disparity here is not as marked as 
that between the first and second, he entirely fails to see that in this 
respect Pascal is primarily concerned with the groundwork and range of the 
two orders. The naked human mind is perfectly capable by itself of carrying 
out disciplined research into the relations between the phenomena of the 
visible world, or of wrestling with abstract problems of geometry, but no 
amount of striving on its own part will ever suffice to bring it to an 
awareness of the supernatural. It is the qualitative difference between 
the two that is important, for all the scientists in the world put together 
would not suffice to produce even the first beginnings of a saint - in 
Pascal’s view it is only by grace, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, 
that this can be achieved.
As Pascal depicts them, the members of the lower orders just do not 
see the values prized in the order above their own^ ^-their private pursuits 
act as a film drawn over their eyes. In other words their respective fields 
of vision are limited to the aspect of experience in which they place their 
end, and seek their fulfilment. Thus it is evident that the terras "corps" 
and "esprit" are used merely as convenient labels to symbolize the dominant 
characteristic of the particular order of values. And it is noteworthy
(l) There is something of an echo here of the fundamental Neo-Platonic 
doctrine of the correspondence and mutual dependence of subject and object; 
’like alone sees like’, of. W.R.Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus. (London, 
1928, 3rd ed.), p.137-8.
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that the term "pensée", laboured by Webb, occurs only once in the whole 
fragment, while "corps" is used only when some neat formula is required to 
represent the first order in a comparison where an elaborate definition 
would tend to produce obscurity.
The way in which the sort of values they pursue in life determines 
the particular order of being to which various individuals belong emerges 
very clearly in connection with the elaboràte doctrine of the "figuratifs" 
worked out in the Pensées, and applied especially to the Old Testament 
prophetic utterances, in order that these may be interpreted as presaging 
the advent of Jesus Christ. The relevant aspect of the doctrine is adumbrated 
in a brief extract from a letter to Mile, de Roannez where Pascal, to 
illustrate the symbolic character of the divine self-disclosure to man, 
refers to:
"...le secret d’Esprit de Dieu caché encore dans l’Ecriture.
Car il y a deux sens parfaits, le litéral et le mystique; et 
les Juifs s’arrêtant à l’un ne pensent pas seulement qu’il 
y en ait un autre, et ne songent pas à le chercher;..."
(p.510; G.E.VI, p.89)
The significance of this failure on the part of the Jews to recognize that
certain passages in the Scriptures are figurative in meaning is that they
are thereby prevented from seeing the values of the spiritual order upon
which these rest, and which should be presented %o the mind through their
agency. Their plight, as it is depicted in the Pensées, shows how their
attempt to find satisfaction in the values of the ’material’ order blinds
them to those of the superna.tural order:
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"Les Juifs charnels attendaient un Messie charnel; les 
chrétiens grossiers croient que le Messie les a dispensés 
d'aimer Dieu; les vrais Juifs et les vrais chrétiens adorent 
un Messie qui les fait aimer Dieu." (p.1231; B.60$)
"Au temps du Messie, ce peuple se partage. Les spirituels 
ont embrasse le Messie; les grossiers sont demeurés pour 
lui servir de témoins." (p.1236; B.748)
"Les Juifs le refusent, mais non pas tous; les saints le 
reçoivent, et non les charnels." (ibid.; B.760)
"Les Juifs charnels n'entendaient ni la grandeur ni 
l'abaissement du Messie prédit dans leurs prophéties.
Ils l’ont méconnu dans sa grandeur prédite, ... ils ne 
le croyaient pas si grand qu’il fût éternel. Et ils 
l’ont méconnu de même dans son abaissement et dans sa 
mort. ...Ils ne le croyaient donc ni mortel, ni éternel; 
ils ne cherchaient en lui qu’une grandeur charnelle."
(p.1272; B.662)
Juifs ont tant aimé les choses figurantes, et les 
;i bien attendues, qu'ils ont méconnu la realité.
"Les 
ont s:
quand elle est venue dans le temps et en la manière 
prédite. Les rabbins prennent pour figures ...tout 
ce qui n'exprime pas l'unique but qu'ils ont, des biens 
temporels." (p.1274; B.670)
The "Juifs charnels", members of the "ordre des corps" as the qualifying
adjective denotes, unable to see the deeper significance of the 'figures',
to penetrate to the 'reality* behind them, to set their goal above the
'material* satisfaction afforded by the things of this world, are consequently
incapable of appreciating the true nature of the spiritual Messiah, or the
prophecies announcing his coming. In this they illustrate the truth of the
claim, made with respect to the supernatural values in the three orders
fragment, that; "La grandeur de la sagesse, ... est invisible aux charnels
et aux gens d'esprit". Here again the Neo-Platonic doctrine that like
alone sees like, subject and object somehow involving and implying each
other, is in evidence. For those of the Jews who were not carnally-minded.
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the "spirituels", the "saints", did welcome the Messiah and were able to
perceive the reality behind the figures, because the "saints" belong to
the "ordre de charité", the order whose Glory Christ came to make manifests
"Les saints ont leur empire, leur éclat, leur grandeur,
...et n'ont nul besoin des grandeurs charnelles •. Jésus- 
Ghrist, sans biens ... est dans son ordre de sainteté..,.
0 qu’il est venu en grande pompe et en une prodigieuse 
magnificence, aux yeux du coeur et qui voient la sagesse!"
The "Juifs charnels" on the other hand were expecting this pomp 
and magnificence to be of the 'material* order, for it was in this light 
that they had interpreted the promises made through the Old Testament 
p r o p h e t s . I t  was but natural, since they were "charnels", that they 
should not see beyond the temporal and the material, in fact the mere 
"figures", for as members of the "ordre des corps" this is all their world, 
and not for one moment can they see beyond it. Their inability to perceive 
the true spiritual significance of the figures is but a particular example 
of that purblindness, characteristic of the preoccupation of members of 
the two lower orders of being, which renders them incapable of seeing the 
values prized in the order outside their own.
(1) "Dans ces promesses-là chacun trouve ce qu’il a dans le fond de son 
coeur, les biens temporels ou,les biens spirituels. Dieu ou les créatures;.." 
(p.1265; B.675) "...l'intelligence des biens promis dépend du coeur, qui 
appelle 'bien* ce qu’il aime;..." (p.1276; B.758)
(2) Saint Augustine likewise notes concerning the failure to perceive the 
figurative significance of certain passages in the ScriptuTes that; "There is 
a miserable servitude of the spirit in this habit of taking signs for things, 
so that one is not able to raise the ^ e of the mind above things that are 
corporeal and created to drink in eternal light," On Christian Doctrine.Ill, 
v,9. Pascal follows him in setting up 'charity* as the criterion which 
determines whether the sense of a particular passage is to be taken literally 
or figuratively. This means that ipso facto the members of the "ordre des 
corps", and especially the carnally-minded Jews who, as the result of their 
exclusive attachment to the material and temporal designed merely to prefigure 
the supernatural and eternal, reverse the true order of things, must of
cont. p.382.
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Moreover, in the scheme of the orders as thus applied ontological
and moral values coalesce, since, by allowing themselves to be ensnared
in the figures, so that they do not mount beyond them to the reality
symbolized, the Jews have become absorbed in what are no more than mere
illusions. For Pascal defines and contrasts the two terms "figure" and
"réalité" as follows;
"Figure porte absence et présence, plaisir et déplaisir."
(p.l266; B.677)
"Figures. - Un portrait porte absence et présence, plaisir 
et déplaisir. La réalité exclut absence et déplaisir."
(ibid.; B.678)
Clearly on this view the figure is the bearer of 'presence* and 'pleasure' 
only when it is treated as a means to lead the mind to something real 
beyond itself, and is not permitted to draw the interest to itself, thus 
hindering the process it is meant to further. Since in the case of the Jews 
the figures do not help them to reach the reality behind, but act as snares 
which hinder the mind from rising, it follows that the values they pursue, 
seen in their true light, can procure but 'absence* and 'displeasure*.
(cont. from p.381) necessity misconstrue the whole significance of the 
Scriptures; "Tout ce qui ne va point à la charité est figure. L'unique 
objet de l'Ecriture est la charité. Tout ce qui ne va point à l'unique 
but en est la figure. Car, puisqu'il n'y a qu'un but, tout ce qui n'y va 
point en mots propres est figure." (p.1274; B.670) "La charité n'est pas 
un précepte figuratif. Dire que Jésus-Christ, qui est venu &ter les figures 
pour mettre la vérité, ne soit venu que mettre la figure de la charité, pour 
ôter la réalité qui était auparavant, cela est horrible. 'Si la lumière est 
ténèbres, que seront les ténèbres?'" (p.1283; B.665) cf. Saint Augustine, op. 
cit., III, x,15. "...Scripture teaches nothing but charity, nor condemns any­
thing except cupidity,..." III,xv,23> "...in the consideration of figurative 
expressions a rule such as this will serve, that what is read should be 
subjected to diligent scrutiny until an interpretation contributing to the 
reign of charity is produced. If this result appears literally in the text, 
the expression being considered is not figurative."
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(ii) The criterion of rank in the scale; reality
The emphatic statements with which the long fragment from the 
hgn^ e^ a. devoted to the exposition of the doctrine of orders concludes 
shows that the three orders, qualitatively different as Pascal asserts 
them be earlier, nonetheless comprise a scale, which is both an ontological 
scale and also a scale of values. True there is no such overlap of 
categories as is normally associated with a scale of values, nor is there 
any suggestion that the lower order is continued in the higher, no more
than that the higher merely transcends the lower adding something new to
it - the higher is reckoned to be absolutely transcendent in regard to 
the lower. But although such a position might seem in fact to preclude 
the possibility of any scale whatsoever, there can be no mistaking the purport 
of Pascal's words - he states quite plainly that the least amount of the 
higher order exceeds in value the greatest amount of the lower.
An extraet from a letter to k&ne. Perier throws some light in
determining what constitutes the criterion of rank in this scale;
"o..I'alliance que la nature a faite entre nous ...celle que 
la grâce y a faite ... je trouve que notre bonheur a été si 
grand d'être unis de la dernière sorte, que nous nous devons 
unir pour le reconnaître et pour nous en réjouir. Car il 
faut avouer que c'est proprement depuis ce temps que nous 
devons nous considérer comme véritablement parents, et 
qu'il a plu à Dieu de nous joindre aussi bien dans son
nouveau monde par l'esprit, comme il avait dans le
terrestre par la chair.
..C'est en quoi nous devons admirer que Dieu nous ait 
donné et la figure et la réalité de cette alliance; car, 
corome nous avons dit souvent entre nous, les choses 
corporelles ne sont qu'une image des spirituelles, et 
Dieu a représenté les choses invisibles dans les visibles.
Cette pensée est si générale et si utile, qu'on .ne doit 
point laisser un espace notable de temps sans y songer 
avec attention." (p.483-4; G.E.II, p.248-9)
(l)c|. p,3~}0.
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Especially noteworthy here for the present purpose are the pairs of anti­
theses which derive from, the original contrast between nature and grace; 
"chair-esprit" (in the sense of the spirit of love infused by divine grace), 
"monde terrestre-nouveau monde", "figure-réalité", "choses corporelles - 
choses spirituelles". The two states envisaged represent respectively 
the figure and the reality of the bond which unites Pascal and the other 
members of his family - the natural or biological relation operative in the 
terrestial world merely symbolizes the spiritual relation effected by 
divine grace in the 'new' w o r l d . A n d  this is alleged to be but a 
particular example of the general principle that corporeal things are no 
more than the image of spiritual things, and that God uses visible and 
natural objects and relationships to symbolize invisible and supernatural 
ones.
Now the dominant characteristic of images or figures, at least
as Pascal conceives of them, is that they lack the reality of the objects
(2)for which they stand.' ' It is to this characteristic therefore that 
he makes oblique reference when he maintains that it is properly speaking 
only since they have been conjoined by grace in a spirituaJL union that the 
members of his family have been truly related to one another. And the use 
of the adverb "véritablement", to denote the real as opposed to the merely 
figurative relation, attests the extent to which truth and reality are
(3)synonymous terms in Pascal's vocabulary in this respect. The conclusion 
to which the foregoing points is that what differentiates the spiritual
(1) This expression is clearly used to designate not 'the world to come', but 
that Pauline kingdom of the Spirit which Pascal is inclined to regard as 
synonymous with the Church.
(2) cf. bf. above, p. 3%^
(3) of. below, p.&%\. 3'SY, .
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relation from the natural, and invests it with greater worth, is the fact 
that it is reqj. whereas the other is only symbolic, so that in this case 
reality constitutes the value-determinant.
In view of the assertions in this passage as to the significance 
and utility of the notion that the natural is an image of the supernatural, 
and more especially since the contrasted terms of the antitheses correspond
(2)
to those used to describe the "ordre des corps" and the "ordre de charité", 
the transfer of the implied value-determinant, reality, appears justified.
This would be equivalent to affirming that the supernatural order of 
charity, and that which it embraces, is the only mode of being which is 
fully and completely real, and hence is of immeasurably greater worth than 
the orders on the lower confines of reality, as it were, for their reality
fn)
is entirely derivative and reflected; in precisely the same way as
(1) Moreover the letter continues; "Nous avons discouru assez particulièrement 
du rapport de ces deux sortes de choses, c'est pourquoi nous n'en parlerons 
pas ici; car cela est trop long pour l'écrire et trop beau pour ne t'être pas 
resté dans la mémoire, et, qui plus est, nécessaire absolument, suivant mon 
avis."
(2) It should however be noted that the adjective "spirituel", used in the 
fragment from the Pensées of the "ordre des esprits", in the extract from the 
letter refers to what is characteristic of the supernatural, that which has 
been endued with divine grace.
(3) It is also noteworthy here that Pascal adopts the standpoint of 
traditional Christian metaphysics which identifies Being with God. In a 
letter to Mme. Périer he alleges that; "..le péché., est le véritable néant, 
parce qu'il est contraire à Dieu, qui est le véritable être.. (p.485; G.E.II, 
p.251) This 'anhypostatic' notion of evil was borrowed by Saint Augustine 
from Platonism, which viewed evil as nothing positive, but as a defect or 
absence of good, the measure of a thing's distance from the source of being. 
For the Platonist all being, in so far as it is true being, is good since it 
derives from God. Thus Saint Augustine writes in On Christian Doctrine that; 
"Because He is good, we are; and in so far as we are, we are good. ...in so 
far as we are evil, to that extent is our being lessened. For He is the 
highest and first being who is altogether immutable ...In this way other 
things which are cannot be unless they take their existence from him, and 
they are good only in so far as He grants them existence." (xxxll, 35) of. 
also Of True Religion, xl, 21; "There is no life which is not of God, for God
cont. on p.386
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the spiritual relation is more valuable and significant in comparison with 
the natural by virtue of the fact that it is real whereas the latter is 
merely figurative. Yet since Pascal's orders are clearly orders of being, 
and since the essential characteristic of being is reality, if the variable 
or criterion of rank in the scale is also reality, this means that the 
assignment of value becomes largely a question of perspective: a thing from 
a given order taken by itself is real and has value, but when compared with 
something from a higher order it loses both its reality and its worth, 
being reduced to the status of a mere image. Thus the relativism which 
has been shown to characterize Pascal's judgements of value is inherent 
in the conception of orders on which they are based.
The evidence garnered from this letter with respect to reality as 
the criterion of rank in Pascal's scale is confirmed by the dominant theme 
of the brief treatise Sur la conversion du pécheur. The process is there 
described whereby the soul gradually becomes aware that the pleasures, 
relationships and good things of this world to which it has become attached 
are transitory, unreal and valueless when seen sub specie aeternitatis. As 
the result of the first influx of divine grace which it receives the soul 
experiences some discomfort;
(cont. from p.385) is supreme life and the fount of life. No life is evil as 
life but only as it tends to death. Life knows no death save wickedness 
('nequitia') which derives its name from nothingness ('ne quidquam')." The 
conception of being as truly realized only in God appears again in Pascal's 
letter to Mme. Périer at the time of their father's death; ".«dans la mort, 
par 1'anéantissement de la vie, la créature rend à Dieu tout l'hommage dont 
elle est capable, en s'anéantissant devant les yeux de sa Majesté, et en 
adorant sa souveraine existence, qui seule existe réellement." (p.493;G.E.II, 
p.544) The implication which this Christian ontology carries for conceptions 
of the material universe has been insisted on hy M.Gilson; "Si Dieu est l'Etre, 
il n'est pas seulement l'être total;'totum esse'; comme on vient de le voir, 
il est encore l'être véritable; 'verum esse'; ce qui signifie que le reste 
n'est que l'être partiel et ne mérite même pas véritablement le nom d'être. 
Voilà donc tout ce qui nous semble au premier abord constituer la réalité par
cont. on p.387.
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"D'une part, la présence des objets visibles la touche plus 
que l'espérance des invisibles, et de l'autre la solidarité 
des invisibles la touche plus que la vanité des visibles."
(p.548; G.E.X, p.422)
Here again it is the antitheses which are important - the visible objects
although present are seen to be mere vanity, of no substance or duration;
whereas the invisble, although as yet unrealized and still the object of
hope, possess the solidity, the reality lacking in the former.
The soul comes to recognize that the perishable things of this
world, from which it has so far derived its sole enjoyment, are passing
from its grasp every moment, and that finally it will find itself completely
bereft of all on which it has pinned its hopes of happiness;
"De sorte qu'elle comprend parfaitement que son coeur ne 
s'étant attaché qu'à des choses fragiles et vaines, son 
âme se doit trouver seule et abandonnée au sortir de 
cette vie, puisqu'elle n'a pas eu soin de se joindre à 
un bien véritable et subsistant par lui-même, qui put 
la soutenir et durant et après cette vie." (p.549;
G.E.X, p.423)
In this comparison between the "bien veritable et subsistant par lui-même", 
capable of sustaining the soul both during and after this life, on the one 
hand, and the "choses fragiles et vaines" which cease with this life, on the 
other, the contrasted pairs of adjectives, "fragiles et vaines" - "veritable 
et subsistant", show that the value-determinant here is the reality to 
which the latter point, as agains the necessarily ephemeral nature of whatever 
the former qualify. And Pascal further maintains in this context that the 
claim that things of this world are capable of transmitting any "plaisir
(continued from p.386) excellence; le monde de l'étendue et du mouvement 
qui nous entoure, rejeté dans la pénombre de l'apparence et relégué dans la 
zone inférieure d'une quasi-irréalité." L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale, 
p.63.
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solide" is proved to be unfounded "par un nombre infini d'expériences si 
funestes et si continuelles"; so that once again solidity, reality is 
denied in the light of the supernatural to things which properly belong 
to the "ordre des corps" or the "ordre des esprits", while their relative 
worthlessness is held to consist in precisely that deficiency.
"Conversion" therefore in Pascal's terms implies a definite
transition, under the influence of divine grace, from the common experience
of life to a new and higher order, the supernatural order of charity. Once
perceived the values of this order appear as the sole reality by the side
of which everything that has preceded, which formerly was taken as valuable
in itself, appears as a great shadow or illusion. Thus in the seventh
letter to Mlle.de Roannez he speaks of;
"..un si grand bonheur et un si grand honneur que Dieu 
leur a fait. Tous les honneurs du monde n'en sont que 
l'image; celui-là seul est solide et réel, .." (p.515;
G.E.VI, p.219)
The familiar contrast is here made in explicit terms - the superior worth 
and greater desirability of the supernatural good stems from the fact that 
it alone is truly real, while the temporal is a mere shadow of it.
However, this 'image-relation', as it may be described, is operative
not only between natural and supernatural, in terms of the contrast between
the "ordre de charité" and the two lower orders, but also between these two
lower orders themselves; between the intellectual and the corporeal. In the
letter to the Queen of Sweden, in the course of marking the differences
between these two orders, Pascal affirms;
"..et le pouvoir des rois sur les sujets n'est, ce me semble, 
qu'une image du pouvoir des esprits sur les esprits qui leur 
sont inférieurs,..." (p.503; G.E.III, p.30-1)
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Since intellectual dominion has the reality lacking in sheer physical 
dominion it follows that the superiority of the "ordre des esprits" over the 
"ordre des corps" does not reside solely in the cognitive power generic to 
the former, but more significantly in the fact that when Juxtaposed the 
former appears as real and the latter merely as an image.
In an important passage from the sixteenth Provinciale the
* image - relation' is applied to what is in this case essentially a scale
of knowing, which illustrates the correspondence Pascal sees as existing
between the reality apprehended and the sort of knowledge that results;
"L'état des Chrétiens ... tient le milieu entre l'état des 
bienheureux et l'état des Juifs. Les bienheureux possèdent 
Jésus-Christ réellement sans figures et sans voiles. Les 
Juifs n'ont possédé de Jésus-Christ que les figures et les 
voiles, ...Et les Chrétiens possèdent Jésus-Christ dans 
l'Eucharistie véritablement et réellement, mais encore 
couvert de voiles. 'Dieu', dit saint Eucher, 's'est fait 
trois tabernacles; la synagogue, qui n'a eu que les ombres 
sans vérité; l'Eglise, qui a la vérité et les ombres ; et 
le ciel ou il n'y a point d'ombres, mais la seule vérité'^
Nous sortirions de l'état oh nous sommes, qui est l'état 
de foi, que saint Paul oppose tant à la loi qu'à la claire 
vision, si nous ne possédions que les figures sans Jésus- 
Christ, parce que c'est le propre de la loi de n'avoir que 
l'ombre, et non la substance des choses." (p.857;G.E.VI,p.2756)
Since it is the reality, or lack thereof, corresponding to the range of
vision in each instance which determines whether the resultant knowledge is
"vérité" or merely "ombres", reality once again appears as the cachet that
distinguishes the various states one from a n o t h e r . T h e  Jews possessed
(l) Pascal's practice of using "vérité" and "réalité" as synonymous terms in 
antithesis to "figure" suggests that not merely reality, but also truth, 
properly pertains only to the supernatural order, and hence is foreign to the 
two purely natural orders. Three extracts from the letter to M.et fce.Périer, 
written at the time of his father's death, contain significant comparisons in 
this regards "..étouffons ou modérons, par 1'intelligence de la vérité, les 
sentiments de la nature corrompue et déçue qui n'a que les fausses images, et 
qui trouble par ses illusions la sainteté des sentiments que la vérité et 
l'Evangile nous doit donner." (p.495;G.E.II,p.5#) "Ne considérons un homme 
comme ayant cessé de vivre, quoique la nature suggère; mais comme commençant
continued on p.390
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only figures in their state of being under the law, so that their knowledge 
was restricted to mere "ombres". Although the Christians do have access
to the reality through the Eucharist, yet, since they do not enjoy unimpeded
vision of it as it is, even their knowledge is not unmixed with "ombres".
It is for the blessed in heaven alone that the state of faith is absorbed 
in the clear sunlight of beatific vision, wherein the supreme reality is 
seen, not 'through a glass darkly', but 'face to face'.
In the Pensées also Pascal refers to this difference between the 
state of faith and that of glory in terms of the familiar 'image - relation', 
ihving pointed out, in connection with figurative interpretation of certain 
expressions in the Old Testament, that "la nature est une image de la grâce", 
he goes ons
"Et même la grâce n'est que la figure de la gloire, car
elle n'est pas la dernière fin. Elle a été figurée par la
loi, et figure elle-même la gloire; mais elle en est la 
figure, et le principe ou la cause." (l) (p.l264;B.643)
The conception adumbrated in the passage from the sixteenth Provinciale and
implied again in this fragment from the Pensées, of three different states
into which individuals are grouped according as they stand in relation to
the supernatural reality, is a recurring one in Pascal's writings. Thus in
a letter to Mile, de Roannez he alleges with respect to the bliss of union
with God that;
(continued from p.389) à vivre comme la vérité l'assure", (p.496;G.E.II,p.549) 
"Eclairons donc l'erreur de la nature par la lumière de la foi." (p.497; G.E.II, 
p.552)
(1) cf. from the Troisième écrit sur la grâce; "..la grâce est donnée pour 
mériter la gloire,. (p.979;G.E.XI,p.l70) and from a letter to Mme.Périer; 
"..la béatitude des bienheureux est un effet et une suite de la grâce,..."
(p.488;G.E.II, p.380)
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"Les bienheureux ont cette joie sans aucune tristesse; les 
gens du monde ont leur tristesse sans cette joie, et les 
Chrétiens ont cette joie mêlée de la tristesse d'avoir suivi 
d'autres plaisirs, et de la crainte de la perdre par l'attrait 
de ces autres plaisirs qui nous tentent sans relâche," (p.515-6 
G.E.VI, p.221)
In the Prière pour le bon usage des maladies the notion recurs in the following 
form;
"..Seigneur, vous avez laissé languir le monde dans les 
souffrances naturelles sans consolation, avant la venue de 
votre Fils unique; vous consolez maintenant et vous 
adoucissez les souffrances de vos fidèles par la grâce de 
votre Fils unique; et vous comblez d'une béatitude toute 
pure vos saints dans la gloire de votre Fils unique. Ce 
sont les admirables degrés par lesquels vous conduisez vos 
ouvrages." (p.611-2; G.E.IX, p.335)
Again in the letter to Mme. périer on the death of their father Pascal writes;
"II n'est done pas juste aussi que nous soyons sans douleur 
comme des anges qui n'ont aucun sentiment de la nature; mais 
il n'est pas juste aussi que nous soyons sans consolation 
comme les Païens qui n'ont aucun sentiment de la grâce; mais 
il est juste que nous soyons affligés et consolés comme 
Chrétiens, et que la consolation de la grâce l'emporte par­
dessus les sentiments de la nature; (p.499;G.E,II, p.556)
Now although this theme affords no exact parallel with that of the three
orders of being, the two are to some degree at least correlative; the state
of those deprived of all awareness of the supernatural corresponds with the
two lower purely natural orders of being, while the states of faith and glory,
which clearly do not differ in kind but merely in degree in their approach to
the supernatural, can both be subsumed under the "ordre de charité".
(l) The triple gradation noted above, p.33i, further exemplifies this theme.
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(ill) Value as a perspective of the orders.
It is obvious that where a conception is sufficiently basic to act 
as the background determining a writer's judgement in particular instances, 
explicit references to it will be rare except when he is concerned to 
expound it at length. Although this applies in Pascal's case in regard to 
the notion of different orders of being, the way in which it does determine 
his estimates of value comes out very plainly in two notable passages from 
his writings.
The removal of justice from the gamut of secular society and
politics, which follows logically from the argument of passages cited
earlier,^  ^has numerous parallels in the Pensées,  ^but a very significant
one also occurs in the Entretien avec M. de Saci. In his assessment there
of the benefits to be derived from a study of the writings of Montaigne
and Epictetus, Pascal is reported as saying that:
"Montaigne est incomparable pour confondre l'orgueil de 
ceux qui, hors la foi, se piquent d'une véritable justice..."
The teaching of Epictetus on the other hand, although it counteracts apathy,
has a tendency to induce pride, and on that account may prove harmful to
those unaware of :
"...la corruption de la plus parfaite justice qui n'est 
pas de la foi." (p.574;G.E.IV, p.55-6)
And the full significance of this last line in particular for an appreciation
of the assumptions underlying Pascal's views on ethics and politics becomes
apparent when it is considered alongside a passage taken from a group of
fragments usually appended to the Pensées, but more closely related in
subject-matter to the Provinciales;
(l) cf. above, p.3<l2. (2) cf. above, p.
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"S'ils ne renoncent à la probabilité, leurs bonnes maximes 
sont aussi peu saintes que les méchantes, car elles sont 
fondées sur l'autorité humaine. Et ainsi, si elles sont 
plus justes, elles seront plus raisonnables, rnais non pas 
plus saintes; elles tiennent de la tige sauvage sur quoi 
elles sont entées." (p.l073;B.920)
Now it is evident from these two extracts that with respect to 
justice and ethics generally Pascal is prepared to recognize that on the 
purely human and secular level varying degrees of such concepts as goodness 
or justice, and their opposites, are realizable in actions performed, 
decisions made, etc.; that relative to other acts on the same plane certain 
acts may be adjudged better, more just, more in accordance with what is there 
regarded as rational behaviour. But, when looked at from the standpoint 
of acts characteristic of the supernatural order, these relative differences 
are so slight as to be negligible, so that from this point of view two 
adjacent terms on the natural level, one of which is good the other bad 
relatively to each other, will appear indistinguishable. The goodness in 
question will not merely be an inferior sort of goodness, but will not be 
goodness at all in the sense which that word connotes in the supernatural 
order.
As Pascal was probably aware, he might have appealed to the 
authority of Saint Augustine in justification of this habit of thinking on 
two levels, and of assigning value accordingly. For the latter, although 
he does not go so far as to say that viewed from the supernatural order 
secular virtues and vices appear on a par, nonetheless contrasts the two 
planes on occasion in such a way as to imply that what is characteristic 
of the lower taken by itself is in every sense worthy, except that compared
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to the higher it is worthless.  ^ ^
Such an approach on Pascal's part testifies not merely to the
influence on his thinking of the basic notion of the orders, but also to
the very mathematical mould in which his mind is cast, and to the extent
to which his terms of reference, regardless of the particular context, are
instinctively mathematical. For these extracts provide an example of the
application of the general principle enunciated at the conclusion of the
short treatise entitled Potestatum numericarum suirna - that a continuous
magnitude of a given order is not increased by the addition to it of any
number of magnitudes of a lower order; points add nothing to lines, lines
add nothing to surfaces, etc.:
"En sorte qu'on doit négliger, comii.e nulles, les quantités 
d'ordre inférieur." (2) (p.171; G.E.III, p.36?)
However, Pascal offers no justification, and doubtless it never crossed
his mind that any was necessary, for this transference of the relation
holding between mathematical concepts to the field of ethics.
It is this practice of falling back in thought on the aspect of
things as viewed from the supernatural order, engendered by his theory of
qualitatively different orders of being, that leads Pascal to the purely
otherworldly standpoint from which he treats as null all earthly activities*
Whence the pessimistic tone of such passages from the Pensées as the
following;
(1) cf. e.g. the following passage from The City of God, v,xix; "..no man can 
have true virtue without true piety, ..nor is that virtue true either, when it 
serves but for human ostentation. But those that are not of the eternal city 
..the city of God, are more useful to their earthly city in possessing that 
purely world-respecting virtue, than if they lacked that also. ..But let that 
virtue that serves human glory without piety be never so much extolled, it is 
not comparable even with the imperfect beginnings of the saints' virtues, whose 
assured hope stands fixed in the grace and mercy of the true God".
(2) of. above, p.dJ].
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"Il ne faut pas avoir l'âme fort élevée pour comprendre 
qu'il n'y a point ici de satisfaction véritable et solide, 
que tous nos plaisirs ne sont que vanité ...Qu'on fasse 
réflexion là-dessus et qu'on dise ensuite s'il n'est pas 
indubitable qu'il n' y a de bien en cette vie qu'en 
l'espérance d'une autre vie, qu'on n'est heureux qu'à 
mesure qu'on s'en approche.. (l) (p.ll74;B.194)
ThiS|^ equivalent to affirming, not merely that earthly existence has no value
save, and in so far, as it leads us on, but that the sole earthly value lies
in the hope of the life to come.
(iv) The contribution of Platonism to this theme.
The tendency latent in the conception of the orders as forming the 
background of Pascal's thought to neutralize the value of everything which 
belongs to space and time is heightened by his ready acceptance of the 
implications of the Platonic theme in the Augustinian theology, with which 
he was acquainted through his association with Port-Royal. It was one of 
the most notable achieignents of Saint Augustine to adapt to the Christian
(2)
doctrine of creation the characteristic Platonic doctrine of exemplarism,
(1) cf.Saint Augustine, The City of God.xix.xx: "Thentherefore is the good of 
the holy society perfect, when their peace is established in eternity, ..What 
man is he that would not account such an estate most happy, or comparing with 
that which man has here on earth, would not avouch this latter to be most 
miserable, were it ever so well fraught with temporal conveniences? Yet he 
that has the latter in possession, and applies it all with reference to his 
hope's firm and faithful object, may not unfitly be called happy already, but 
that is rather in his expectation of his future state than in his fruition of 
the present. F o r this present possession without the other hope is a false 
beatitude and a most true misery. For herein is no use of the mind's truest 
good, because there is lacking the true wisdom, which ... shouldlefer his 
intent in all these unto that end, where God shall be all in all, where 
eternity shall be firm, and peace most absolute and perfect."
(2) On this aspect of Saint Augustine's thought cf. E. Gilson, (cont.p.396)
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consisting above all in the recognition of an unseen world of unchanging
reality behind the flux of phenomena, of a spiritual universe compared with
which the world of appearances grows pale and becomes a mere symbol. The
reception which Pascal accords to this view of the world of sensible
phenomena as the shadow or reflection of a higher world of reality is
strikingly illustrated in a passage from a letter to Mame. Périer, very
reminiscent of Plato's famous parable of the shadow in the caves
"...les choses corporelles ne sont qu'une image des spirituelles, 
et Dieu a représenté les choses invisibles dans les visibles.
...comme nos péchés nous retiennent enveloppés parmi les 
choses corporelles et terrestres*..il faut que nous nous 
servions du lieu même ou nous sommes tombes pour nous 
relever de notre chute. C'est pourquoi nous devons bien
ménager l'avantage que la bonté de Dieu nous donne de nous
lai^er toujours devant les yeux une image des biens que nous 
avons perdus, et de nous environner dans la captivité même ou 
sa justice nous a réduits, de tant d'objets qui nous servent 
d'une leçon continuellement présente.
De sorte que nous devons nous considérer comme des criminels 
dans une prison toute remplie des images de leur libérateur 
et des instructions nécessaires pour sortir de la servitude;.."(T)
(p.484; G.E.II, p.249-50)
The Platonic conception of the visible world as a pale copy of the unseen,
eternal one is adapted here by Pascal to his own purpose, but the depreciation
which the world of the material senses undergoes consequent on its being
(cont. from p.295) Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin, (Paris, 1929) 
p.253-78.
(l) Chevalier (Pascal. Paris, 1922, p.80-1) appears to consider that Pascal 
actually had in mind the passage from The Republic when writing this letter, 
but it seems to me much more likely that he was familiar with this Platonic 
theme through his study of Saint Augustine. In Of True Religion for example, 
Augustine outlines a very similar view of the symbolism of sensible appearances, 
which enables the mind to rise above these to the reality they reflects "If we 
cleave to the eternal Creator we must necessarily be somehow affected by 
eternity. But because the soul, implicated in and overwhelmed by its sins, 
cannot by itself see and grasp this truth, if in human experience there were 
no intermediate stage whereby man might strive to rise above his earthly life 
and reach likeness to God, God in his ineffable mercy by a temporal
cont. p.397
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reduced in status in this way to a 'prison-house* filled with mere 'images'
needs no e m p h a s i s , N o t  only is the phenomenal thereby denied any
positive value in itself, but its symbolic significance becomes entirely
relative, dependent upon whether it fulfils its purely representative
function or rather tends to insinuate itself into the position of the real
and final, thus attracting to itself the attention which it should direct
elsewhere, Pascal goes on in the same letter to condemn the 'idolatry' to
which this latter alternative gives rise;
"•.l'on voit que dans les ténèbres du monde on les suit 
par un aveuglement brutal, que l'on s'y attache et qu'on
en fait la dernière fin de ses désirs, ce qu'on ne peut
faire sans sacrilège, car il n'y a que Dieu qui doive être
la dernière fin comme lui seul est le vrai principe.^ ' Car,
quelque ressemblance que la nature créée ait avec son 
Créateur, et encore que les moindres choses et les plus 
petites et les plus viles parties du monde représentent au 
moins par leur unité la parfaite unité qui ne se trouve qu'en 
D i e u , o n  ne peut pas légitimement leur porter le souverain 
respect, parce qu'il n'y a rien de si abominable aux yeux de 
Dieu et des hommes que l'idolâtrie,. (p.4.84-5;G.E.II, p.2$0)
(cont. from p.396) dispensation has used the mutable creation, ., to remind the 
soul of its original and perfect nature, and:so has come to the aid of 
individual men and indeed of the whole human race. ..The treatment of the soul, 
which God's providence and ineffable loving-kindness administers, is most
beautiful in its steps and stages. ..we dwell among temporal things, and love
of them is an obstacle to our reaching eternal things, ...Wherever a man falls 
there must he lie until he is raised up. So we must strive, by means of the 
carnal forms which detain us, to come to know those of which carnal sense can 
bring us no knowledge." x,19, and xxiv, 45. The likelihood of Pascal's being 
acquainted with this particular work of Saint Augustine is considerable in view 
of the fact that it was translated by Arnauld in 1647, while the letter in 
question is dated 1 April, I658.
(1) The iraplication of the passage is therefore that subsequent to the Fall
man lost his capacity of immediate, direct vision of supernatural realities,
and has been dependent since on the analogical, indirect sort of knowledge 
which can be gleaned from the 'images' that surround him on all sides in his 
state of servitude, cf. from the Pensées, where the "Sagesse de Dieu" is 
represented as saying; "..vous n'êtes plus maintenant en l'état oîi Je vous ai 
formés. J'ai créé l'homme saint, innocent, parfait; je l'ai rempli de lumière 
et d'intelligence; je lui ai communiqué ma gloire et mes merveilles. L'oeil de 
l'homme voyait alors la majesté de Dieu, Il n'était pas alors dans les 
ténèbres qui l'aveuglent,. (p.1224; B.430)
(2 and 3 cont. p.398)
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Man on Pascal's view is imprisoned, as the result of the Fall, among the 
shadows of the world of sensible phenomena, but should be engaged on the 
return journey, as it were, to his heavenly home. The great moral danger 
involved in this is that he should forget himself en route, overlook the 
symbolic character of all that belongs to the world of space and time, and 
lose sight of his true end and goal. By allowing mere finite objects, 
harmless enough in themselves, to be mistaken for the end of life, the eye 
of man is kept fixed downwards to the things of earth, the images, instead 
of being raised to the heavenly reality. It follows therefore that it is 
impossible in Pascal's terms to acknowledge this world as of interest or 
value in itself without prejudice to its significance as a symbol of the 
eternal*
(2 from p.397) Pascal is at one with Plato in the primarily moral character 
of this concern that men should rise beyond the symbols to the contemplation 
of the higher reality which they veil. The following comments of R.L. 
Nettleship on Plato's allegory of the cave (The Republic. VII,51$f) are 
particularly significant in this regards "It would be a great mistake to 
regard the darkness of the cave as a mere darkness of intellectual ignorance, 
or the escape from it as a mere intellectual:enlightenment. In the mind of 
Plato, reason is never for long dissociated from emotion, or knowledge from 
purpose; the highest impose to him is the impulse towards truth, and the 
highest knowledge is knowledge of the end of action. Thus the great reason 
why the spark of 'divine' intelligence is so nearly smothered in man is not 
primarily the difficulty of learning or the mysteriousness of nature; the 
fetters which bind men in the cave are those 'leaden weights which the 
pleasures of gluttony and the like gather round them, and which turn the eye 
of the soul to the earth'. ..It is because men will not rouse themselves to 
the reality which is there if they had the eyes to see it, because they 
mistake the passing shows of sense for the eternal essence of which they are 
the mere outside, ..that 'before they are well awake in this world they find 
themselves in the other, sleeping the heavy sleep of death.' " The Theory of 
Education in the 'Republic' of Plato, in Hellenica. (London, 1880),p.154-5#
(3) Saint Augustine similarly holds that all things partake in some degree in 
the unity which is truly realized in God alone: "..there is no form or material 
thing which does not have some trace of unity,.." op.cit.,xxxii,60. cf.ibid. 
xxxvi, 660
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A notable example of the application of this Platonic theme to a
concrete instance, and one which brings out the value-judgement implicit in
it, occurs in another letter to Vkae. Perier, in connection with her husband's
projected building-plans. Pascal objects to the extravagance of these; if
carried out they will require Périer to go for a considerable period of time
without turning his mind to anything else, so that he will end by devoting
to the building operation;
"••le temps qu'il faudrait pour se détromper des charmes 
secrets qui s'y trouvent." (p.489;G.E.II, p.383)
Pascal urges Mne. Périer to take thought on the matter, and to encourage
her husband to restrict himself to the bare necessity;
"..de peur qu'il arrive qu'il ait bien plus de prudence et 
qu'il donne bien plus de soin et de peine au bâtiment d'une 
maison qu'il n'est pas obligé de faire, qu'à celui de cette 
tour mystique, dont tu sais que saint Augustin parle dans 
une de ses lettres, .•" (p.490;G.E.II, p.383)
Man therefore must be ever on his guard against getting caught in the net
of sensual indulgence in whatever form, which will blind him to the reality
beyond, behind and above the merely material. The danger to which such an
elaborate project exposes Périer is that he will become so bound up with
it, an inessential and purely worldly enterprise, that he will neglect and
eventually lose all sight of that which alone is essential and has reality.
But perhaps most illuminating as to the way in which this Platonic 
view of the symbolism of the sensible world helps to qualify Pascal's 
appreciation of the purely temporal and this-worldly is a further passage 
from the previous letter. After sounding his warning about the idolatry of 
those who set up some object from the material order as the supreme goal 
of their desires, he continues:
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”..ceux à qui Dieu fait connaître ces grandes vérités 
doivent user de ces images pour jouir de Celui qu'elles 
représentent, et ne demeurer pas éternellement dans cet 
aveuglement charnel et judaïque qui fait prendre la figure 
pour la réalité.” (p./!85; G.E.II, p.251)
The injunction to penetrate to the reality shadowed forth by the images,
implying as it does that reality in the highest sense of the term is
identified with the supernatural,and the figures with the world of
sensible phenomena, is of less significance in some ways than the appearance,
in this context, of the two verbs "user” and "jouir”. For Pascal's employment
of these two particular verbs to distinguish the sort of attitude appropriate
to the phenomenal and the supernatural respectively points to his familiarity
with, and endorsement of, Saint Augustine's division of things into the two
categories of use and enjoyment. The reference to the "aveuglement
charnel et judaïque” of those whose attention is rivetted to the sensible
image, so that it conceals instead of revealing the reality behind, is also
significant in this regard as foreshadowing the main theme of the doctrine
of the "figuratifs” elaborated in the Pensées. The error of the "Juifs
charnels” is there alleged to consist precisely in their reversal of the
(1) cf. also above, p.39Jn.3.
(2) The passage from Saint Augustine's writings which Pascal has in mind here 
is almost certainly the following one from the treatise On Christian Doctrine, 
with which he was acquainted as a reference to it in the Pensées attests (p. 
1260,n.; B.9OO); "To enjoy something is to cling to it with love for its own 
sake. To use something, however, is to employ it in obtaining that which you 
love, provided it is worthy of love. ..Suppose we were wanderers who could 
not live in blessedness except at home, miserable in our wandering and 
desiring to end it and to return to our native country. We would need
vehicles .. But if the amenities of the journey and the motion of the vehicles
itself delighted us, and we were led to enjoy those things which we should use, 
we should not wish to end our journey quickly, and, entangled in a perverse 
sweetness, we should be alienated from our country, ..Thus in this mortal life, 
wandering from God, if we wish to return to our native country where we can 
be blessed we should use this world and not enjoy it, so that the 'invisible
things' of God 'being understood by the things that are made' may be seen,
cont, p.AOl
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true order of things with respect to images and reality, use and enjoyment.
In their 'cupidity* they enjoy what ought to be used and use what ought to be
enjoyed, thus naking reality subservient to images by finding their end in what
ought to be the means, and their means in what ought to be the end;
"..quand les biens sont promis en abondance, qui les empêchait 
d'entendre les véritables biens, sinon leur cupidité, qui 
déteiminait ce sens aux biens de la terre? Mais ceux qui 
n'avaient de bien qu'en Dieu les rapportaient uniquement à Dieu.
Car il y a deux principes qui partagent les volontés des hommes, 
la cupidité et la charité. Ce n'est pas que la cupidité ne 
puisse être avec la foi en Dieu et que la charité ne soit avec 
les biens de la terre; mais la cupidité use de Dieu et jouit du 
monde; et la charité, au contraire."(2) (p.1271; B.571)
This assignraent of whatever belongs to the world of here and now to the category
of "use", so that it becomes a mere means to the attainment of an end which lies
outside its own order, contributes to the effect of the dominant Platonic theme
in depriving it of all value in itself.
(v) Relativism remains the dominant characteristic of Pascal's estimates 
ûLjCâllàâ.
Although Pascal conceives of the world of sensible phenomena as 
sacramental and symbolic, witnessing to the existence of a spiritual reality
(3)behind and above, he does not share the conviction of Thomas Aquinas
(cont,from p.iOO) that is, so that by means of corporeal and temporal things we 
may comprehend the eternal and spiritual." I,iv,4.cf.ibid., I,xxii,20; I,xxv,39; 
II,xxiii,36. Also Of True Religion, III, 101, where he again interprets the 
passage from Romans, 1,20, with Platonic overtones, as "..the return from 
temporal to eternal things,,."; ibid.liv, 105, The City of God. I,xxviii.
(1) cf. also above,
(2) cf. Saint Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Ill, x, I6; "I call 'charity' 
the motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and the 
enjoyment of one's self and of one's neighbour for the sake of God; but 'cupidity* 
is a motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of one's self, one's neighbour, or 
any corporeal thing for the sake of something other than God," On Divers 
Questions, xxx; "..all human perversity, or vice, consists in wishing to enjoy 
what we ought to use, and to use what we ought to enjoy."
(3) Further references to this sacramental aspect of the world of nature occur 
in the letters to Mile, de Roannezs "Dieu veut que nous jugions de la grâce
cont, p.A02.
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that its symbolic character can be discerned by man simply through the
exercise of his natural faculties. In the parable of the prison the various
'images' and 'instructions', provided in order to enable the captive to make
good his escape, cannot be read aright by the naked human eye:
"..mais il faut avouer qu'on ne peut apercevoir ces saints 
caractères sans une lumière surnaturelle; car comme toutes 
choses parlent de Dieu à ceux qui le connaissent, et qu'elles 
le découvrent à tous ceux qui l'aiment, ces mêmes choses le 
cachent à tous ceux qui ne le connaissent pas." (p./î84;G.Ë.II,p.250).
The value of the physical world therefore as a medium of revelation is entirely
relative; for it will show a different face according as the observer who
presents himself before it brings an eye already lightened by supernatural 
(1)
faith or not. If the former, the universe will appear to him as but the
phenomenon for expressing God's eternal reality; if the latter, it will be 
turned from a medium of instruction to an instrument of delusion, which 
ensnares him by captivating his senses so that he becomes unable to see beyond 
to the true ground which lies behind.
(cont. from p.401) par la nature, ..(p.509; G.E.VI, p.85) "..le secret de
la nature qui couvre Dieu,.." (ibid; G.E.VI; p.87) "Dieu est demeuré caché 
sous le voile de la nature qui nous le couvre jusqu'à l'Incarnation;.." (p.510; 
G.E.VI, p.88) "Le voile de la nature qui couvre Dieu.." (ibid.; G.E.VI; p.89), 
and in the Pensées: "La nature a des perfections, pour montrer qu'elle est 
l'image de Dieu, et des défauts, pour montrer qu'elle n'en est que l'image."
(p.1200; B.580) "..la conduite de Dieu est cachée sous la nature, comme en 
tous ses autres ouvrages." (p.1334; B.876)
(l) Although Saint Augustine likewise holds that the possibility of nature 
revealing its spiritual ground depends on the eye of the beholder, he does not 
stipulate for faith as the prerequisite in this regard. On the contrary, as 
the following passages serve to show, he believes with Plato that the capacity 
for recognition is possessed by all alike if they will but rouse themselves to 
exercise it: "All things are present to the blind as to the seeing. A blind 
man and one who hath sight, standing on the same spot, are each surrounded by 
the same forms of things; but one is present to them, the other absent,...not 
because the things themselves approach the one and recede from the other, but 
on account of the difference of their eyes. ..Thus also is God everywhere
(cont.p. 0^3)
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Thus in the fourth letter to Mile, de Roannez, where Pascal insists
at some length on the importance of the sacramental aspect of the sensible
world, it is the Christians alone who are envisaged as capable of perceiving
its symbolic reference:
"Toutes choses couvrent quelque mystère; toutes choses sont 
des voiles qui couvrent Dieu. Les Chrétiens doivent le 
reconnaître en tout."(l) (p.$10; G.E.v/l, p.9q)
The Christian alone is able to see through and over the sensible appearances
in this way to the reality which they veil - the world of nature lies open
to his eye, which has been illuminated by divine grace, and so is enabled
to trace there the footprints of the supernatural creator. The success
which Pascal achieves in thus reinvesting the natural order with value as
sacramental remains therefore wholly relative.
(Cpnt from p.402) present, everywhere whole..." On The Psalms. XCIX, 5-6. 
"If a man merely stares at the world, while another not only sees but 
questions it, the world does not appear differently to them; but appearing 
the same to both, it is dumb to one and answers the other. Or rather it 
speaks to all, but only those can understand it who compare its answer with 
the truth that is within them," Confessions. X,vi, 10.
(1) The same point is made in a slightly different way in a short fragment 
from the Pensées ; "Le monde subsiste pour exercer miséricorde et jugement, 
non pas comme si les hommes y étaient sortant des mains de Dieu, mais comme 
des ennemis de Dieu, auxquels il donne, par grâce, assez de lumière pour 
revenir, s'ils le veulent chercher et le suivre, mais pour les punir, s'ils 
refusent de le chercher..." (p.l293;B.584) Those whose eye has been 
enlightened by divine grace are therefore enabled to see in mere visible 
phenomena pointers beyond the world of sense to the spiritual reality: a 
condition which contrasts both with that of original righteousness, when no 
special gift of grace was necessary for man to perceive in the seen world an 
index to the unseen, and with that of the indifferent, for whom the material 
order constitutes simply a barrier to the spiritual since they have no 
inclination to seek after God. Thus in the first case the 'world', man's 
temporal surroundings, exercises a ministry of compassion by providing a 
pointer to the supernatural, while in the latter it acts as judgement, since 
men fail to take advantage of the opportunity it affords them of seeking for 
God.
(2) Saint Augustine is much more successful in this respect. In his scheme 
of creation based on the Platonic doctrine of 'participation* there are 
degrees of reality, and all things are graded according to their likeness to
(cont. on p.404)
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This relativist attitude toward the world of sensible phenomena
as shadowing forth its spiritual ground is perhaps most marked in Pascal's
anti-deism - his rigorous denial of the worth of religion which relies
(l)on the argument from design in nature. In this regard he entirely 
repudiates the view that nature can suggest to man the existence of God 
or of a spiritual order as an idea hitherto strange. He believes that God 
can, and indeed ought to, be recognized in nature, but not known from nature; 
that if a man be already firm in the knowledge of God he cannot help but see 
him in nature, but that it is impossible to discover him there if previously 
unknown. Thus he does not consider the Christian's contemplation of 
providence and life to be of the nature of a search after God, but rather
to be of the nature of a recognition and observation of the operation of the
God whom he already knows.
(cont. from p.403) God. Thus in The City of God he affirms that; ..nothing in 
nature being evil, ..but everything from earth to heaven ascending in a scale
of goodness, and so from the visible unto the invisible, unto which all are
unequal. And in the greatest is God the great workman, yet no less is he in 
the less: which little things are not to be measured by their own greatness, 
being near to nothing, but by their Maker's wisdom;.." (XI, XXII) Again in the
same work he speaks of "running through all things under us (which could not be
created, formed, nor ordered without the hand of the most essential, wise, and 
good God), and so through all the works of the creation; gathering from one 
more plain, and from another less apparent marks of his essence;.." (XI, XXVIII) 
Moreover, unlike Pascal, Saint Augustine does not hesitate to avail himself of
the way in which natural objects reflect in their order, unity and beaijty the
unity and immutable perfection of God as proof of his existence; "For whitherso­
ever thou turnest He speaks to thee by the marks which he has impressed on his
works, and when thou art slipping back to exterior things, he recalls thee by
the very forms of these things ..Gaze at the sky, the earth, the sea, and all 
the things which shine-in them or above them, or creep or fly or swim beneath 
them. They have forms because they have rhythm; take this away and they will 
no longer be. From whom then are they save from him, from whom rhythm is; 
since they have being only in so far as they are rhythmically ordered." (On
Free Will  ^ II,xvi. cf. also Confessions. XI,iv.
(l) The following passages from the Pensées attest this attitude; "J*admire 
avec quelle bardiesse ces personnes entreprennent de parler de Dieu. En 
adressant leurs discours aux impies, leur premier chapitre est de prouver la
(cont.on p.405)
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Obviously such a position entails the rejection of the traditional
Aristotelean proof of the supernatural reality, based on the fact that the
physical universe gives no account of itself as a self-sustaining and
self-contained system, but always implicitly postulates something beyond
itself as sustaining it. But more than this it attests that curious blend
of Pascal's fundamental notion of disparate orders of being with the element
of Neo-Platonism detected in his thought earlier.^  ^ Since spiritual
things are spiritually discerned it follows that the members of the two
lower orders of being are precluded from the knowledge of them, for they
are blind to the values of the supernatural order which lie without their
purview. In Neo-Platonic terms, like alone sees like, or, as Plotinus's
(2)famous canon runs, "the spiritual world is not outside the Spirit.."' ' 
percipient and object in some mysterious way depend upon and correspond to 
each other. It is therefore inconceivable that the "charnels" or "savants" 
should be able by mere scrutiny to perceive the sacramental character of the 
world of nature; that world as seen by the spiritual man must of necessity 
be a very different world from the one seen by the carnal or intellectual man.
(cont. from p.404.) Divinité par les ouvrages de la nature. Je ne m'étonnerais 
pas de leur entreprise s'ils adressaient leurs discours aux fidèles, car il 
est certain que ceux qui ont la foi viv^e dedans le coeur voient incontinent 
que tout ce qui est n'est autre chose que l'ouvrage de Dieu qu'ils adorent.
Î4ais pour ceux en qui cette lumière s'est éteinte, et dans lesquels on a 
dessein de la faire revivre, ces personnes destituées de foi et de grâce, qui, 
recherchant de toute leur lumière tout ce qu'ils voient dans la nature qui les 
peut mener à cette connaissance, ne trouvent qu'obscurité et ténèbres;*."
(p.1183-4; B.242) " *£h quoi, ne dites-vous pas vous-même que le ciel et les 
oiseaux prouvent Dieu?' - Non. - 'Et votre religion ne le dit-elle pas?' - 
Non. Car encore que cela est vrai en un sens, pour quelques âmes à qui Dieu 
donne cette lumière, néanmoins cela est faux à l'égard de la plupart." (p.1183; 
B.244) "..je n'entreprendrai pas ici de prouver par des raisons naturelles, ou
l'existence de Dieu, ..non seulement parce que je ne me sentirais pas assez 
fort pour trouver dans la nature de quoi convaincre des athées endurcis, mais 
encore parce que cette connaissance, sans Jésus-Ohrist, est inutile et stérile. 
..Tous ceux qui cherchent Dieu hors de Jésus-Christ, et qui s'arrêtent dans la
(cont. p.406)
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The spiritual illuiaination which accompanies faith, itself the
product of divine grace, enabling man to see what he could not otherwise see,
is conceived of by Pascal somewhat after the pattern of the higher
intellectual education in The Republic.whereby the eye of the soul is
converted from the idols of the cave to the upper world of sunlight, and
finally to the vision of the Good. Thus the short treatise Sur la
conversion du pécheur opens with the following statement:
"La première chose que Dieu inspire à l'âme qu’il daigne 
toucher véritablement, est une connaissance et une vue 
tout extraordinaire par laquelle l'âme considèîre les
choses et elle-même d'une façon toute nouvelle." (p.548;
G.E.X, p.422) ^
After receiving this illumination which transforms itself and its
environment together, the soul undergoes an elevating process in the course
of which it is converted from its preoccupation with this-worldly 'goods',
and is finally brought to appreciate the values of the supernatural order;
"..sa raison aidée de la lumière de la grâce lui fait 
connaître qu'il n'y a rien de plus aimable que Dieu.."
(p.550; G.E.X, p.425)
More significant for the present purpose however is the tonic effect which
grace is represented as having on man's natural capacity, throwing open a
whole new world consequent on the act of faith, so that the Christian's eye
is illuminated and then turned back on the world with transfigured si^t.
(cont. from p.405) nature, ou ils ne trouvent aucune lumière qui les 
satisfasse, ou ils arrivent à se former un moyen de connaître'Dieu...sans 
médiateur, et par là ils tombent, ou dans l'dfeéisme ou dans le déisme,.."
(p.1281; B.556)
(^rom P.4O5 (1) cf. above, p.319+390.
" " (2) cf. Inge, op.cit., loc.cit,
(1) cf. Nettleship, op.cit., p.l57ff. It is significant that Nettleship 
actually remarks that: "The general principle, then, of the higher education 
is expressed in the term 'conversion'." p.157.
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This function of grace as a sort of tonic acting on man's natural
faculties and thereby opening fresh perspectives to the eye of the believer,
is further emphasized in a rather different context in a letter to Mme.
Périer, in connection with the ability to perceive the spiritual significance,
not of the world of sensible phenomena, but of Scriptural texts;
"«.pour y entendre ce langage secret et étranger à ceux qui 
le sont du ciel, il faut que la même grâce, qui peut seule 
en donner la première intelligence, la continue et la rende 
toujours présente .. car notre mémoire, aussi bien que les 
instructions qu'elle retient, n'est qu'un corps inanimé et 
judaïque sans l'esprit qui les doit vivifier." (p.488-9;
G.E.II, p.379-81)
By insisting in this way on the necessity for the spiritualized insight of 
faith for man to be able to trace the lineaments of the supernatural in the 
world of nature, Pascal is in effect doing little more than reaffirm the 
disparateness of the different orders of being. For the notion that man is 
capable of reaching to a knowledge of God through his own efforts is not only 
foreign to his mind as such, but runs counter to the whole gist of that 
conception. Hence the insistence that awareness of the supernatural can only 
come about in the first instance as the result of a discovery by God of 
himself to man.
Despite the fact therefore that Pascal arranges his various orders 
of being in a hierarchy in accordance with their correlative values, alleging 
elsewhere moreover that the meanest material forms belonging to the corporeal 
order represent the supernatural reality, because even they partake in some
(l) cf. especially the following; "La foi est un don de Dieu. Ne croyez pas que 
nous disions que c'est un don de raisonnement." (p.1222; B.279) "Dieu seul peut 
mettre les vérités divines dans l'âme, et par la manière qu'il lui plaît,"
(De l'esprit géométrique, p.392;G.E.IX, p.271-2) "..il est impossible que Dieu
soit jamais la fin, s'il n'est le principe," (p.1203; B.448)
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measure in the unity which is truly realized only in God, the gulf remains 
unbridged between the different standpoints whence proceed his sometimes 
contradictory estimates of value. Since he stipulates that it is only to 
the true spiritual eye, illuminated by grace, that natural phenomena reveal 
their relation to the supernatural, such an attempt to give back value to 
the natural order does but add a further dimension to the relativity of 
his scale. The mere fact that the visible to the Christian's eye is in 
every part a revelation of the invisible, so that he sees even in the 
things of the natural order a witness to the supernatural, does not break 
down the duality; considered in itself this order still manifests varying 
degrees of positive worth; but when considered in relation to the supernatural 
order all is changed, and it appears as in itself worthless. Thus, just as 
in Pascal's scheme of reality there is no step by step rise from a lower 
order to a higher one through a 'chain of being', so also at the critical 
points in his scale of values differences of degree cease to have any 
relevance when a radical difference of kind is in question®
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Les Pensées et oeuvres choisies. Introduction .. par J. Dedieu,
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- Augustinus. 3 vol., Louvain, Zegeri, 1640.
- Essais. Nouvelle édition conforme au texte de
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La sagesse franchise. Paris, Pion, 1925.
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- Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of Saint Augustine. 
London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1938.
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- L'honnête homme et le croyant selon Pascal. Mqdern 
Philology, vol.53, no.4, 1956, p.217-226.
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